*902Appellants, Romilio F. Marques, M.D., Romilio F. Marques, M.D., P.A., Naples HMA, LLC, d/b/a Physicians Regional Medical Center, Ofelia Marin, M.D., KIDZ Medical Services, Inc., Jorge Mujica, M.D., and Quail Emergency Physicians, LLC, defendants below (collectively, "the Appellants"), appeal from a non-final order denying their motion to transfer venue pursuant to section 47.122, Florida Statutes (2016). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 5, 2014, Pedro Garcia ("Pedro"), a six-day old infant, developed a serious intestinal condition that caused him to vomit green bile. His mother, Norma Cisneros ("Cisneros"), took him to the emergency room at Physicians Regional Medical Center ("Physicians Regional"), a hospital operated by Naples HMA, LLC ("Naples HMA"). At that initial visit, Pedro was seen by Dr. Jorge Mujica ("Mujica"), an emergency room physician. Mujica discharged Pedro less than two hours after Pedro and Cisneros had arrived.
When Pedro's symptoms persisted, Cisneros took her son on November 24, 2014, to see Dr. Romilio Marques ("Marques"), a pediatrician in Naples, who in turn referred Cisneros to a local specialist, Dr. Ofelia Marin ("Marin"). Marin saw Pedro multiple times over the course of several weeks. On December 20, 2014, Cisneros brought Pedro back to the emergency room at Physicians Regional, where he was again seen by Mujica. Mujica diagnosed Pedro with colic and discharged him. The following morning, Pedro's condition worsened, and Cisneros again returned to Physicians Regional. On this visit, Dr. Michael Ropele, a different emergency room doctor at Physicians Regional, saw Pedro and ordered an X-ray that revealed Pedro suffered from a volvulus, a twisting of the intestine. Pedro was then airlifted to Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital in Broward County for treatment. At Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital, Pedro received life-saving treatment, including five surgeries, and remained there for close to two and a half months.
On April 11, 2016, Pedro's parents, Cisneros and Jesus Garcia ("Garcia"), on behalf of Pedro and themselves individually (collectively "Appellees"), filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Miami-Dade County against Naples HMA, Drs. Mujica, Marques, and Marin, and the doctors' employers-Quail Emergency Physicians, LLC ("Quail Emergency"), Romilio F. Marques, M.D., P.A. ("Marques P.A."), and KIDZ Medical Services, Inc. ("KIDZ").
The three individual defendants reside and work in Collier County. Of the four corporate defendants, KIDZ has its principal place of business in Miami-Dade County, *903Marques P.A. is registered in Collier County, and Naples HMA and Quail Emergency are foreign companies with registered agents in Leon County.1
Appellants, except Naples HMA, filed motions to transfer venue to Collier County pursuant to section 47.122, Florida Statutes (2016) ("the motions"). Naples HMA did not file its own motion to transfer, but instead moved to join in the motions filed by the other Appellants. The motions were substantially similar, and all argued that Miami-Dade County would be inconvenient for the parties and witnesses and that the interests of justice weighed in favor of transferring venue to Collier County. Drs. Mujica, Marin, and Marques each filed affidavits in support of their motions, and each asserted that they lived and worked in Naples, Florida, and that their professional and personal lives would be unduly burdened by a trial in Miami-Dade County. None of the doctors' affidavits addressed or established substantial inconvenience or undue expense that would require a change of venue for the convenience of the anticipated witnesses.
The affidavit of KIDZ's CFO stated that it would be beneficial for the action to be in Collier County because that is where Pedro received his medical treatment. Naples HMA submitted the affidavit of a risk management officer who stated she would be inconvenienced by having to travel to Miami-Dade County for trial. Marques P.A. and Quail Emergency did not submit affidavits in support of their respective motions.
None of the Appellants submitted any affidavits or other evidence addressing the identity of the witnesses needed for trial, whether the witnesses were material, or the significance of the witnesses' testimony. Dr. Marin and KIDZ filed an unverified Notice of Filing in support of their motion to transfer that simply listed the date of each of Pedro's treatments, the respective treating physician or hospital, and the location of the physician or hospital. This Notice stated that the list of names and dates was obtained from Pedro's medical files. It did not identify the nature of the treatments, nor did it purport to identify which individuals or entities would be trial witnesses (material or otherwise) or the substance (much less the significance) of their anticipated testimony. Appellees filed responses in opposition to each of the motions to transfer, arguing that venue was proper in Miami-Dade County and that Appellants had not met their burden under section 47.122.
