LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART, AND ASSIGNS REASONS.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion. I concur in the majority's affirmation of the district court's award of sole custody to Mr. England and supervised visitation to Ms. England. I write separately as to that affirmation, however, to provide reasons why the burden of proof set forth in Bergeron v. Bergeron1 was improperly applied to an emergency temporary allocation of custody time under La. C.C.P. art 3945.
I dissent from the majority's amendment and affirmation as amended of the portion of the district court's judgment ordering Ms. England to seek counseling from a specific therapist. I would reverse that portion of the district court's judgment because there is no authority in Louisiana law for a judge to order a litigant to seek counseling in a proceeding under La. C.C.P. art. 3945.
First, the district court's judgment in this case improperly applies the burden of proof set forth in Bergeron to Mr. England's Article 3945 petition. Although neither party expressly challenges the application of Bergeron, Rule 1-3 of the *1072Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal states that the Courts of Appeal will review issues other than those specified in assignments of error when "the interest of justice" clearly requires such review. The interests of justice require that child custody matters are decided by application of the proper burden of proof. This improper application is problematic to future custody proceedings in this case and requires a clarification at this time. I therefore choose to address this error.
Bergeron requires that when a party seeks a modification of a custody arrangement established by a considered decree, the proponent of the change must prove that a change of circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child has occurred since the prior custody order, and:
The party seeking a change bears a heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the child as to justify modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change in environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.
492 So.2d 1193, 1200 (La. 1986) ; see also Gray v. Gray , 2011-548, pp. 19-20 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1247, 1258-59.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3945 provides, in relevant part:
* * *
B. An ex parte order of temporary custody of a minor child shall not be granted unless:
(1) It clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified petition or by supporting affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition.
(2) The applicant's attorney certifies to the court, in writing, either:
(a) The efforts which have been made to give the adverse party reasonable notice of the date and time such order is being presented to the court.
(b) The reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required.
C. An ex parte order of temporary custody shall:
(1) Expire by operation of law within thirty days of signing of the order; however, the order may be extended for good cause shown at any time before its expiration for one period not exceeding fifteen days.
(2) Provide specific provisions for temporary visitation by the adverse party of not less than forty-eight hours during any fifteen-day period, unless the verified petition or supporting affidavit clearly demonstrates that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child as a result of such visitation.
(3) Be endorsed with the date on which the ex parte order is signed and the date and hour of the rule to show cause.
D. The rule to show cause why the respondent should not be awarded the custody, joint custody, or visitation of the child shall be assigned for hearing not more than thirty days after signing of the ex parte order of temporary custody.
* * *
F. In the event an ex parte order of temporary custody is denied, the court shall specifically allocate between the parents the time which the child shall spend with each parent at the hearing on the rule to show cause set pursuant to Paragraph D of this Article, unless immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child....
*1073Article 3945 thus provides for injunctive relief, first through an ex parte order, and then through a determination of custody at a hearing no more than thirty days after the signing or the denial of the ex parte order. At the thirty-day hearing, the district court "shall specifically allocate between the parents the time which the child shall spend with each parent unless immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child."
Article 3945 allows a district court to award sole custody at the thirty-day hearing where it finds that "immediate and irreparable injury will result...." This burden of proof, like the burdens established by other Louisiana statutes addressing emergency changes of custody,2 differs from the burden of proof required by Bergeron . Moreover, the record indicates that the district court intended the custody judgment it rendered to be temporary. The judgment itself states Mr. England "is awarded temporary sole custody of the minor children."
Given the temporary nature of emergencies, it is problematic to apply a burden of proof meant to prevent frequent changes in a child's living situation. In Bergeron, the Louisiana Supreme Court concedes that the Bergeron standard may "inflexibly" prevent modifications of custody, but finds that such a "heavy burden of proof in custody modification cases is justified" due to the harm caused to children when "liberal custody modification rules" are applied. 492 So.2d 1193 at 1199 (citations omitted). The Court goes on to state:
The child has at stake an interest of transcending value in a custody modification suit-his best interest and welfare-which may be irreparably damaged not only by a mistaken change in custody but also by the effects of an attempted or threatened change of custody on grounds that are less than imperative. The consequences to the mental and emotional well-being and future development of the child from an erroneous judgment, unjustified litigation, threat of litigation, or continued interparental conflict are usually more serious than similar consequences in an ordinary civil case.
