We grant the defendant's motion for rehearing and certification, deny the defendant's motion for rehearing en banc, and substitute the following opinion for the opinion we issued on October 24, 2018.
The labyrinth of restitution is at issue in this appeal. The law on restitution is both challenging in terms of proof, yet essential to ensure justice for the victim. It currently requires proof of the fair market value of property lost or damaged. That proof *373was lacking in this case. We therefore reverse and remand the case for a new restitution hearing.
The defendant pled guilty to dealing in stolen property and false verification of ownership to a pawnbroker. The State nolle prossed the grand theft charge. The plea agreement did not specify a restitution amount, but stated: "Restitution ordered for victim ...; amount to be determined by agreement of parties or at restitution hearing (hearsay & causation objections waived)." The transcript does not reflect any limitation on the amount of restitution.
At the hearing, the State sought restitution not only for the items pawned, but for all items taken. The defendant objected and argued that restitution should be limited to the items pawned as she pled only to the dealing in stolen property and false verification of ownership to a pawnbroker charges. She did not plead to the grand theft charge, which the State nolle prossed. The court overruled the objection and proceeded with the hearing.
The victim testified to the items' value by providing their original price, and guesstimating their replacement value.1 For example, the victim testified that a Samsung flat screen television "roughly" cost "probably around" $ 5000 or $ 6000, that an X-Box 360 cost "right around" $ 100, that some stolen sweatshirts cost "around 70 dollars apiece," that a leather jacket cost "[p]robably around 4- or 500 dollars," and that a bag containing pool sticks was worth "right around" $ 1,200.
The State sought $ 9,984.12, an amount reached by subtracting the value of some recovered items from the total amount, and the victim's guesstimates of replacement value for the remaining items. The defendant not only objected to restitution for the items that had not been pawned, but to the victim's guesstimates, and his qualifications to testify to present value. The court ordered the defendant to pay $ 9,984.12, which included the original price, not the fair market value, of many of the items.
Section 775.089(7), Florida Statutes, provides:
Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense is on the state attorney. The burden of demonstrating the present financial resources and the absence of potential future financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant. The burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems appropriate is upon the party designated by the court as justice requires.
§ 775.089(7), Fla. Stat. (2018).
State v. Hawthorne , 573 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1991) provides the formula for determining fair market value for restitution purposes. Fair market value should be established through direct testimony or evidence of the following four factors: "(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of depreciation." Id . at 332.
There are a few more rules that apply to restitution hearings. One, victims are "qualified" to testify to the value of their property. Id. at 333 n.6. Two, "[h]earsay evidence may not be used to determine the amount of restitution when there is a proper objection by the defense to the *374hearsay evidence." Phillips v. State , 141 So.3d 702, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Conway v. State, 115 So.3d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ). Three, the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. § 775.089(7), Fla. Stat. (2018). And four, trial courts have discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Phillips , 141 So.3d at 707.
Here, the victim testified about the items' purchase price and provided some receipts. This was sufficient to satisfy the first factor, the original cost. But, there was no testimony about the manner in which the items were used, their general condition and quality, and the percentage of depreciation. The victim merely provided replacement cost guesstimates. This testimony was insufficient to establish fair market value.
In Thompson v. State , 68 So.3d 425, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) we reversed a restitution award because it was "based on purchase price without adequately calculating the fair market value of the stolen items."
We find the victim's testimony from personal knowledge regarding the purchase price and purchase date to be competent evidence to substantiate the items' original cost. The record, however, contains no competent evidence of the "general condition and quality of the items" or the percentage of depreciation that would permit the trial court to calculate market value.
Id . (citations omitted).
Contrastingly, in Yaun v. State , 898 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), we affirmed a trial court's restitution award based on the victim's testimony of the items' value. We did so, however, because restitution was part of the plea agreement. Id. The record does not reflect such an agreement here.
Under either Thompson or Yaun , the evidence here was insufficient.
