Appellant seeks review of a final administrative order awarding compensatory damages to Appellee on the ground that blasting activities at Appellant's quarry caused damage to the shore of Appellee's lake. Appellant asserts that the order should be reversed because (1) Appellee's petition for damages was time-barred under section 552.40(1), Florida Statutes (2015) ; and (2) Appellee failed to prove that Appellant's blasting activities damaged Appellee's lake. We disagree and affirm.
I.
The administrative law judge's final order outlined the relevant facts of this case, many of which are undisputed and are recounted here. Specifically, Appellee is a condominium association that oversees a mobile home community consisting of 220 mobile homes and two vacant lots. Appellee holds title to a number of common elements, including a man-made lake-the South Lake-that was excavated sometime before 1975 when Appellee was organized.
In 2005, Appellant began blasting at three mines near the South Lake, the closest being located approximately 7000 feet from Appellee's property. This blasting continued without significant interruption from that time. Appellant performed twenty-five blasts between July 1, 2015, and October 17, 2016. Based on this figure, the administrative law judge drew the reasonable inference that the number of historical blasts affecting Appellee's property was in the range of 200 to 250.
In 2011, about five or six years after Appellee began its blasting activities, the shore of the South Lake began to destabilize, and saturated soil at the edge of the lake began to slough and slump into the water. This opened up fissures in the slope, which undermined the upward bank. In time, holes appeared in the bank, and pieces of the once level surface fell off, resulting in a narrowing of the horizontal area from roughly five feet to about a foot and a half. Residents observed the ground falling into the water in close temporal proximity to the blasting.
In late 2014 or early 2015, Appellee retained James McNew, the president and owner of a consulting business called Upper *1290Keys Consulting, to give recommendations concerning restoration of the lake bank. On July 18, 2015, Upper Keys Consulting prepared a proposal in the amount of $840,000.00 for restoring the shore of the South Lake and installing preventive devices to protect the shoreline against erosion from further blasting.
On February 22, 2016, Appellee filed a petition pursuant to the Florida Construction Materials Mining Activities Administrative Recovery Act, alleging that Appellant had caused damage to the South Lake through the use of explosives in connection with construction materials mining. Appellee subsequently moved to amend the petition to allege that it was seeking damages pursuant to the proposal from Upper Keys Consulting dated July 18, 2015. Appellant opposed the motion on the ground that the alleged damages were based on an estimate prepared more than 180 days before the filing of the original petition, rendering the petition untimely under section 552.40(1), which required the petition to be filed within 180 days "after the occurrence of the alleged damage." The administrative law judge granted the motion to amend without prejudice to Appellant's right to present evidence at the final hearing that the amended petition was untimely.
At the final hearing, the administrative law judge addressed Appellant's motion to exclude Appellee's proposed expert, James McNew, on the ground that he was not competent to testify because he had no training or significant education in seismology, geotechnical engineering, or geology, other than one class taken in college in the early 1970s. The administrative law judge preliminarily denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue when McNew was called as a witness.
Over Appellant's renewed objection, McNew was allowed to testify as an expert on causation. During direct examination, McNew stated that he consulted extensively with his colleague, Jack Altoff; that they produced a set of notes based on their conversations and extensive research of the literature; and that these conversations formed the basis of his opinion as to the causes of the slope stability failures around the lake. The administrative law judge allowed McNew to testify despite Appellant's objection that McNew "admitted that some of his opinion was going to be based on what another engineer told him."
McNew opined that vibrations from Appellant's blasting caused the problems at Appellee's lake. Specifically, he explained that these vibrations acted upon the soft layer of silt atop the shore and bank of the South Lake, causing the liquefaction of this saturated soil extending up to eight feet beneath the surface. This led to the compaction of the loose, wet soil around the edges of the lake, opening up cracks and holes and weakening the slope, which began to erode and fail. McNew conceded that there were no legal standards in Florida or elsewhere establishing thresholds above which lakeshore slope instability would be expected under the stress of blast-related vibrations. In formulating his opinion, McNew stated that he used Transit Authority Guidelines rather than mining guidelines because the transit guidelines provided a more realistic standard where the damages were not to buildings. McNew also ruled out other possible causes such as earthquakes or heavy truck hauling near the lake.
