In re Anderson, 267 So. 3d 1158 (2018)

Dec. 13, 2018 · Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit · 2017 CA 1576
267 So. 3d 1158

IN RE: Medical Malpractice Review Panel Proceedings of Tiffany ANDERSON

2017 CA 1576

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: November 14, 2018
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, December 13, 2018

Anselm N. Nwokorie, Brian G. Smith, Monroe, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Tiffany Anderson

David A. Woolridge, Jr., Brent J. Bourgeois, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund, Oversight Board

F. Williams Sartor, Jr., Monroe, LA, Counsel for Intervenor/Appellee, St. Francis Medical Center, Inc.

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, McDONALD, McCLENDON, and CHUTZ, JJ.

WHIPPLE, C.J.

*1159Plaintiff, Tiffany Anderson, appeals a judgment of the district court affirming the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board's determination and declaration that plaintiff's claim was invalid and without effect due to her failure to timely pay the required filing fee, and denying plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we reverse and render judgment in favor of plaintiff.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2016, Tiffany Anderson filed a request for a medical review panel with the Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF Board), alleging malpractice by emergency room doctors at St. Francis Medical Center during her visits to the emergency room on June 5, 6, and 7, 2015. On June 10, 2016, the PCF Board sent a letter to counsel for Ms. Anderson, acknowledging receipt of her June 6, 2016 request and advising that a filing fee of $400.00 ($100.00 per named qualified provider) must be received by the PCF Board within forty-five days of the postmark of the notice, "in accordance with R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c)." The letter further provided that "[f]ailure to comply shall render the request invalid and without effect and the request shall not suspend the time within which suit must be instituted." The parties do not dispute that the 45-day deadline for payment of the filing fee to the PCF Board was July 25, 2016.

On July 22, 2016, prior to the expiration of the deadline for payment, counsel for Ms. Anderson mailed the filing fee from his Monroe office to the PCF Board's office via certified mail.1 However, the filing fee was not received by the PCF Board until August 1, 2016, seven days after the 45-day deadline. By correspondence dated July 28, 2016, the PCF Board notified counsel for Ms. Anderson that the filing fee was not received within the time allowed and, therefore, her claim was considered "invalid and without effect." The letter further provided that by copy of the letter, the PCF Board was notifying all involved parties "of this declaration."

On August 25, 2016, Ms. Anderson filed a petition for judicial review and writ of mandamus, requesting that the district court review the PCF Board's decision and render judgment reversing the PCF Board's decision finding her claim invalid and without effect, and ordering the PCF Board to convene a medical review panel.2

After a hearing, the district court rendered judgment on April 25, 2017, affirming the PCF Board's determination that Ms. Anderson's claim with the PCF Board *1160was rendered invalid and without effect for her failure to timely pay the required filing fee, and further denying the mandamus relief requested by Ms. Anderson. Ms. Anderson then filed the instant appeal from the April 25, 2017 judgment.

ANALYSIS

At the time of Ms. Anderson's request for a medical review panel, LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c) provided:3

A claimant shall have forty-five days from the mailing date of the confirmation of receipt of the request for review... to pay to the board a filing fee in the amount of one hundred dollars per named defendant qualified under this Part.

On appeal, Ms. Anderson argues that the PCF Board has erroneously interpreted this provision to mean that the payment must be received by the PCF Board within the 45-day time period, failing which the claim will be declared "invalid and without effect." Ms. Anderson contends that the mailbox rule should apply, wherein the date of mailing is the determinative date, not the date payment is received by the PCF Board. In support of her argument, Ms. Anderson cites LSA-R.S. 1:60, which provides:

A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the filing of papers, including but not limited to applications, forms, reports, returns, statements, and filings of any kind with the state, its agencies, boards, and commissions shall be deemed timely in either of the following cases:
(1) The papers are delivered on or before the due date.
(2) The papers are mailed on or before the due date. If the papers are received by mail on the first working day following the due date, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that they were timely filed. In all cases where the presumption does not apply, the timeliness of the mailing shall be shown only by an official United States postmark or by official receipt or certificate from the United States Postal Service made at the time of mailing which indicates the date thereof. For purposes of this Section, "by mail" applies only to the United States Postal Service.

Ms. Anderson contends that the filing of a complaint with the PCF Board and the payment of the fee are inexorably joined, as a complaint is not considered filed until the fee is paid and, thus, the mailbox rule as set forth in LSA-R.S. 1:60(A)(2) should govern. Ms. Anderson further notes that LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(2)(b)4 establishes *1161a mailbox rule for the filing of a complaint and, thus, logic dictates that this same rule should apply to the payment of the fee, as both subsections are part of the same statute, citing In re Medical Review Panel of Davis v. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center-Shreveport, 41,273 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/25/06), 939 So.2d 539, 543, writ denied, 2006-2343 (La. 12/8/06), 943 So.2d 1092 (finding that the statute provides a mailbox rule for the filing of the complaint and that accordingly, the same mailbox rule would apply to the 45-day period for paying the fee ).