Restitution continues to be a perplexing uphill battle for victims. Recently, Floridians voted to amend our constitution to in part address restitution. Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. (2018) (Constitutional ballot Amendment 6, also known as Marsy's Law). The amendment ensures the victim's right to:
• full restitution and to be provided with assistance collecting restitution;
• have any monies or property collected from any person who has been ordered to make restitution be first applied to the restitution owed to the victim before paying any amounts owed to the government; and
• compensation as provided by the law.
See Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. (2018).
Despite the statute, the rules, the case law, and the constitutional amendment, proving restitution continues to be difficult for victims, and receiving compensation for their loss continues to be elusive. See, e.g., G.M.H. v. State, 18 So.3d 728, 729-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; I.M. v. State, 958 So.2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ; Smith v. State , 941 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ; Ibrahim v. State , 866 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
We have previously suggested a legislative fix by adding the following to section 775.089(7) : "The court is not bound by fair market value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts, but rather may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration of hearsay." See Phillips , 141 So.3d at 706. And yet, the statute remains the same as does the problem--proving restitution.
Because the State failed to prove fair market value here, we reverse the restitution award, and remand the case for *375a new hearing to determine restitution using Hawthorne's formula.2 But, because the issue persists, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance.
Is Hawthorne's formula for determining restitution based on the fair market value of the victim's property still viable after the passage of Amendment 6 (Marsy's Law), or should a trial court no longer be bound by fair market value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts, and instead exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration of hearsay?
Reversed and remanded for a new restitution hearing.
Gerber, C.J., concurs.
Ciklin, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Ciklin, J., concurring specially.
With the fervent hope that the Florida Legislature tackles and addresses Florida's broken statutory restitution scheme, I take the liberty of setting out most of an insightful law review article written by Florida attorney Adam Hapner.
DO YOU KNOW THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY?: A CALL TO THE LEGISLATURE TO REVISE SECTION 775.089, FLORIDA STATUTES, GOVERNING RESTITUTION
* * * *
II. MEASUREMENTS OF PROPERTY LOSS
A. Fair Market Value
In most cases, the appropriate measure of the victim's property loss is the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense.19 "Fair market value" is defined as "[t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction."20 To establish fair market value, the State must present either direct testimony or evidence of all of the following four factors: "(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of depreciation."21
1. Replacement Value
Normally, replacement value is an improper measure of the victim's loss.22 But if a "ready market of identical items" to the property exists,23 or if replacement *376value is the actual loss suffered by the victim,24 replacement value and fair market value may be the same.
2. Retail Value
In general, retail value is also an improper measure of the victim's loss.25 However, if the victim deals in the type of goods lost, stolen, or damaged, retail value-rather than replacement or wholesale value-may represent the true market value of the victim's loss.26
B. "Fair Amount" Value
Fair market value is not the sole standard for determining restitution amounts.27 In State v. Hawthorne , the Supreme Court of Florida held that when fair market value does not adequately reflect the victim's loss, such as with a family heirloom, or when consideration of depreciation would be inequitable, such as with a recently purchased car, the court "may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution."28 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the holding in Hawthorne to mean that "the trial court has discretion to take into account any appropriate factor in arriving at a fair amount [that] will adequately compensate a victim for his or her loss and further the purposes of restitution."29 In other words, if the trial court finds that fair market value is an inappropriate measure of the victim's loss, the appropriate measure is "fair amount" value.30
Not surprisingly, there is no precise definition of "fair amount" value. In recognition that the primary purpose of restitution is to compensate the victim, the measure is intentionally broad so it can encompass instances when the market value of the victim's property does not adequately compensate the victim.31 For example, *377in Hawthorne , after the defendant was found guilty of grand theft auto, the trial court ordered him to pay restitution to the owner of the stolen vehicle "in the amount of $ 1500 for the vehicle and $ 250 for the owner's travel expenses."32 This amount of restitution was based solely on the victim's testimony:
At the restitution hearing, the owner testified that the auto at issue was a 1979 Ford Fairmount; had a book value of $ 1650 in 1985 when it was purchased for $ 1530; was repaired shortly before the theft and was in good operating condition; was stolen 14 months after purchase; and was valued at zero after the theft because it had been completely burned. The owner further testified that she did not know the mileage of the car at the time it was stolen, and that she had incurred expenses of $ 250 in securing alternative transportation.33