During Appellant's case, Appellant presented expert testimony from two Florida-licensed professional engineers, Steven Black and Eric Stern, who opined that erosion of the lakeshore was caused by the action of wind, waves, and rainwater percolating down and through the ground and pulling the silt from the bank. Both witnesses concluded that Appellant's blasting activities were not close enough to Appellee's *1291property to impart sufficient energy to affect the soil around the South Lake. Black also ruled out heavy truck traffic as a cause, but conceded that heavy truck traffic could affect the silt layer of a lakeshore over a continuous period of time.
Appellant also presented expert testimony from Jeffrey Straw, who opined that soil consolidation would not occur at the "peak particle velocities" or PPV levels likely to have occurred at the lakeshore as a result of Appellant's blasting. Straw disagreed with McNew's opinion that mining guidelines were not applicable in this case.
In his final order, the administrative law judge found James McNew's opinion on causation to be more persuasive than the competing view offered by Appellant's experts. In doing so, he noted that Steven Black's categorical opinion that blasting could not be a cause of the damage to Appellee's lake was undercut by his concession that heavy truck traffic could affect the silt layer of a lakeshore over a continuous period of time. The administrative law judge also found that the circumstantial evidence supported McNew's opinion. Specifically, he noted that "the South Lake had existed for at least 35 years without experiencing the deterioration of the shore and bank that became noticeable within just five or six years after the start of the blasting, and which worsened over time as the blasting has continued." He also noted "the persuasive evidence that visible damage occurs in the wake of individual blasts."
Although the administrative law judge credited Steven Black's testimony to the extent it supported a finding that erosion from wind, wave, and rainwater was a natural cause of some of the bank erosion at the South Lake, he found that Appellant's blasting combined with natural forces and constituted a legal cause of the claimed property damage. He also accepted Jeff Straw's testimony concerning the PPV levels likely to have occurred at the lakeshore as a result of Appellant's blasting, but rejected Straw's opinion that soil consolidation would not occur at those levels, concluding that this testimony was unpersuasive because Straw merely conveyed the opinions of the authors of scientific literature that Straw had read; authoritative literature was supposed to be used on cross-examination, not to bolster Straw's opinion testimony; and Straw's testimony was inconsistent with Black's testimony that ground-borne vibration from heavy trucks could cause soil erosion at the lakeshore.
Finding that blasting was an ultra-hazardous activity for which strict liability was imposed, the administrative law judge concluded that Appellee was not required to prove that Appellant was negligent or that Appellant's blasting was the sole cause of Appellee's damage. He awarded $840,000.00 in damages as requested by Appellee based on the proposal from Upper Keys Consulting dated July 18, 2015, to restore and protect the shoreline against erosion from further basting. He rejected Appellant's claim that Appellee's petition was untimely, explaining that "as a matter of fact, the property damage at issue is present and continuing; the harm to the lakeshore is cumulative, indivisible, and inseparable." This appeal followed.
II.
In 2003, the Florida Legislature enacted sections 552.32 - 552.44, Florida Statutes, collectively entitled the Florida Construction Materials Mining Activities Administrative Recovery Act. Ch. 2003-62, Laws of Fla. Section 552.36(1), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that "[t]he Division of Administrative Hearings has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims for damages to real or personal property caused by the use of explosives in connection with construction *1292materials mining activities." In addition, section 552.40(1), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that "[a] person may initiate an administrative proceeding to recover damages resulting from the use of explosives in connection with construction materials mining activities by filing a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings ... within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged damage." Section 552.40(7) further provides that "[i]f the administrative law judge finds that the preponderance of the evidence presented demonstrates that the petitioner's damages were caused by the respondent's use of explosives, the administrative law judge shall set forth in a final order precise findings as to the damages attributable to the respondent and shall direct the respondent to pay damages in an amount supported by the preponderance of the evidence presented within 30 days after the final order is issued, unless the matter is appealed in accordance with s. 552.42."
