¶ 1. This matter comes before the Court on Interlocutory Appeal from the Warren County Circuit Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, City of Vicksburg. April Horton-the estate administratrix for decedent Emmanuel Erves-appeals the circuit court's decision, arguing that the court erred in finding that the City is entitled to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). However, because Horton's claims against the City of Vicksburg do not support a private cause of action, we fail to reach the merits of her MTCA-immunity arguments. Finding that Horton cannot establish that the City breached any discernable duty owed to the decedent, we affirm the circuit court's decision.
FACTS
¶ 2. A ninety-eight-year-old home sits at 819 Walnut Street in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Located within the Vicksburg Historic District, this single-family dwelling was converted to a "rooming house" by Malcolm and Rose Carson in early 2000, and then sublet to various tenants throughout the last decade. One of those tenants-Emmanuel Erves-rented a room from the Carsons for several years. On February 24, 2014, Erves tumbled down the home's exterior concrete stairs and died as a result of the injuries he sustained.1
¶ 3. Estate administratrix for Erves April Horton filed a complaint in the Warren County Circuit Court alleging negligence by the Carsons and MM & R Land Investments for their failure to provide a reasonably safe premises, failure to provide adequate security, and failure to warn of a dangerous condition. Horton claimed *506that the condition and configuration of the stairs where Erves fell, along with the absence of a mandatory handrail, violated the city's housing code. She argued that, because of these violations, Erves was unable to regain his balance or break his fall, which ultimately resulted in fatal injuries.
¶ 4. One year later, Horton amended her complaint to include the City of Vicksburg and City Code Inspector Benjie Thomas as defendants in the action. Claiming that Thomas and the City breached their duty to inspect the property adequately, and that the City individually failed to provide reasonable supervision of Thomas in his duties, Horton argued that both parties should have known that the home's exterior steps were not up to code, posing an unreasonable risk of harm to the public.
¶ 5. After a year of discovery and procedural delay,2 the City filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court. Arguing that property-code enforcement is a discretionary function under the International Residential Code (IRC) and the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC),3 the City asserted its immunity under the MTCA as a defense to all of Horton's claims. The City then argued that Horton failed to state a cognizable claim under which she could support her prima facie case for negligence. Claiming that the City did not owe Erves a duty related to his tenancy in a private residence, Vicksburg argued that, without such a duty, no claim for negligence could be maintained.
¶ 6. Following a hearing on the matter, the Warren County Circuit Court found that Horton had failed to prove that the City's inaction breached a duty and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Citing Brantley v. City of Horn Lake , 152 So.3d 1106 (Miss. 2014), the court found that the defendant's enforcement of the property code constituted a discretionary function under the MTCA, precluding Horton from recovering damages from the defendant. The court recognized that the application of MTCA immunity "is a question of law and, therefore, is a proper matter for summary judgment." It then determined that Horton had failed to show that the City was bound to any other ordinance or regulation requiring it to "force a property owner to install a handrail on the exterior steps of a building ... over fifty years old and located within the City's historical district." Ultimately, the trial court determined that the City's enforcement of the code was discretionary as it applied to homes in the historical district, granting the City immunity under the MTCA.
¶ 7. On appeal, Horton argues that the lower court mischaracterized this Court's holding in Brantley and ignored the Court's holding in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams ex rel. Adams , 197 So.3d 406 (Miss. 2016). She claims that the trial court's misguided reliance on this Court's standard resulted in an erroneous conclusion. It is from this claim of error that Horton appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's application of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act as well as of that court's determination of a motion for summary judgment. Doe v. Rankin Cty. Sch. Dist. , 189 So.3d 616, 619 (Miss. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record before the Court shows *507"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c). When presented with such a judgment, the Court considers all the available evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville , 158 So.3d 1106, 1109 (Miss. 2015) (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(e) ). However, that party also must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Id. Furthermore, "we must affirm the grant of summary judgment '[i]f any ground raised and argued below will support the lower court's decision.' " Crider v. DeSoto Cty. Convention and Visitors Bureau , 201 So.3d 1063, 1070 (Miss. 2016) (citing Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward , 687 So.2d 1205, 1214 (Miss. 1996) ).