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court's award of restitution, holding that the State had failed to establish the fair market value of the stolen vehicle at the time of the theft because the State presented no evidence regarding the percentage of depreciation for the vehicle.34
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the First District Court, holding that the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court was supported by competent, substantial evidence.35 Specifically, the court stated that because the victim testified to the "purchase price of the car, the book value at the time of purchase, the repairs made to the car, and the general condition of the car[,] ... the amount of the restitution order was supported by the evidence."36 Thus, in Hawthorne , although there was no precise measurement of the victim's loss, and the victim did not testify to all of the fair market value factors, based on the evidence presented, the court found that $ 1500 was a "fair amount" to compensate the victim for the car and to further the purposes of restitution.37
III. METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF
Despite the laudable efforts made by the Hawthorne court to limit the inequitable results that can undoubtedly occur when the State is required to establish precise measurements of loss, the requirements currently imposed by Florida law often make it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, for the State to prove the victim's loss.38 Regardless of which measurement of value is used, the methods available to the State for establishing the value of the victim's property in a restitution hearing are limited. Moreover, as discussed below, each approach encounters problems due to the Florida Evidence Code.39
A. Fair Market Value
1. Direct Evidence
If the State seeks to establish fair market value via direct testimony, it can hire *378an expert witness to testify concerning the value of the property. However, hiring an expert witness to testify to fair market value involves considerable time and expense.40 In addition, when property is stolen or lost and the victim has little information regarding the date of purchase, original price, or other details of the property-such as when the victim receives the property as a gift-the expert will have a difficult time establishing his or her competency and reliability to opine as to the property's value, as required by section 90.702, Florida Statutes.41 In such circumstances, the expert must accept the victim's description of the property and speculate that a similar item has a certain value.42 However, Florida courts have found that such speculative expert testimony is insufficient to establish fair market value.43
Another way for the State to establish fair market value via direct evidence is to present the testimony of the victim. As a practical matter, the victim is often the State's best (if not only) witness. In Hawthorne , the court noted that "an owner of property is generally qualified to testify as to the fair market value of his property," whether or not the owner is qualified as an expert.44 This statement presumes that the owner has familiarity with the characteristics of the property, knowledge of its uses and purposes, and experience in dealing with it.45 Yet, that presumption is a "fragile" one.46 If it is not shown that the owner has knowledge of the property's fair market value, Florida courts routinely hold that the victim's mere opinion testimony of the value of his or her property is insufficient to establish the amount of restitution.
*37947 Thus, unless the victim deals in the type of goods lost, stolen, or damaged, the victim is unlikely to be sufficiently qualified to provide the fair market value of his or her property. Of course, the cases in which a burglar takes art from the home of an art appraiser, an arsonist burns down the house of a realtor, or a robber takes a vehicle from a used-car salesperson are undeniably rare.
Even when the victim makes a good-faith effort to learn the fair market value of his or her property prior to testifying, the victim's opinion may still be inadmissible due to the rules of evidence.48 For example, at least one Florida court has noted that sometimes it is "practically impossible for the victim to establish the restitution amount without relying on hearsay evidence."49 In theory, at least at its origination, a victim's personal knowledge of the value of his or her property is usually based on some form of hearsay, such as a receipt,50 an appraisal or estimate,51 or the price in a store catalog or on a store website.52 However, because there is no statutory exception to the general exclusion of hearsay in restitution proceedings,53 Florida courts have unanimously held that if the defense properly objects, hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible to determine the amount of restitution.54
*380Thus, because the owner must provide some predicate for the valuation he or she offers,55 and hearsay evidence is an insufficient basis for the owner's opinion in Florida,56 many victims will not be sufficiently qualified to opine as to their property's value.
The general exclusion of hearsay does not mean that hearsay evidence is never admissible in a restitution hearing, however. Even when the defendant objects, if the hearsay evidence meets an exception to the general exclusion rule and has "some minimal indicia of reliability," the hearsay evidence is likely admissible.57 For example, "[w]ritten opinions or estimates may qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes...."58 But for a written opinion or estimate to meet the business record exception, the production of estimates must be a regularly conducted business activity, and the State must either call a witness to lay the foundational requirements of section 90.803(6) or establish the foundation by certification or declaration.