A.
Initially, Appellant claims that the administrative law judge erred in awarding damages to Appellee pursuant to section 552.40 because Appellee's petition was not filed "within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged damage." Specifically, Appellant notes that Appellee filed its petition on February 22, 2016, seeking damages of $840,000.00 based on the written proposal dated July 18, 2015. However, the administrative law judge rejected Appellant's claim that the petition was time-barred concluding that "the property damage at issue is present and continuing; the harm to the lakeshore is cumulative, indivisible, and inseparable." In a continuing tort action, the statute of limitations runs from the time of the last tortious act. Millender v. State, Dep't of Transp. , 774 So.2d 767, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Although no Florida case law has addressed this precise issue, other jurisdictions have recognized that repeated blasting activities can constitute the continuing tort of trespass. See Haynie v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 137 F.Supp.2d 1292, 1294 n.5 (S.D. Ala. 2000) ; Oswald v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 968 F.Supp. 639, 645-46 (M.D. Ala. 1997) ; Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc. , 435 So.2d 218, 220-21 (Ala. 1983) ; Donaldson v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc. , No. 1892 WDA 2014, 2015 WL 3938721 (Pa. Super. Ct June 9, 2015). The administrative law judge found that Appellant performed twenty-five blasts between July 1, 2015, and October 17, 2016, and drew the reasonable inference that the number of historical blasts affecting Appellee's property was in the range of 200 to 250. Furthermore, Appellant sought damages to repair and restore the lakeshore and to abate future erosion of the lakeshore. These constitute temporary damages, which are properly recovered in a continuing tort action for trespass. See Town of Miami Springs v. Lawrence , 102 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla. 1958) ; Baker v. Hickman , 969 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; Carlton v. Germany Hammock Groves , 803 So.2d 852, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ; Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs , 473 So.2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ; see also Bisque Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. Towers of Quayside No. 2 Condo. Ass'n, Inc. , 639 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (distinguishing between permanent damages, which are measured by diminution in the value of property, and temporary damages, which are measured by the cost of repairing or restoring the property to its original condition). Based on the above, we conclude that Appellee alleged a continuing tort such that each blast performed by Appellant gave rise to a new cause of action for which successive actions for damages might be brought.
Even if Appellee alleged a continuing tort, Appellant argues that Appellee can only recover damages from blasting activities *1293that occurred less than 180 days before the filing of Appellee's petition. Because Appellee sought damages based on a written proposal dated July 18, 2015, Appellant asserts that Appellee sought damages for blasting activities occurring more than 180 days before the filing of Appellee's petition, which were timed barred by section 552.40(1). However, the administrative law judge awarded $840,000.00 based on the written proposal "for restoring the shore of the South Lake and installing preventative devices to protect the shoreline against erosion from future blasting." The one-page proposal does not break down the cost of restoring the lake to its original condition-which could be time-barred-and the cost of installing preventive devices to protect the shoreline against erosion from future blasting-which would not be time-barred. Testimony at the final hearing did not break down these costs in further detail.
Furthermore, Appellant has not established that damages for restoration of the lake are entirely untimely. James McNew testified at the final hearing that his proposal was current as of the date of the final hearing; Appellee presented testimony that the lakeshore continued to deteriorate after Appellant's blasting activities in 2016, which fell within the 180-day limitations period; and the administrative law judge found that "[t]he stability of the slope has continued to worsen, and, as of the final hearing, the deterioration of the lakeshore, like the blasting, was ongoing." To the extent that a portion of the damage award might be time-barred, Appellant has failed to meet its burden of showing what portion of the award was barred by the statute of limitations. See Town of Miami Springs , 102 So.2d at 146 (holding that the burden is on the pleader to prove the defense of the statute of limitations); State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Fleet Credit Corp. , 691 So.2d 512, 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ("Fleet's failure to controvert this evidence precludes its argument that the statute of limitations bars the instant action, as Fleet must carry the burden of proving a statute of limitations defense."); see also Hanano v. Petrou , 683 So.2d 637, 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
B.
