The plaintiff, Lindsay Owens, appeals a final order dismissing her legal malpractice complaint on the ground that the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate the dispute. We reverse, finding that the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement was unenforceable for violating the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.1
The plaintiff filed a three-count legal malpractice action against the defendants, Katherine Corrigan, Esq., and the law firm KLC Law, P.A., alleging that the defendants negligently represented her in a dependency case, causing her to lose custody of her children.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the plaintiff had signed a retainer agreement requiring her to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. The retainer agreement included the following arbitration clause:
Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to our fees, charges, performance of legal services, obligations reflected in this letter, or other aspects of our representation shall be resolved through binding arbitration in Broward County, Florida, in accordance with the Fee Arbitration Rule (Chapter 14) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, and judgment on the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. [YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATION YOU ARE RELINQUISHING YOUR RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION IN COURT AND TO A JURY TRIAL.]
The plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. First, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was "vague and ambiguous" because the phrase "performance of legal services" was included within a reference to fees and charges, and because the arbitration clause stated that arbitration would be in accordance with the Fee Arbitration Rule. Second, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because the *749retainer agreement did not comply with the Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i), which prohibits lawyers from making an agreement with a client for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes without advising the client in writing that the client should consider obtaining independent legal advice.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's trial counsel seemed to concede (albeit incorrectly) that the fee arbitration program established in Chapter 14 of the Florida Bar Rules allowed arbitration of legal malpractice claims.2 Relying on the plaintiff's counsel's concession, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and reasoned: "If Chapter 14 strictly said, you know, we only arbitrate fee disputes, then I think [the plaintiff] would be right. But Chapter 14 does not just arbitrate fees, it arbitrates all grievances."
The trial court later entered a final order of dismissal, finding that the parties "entered into an agreement to arbitrate that was not waived."
The plaintiff moved for rehearing, pointing out for the first time that jurisdiction to arbitrate under Chapter 14 was limited to disputes over the entitlement to or amount of legal fees. Thus, the plaintiff argued that her only available forum was the Florida judicial system, and that a denial of access to that forum would be a denial of due process.
The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for rehearing. This appeal ensued.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that: (1) the trial court's order violated her right to due process by denying her a proper forum for redress of grievances; (2) the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it violated Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) by omitting the cautionary notice required under that rule; and (3) the arbitration provision was ambiguous as to whether it required arbitration of a legal malpractice claim.
We address the plaintiff's second argument, which we find to be dispositive.
Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to a trial court's conclusions regarding the construction and validity of an arbitration agreement is de novo. United HealthCare of Fla., Inc. v. Brown , 984 So.2d 583, 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Requirements for Mandatory Arbitration
In deciding whether arbitration of a dispute is required, there are three elements for a court to consider: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp. , 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999).
Whether the Arbitration Clause is Unenforceable for Violating the Florida Bar Rules?
The plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision is invalid because it violated Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i).3 We agree.
*750Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) prohibits lawyers from making an agreement with a client prospectively providing for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes without advising the client in writing that the client should consider obtaining independent legal advice:
(i) Arbitration Clauses. A lawyer shall not make an agreement with a potential client prospectively providing for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes without first advising that person in writing that the potential client should consider obtaining independent legal advice as to the advisability of entering into an agreement containing such mandatory arbitration provisions. A lawyer shall not make an agreement containing such mandatory arbitration provisions unless the agreement contains the following language in bold print:
NOTICE: This agreement contains provisions requiring arbitration of fee disputes. Before you sign this agreement you should consider consulting with another lawyer about the advisability of making an agreement with mandatory arbitration requirements. Arbitration proceedings are ways to resolve disputes without use of the court system. By entering into agreements that require arbitration as the way to resolve fee disputes, you give up (waive) your right to go to court to resolve those disputes by a judge or jury. These are important rights that should not be given up without careful consideration.
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(i).
Arbitration clauses in retainer agreements governed by Florida law "must comply with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar." Mintz & Fraade, P.C. v. Beta Drywall Acquisition, LLC, 59 So.3d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). If a mandatory arbitration provision in a fee agreement "does not conform with Rule 4-1.5(i), the provision may be unenforceable on its face." Feldman v. Davis , 53 So.3d 1132, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
Here, the retainer agreement violated Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) because the agreement prospectively provided for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes without giving the plaintiff the required written notice that she "should consider obtaining independent legal advice as to the advisability of entering into an agreement containing such mandatory arbitration provisions." Thus, because the arbitration clause does not comply with Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i), we hold that it is unenforceable on its face.
We disagree with the defendants' argument that Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) is inapplicable because this case does not involve a fee dispute. Even though the arbitration clause could be read as requiring arbitration of matters in addition to fee disputes,4 this does not alter the *751fact that the arbitration clause clearly violated the rule by prospectively providing for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes without giving the required warning language. This is enough to invalidate the arbitration clause in its entirety.
Indeed, because the retainer agreement did not contain the required warning under Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i), the plaintiff was never placed on notice that she should consider consulting with another lawyer before signing an agreement with mandatory arbitration requirements. And, had the plaintiff consulted independent legal counsel, she presumably would have been advised that signing the agreement could result in her giving up the right to litigate a malpractice claim, which is far more serious than giving up the right to litigate a fee dispute.
We also decline to sever the portion of the arbitration clause that provides for mandatory arbitration of fee disputes. The portion of the arbitration clause requiring arbitration of fee disputes was inextricably intertwined with the portion requiring arbitration of disputes concerning the performance of legal services. Stated another way, an attorney's entitlement to recover fees depends in large part upon the competence of the attorney's performance. See , e.g. , Fla. Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe , 472 So.2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985). Thus, because the mandatory arbitration of fee disputes went to the essence of the arbitration agreement, we decline to sever the invalid portion of the arbitration clause, which would require us to rewrite the agreement. See Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc. , 86 So.3d 456, 459 (Fla. 2011) (refusing to sever the invalid portion of an arbitration agreement because it went to the "very essence of the agreement").
In short, the contract here at issue is different than the garden variety commercial contract. Lawyers owe ethical obligations and duties to their clients that exceed what the common law requires of arm's length contracting parties. We therefore hold that the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement was unenforceable on its face for violating Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i). Because the arbitration clause was unenforceable, we reverse the order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and Remanded.
Gross, J., concurs.
Kuntz, J., dissents with opinion.