I therefore write separately to spotlight the importance of compliance with Boykin and C.Cr.P. art. 556.1, as well as the overarching obligation of the district attorney and defense counsel, as officers of the court, to perfect the record for purposes of direct appeal and the post-conviction process. In my view, this shocking and fundamental deficiency warrants the serious consequences of vacating a felony conviction and sentence-even a decade later-in this case.
State v. Trahan, 241 So. 3d 286 (2018)
April 16, 2018
·
Louisiana Supreme Court
·
No. 2016–KP–2083
241 So. 3d 286
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Daryl TRAHAN
No. 2016-KP-2083
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 16, 2018
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
Writ denied.
WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.
CLARK, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
CLARK, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
While there is no dispute that the trial court did not advise the defendant of his Boykin rights during the plea colloquy, I find his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered into. The defendant was advised by his attorney of the rights he was waiving, and he expressly maintained throughout the proceedings that he desired to plead guilty and avoid trial. The trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his rights does not alone discharge the defendant's burden in post-conviction proceedings of showing, as a basis for vacating his convictions, a constitutional defect in his guilty pleas. See *287La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2, see also State v. Harris , 97-1352, pp. 1-2 (La. 10/31/97), 702 So.2d 678, 678-79. Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the defendant's convictions and sentences.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
In 2007, Relator entered pleas of guilty to attempted second-degree murder and two counts of false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon. The trial court failed to inform or question Relator concerning his understanding that his pleas involved the waiver of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers. See Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. The trial court ordered a PSI, and defendant was later sentenced to 35 years at hard labor "without benefits" consecutively with two concurrent terms of 5 years at hard labor.
In an evidentiary hearing on collateral review, the trial judge acknowledged the lack of a Boykin colloquy, but denied the application, concluding it to be meritless in light of testimony of the attorney representing Relator during the guilty plea that, although she could not specifically recall what transpired in this case, she "routinely advised" her clients of their constitutional rights prior to a guilty plea. The court of appeal correctly granted Relator's writ application, vacated the convictions and sentences, and remanded for further proceedings. While it is laudable that defense counsel routinely, and perhaps even fastidiously, advises her clients of applicable constitutional rights, it was not her duty to conduct a Boykin examination. Rather, it was the duty of the trial judge.