Assuming that Appellee's petition was not untimely, Appellant claims that Appellee failed to prove that Appellant's blasting activities damaged Appellee's lake. In doing so, Appellant claims that James McNew should not have been accepted as an expert under the standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which was adopted when section 90.702, Florida Statutes, was amended in 2013. Ch. 2013-107, § 1, Laws of Fla. Although the Florida Supreme Court declined to adopt this amendment to the extent it was procedural in In re Amendments to Florida Evidence Code , 210 So.3d 1231 (Fla. 2017), the amendment would still apply in administrative proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, which are not governed by rules of procedure promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. See § 120.54(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing that the uniform rules adopted by the Administration Commission shall be the rules of procedure for each agency subject to Chapter 120). However, even though the Daubert standard would apply, Appellant's claim is not preserved for appeal because Appellant never raised a Daubert objection or requested a Daubert hearing below. See Rojas v. Rodriguez , 185 So.3d 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ; Booker v. Sumter Cty. Sheriff's Office/N. Am. Risk Servs. , 166 So.3d 189, 192-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Accordingly, we cannot address Appellant's legal challenge to McNew's opinion to the extent Appellant alleges a flawed scientific foundation or methodology.
*1294In its motion to exclude McNew's testimony, Appellant simply claimed that although McNew had a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering in 1972, he was neither trained nor experienced in the fields of seismology, geotechnical engineering, or geology, which was necessary for the witness to express an opinion on the causal relationship between Appellant's blasting activities and Appellee's alleged damages. Appellant repeated this claim during the final hearing without further elaboration. The administrative law judge denied Appellant's motion and addressed the issue in his final order as follows:
Although Mr. McNew is not licensed as a professional engineer, he holds a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, awarded in 1972, and during the course of a 50-plus-year career has been involved as a consultant or project manager on a number of marine projects, including the construction of 27 bridges in South Florida, all of which had earthwork abutments and adjoining bodies of water. Some of the projects Mr. McNew supervised involved drilling and blasting operations. As a result, Mr. McNew has acquired specialized knowledge relating to the use of explosives in and around saturated and submerged soils from long practical experience, which in addition to his formal education and training qualified him to testify as an expert on causation in this case.
Based on these findings-which are supported by competent substantial evidence-the administrative law judge did not abuse his discretion in finding McNew qualified to testify as an expert on causation in this case. See Chavez v. State , 12 So.3d 199, 205 (Fla. 2009) ("A witness may be qualified as an expert through specialized knowledge, training, or education, which is not limited to academic, scientific, or technical knowledge. An expert witness may acquire this specialized knowledge through an occupation or business or frequent interaction with the subject matter."); Brooks v. State , 762 So.2d 879, 892 (Fla. 2000) ("It is within the trial court's discretion to determine a witness's qualifications to express an opinion as an expert, and the trial court's determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.").