*38159 Thus, because written opinions and estimates are unlikely to be self-authenticating, as noted above, the State must incur the additional time and expense of producing an additional witness to testify concerning the value of the victim's property, and even then, the witness may not be sufficiently qualified or have enough information to form a reliable basis on which to opine.60 Indeed, Florida courts routinely reverse trial courts' restitution awards because the State's evidence failed to comply with the foundational requirements of section 90.803(6).61
2. Indirect Evidence
To establish fair market value indirectly, the State must present evidence of each of the following four factors: "(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of depreciation."62 However, this approach undoubtedly requires the testimony of the victim, another witness, or both,63 and thus encounters the same evidentiary requirements mentioned above.64 For example, if the victim received the property by gift or inheritance, as is often the case with jewelry, the victim may not be able to testify to the original market cost without speculating or relying on hearsay.65 In such circumstances, *382even if an appraiser is hired, he or she will not be able to opine as to the item's original market cost without knowing the details of the item.66 Furthermore, as in Hawthorne , many victims will have a difficult time providing the percentage of their property's depreciation because such knowledge is typically outside the scope of most laypeople's experience.67 Yet, if the State fails to prove with specificity the percentage of depreciation and the trial court makes a good-faith effort to depreciate the item, the appellate court will reverse the restitution award because it is error for the court to "arbitrarily" depreciate an item.68
B. "Fair Amount" Value
"Fair amount" value is a more relaxed standard for measuring the victim's loss because it allows the court to consider "any appropriate factor" in determining the amount of restitution to award.69 However, even when the trial court uses the "fair amount" standard to determine the victim's loss, the rules of evidence still apply.70 Consequently, the court's consideration of any appropriate factor is limited by what evidence the State can present in accordance with the rules.
Moreover, these cases are rare because, as the court noted in Hawthorne , "in most instances the victim's loss and the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense will be the same."71 Consequently, the State must prove fair market value in the majority of cases.72 Therefore, more often than not, the State is faced with the dilemma of either spending considerable time and expense to prove the value of something that was unjustly taken from the victim or allowing the victim to *383walk away empty-handed for a second time.73
IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S PROPOSAL
Unfortunately, when the State cannot prove the amount of a victim's loss, it causes unjust results that conflict with the purposes of restitution proceedings. For example, in Phillips v. State , the defendant stole several items of jewelry from the victim.74 However, because the victim did not purchase many of the items, she did not have "first-hand knowledge of the [jewelry's] purchase date, original value, or quality."75 As a result, to determine the fair market value of her jewelry, the victim conducted online research, located three or four pieces that were similar, and averaged their prices.76 Following a restitution hearing in which she testified to the average prices of all of her stolen jewelry, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $ 20,511, the total of her averages.77
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida ("Fourth DCA") reversed and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, finding that as the law currently exists, "the victim's reliance on hearsay evidence from websites was insufficient to establish the restitution amount."78 But in doing so, the court acknowledged that establishing the restitution amount without relying on hearsay was "practically impossible" and that reversal "appears to have caused an unjust result for the victim, because she and the state appear to have no other means by which to prove the restitution amount" on remand.79
In addition, the court recognized that other Florida courts recently reversed restitution awards, leaving "wholly innocent person[s] ... with a more difficult, if not impossible, path to recover their stolen items' value."80 Accordingly, the Fourth DCA recommended that the Florida Legislature revisit section 775.089 and "consider providing trial courts with wider discretion in setting the restitution amount."81 Specifically, the court recommended adding the following language to section 775.089(7) : "The court is not bound by fair market value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts, but rather may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration of hearsay."82
When broken down, the Fourth DCA's recommendation has three components. First, it explicitly states that the court is not required to use fair market value to measure the victim's loss.83 Second, it provides the court with discretion necessary "to further the purposes of restitution" in determining restitution amounts.84 Third, it permits the use of hearsay evidence in *384restitution proceedings.85
A. Advantages
From a public policy standpoint, there are significant advantages and only minor disadvantages to adopting the Fourth DCA's more relaxed framework to measuring and proving the amount of the victim's loss in a restitution hearing. One advantage is that it would alleviate onerous requirements of proof in restitution hearings. Importantly, restitution is a post-adjudication sentencing proceeding.86 Therefore, the defendant's guilt has already been stipulated to or determined beyond a reasonable doubt. In adopting section 775.089, it is unlikely that the Florida Legislature intended to turn sentencing proceedings into "complicated, prolonged trials of the normal civil variety."87 Instead, restitution proceedings should be "expedient and reasonable, with uncertainties resolved with a view toward achieving fairness to the victim."88 By giving the trial court broader discretion in determining restitution amounts, and by allowing hearsay evidence to prove the amount of loss sustained by the victim, the Fourth DCA's proposal will save the State, the courts, and the victim considerable time and expense at sentencing.
