*1283Jose A. Gonzalez was 16 years, 10 months old when he committed first degree murder by stabbing a stranger twelve times. Following a jury trial, he was sentenced to life pursuant to the sentencing scheme later invalidated in the wake of Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Gonzalez' sentence was thus vacated, and the cause remanded for resentencing. Gonzalez v. State , 177 So.3d 1266 (Fla. 2015). Following an evidentiary hearing, he again was sentenced to life with the opportunity for early release with a review hearing to be held in accordance with sections 775.082(1)(b)1. and 921.1402(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2016). Gonzalez now challenges that sentence.
We reject Gonzalez' argument that a jury, rather than a circuit judge, must pass on the factors set forth in section 921.1401(2). See Copeland v. State , 240 So.3d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ; Beckman v. State , 230 So.3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). As for the decision of the trial court to impose a life sentence, we find no error in the conclusion that the case at bar presents the "uncommon circumstance" where life imprisonment constitutes an appropriate sentence for a homicide offense committed by a juvenile. Copeland , 240 So.3d at 59. Prior to resentencing, the trial court received evidence and substantial argument regarding the sentencing considerations set forth in section 921.1401(2)(a)-(j). The trial court issued a detailed sentencing order analyzing the statutory factors. No error has been shown.
Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.