"A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence unless the case comes within the following rules: (1) The evidence must appear to have been discovered since the trial, and, from the affidavit of the new witness, what such evidence will be, or its absence satisfactorily explained. (2) It must appear from facts stated in his affidavit that plaintiff was diligent in ascertaining and securing *270his evidence, and that the new evidence is such that due diligence would not have secured it before the verdict. (3) Such evidence must be new and material, and not merely cumulative; and cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the same kind to the same point. (4) The evidence must be such as ought to produce an opposite result at a second trial on the merits. (5) And the new trial will generally be refused when the sole object of the new evidence is to discredit or impeach a witness on the opposite side." Syllabus Point 1, Halstead v. Horton , 38 W.Va. 727, 18 S.E. 953 (1894).
Syl., State v. Frazier , 162 W.Va. 935, 253 S.E.2d 534 (1979).
This Court affords trial judges a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly-discovered evidence warrants the grant of a new trial. "This deference is due, in part, to the superior position the trial judge holds when assessing the credibility of the new evidence, an essential component of the determination of whether the evidence would make a different result on retrial probable." State v. Pinder , 114 P.3d 551, 565 (Utah 2005).4
In the present case, the trial court articulated the prongs of the Frazier test and then meticulously applied them to the facts before it. Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence in the form of Mr. Banks' testimony. Specifically, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred when it concluded the Defendant satisfied the second and fourth Frazier factors. We address each of these arguments in turn.
With regard to the second Frazier factor, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred when it concluded the Defendant was diligent in his attempts to secure Mr. Bank's trial attendance. Petitioner argues that the Defendant knew Mr. Banks could have been contacted at his sister's address: 9200 Denison Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, as this was the address provided to the Defendant in the State's initial discovery disclosure, four months before trial.
Petitioner's argument is unimpressive. He ignores the uncontested fact that the Defendant's trial counsel, Mr. Sheehan, was notified by the police and/or the assistant prosecutor-after the State's initial discovery disclosure-that the police did not know the whereabouts of Mr. Banks. The trial court found that the Defendant could not have reasonably secured the presence of Mr. Banks at trial in light of the foregoing:
a. Sheehan listed Banks as a witness albeit with an "unknown" address in Defendant's discovery disclosure; he indicated an "unknown" address after he had been notified by detectives and/or counsel for the State in August, 2016, that Banks' whereabouts were then presently unknown. Stated otherwise, the defense intended, at least preliminarily, to employ Banks as a witness, but perceived itself as incapable of identifying his whereabouts based upon representations by the prosecution.
b. Banks was affirmatively avoiding being found by anyone given his stated fear that someone would be coming after him.
c. Banks did not have a legal residence at 9200 Denison Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, his sister's address, and stayed there only infrequently.
d. Banks "bounced" around from place to place and had no identifiable address.
e. Banks was, for a period of time, actually homeless and had received assistance from his probation officer in getting placement in a homeless shelter somewhere in Cleveland.
*271f. Sheehan continued to make efforts to locate Banks, including interviewing third parties ... who he believed might have been able to provide him with information or leads as to Banks' whereabouts.
g. Sheehan called and texted the phone number he believed to have been Banks' number, although his calls went unanswered and his texts not responded to.
h. Sheehan forwarded information he had received from Cordell Coleman [the brother of Lemroy Coleman] to the effect that Banks was located near "99th and Denison" in Cleveland to Burgoyne [the Defendant's investigator]. Burgoyne deemed such vague information insufficient for purposes of commencing an investigation into Banks' whereabouts.
Consequently, the Defendant satisfied the "reasonable diligence" prong of Frazier . Moreover, while this determination is a mandatory component of Frazier , the trial court's primary focus was properly on the significance and impact of the newly discovered evidence, not upon the failings of counsel or whether counsel's lack of diligence was so unjustifiable that it fell below constitutional standards. "If consideration of the newly discovered evidence is essential to a fair trial and a just verdict, the court should be able to grant a new trial without condemning trial counsel as constitutionally ineffective." People v. Soojian , 190 Cal.App.4th 491, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 435, 454 (2010).
With regard to the fourth Frazier factor, Petitioner contends the trial court erred when it concluded that Mr. Banks' testimony would likely have produced a different result at a second trial. Petitioner relies on the video surveillance footage of the shooting, the Defendant's admission to shooting at the victims, and the fact that Mr. Coleman died from a bullet that entered from an elevated position which would be consistent with the Defendant firing from the stairs of the Legion. Petitioner also attacks the credibility of Mr. Banks, a twice-convicted felon, who was on probation at the time of the shooting.
Petitioner's argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First of all, credibility determinations are for the trial court, not this Court. The decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of Mr. Banks and Mr. Saunders was within the peculiar competence of the trial court, who has seen and heard them testify. Second, Petitioner fails to address the fact that the police found a bullet matched to the one found in Mr. Coleman's body on the ground next to him, fifteen feet up Lane E and around the corner from where the Defendant fired shots. Thus, the crime scene evidence substantiates Mr. Banks' testimony that a second shooter was in Lane E. Third, Petitioner fails to undermine in any meaningful fashion the fundamental basis for the trial court's ruling: Mr. Banks' testimony identifying Mr. Saunders as the perpetrator of these crimes goes to the very essence of the Defendant's guilt or innocence on the charges at issue. If the jury has the benefit of Mr. Banks' testimony, it is likely that a different result will be reached on retrial.5 Consequently, although a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence is "very seldom granted" this case epitomizes such an extraordinary circumstance. Syl. Pt. 9, in part, State v. Hamric , 151 W.Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1966).
For that reason, Petitioner has not shown "the existence of clear error as a matter of law[.]" Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Hoover , 199 W.Va. at 14-15, 483 S.E.2d at 14-15. Ultimately, the decision to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence was within the sound discretion of the trial court. Because a writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court, we conclude that the writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner will not issue.6
*272Finally, a new trial is warranted in the interest of justice.7 Those entrusted with the responsibility of representing the State at criminal proceedings must never forget their fundamental obligation is not to convict but to see that justice is done. "If fairness and justice are forgotten in the pursuit of a guilty verdict, the integrity and authority of our criminal justice system is challenged." State v. Goode , 278 N.J.Super. 85, 650 A.2d 393, 397 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has declared:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger v. U.S. , 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). The same holds true for the prosecuting attorneys of this State. Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Boyd , 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977).
Therefore, a new trial must be awarded to see that justice is served by securing a lawful conviction. Obviously, if the Defendant was wrongfully convicted of second-degree murder and malicious wounding, the real perpetrator remains free to victimize again. At stake is the very integrity of the criminal justice system and our trial courts' ability to conduct fair trials.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court denies the writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prevent the Circuit Court of Ohio County from enforcing its December 21, 2017, order.
Writ denied.
JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE WALKER dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.