Furthermore, while victims of crime may still pursue a damages award in a separate, civil lawsuit,89 the Florida Legislature specifically adopted the restitution statute for the benefit of crime victims.90 Restitution is "intended to provide an additional alternative to reimburse a crime victim, over and above traditional remedies like a civil lawsuit."91 However, holding the State to the same requirements of those in a full-fledged civil lawsuit undermines the primary purpose of restitution because it makes it less likely that the *385victim will be compensated for their loss.92 As one Florida judge explained, "the goal of the criminal justice system should be to strive to allow full compensation to victims-not to make them victims twice."93 Thus, adopting the Fourth DCA's recommendation would not only save considerable time and money, it would also limit unjust results by better serving the primary purpose of the restitution statute.94
Adopting the Fourth DCA's suggestion would also give the trial court the discretion it needs to establish a restitution amount that adequately instills upon the defendant the consequences of his or her actions.95 Mandatory restitution is an important aspect of sentencing defendants, in part, because it "impress[es] upon offenders that their conduct produces concrete and devastating harms for real, identifiable victims."96 Moreover, the secondary purpose of restitution is "to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal justice system."97 The Supreme Court of Florida previously recognized that "[t]he trial court is best able to determine how imposing restitution may best serve those goals in each case."98
However, the current state of the law severely limits the trial court's ability to determine an appropriate restitution amount at sentencing. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(b) provides that "[t]he court shall entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence."99 To the extent that restitution is an important aspect of sentencing,100 hearsay evidence is often relevant to the defendant's sentence because, as mentioned above, it is helpful, and *386sometimes necessary, to determine the amount of loss sustained by the victim as a result of the defendant's criminal offense.101 Section 775.089 in fact requires the court to consider the amount of the victim's loss in determining whether to order any restitution at all.102 Nonetheless, although hearsay evidence is admissible in other sentencing proceedings in Florida, such as probation revocation hearings103 and capital sentencing proceedings,104 hearsay is still inadmissible in restitution hearings.105 As a result, when the State cannot prove the amount of the victim's loss without relying on hearsay, the court cannot order the defendant to pay restitution, and the defendant may not appreciate the full effect of his illegal acts.