Id. at 1200. The Court's language makes its intent evident-the Bergeron standard exists to prevent frequent custody changes because frequent custody changes are harmful to children.
This rationale loses its sagacity when applied to emergencies under La. C.C.P. art. 3945. The problem Bergeron seeks to prevent, frequent changes in custody, is only amplified when a litigant must prove Bergeron in an emergency situation. Because a Bergeron determination results in a new considered custody decree, such reasoning would subject a child to two custody trials for one emergency-one to obtain a necessary temporary allocation of custody time during the pendency of the emergency situation, and another to return to the prior custody arrangement after the *1074emergency has abated.3 To hold that the Bergeron standard applies to emergency custody changes under La. C.C.P. art. 3945 is to undo the rationale of Bergeron itself. Consequently, the district court erred as a matter of law in applying Bergeron to the Article 3945 petition.
Despite the district court's erroneous application of Bergeron , the emergency division of custody time rendered by the district court is proper and in the best interest of the children. The record makes clear that immediate and irreparable injury would result to the children if joint custody were continued, especially considering the testimony of Dr. Luscher and the emotional trauma experienced by the children when they viewed Mr. England's video during the Watermeier hearing. Accordingly, under La. C.C.P. art. 3945, the district court did not err in temporarily allocating time equivalent to sole custody to Mr. England.
Next, the district court improperly ordered Ms. England to seek mental health treatment. The majority states that Ms. England only challenges the portion of the judgment specifying a treatment provider, and not the provision requiring her to seek treatment itself. However, Ms. England states that the order requiring her to receive mental health treatment "is an attempt to regulate the behavior of the parties," "substitutes resolution of the parents' problems for the children's best interest," and "is prohibited." Moreover, Ms. England argues that the district court's judgment violates her constitutional right of free association-an argument that would be nonsensical if, as the majority states, Ms. England only objects to being ordered to associate with this particular mental health counselor. Therefore, the issue of whether the district court had the authority to order Ms. England to receive mental health treatment is properly before this Court.
The majority broadly states that "the court has the authority and discretion to order counseling in custody matters." This assertion is inaccurate. There is statutorily created authority for a district court under specific circumstances to mandate treatment. Under La. R.S. 9:364 (C), a district court shall mandate that a parent found to have a history of perpetrating family violence must participate in a domestic abuse program in order to be allowed supervised visitation, and mandate completion of that program in order for that parent to be allowed unsupervised visitation. Under part D of the same statute, a parent found to have sexually abused their child shall be prohibited from visitation until the parent has completed a treatment program for sexual abusers. Likewise, under La. R.S. 9:331.1, a party to a custody or visitation proceeding may be required to submit to drug testing. No such statutory authority exists, however, to require mental health counseling under La. C.C.P. art. 3945.
In contrast, the statutes the majority uses as "example[s]" of the district court's "authority and discretion to order counseling in custody matters" do not actually allow a district court to order treatment. Louisiana Revised Statute 9:331 allows a district court to order an "evaluation" of a party or a child in a custody or visitation proceeding.4
*1075Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:361 et seq., (the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act) as explained supra in reference to La. R.S. 9:364 (C), only allow for mandated mental health treatment under specific circumstances not at issue in the case sub judice.5 Likewise, La. Ch.C. art. 308 only provides authority for a court to refer charges that a child's physical or mental health or welfare is in danger to the Department of Children and Family Services, not to mandate counseling.6
In the absence of statutory authority to do so, I would not interpret the district court's authority so broadly. Rather, I find that the district court lacks the "authority and discretion" to order mental health counseling when rendering judgment on proceedings under La. C.C.P. art. 3945.7
*1076Accordingly, I would reverse that portion of the district court's judgment.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.8