Appellant also objected below to McNew's testimony on the ground that McNew "admitted that some of his opinion is going to be based on what another engineer told him." Specifically, McNew testified that he consulted extensively with his colleague, Jack Altoff; that they produced a set of notes based on their conversations and extensive research of the literature; and that these conversations formed the basis of his opinion of the causes of the slope stability failures around the lake. In Linn v. Fossum , 894 So.2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), this court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert opinion testimony of a urologist, who testified that she consulted with other urologists in formulating her opinion, noting that "[i]t is proper for an expert witness to consult with other experts in the same field in formulating an opinion." Id. at 977. Although the Florida Supreme Court quashed this decision, it did so on the narrower ground that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify on direct examination that she consulted with colleagues, approving the Fourth District's decision in Schwarz v. State , 695 So.2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Linn v. Fossum , 946 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2006). In Schwartz , the Fourth District held that "while there was nothing improper about Dr. Burton consulting with other experts in his field , he should not have been allowed to testify that he did so on direct examination." 695 So.2d at 455 (emphasis added). Accordingly, while it may have been potentially improper for McNew to testify on direct examination that he consulted with a colleague *1295in arriving at his opinion, McNew's consultation with a colleague was not a basis for excluding McNew's testimony in its entirety. See Schoenwetter v. State , 931 So.2d 857, 870-71 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a medical examiner-who did not perform the subject autopsies-to testify about the cause and manner of death based, in part, on discussions with the medical examiner who did conduct the autopsies); Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Stone ex rel. Stone , 92 So.3d 264, 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ; G.V. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 795 So.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
Even if the administrative law judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting McNew's testimony, Appellant asserts that the administrative law judge should not have relied on it because McNew did not specifically state his opinion within a reasonable degree of scientific probability or certainty. However, when asked for his final opinion, McNew testified-without equivocation-that Appellant's "blasting and the vibrations created from the blasting caused this problem[,]" rendering the testimony competent evidence that the administrative law judge could consider on the issue of causation. See Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply, Inc. , 647 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ; see also Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. A.N., Sr. , 905 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ("We hold that the substance of the psychologist's testimony when considered in its entirety meets the threshold of 'reasonable probability' ...."); cf. Buenoano v. State , 527 So.2d 194, 197-98 (Fla. 1988) ("Expert medical testimony as to the cause of death need not be stated with reasonable certainty in a homicide prosecution and is competent if the expert can show that, in his opinion, the occurrence could cause death or that the occurrence might have or probably did cause death.").
In addition to McNew's expert testimony, the administrative law judge relied on circumstantial evidence to find a causal connection between Appellant's blasting activities and the damage to Appellee's lake. Causation can be established by both expert testimony and circumstantial evidence. See Gant v. Lucy Ho's Bamboo Garden, Inc. , 460 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) ; see also Brown , 647 So.2d at 1036. Generally, the issue of proximate causation is to be resolved by the trier of fact. Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 642 So.2d 774, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). A finding of causation will be sustained on appeal if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. See State, Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Amora , 944 So.2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). We conclude that competent substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge's finding that Appellant's blasting activities were a contributing cause of the damage to Appellee's lake. The administrative law judge correctly concluded that this was sufficient to subject Appellant to strict liability because blasting is an ultra-hazardous activity.* See Poole v. Lowell Dunn Co. , 573 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that defendant engaged in blasting activities, which the trial court found to be ultra-hazardous and subject to strict liability, was liable for the consequences of his conduct even though some other cause contributed to the same damage).
*1296C.
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously rejected the expert testimony of Jeffrey Straw. The decision to accept or reject expert testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Beach Cmty. Bank v. First Brownsville Co. , 85 So.3d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). However, discretion in rejecting expert testimony cannot be exercised arbitrarily and requires some reasonable basis in the evidence. Id. The administrative law judge did not reject Straw's testimony in its entirety, but only his opinion that soil consolidation would not occur at the PPV levels likely to have occurred at the lakeshore as a result of Appellant's blasting. The administrative law judge found this testimony unpersuasive because Straw merely conveyed the opinions of the authors of scientific literature Straw had read; authoritative literature was supposed to be used on cross-examination, not to bolster Straw's opinion testimony; and Straw's testimony was inconsistent with Black's testimony that ground-borne vibrations from heavy trucks could cause soil erosion at the lakeshore. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the administrative law judge's rejection of this testimony was not arbitrary and had some reasonable basis in the evidence.
III.
Because Appellant failed to establish that any of the administrative law judge's rulings constituted reversible error, we affirm the final administrative order in its entirety.
AFFIRMED .
Wetherell, J., concurs; Makar, J., concurs with opinion.