ANALYSIS
Whether the circuit court erred in granting the City of Vicksburg's Motion for Summary Judgment.
¶ 9. In its order granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that the City's historic-building provision (found in IPMC Section 102.6) provides the City of Vicksburg the authority to enforce the property maintenance code in the historic district at its discretion.4 Initially, the court agreed that the City's choice to adopt the code created a duty to inspect all private property within the city and to enforce the IPMC provisions. However, because the Section 102.6 exemption limits the only ordinance Horton identified as requiring the City's inspection and regulation of buildings located within the historic district, the court then determined that Horton had failed to prove that the City and the inspector breached any ministerial duty owed to Erves as a tenant of the historic home. Finding the duties at issue to be discretionary, the court granted the City's motion.
¶ 10. The circuit court's order cited IPMC Sections 102.6 and 104.1,5 interpreting their language as creating discretion for the execution of the inspector's duties and the City's protection from liability for Erves's injuries. The court referenced Section 104.1 as providing the inspector with discretion in interpreting and applying the provisions of the code. Noting this discretion, the court found that the inspector's actions aligned with Section 102.6, where he judged the "designated historic building" to be safe and in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare.
¶ 11. Horton argues that this ruling erroneously interprets Brantley , fails to apply Adams , and accordingly should be reversed. However, we need not address the applicability of these cases or the MTCA on appeal. While the court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of the City, its analysis of Brantley and its progeny are of no moment. Critical to Horton's appeal is not whether the immunity *508provided for in the MTCA prevents her recovery, but whether the underlying facts of her complaint support a private cause of action against the City and its employees. As discretionary-function immunity was not the only ground considered by the court under the summary-judgment motion, we may consider any contested issues of fact identified as material. Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward , 687 So.2d at 1214. To that end, we will affirm the lower court's entry of summary judgment "[i]f any ground raised and argued below will support the lower court's decision." Id.
¶ 12. Throughout the matter, Horton has maintained that when the City adopted the property code via ordinance, the IPMC became a binding directive, with no room permitted for deviation, unless expressly provided. Citing IPMC Section 102.6, Horton describes the limited instance of discretion which allows an inspector to determine whether a historic building is safe and whether any issues with the building require compliance with the code. Explaining that this section applies only to those buildings within the city which are deemed historic, Horton asserts that the court erroneously applied this exception to the rooming house because it has not received designation as a historic building . Rather, it merely sits in a historical district. She argues that, as a result, the house still must comply with all directives in the code, rendering the City's failure to ensure that the home was equipped with an exterior handrail a breach of its duty to the decedent.6
¶ 13. It is well-settled that "[t]he MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for acts or omissions which give rise to a suit." Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson , 804 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Miss. 2002) (citing L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist. , 754 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Miss 1999) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Supp. 2001) ). The Act waives "the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions from claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such governmental entities and the torts of their employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment." Taylor v. Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 186 So.3d 384, 390 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5 (Rev. 2012) ). Though the MTCA permits negligence actions against a governmental entity, to challenge the viability of a governmental actor's immunity under the MTCA, a plaintiff must first state a valid claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 391. See also Tunica Cty. v. Gray , 13 So.3d 826, 829 (Miss. 2009), holding that "a mere violation of a statute or regulation will not support a claim where no private cause of action exists." It is only after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the entity that the MTCA and its immunity provision will be addressed. Id. Here, we find that Horton has failed to establish such a case against the City of Vicksburg.