In response, the PCF Board and intervenor, St. Francis Medical Center, counter that the statute regarding the deadline for payment of the fee is distinct from the provision regarding the deadline for filing a complaint. In support, the PCF Board and St. Francis Medical Center cite In Re Medical Review Proceeding of Benjamin, 14-192 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 161, writ denied, 2015-0142 (La. 4/10/15), 163 So.3d 814, and contend that the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c) to require that the filing fee must be received by the PCF Board within the 45-day period, not that the filing fee must "simply" be mailed by a claimant within this time period.5

However, we note that in its most recent pronouncement on this issue, the Fifth Circuit states that its prior statements in Benjamin concerning this issue were "dicta," and that the mailbox rule should apply when determining the timeliness of filing fees paid to the PCF Board. Specifically, in In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings of Glover, 17-201 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/25/17) 229 So.3d 655, 662, the Fifth Circuit distinguished its prior opinion in Benjamin, noting the claimants in the case before the court had mailed the filing fees to the PCF Board with valid postage via certified mail within the 45-day period, whereas, in Benjamin, the claimant failed to pay sufficient postage when the fees were originally mailed and when the claimant re-mailed the fees, the payment was returned due to insufficient funds. The Fifth Circuit further stated in Glover that its prior statement in Benjamin, that payment occurs when the filing fees are received by the PCF Board, was dicta. Glover, 229 So.3d at 662. The Fifth Circuit further noted that LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c) does not specify whether the term "to pay" requires receipt of the payment or is satisfied by the mailing of the payment within the 45-day time period. The Fifth Circuit concluded that because there are two possible statutory interpretations, the one favoring maintaining the action, as opposed to barring it, must be adopted. Glover, 229 So.3d at 662. Additionally, the court recognized in Glover that because laws on the same *1162subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other, the mailbox rule should apply for the payment of fees to the PCF Board, just as it applies to the filing of a medical malpractice complaint. Glover, 229 So.3d at 662. See LSA-C.C. art. 13 ; LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(2)(b).

The PCF Board argues that this issue has already been litigated in this court, and, if this court deems otherwise, Benjamin and Igwike should be followed in the event this case is deemed to be a matter of first impression for this court.6

In the instant case, we find the facts similar and the arguments identical to those presented to the Fifth Circuit in Glover. We further find that the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in its most recent pronouncement on this issue in Glover is more persuasive than that of the courts in Benjamin and Igwike. Accordingly, we likewise find that the mailbox rule should apply when determining the timeliness of filing fees paid to the PCF Board, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c). See also Davis, 939 So.2d at 543. To hold otherwise would mean that, in determining the timeliness of payment, if sent by the claimant via ordinary mail or certified mail to the PCF Board within the 45-day period, as opposed to the claimant appearing and paying in person, could render meaningless and circumvent the 45-day statutory period for payment and render a payment untimely if the Board simply failed to claim or retrieve its mail until after the time period for paying had elapsed. Thus, we find that Ms. Anderson's filing fee was timely paid to the PCF Board, as the record clearly demonstrates that the filing fee was mailed via certified mail, with proper postage affixed, within the required 45-day period. Accordingly, the PCF Board erred in declaring Ms. Anderson's claim invalid and without effect, and the *1163district court erred in upholding this declaration and in denying Ms. Anderson's petition for writ of mandamus.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the April 25, 2017 judgment of the district court, which denied Ms. Anderson mandamus relief and affirmed the PCF Board's declaration that Ms. Anderson's claim was invalid and without effect for failure to timely pay the filing fee. We hereby grant Ms. Anderson's application for writ of mandamus and order the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board to convene a medical review panel in furtherance of her claim in this matter, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8. Costs in the amount of $770.00 are assessed against appellees, the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

McDonald, J. dissents and will assign reasons.

McDonald, J. Dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion that the "mailbox rule" applies in this matter. I believe there is only one reasonable interpretation of the phrase "to pay to the board" and it means the fee must be received by the PCF Board within the 45 days, not just mailed to the PCF Board during that time period. This is the holding in In Re Medical Review Panel Proceeding of Benjamin, 14-192 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 161, writ denied, 2015-0142 (La. 4/10/15), 163 So.3d 814 and Igwike v. Memorial Medical Center, 2006-0167 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/07), 959 So.2d 562. Both held that the payment (or a forma pauperis affidavit in lieu of payment) had to be received within the 45 days. A subsequent panel of the Fifth Circuit in In Re Medical Review Panel Proceedings of Glover, 17-201 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 229 So.3d 655, however, opined that Benjamin was dicta and found that the payment was timely when mailed. I believe Glover is clearly wrong about the Benjamin decision; the conclusion that "pay to the board" means when received and not when mailed, is certainly not dicta. The Second Circuit weighed in on this issue in In Re Medical Review Panel of Davis v. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center -Shreveport , 41,273 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/25/06), 939 So.2d 539, writ denied, 2006-2343 (La. 12/8/06), 943 So.2d 1092. The Second Circuit found that the "mailbox rule" applied.

As noted Davis was decided in 2006, Igwike in 2007, and Benjamin in 2014. Glover was not decided until October, 2017. In the 2016 Regular Session of the Legislature, La. R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(c) was amended so that the 45 days did not begin to run until the date of receipt by the claimant rather than from the date of mailing by the PCF Board. Obviously, the Legislature was sensitive to the issue of receipt versus mailing. Had they believed there was a problem with the interpretation of the phrase "to pay to the board," they had ample opportunity to correct it. I believe the Legislature is moving in the direction of a date of receipt requirement rather than date of mailing. In 2016 the Legislature addressed the facsimile filing statute. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:850(B)(1) was amended to require delivery of the original filing within seven days of the fax filing. Prior to this amendment, the requirement was for the original to be forwarded within the seven days (i.e. the "mailbox rule"). Thus, the Legislature changed the fax filing statute from the date of mailing or forwarding to the date of delivery or receipt by the clerk of court.

For these reasons I believe Benjamin and Igwike are correct interpretations of *1164the requirement that the fee be paid to the PCF Board and the payment must be received within the 45 days, not mailed within the 45 days.