The State charged M.C. with reckless driving by traveling at a high rate of speed and disregarding traffic control signals.3 The aggravated assault charges were premised on M.C.'s swerving and driving toward two officers. Lastly, the petition alleged that M.C. ran after the crash despite being told to stop. The officer who initiated the chase testified that there was a distance of "six or seven" miles between his turning on his lights and sirens in Walton County, and M.C.'s eventual *198car crash. Thus, the offenses set forth above occurred at various points along this span of at least six miles, during which the officers "[l]eft the city limits." Despite extensive testimony regarding the streets, highways and intersections on which all of these offenses occurred, the State failed to elicit any evidence that they occurred in Walton County.4 In the Interest of J.B. , supra, 289 Ga. App. at 618-619, 658 S.E.2d 194 (street addresses and other locations in the record insufficient to establish venue).
Additionally, we cannot rely on the officers' employment as additional evidence regarding venue because the testifying officers were employees of the Loganville Police Department, and the record does not show that their jurisdiction was confined solely to Walton County. See Frasier v. State , 295 Ga. App. 596, 600 (3), 672 S.E.2d 668 (2009) ; Bell v. State , 291 Ga. App. 169, 170 (2), 661 S.E.2d 207 (2008) (where arrest was made by city police and State failed to show that city was located entirely within the county where trial was held, "jury was not authorized to find that, in the proper performance of their duties, the officers made the stop and arrest within the territorial jurisdiction of [the county]").
We recognize that under OCGA § 17-2-2 (e), "[i]f a crime is committed upon any ... vehicle ... traveling within this state and it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the crime could have been committed through which the ... vehicle ... has traveled." (emphasis supplied). This statute, however, "applies only when it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed." Thompson v. Brown , 288 Ga. 855, 856, 708 S.E.2d 270 (2011). Here, the witnesses explicitly testified as to the location of the reckless driving, the aggravated assaults, and the obstruction; the State could have but simply failed to elicit that those locations were within Walton County. Thus, this statute is inapplicable here. Id. (statute inapplicable since location of crime could be ascertained); Rogers v. State , 298 Ga. App. 895, 899 (3)(681 S.E.2d 693) (2009) (same).
The State's contentions on this issue of venue are all unavailing. First, the State argues that dash camera video footage was entered into evidence and viewed by the juvenile court, and this would have allowed the juvenile court to observe where the acts occurred. The record does not show that the juvenile court took judicial notice of any "geographical facts," so as to support a finding of venue, "[n]or are we, as a reviewing court, free to resort to judicial notice to legitimize a judgment." Bradley v. State , 238 Ga. App. 490, 519 S.E.2d 261 (1999).
The State's attempt to analogize this case to Ward v. State , 270 Ga. App. 427, 606 S.E.2d 877 (2004) is similarly unpersuasive. In Ward , which also involved a police chase, officers expressly testified that the pursuit of the suspect both began and ended in Fulton County. Id. at 428, 606 S.E.2d 877. There is no such evidence here establishing that the entirety of the police chase was within the confines of Walton County, and the State's argument is especially problematic because this chase spanned at least six miles. King v. State , 271 Ga. App. 384, 387 (1), 609 S.E.2d 725 (2005) (fact that appellant was arrested in Ben Hill County, 200 yards away from the crime scene, did not prove venue in that county); compare Brewster v. State , 300 Ga. App. 143, 144, 684 S.E.2d 309 (2009) (evidence of venue sufficient where officer testified that he was patrolling in Newton County when he came into contact with appellants; identified the pursuit route on a map of Newton County; and testified that no portion of the route fell outside the map).
Also baseless is the State's contention that M.C. never presented evidence that any part of the incident occurred in a county other than Walton County. That is not M.C.'s burden. "[T]he State's burden never shifts to the defendant to disprove venue, as it is axiomatic that the evidentiary burden in a criminal prosecution is upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment *199and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation omitted.) Downs v. State , 257 Ga. App. 696, 697-698 (1), 572 S.E.2d 54 (2002). Accordingly, we conclude that the State failed to establish venue with regards to the two counts of aggravated assault upon a peace officer, reckless driving, and obstruction of an officer, and we must reverse the delinquency adjudication as to these offenses. In the Interest of D.D. , 287 Ga. App. 512, 515 (2) (a)-(b), 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).
Nevertheless, "the [S]tate may retry [M.C.] without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause [if] there was otherwise sufficient evidence at trial to support the defendant's delinquency adjudication for the crimes charged." (Citations omitted.) In the Interest of D.D. , supra, 287 Ga. App. at 512, 515 (2) (b), 651 S.E.2d 817.
We conclude that there was otherwise sufficient evidence on each of the four counts. The evidence that M.C. disregarded two red traffic lights while driving at 126 miles per hour, which was well above the speed limit, was sufficient to prove reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. State , 259 Ga. App. 819, 821, 578 S.E.2d 516 (2003). Likewise, the testimony that M.C. swerved and drove toward the two officers at a speed of at least 80 miles per hour, so close to the officers that they braced for impact, authorized the juvenile court to conclude that M.C. committed an aggravated assault upon both officers. Dyer v. State , 261 Ga. App. 289, 290 (1), 585 S.E.2d 81 (2003). Lastly, the evidence that M.C. fled on foot after the crash and did not heed the calls to stop sufficiently supported a finding of obstruction. In the Interest of E.C. , 292 Ga. App. 798, 800-801, 665 S.E.2d 896 (2008). Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial. In the Interest of D.D. , supra, 287 Ga. App. at 515 (2) (b), 651 S.E.2d 817.
In summary, we affirm M.C.'s adjudication of delinquency for attempting to elude a police officer and reverse his adjudications of delinquency for failure to prove venue on the remaining charges which are not barred from retrial by double jeopardy.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Andrews and Brown, JJ., concur.