Appellant was charged as a principal for trafficking in methamphetamine under sections 777.011 and 893.135, Florida Statutes. To sustain his conviction as a principal, the State was required to establish that Appellant "intend[ed] that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime." Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis added); Evans v. State, 643 So.2d 1204, 1205-06 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("To secure a conviction on an aider and abettor theory, the state must establish (1) that the defendant helped the person *131who actually committed the crime by doing or saying something that caused, encouraged, incited or otherwise assisted that person to commit the crime ; and (2) that the defendant intended to participate in the crime.") (emphasis added) ). We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, including construing all inferences in favor of the State. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1974).
There was legally sufficient evidence to submit to the jury that Appellant "intended to participate in the crime," Evans , 643 So.2d at 1206, including Appellant's post-arrest admission that he and the other suspects should not have completed the drug transaction. But there was not sufficient evidence that Appellant did some act to assist in the commission of the crime. Theophile v. State , 78 So.3d 574, 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Thus, under our de novo review of the trial court's ruling denying Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 2001) (en banc), we reverse Appellant's conviction as a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes. Based on our decision, we need not address the other issues raised by Appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to discharge Appellant.
Lewis and Makar, JJ., concur.