*477Walter Ryan Matzuk appeals a final order of the circuit court granting Christina Price's petition to disestablish his paternity and her petition to establish the paternity of Ryan Bedell. Matzuk argues that the circuit court erred in finding that a material mistake of fact existed with regard to paternity. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Price's son, W.M., was born in April 2012. According to the parties' pleadings, upon the child's birth, Matzuk signed an acknowledgement of paternity in which he affirmed, under oath, that he was the "natural parent of the child."1
In 2017, five years after the child's birth, Price filed two petitions related to the paternity of W.M. On April 3, 2017, Price filed a petition to establish paternity for her son, W.M. The petition alleged that Price "reasonably believe[d]" that W.M. "may be the biological product of a union" between herself and Bedell and that Matzuk's endorsement of the acknowledgement of paternity was an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact under Code § 20-49.1.2 On September *254*4786, 2017, Price filed a petition to disestablish paternity. The petition moved the circuit court to order genetic testing pursuant to Code § 20-49.3 and Code § 20-49.10.3 Price specifically asked the court to order genetic testing of herself, Matzuk, Bedell, and W.M., to "disestablish paternity of Matzuk, establish the paternity of Bedell, and enter an [o]rder of [p]arentage."
The court ordered that Price, Matzuk, Bedell, and W.M. submit to genetic testing.4 The results, filed with the court on December 13, 2017, established that Bedell could not be excluded as the biological father of W.M.5
On May 29, 2018, at a hearing held on Price's petitions, Price testified that when W.M. was born, she was not aware of the identity of W.M.'s biological father. At that time, she thought that the biological father could have been either Matzuk or Bedell. Prior to W.M.'s birth, Price had told *479Matzuk that either he or Bedell was W.M.'s biological father. She did not know for certain that Matzuk was not W.M.'s biological father until a genetic test was completed in March 2015. She testified that Matzuk had not wanted to undergo genetic testing regarding W.M.'s paternity.
Matzuk initially testified that when he signed the birth certificate at the hospital following W.M.'s birth, he was aware that he was not W.M.'s biological father. However, he did acknowledge at the hearing that he had previously testified under oath that when Price informed him that she was pregnant, she had told him that W.M.'s biological father could be either himself or Bedell. He testified that at the time he signed the birth certificate, he "felt that [W.M.] was not mine." When asked if he "felt that, but ... didn't know that," Matzuk replied, "I don't think that anybody knew that." He then testified that, when he signed the birth certificate, he "knew it in my heart that this was not my child." He acknowledged that he did not "do any kind of scientific research at that moment to find out if [W.M.] was [his] child or not [his] child."
At the hearing, counsel for Price and Bedell argued that the petition to disestablish paternity should be granted because the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was the result of a material mistake of fact under Code § 20-49.1. Counsel for Matzuk contended that appellees had not established that a material mistake of fact had existed at the time of the acknowledgment of paternity.
On August 13, 2018, the circuit court held another hearing on the matter. The court asked counsel for Matzuk whether denying the petition to disestablish paternity "[w]ould ... be tantamount to eliminating Mr. Bedell's parental rights?," and counsel replied in the negative. The court then asked if Bedell would have "those rights, under Troxel [v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000),] and the line of cases, if he has not been legally determined to be the biological father?," to which counsel for Matzuk replied, "Yes." Counsel for Bedell then argued that denying the petition to disestablish paternity would be tantamount to eliminating his *480client's rights because Bedell would not be listed on the child's birth certificate and because this determination would affect his custody rights.
In addition, counsel for Bedell argued that the petition to disestablish Matzuk's paternity should also be granted under Code § 20-49.10. He contended that genetic testing had established that Bedell was W.M.'s biological *255father and that Code § 20-49.10 "controls" and "stands independent" of Code § 20-49.1.
After hearing argument, the circuit court made several findings. First, it concluded that an unpublished opinion of this Court, Wooddell v. Lagerquist, No. 2121-11-3, 2012 WL 5866481 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012), indicated that the two paternity statutes at issue, Code §§ 20-49.1 and -49.10, "should be read with the idea in mind that they should be and could be harmonized." In regard to Code § 20-49.10, the court found that the genetic testing filed with the court was a scientifically reliable genetic test that established the exclusion of Matzuk, the individual named as a father in a legal determination, as W.M.'s biological father. In regard to Code § 20-49.1, the court found, "applying the facts as the [c]ourt has heard them ... with regard to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses that there has been a material mistake of fact with regard to the issue of paternity." In addition, the court found that denying Price's petition to disestablish paternity "would be tantamount to preventing Mr. Bedell from being determined to be the father and have the effect of terminating Mr. Bedell's parental rights."
Based upon these findings, the court granted Price's petition to disestablish paternity, after noting that Code §§ 20-49.1 and -49.10, "when read in harmony with one another, coupled with Mr. Bedell's constitutional right with regard to his parental rights, require the disestablishment." The court also granted Price's petition to establish the paternity of Bedell as the biological father of W.M.
A final order reflecting these determinations was entered by the court on September 17, 2018. This appeal followed.