Relatedly, once the court has determined that monetary restitution is appropriate in an individual case, it should have broad discretion in fashioning a restitution order.106 In Hawthorne , the court held that the trial court is not tied to fair market value as the sole standard for measuring the victim's loss, but rather, it "may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution."107 However, the court limited its holding to instances when fair market value is an inappropriate measure of the victim's loss.108 Therefore, in most instances, the trial court must use fair market value to determine the amount of the victim's loss, which means that the State must present a witness with personal knowledge of the fair market value of the victim's loss, or the State must present evidence of all four fair market value factors.109
While the holding in Hawthorne certainly improved the law governing restitution proceedings, it failed to address instances when fair market value may adequately reflect the victim's loss, but the State is unable to meet the demanding criteria to prove fair market value. In such circumstances, the victim is left without recourse, and the defendant receives a windfall for his actions. Rather than give the court broad discretion in rare instances when fair market value is inappropriate to measure the victim's loss, the court should have discretion to take into account any appropriate factor in all instances.110 The Fourth *387DCA's recommendation simply adopts the approach taken in Hawthorne , but permits it in all circumstances. This is a reasonable approach considering the fact that case law subsequent to Hawthorne suggests that the defendant can easily defeat the State's presentation of evidence concerning fair market value by objecting to hearsay or speculation, or by noting that not all of the factors pertaining to fair market value have been proved by competent, substantial evidence.111
B. Disadvantages
A disadvantage of the Fourth DCA's recommendation is that it failed to provide an alternative measure of the victim's loss. Although the Fourth DCA reiterated the holding in Hawthorne that the trial court is not tied to "fair market value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts,"112 it did not say what standard the court should use when fair market value is not used. Nevertheless, case law subsequent to Hawthorne established that "fair amount" value is the appropriate, alternative measure to fair market value.113 As with replacement value and retail value, "fair amount" value may ultimately be the same as fair market value.114 Yet, the method of proof of "fair amount" value is much more conducive to accomplishing the purposes of restitution because it is intentionally broad and allows the court to consider any appropriate factor in determining the amount of restitution to award.115 Thus, the fact that the Fourth DCA did not provide an alternative measure of value should not prevent adoption of the Fourth DCA's proposal; "fair amount" value is implicitly the measure of value under the Fourth DCA's proposal.
A related disadvantage of the Fourth DCA's proposal is that without a definite standard to guide the court's determination *388of the victim's loss, the trial court may appear to have too much discretion, which may result in a windfall for the victim. However, at least in theft cases, it is highly unlikely that a trial court's restitution award would exceed any possible judgment in a civil action because, in a civil action, the victim may claim treble damages and attorneys' fees in addition to the property loss.116 Moreover, safeguards in the law already protect against trial courts abusing their discretion. For example, even when the court uses "fair amount" value to determine the victim's loss, the trial court's restitution order must still be supported by competent, substantial evidence.117 In addition, the trial court may only award restitution in an amount causally connected to the defendant's crime.118 Thus, even with more discretion, courts would not be able to award restitution in an arbitrary amount that favors the victim at the expense of the defendant's right to due process.119
Moreover, while the purpose of restitution is not to create a windfall for the victim,120 it is certainly not to create one for the defendant either. In other contexts, Florida laws are much more forgiving where one party is the cause of a lack of evidence favorable to the other party. For example, section 90.804, Florida Statutes, provides that hearsay evidence is admissible if the opposing party "wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result."121 Case law provides that criminal charges must be dismissed if the prosecution destroys exculpatory evidence in bad faith.122 There are even independent causes of action, both civil and criminal, for intentionally destroying evidence that hinders the opposing party's ability to prove its case.123 The principle that supports all of these laws is that the party responsible for the intentional destruction of evidence should not benefit from its bad-faith actions, and the party relying on the evidence should not be penalized for the bad-faith acts of another. Similarly, in the context of restitution proceedings, the State has proven or the defendant concedes that he has wrongfully caused loss or damage to property *389that could otherwise be used to determine its value. Thus, in light of the aforementioned principle, the law should be less concerned with providing windfalls to victims, and more tolerant of victims' inability to testify to the amount of restitution when their inability is due largely to no fault of their own. The Fourth DCA's suggestion simply acknowledges this principle by alleviating strict requirements of proof in a restitution hearing.
Another potential disadvantage of the Fourth DCA's suggestion concerns the admission of hearsay. When hearsay is permissible as the only evidence offered to support the trial court's award of restitution, the result may be questionable. For example, whether due to poor memory, improper incentive, or other reasons, victims may exaggerate the true value of their property.124 The reliability of evidence is in fact the core concern underlying the general exclusion of hearsay evidence.125
Concern for the reliability of hearsay evidence should not prevent adoption of the Fourth DCA's proposal, however, because Florida courts already require that for hearsay to be admissible, it must contain "some minimal indicia of reliability."126 In addition, not all hearsay is a verbal assertion by the witness. In many instances, the State offers documentary evidence of value, which is generally considered more reliable than oral hearsay,127 and is verifiable by the defendant and the court, but the evidence is nevertheless turned away due to the general exclusion of hearsay in restitution proceedings.128 In such circumstances, if the trial court finds the documentary evidence to be sufficiently reliable, it is unclear why the victim or the State is nonetheless required to incur the expense and inconvenience of presenting an additional witness to recount what is already stated in the document.