On July 18, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motions to transfer venue. The trial court denied the motions to transfer in a written order dated August 4, 2016. Relying on this Court's decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mooney, 147 So.3d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), the trial court stated that in order to successfully challenge a plaintiff's forum selection "the burden is upon the defendant to show either substantial inconvenience or that undue expense requires a change for the convenience of the parties or witnesses." Id. at 43 (emphasis in original). The trial court further explained that this Court "has made clear that plaintiffs may select a venue for any reason," and set forth in its written order the standard articulated by this Court in R.J. Reynolds:
We also cannot agree with any conclusion that plaintiffs should not be able to select an attorney or expert witnesses in a county and maintain suit there simply *904because they see some procedural advantage or because juries in the chosen forum tend to award larger monetary damages. There is nothing improper in choosing a venue because it is the most advantageous venue procedurally, or otherwise, for the law itself recognizes a plaintiff's privilege in initially selecting a venue irrespective of reason. If, therefore, venue is proper in more than one place, a plaintiff has the privilege of selecting which venue is most favorable to it for any reason and that selection will not be disturbed absent evidence that the chosen venue is either not proper in the place selected or substantially inconvenient to the witnesses or parties.
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). Applying R.J. Reynolds, the trial court concluded that although the Appellants "presented evidence that there was some inconvenience and expense involved if the trial were to proceed in Miami-Dade County," the evidence set forth in the affidavits was not "sufficient to establish the substantial inconvenience or undue expense which the law requires [and] [a]ccordingly, a transfer of venue is not warranted here." (emphasis in original). This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order denying a motion to transfer venue under section 47.122, Florida Statutes, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hyatt Corp. v. Howarth, 678 So.2d 823, 823-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In reviewing such decisions, we have cautioned:
The trial court's discretion is abused "only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).... We may not, under the abuse of discretion standard, simply supplant this decision with this court's preference on a de novo review of the same venue factors.
Id. at 824 n.1. Where "the record contains a logical basis for the exercise of [the trial judge's] discretion," there is no abuse of discretion. Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983) ; accord Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1203.
III. ANALYSIS
Initially, we note that all the parties agree that venue is proper in both Miami-Dade and Collier counties. "[W]here venue is proper in more than one county, the choice of forum rests with the plaintiff." P.V. Holding Corp. v. Tenore, 721 So.2d 430, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Section 47.122, however, authorizes a court to "transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought" for "the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice." While the three elements of this statute are in the disjunctive and thus a change in venue could arguably be based on any of them, this Court has held that "[o]f the three statutory factors-convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and interest of justice-the most important factor is the convenience of the witnesses." Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Estate of Chavez ex rel. Hernandez, 8 So.3d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
As the trial court correctly found, in order to successfully challenge the plaintiff's forum selection, " 'the burden is upon the defendant to show either substantial inconvenience or that undue expense requires a change for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.' " R.J. Reynolds, 147 So.3d at 43 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Burns, 672 So.2d 834, 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) ). "This requires the defendant to come forward with record evidence to support a transfer." Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted) (citing Burns, 672 So.2d at 835 ). It is therefore incumbent on the party seeking *905transfer " 'to submit affidavits or other evidence that will shed necessary light on the issue of the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.' " Cardelles v. Catholic Health Servs., Inc., 14 So.3d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Wynn Drywall, Inc. v. Aequicap Program Adm'rs, Inc., 953 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Appellants failed to meet their burden.
" '[I]n order for a court to consider the convenience of the witnesses, the court must know who the witnesses are and the significance of their testimony.' " R.J. Reynolds, 147 So.3d at 45 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ); see also Foster Marine Contractors, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 541 So.2d 114, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) ("[Defendant must also] show[ ] the subject matter of the various witnesses' testimony (to wit: the quality of the testimony versus the quantity of the testimony)." (emphasis in original) ). It is therefore important for the trial court to know whether the witnesses identified are key or material witnesses. See Hu v. Crockett, 426 So.2d 1275, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (noting that "since the quality of testimony by a key witness may well outweigh the quantity of testimony by a number of witnesses testifying to relatively unimportant matters," the significance of the witnesses' testimony is relevant to section 47.122 ). Here, the Appellants failed to establish the identity of the key or material witnesses. Indeed, no record evidence established the identity of the witnesses needed for trial much less the significance of these witnesses' testimony, and the trial court recognized as much at the hearing. Appellants therefore failed to meet their burden by not disclosing information as to the necessity, relevance, or significance of the evidence to be presented by material witnesses at trial. See R.C. Storage One, Inc. v. Strand Realty, Inc., 714 So.2d 634, 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), quoted with approval by R.J. Reynolds, 147 So.3d at 44. Moreover, even if all of the individuals listed in the unsworn Notice filed by Marin and KIDZ were presumed to be key or material witnesses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants failed to meet their burden, as none of the Appellants submitted affidavits or other evidence demonstrating how these witnesses would be substantially inconvenienced or that undue expense required a change in venue for the convenience of these witnesses. See R.J. Reynolds, 147 So.3d at 43.
Although we may have reached a different conclusion were we sitting as the trial court, we may not, under the abuse of discretion standard, supplant our judgment for that of the trial court. "The trial court-with the parties before it and the case having been assigned to its judicial labor-was thus within its discretion to either grant or deny the motion for change of venue." Hyatt, 678 So.2d at 824 n.1. Here, Appellants failed to show which of the witnesses were key or material witnesses, and further failed to show substantial inconvenience or undue expense that required a change of venue for the convenience of the witnesses. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to transfer venue and affirm the trial court's order.
AFFIRMED.
FERNANDEZ, J., concurs.