¶ 14. Horton's complaint and brief on appeal allege that the building code established the City's duty to inspect Carson's property and either condemn the home or note its handrail deficiency. Citing Sections 102.6 and 104.1 of the municipal building code, Horton asserts that the City had an obligation to ensure the private structure was equipped with a handrail on its exterior steps. She claims that, by not *509acknowledging the deficiency or requiring Carson to correct the code violation, the City failed to properly inspect and/or condemn the premises. Additionally, Horton claims the City both negligently supervised and negligently employed Code Enforcer Benjie Thomas, who likewise negligently failed to acknowledge and correct the code violations.
¶ 15. We disagree and find that Horton has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to an existing duty owed to the decedent and breached by the City. Under Section 102.6 of the City code, Vicksburg and its officials are not required to enforce the handrail requirement under Section 307.1 on those structures "designated as historic buildings when such buildings or structures are judged by the code official to be safe and in the public interest of health, safety, and welfare." IPMC § 102.6. In its motion for summary judgment and on appeal, the City explained that, following its formation of the Vicksburg Historical District, the Walnut Street residence was designated as part of the City's historical "green zone," a decision which substantiated the home's historical value.7 This designation is further supported by the Mississippi Department of Archives and History (MDAH). In its Inventory Database list,8 the MDAH recognizes all 805 properties located within the Historical Vicksburg District-including the 819 Walnut Street home. In light of these designations, we find that the Section 102.6 exception limits the applicability of the IPMC to the buildings and structures within the historic district.
¶ 16. Although not binding, the commentary on Section 102.6 is instructive on this point. Therein, the section allows for the "widest flexibility in enforcing the code when the building in question has historic value." IPMC § 102.6 cmt. This flexibility is not without exception, however. "The most important criterion for application of this section is that the building must be specifically classified as being of historic significance by a qualified party or agent ... after considerable scrutiny of the historical value of the building." Id. We find that the City of Vicksburg was the "qualified party or agent" that specifically classified the home and its surrounding areas to be historically significant. As a result, the City is relieved of any obligation under Section 307.1 by the exception found in Section 102.6.
¶ 17. Upon presenting a motion for summary judgment, the moving party is entitled *510to judgment as a matter of law when the court can find no genuine issue of material fact. M.R.C.P. 56(c). While the nonmoving party is given the benefit of every reasonable doubt ( Smith v. Sanders , 485 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 1986) ), we find that Horton failed to set forth significant probative evidence or rebuttal to show that there are indeed genuine issues for trial. Newell v. Hinton , 556 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Miss. 1990).
¶ 18. The dissent proposes that because Horton submitted two affidavits to the trial court in support of her response to the City's motion for summary judgment, the court's decision to render summary judgment was improper. Through these affidavits, the dissent finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the rooming house was a historic building under the relevant code provision. While the dissent correctly points out that these affidavits create a question as to whether any ordinance or regulation rendered an alleged duty ministerial, an analysis of the City's immunity under the MTCA is not needed in this matter. As an element of negligence, duty is a question of law, and whether a defendant breached its duty to the plaintiff is a question of fact. Griffith v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. , 203 So.3d 579, 585 (Miss. 2016). When a plaintiff fails to prove that a duty is owed, there can be no claim for negligence. Id. Neither of the affidavits presented by Horton establishes a duty owed by the City to ensure that Carson's private rooming house complied with the handrail requirement. Therefore, because Horton did not demonstrate that the City owed the decedent a duty as it related to the Walnut Street residence, she failed to present an essential element of her prima facie claim for negligence, making summary judgment appropriate in the matter.
CONCLUSION
¶ 19. We find that, because Horton did not establish that the City of Vicksburg owed the decedent a duty to inspect or condemn the residence at 819 Walnut Street, and did not demonstrate that the City or its employees breached a duty under any adopted ordinance or regulation, she failed to present a genuine issue of material fact for the court's consideration. As a result, the trial court did not err in its ruling, and summary judgment was appropriate in this matter. We therefore affirm the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Vicksburg.
¶ 20. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, J.