A related disadvantage of allowing hearsay, including documentary hearsay, is that the defendant may not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on matters such as the declarant's qualifications and his or her methods or factors used to value the property.129 However, *390this concern should also not prevent adoption of the Fourth DCA's proposal for at least two reasons. First, at least one Florida court has previously concluded that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause "does not apply in restitution hearings because restitution proceedings are an aspect of sentencing."130 Therefore, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to confront witnesses against him in a restitution hearing.131
Second, the trial court's ability to discern truth from falsity and to assign weight to evidence in a restitution hearing should not be underestimated or substituted. For the same reason appellate courts defer to the trial court's determinations of facts in general, the trial court's decisions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give to evidence in restitution proceedings should not be second-guessed on appeal.132 While sitting as trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the victim's testimony or other evidence offered by the State.133 Moreover, even when hearsay is admissible in a restitution proceeding, the defendant may cross-examine any witness that does testify and may introduce contrary evidence-including reliable hearsay evidence-in his or her defense.134 Thus, with these considerations in mind, the admissibility of hearsay in a restitution proceeding should not prevent the adoption of the Fourth DCA's recommendation.
* * * *
CONCLUSION
Due to the unjust results that can occur when the court has limited discretion and when the State must meet onerous requirements to prove the amount of loss sustained by the victim of a crime, the Florida Legislature should revise *391section 775.089 to better conform to the purposes of restitution proceedings, which are both compensatory and punitive. Recognizing that many victims cannot testify to the fair market value of their property, the Fourth DCA recommended providing the trial court with broader discretion to further the purposes of restitution. In addition, the Fourth DCA's proposal does not require the court to use fair market value in determining the amount of the victim's loss and expressly permits the admission of hearsay evidence in restitution proceedings. As such, the Fourth DCA's proposal offers a great starting point in revising section 775.089 because it relaxes both the measurement of value and the method of proof in restitution proceedings. However, the Fourth DCA's proposal does not explicitly address important concerns, such as the appropriate measure of value, the lack of reliability of hearsay evidence, and the defendant's right to due process. Thus, in light of the concerns mentioned above, the Florida Legislature should adopt the Fourth DCA's proposal, but with the following three caveats that incorporate aspects of the federal standard.141
First, because the Fourth DCA's proposal does not provide an alternative measure to fair market value, the statute should explain that the court may use "fair amount" value to determine the amount of the victim's loss in all circumstances.142 Second, although some Florida courts already provide that hearsay must contain "some minimal indicia of reliability" to be admissible in a restitution hearing, it would be wise to include this language explicitly in the statute as well.143 Third, because the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing, the Legislature should consider providing the defendant with an opportunity to rebut or refute any hearsay evidence that is offered by the State, as is already done in Florida capital sentencing proceedings.144
In accordance with the Fourth DCA's recommendation, and the caveats mentioned above, section 775.089(7) should ultimately read as follows, with the suggested changes in italics:
Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. In determining restitution amounts, the court may exercise discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution. The court may consider any appropriate factor in awarding a fair amount that adequately compensates the victim. The burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense is on the state attorney. The burden of demonstrating the present financial resources *392and the absence of potential future financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant. The burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems appropriate is upon the party designated by the court as justice requires. Hearsay evidence is admissible in restitution proceedings if the hearsay evidence is found by the court to have a minimal indicia of reliability. The defendant may refute hearsay evidence offered by the state attorney.
In addition, because the above proposal permits the court to use discretion "to further the purposes of restitution," but the purposes of restitution do not appear anywhere in section 775.089, the Florida Legislature should explicitly include the purposes of restitution at the forefront of the statute. With the implementation of these suggested changes, the purposes of section 775.089 are more likely to be accomplished, which means that defendants who cause loss to innocent victims are less likely to receive a windfall for their criminal actions and that victims of crime are more likely to be compensated for their losses.