Charles Davis appeals the summary judgment entered against him. Appellees argue we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, contending the order at issue was not a final order. While appellees are correct that an order merely denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order, see Cardiothoracic and Vascular Surgery, P.A. v. W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 993 So.2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the order here did more. This order concluded by saying the appellees' summary judgment was granted, and "that judgment be entered in [appellees'] favor, and that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint ... be dismissed with prejudice." This language is enough to establish finality. See Hoffman v. Hall , 817 So.2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("Where an order stated that 'final summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of' a party, the language was self-executing, did not contemplate any further judicial labor with regard to the rights of the parties and was sufficient to establish finality.").
Turning to the merits of Davis's appeal, we conclude that after appellees filed their summary judgment motion, Davis did not meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See RNR Invs. Ltd. P'ship v. Peoples First Cmty. Bank , 812 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("Where the moving party offers evidence to support its claim of the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party 'must demonstrate the existence of such an issue or issues either by countervailing facts or justifiable inferences from the facts presented.' " (quoting Fleming v. Peoples First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 667 So.2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ) ).
AFFIRMED .
B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.