*481II. ANALYSIS
"On appeal, the reviewing court cannot set aside the judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury unless it is 'plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.' " Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enf't ex rel. Comptroller v. Flaneary, 22 Va. App. 293, 304-05, 469 S.E.2d 79 (1996) (quoting Code § 8.01-680 ). However, we review the circuit court's "statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo ." Craig v. Craig, 59 Va. App. 527, 539, 721 S.E.2d 24 (2012) (quoting Navas v. Navas, 43 Va. App. 484, 487, 599 S.E.2d 479 (2004) ).
"The determination of parentage, when raised in any proceeding, shall be governed by [Chapter 3.1 of Title 20 of the Code of Virginia]." Code § 20-49.2. Code § 20-49.4 provides, in part, that "[t]he standard of proof in any action to establish parentage shall be by clear and convincing evidence."
On appeal, Matzuk challenges the circuit court's determination under Code § 20-49.1 that a material mistake of fact existed with regard to paternity.6
*256*482Code § 20-49.1 provides several ways to establish a legal parent-child relationship between a man and a child. Specifically, Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that a parent and child relationship between a child and a man may be established by the following means:
A voluntary written statement of the father and mother made under oath acknowledging paternity and confirming that prior to signing the acknowledgment, the parties were provided with a written and oral description of the rights and responsibilities of acknowledging paternity and the consequences arising from a signed acknowledgment, including the right to rescind. ... A written statement shall have the same legal effect as a judgment ... and shall be binding and conclusive unless, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, the person challenging the statement establishes that the statement resulted from fraud, duress or a material mistake of fact.
Shortly after W.M.'s birth, Matzuk signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, affirming that he was the biological father of W.M. This acknowledgment established a legal parent-child relationship between Matzuk and W.M. pursuant to Code § 20-49.1(B)(2). Matzuk's voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was "binding and conclusive" unless a subsequent judicial proceeding found that it resulted from either fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact. In this case, the circuit court, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, found that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was a result *483of a material mistake of fact; thus, it was not "binding and conclusive" on the parties.
Matzuk argues that this determination was in error and thus the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is still binding and conclusive. He contends that he and Price were aware that he might not have been W.M.'s biological father when the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was executed. Thus, Matzuk argues, no material mistake of fact existed at the time the acknowledgment was executed because neither party "mistakenly" believed that he was the biological father when in fact he was not; rather, both parties knew that the issue was uncertain, yet made the deliberate decision to execute the acknowledgment of paternity. However, based upon the plain language of the statute itself, we reject this interpretation of when a material mistake of fact must occur in order to render a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity no longer binding and conclusive under Code § 20-49.1(B)(2).
Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) does not provide a definition of "material mistake of fact." Therefore, we turn to the language's ordinary usage to ascertain the meaning of the term. "When, as here, a statute contains no express definition of a term, the general rule of statutory construction is to infer the legislature's intent from the plain meaning of the language used." Jones v. Commonwealth ex rel. Moll, 295 Va. 497, 504, 814 S.E.2d 192 (2018) (quoting Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335 (1998) ); see also Dietz v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 123, 133, 804 S.E.2d 309 (2017) (applying the "ordinary and plain meaning" of words not defined in a statute (quoting Hilton v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 293, 299, 797 S.E.2d 781 (2017) )).
In the instant case, we find that the facts of this case fully support the circuit court's determination that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was a result of a "material mistake of fact" based upon the ordinary understanding of this language.
*484"Material" is defined as "[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making process." Material, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Here, it is obvious that Matzuk's acknowledgment of paternity, when he was not in fact W.M.'s biological father, was "material" in that the knowledge of the actual biological father of W.M. was an issue that "would affect a person's decision-making process."
"Mistake" is defined as "[a]n error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief." Mistake, Black's, supra. Again, it is clear that a "mistake," as that word is ordinarily used, occurred. Matzuk affirmed *257on the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity that he was the "natural parent of the child." Matzuk was not certain at the time that he was in fact W.M.'s biological parent. Later, the parties learned definitively through genetic testing done pursuant to Code § 20-49.10 that Matzuk was not W.M.'s biological father.7 Therefore, the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity completed under Code § 20-49.1 was a result of Matzuk's affirmation that he was W.M.'s biological father-which clearly was "[a]n error, misconception, or misunderstanding."
Examining the statute's plain language, as we must, we reject Matzuk's assertion that no mistake of fact occurred because the parties were aware that he might not have been the father when he executed the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. A plain reading of the statute makes clear that there is no requirement that a party have no knowledge that a fact might be untrue to create a mistake of fact. Rather, the party must act in part upon an an error, misconception, or *485misunderstanding. Here, Matzuk's affirmation that he was the biological father of W.M. was in error, and thus the parties' voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was a result of a "mistake of fact." See Rogers v. Wcisel, 312 Mich.App. 79, 877 N.W.2d 169 (2015) (holding, in a motion to revoke acknowledgment of parentage, that a mistake of fact existed when the putative father's belief that he was the biological father was only partial or was somewhat in doubt and he later learned through genetic testing that he was not the biological father).
Under the unique circumstances of the instant case, we find that the record provided ample support for the circuit court's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was not binding and conclusive under Code § 20-49.1 because it was a result of a mistake of fact, and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal.8
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Affirmed.