Petitioner Jedediah C.1 sexually molested two minor children-including his son-and *199attempted to molest a third minor child. He pleaded guilty to sexual abuse by a parent, incest, and attempt to commit a felony. The Circuit Court of Jackson County imposed an effective sentence of sixteen to thirty-eight years and denied Petitioner's request for credit for time served on home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bail. Petitioner contends that he should have received credit for time served on home incarceration and that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate. We disagree and affirm the circuit court's sentencing order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between July 2013 and December 2014, Petitioner sexually molested his son and one of his son's friends and attempted to molest another of his son's friends. All three children were minors. Petitioner was indicted on five counts of first-degree sexual assault, five counts of incest, twelve counts of first-degree sexual abuse, fifteen counts of sexual abuse by a parent, and two counts of sexual abuse by a custodian. Following Petitioner's pretrial hearing, he was placed on home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bail, subject to various conditions set forth in the Home Incarceration Program Participation Agreement (home incarceration agreement). Petitioner spent 281 days on home incarceration.
Although Petitioner was facing a thirty-nine-count indictment, the State had concerns about presenting the victims' testimonies at trial due to their emotional difficulties and the nature of the allegations. Thus, Petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement on April 22, 2016, and a plea hearing was held on that date. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty-pursuant to Kennedy v. Frazier2 -to one count of sexual abuse by a parent, one count of incest, and one count of attempt to commit a felony, a lesser-included offense of first-degree sexual abuse. The other thirty-six counts were dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion requesting that his bond and home confinement be continued until his sentencing date. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion, rescinding Petitioner's bond and remanding him to jail pending sentencing.
Petitioner subsequently was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years with a fine of $5,000 for the crime of sexual abuse by a parent, not less than five nor more than fifteen years and a fine of $5,000 for the crime of incest, and not less than one nor more than three years and a fine of $300 for the crime of attempt to commit a felony. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The circuit court denied Petitioner credit for any time served on home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bail on the basis that Petitioner benefited from his plea bargain with the State. Petitioner now appeals the sentencing order entered on October 13, 2016.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
With respect to the standard of review of sentencing orders, this Court has held that " '[t]he Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders ... under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.' Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas , 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)."3
III. ANALYSIS
We first address Petitioner's assertion that the circuit court erred in denying him credit for time served on home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bail. Petitioner argues that the terms of his home incarceration, *200although a condition of pretrial bail , were identical to the terms imposed in post-conviction home incarcerations which are enumerated in West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 (2014).4
In State v. Hughes5 , this Court explained the distinction between post-conviction home confinement pursuant to the Home Confinement Act (the Act)6 and home confinement as a condition of pretrial bail. We found that the Act applies only to post-conviction situations and is penal in nature.7 We held the Act only applies to "offenders," which are defined in the Act as "any adult convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment or detention in a county jail or state penitentiary; or a juvenile convicted of a delinquent act that would be a crime punishable by imprisonment or incarceration in the state penitentiary or county jail, if committed by an adult."8 We further concluded that the penal intent of the Act is reflected by the substantial restrictions enumerated *201in West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 that are placed on the offender.9 We observed that an order for home confinement must contain the mandatory, restrictive burdens set forth in West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 so that the intent of the court in granting home confinement under the Act is clear.10
In Hughes , this Court distinguished home confinement imposed post-conviction from when it is imposed as a condition of pretrial bail. We specifically noted that "the purpose of pre-trial bail is not to punish, but rather it acts as 'security for the appearance of a defendant to answer to a specific criminal charge before any court or magistrate at a specific time or at any time to which the case may be continued.' "11 Thus, we held that home confinement as a condition of pretrial bail is not the equivalent of incarceration:
When a person who has been arrested, but not yet convicted of a crime, is admitted to pre-trial bail with the condition that he be restricted to home confinement pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-1C-2(c) (1992), the home confinement restriction is not considered the same as actual confinement in a jail, nor is it considered the same as home confinement under the Home Confinement Act , West Virginia Code §§ 62-11B-1 to - 12 (1993). Therefore, the time spent in home confinement when it is a condition of bail under West Virginia Code § 62-1C-2(c) does not count as credit toward a sentence subsequently imposed .[12 ]
We observed that "the numerous mandatory restrictions that must be imposed upon an individual granted home confinement under [ West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 of] the Act due its penal nature" are absent from the statutory scheme regarding bail. Therefore, we concluded that "[t]he absence of substantial restrictions indicates that bail, even with a home confinement restriction, is not the equivalent of incarceration."13
Four years later, this Court addressed the issue of whether an offender placed on home incarceration as a condition of post-conviction bail is entitled to receive credit for time spent on home incarceration.14 In State v. McGuire , we held:
[p]ursuant to the provisions of the Home Incarceration Act, West Virginia Code §§ 62-11B-1 to - 12 (1997 & Supp. 1999), when an offender is placed on home incarceration as a condition of post-conviction bail , if the terms and conditions imposed upon the offender are set forth fully in the home incarceration order and encompass, at a minimum, the mandatory, statutory requirements enunciated in West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5, then the offender is entitled to receive credit toward any sentence imposed for time spent on home incarceration , whether or not the offender violates the terms and conditions of home incarceration and whether or not the order specifically references the Home Incarceration Act.[15 ]
In so finding, we specifically observed that certain essential criteria must be established before a determination can be made that home incarceration was imposed by a circuit *202court under the provisions of the Act.16 We stated:
First , it must be found that the individual upon whom home incarceration was imposed was an offender as that term is defined by the Act. See W. Va. Code § 62-11B-3(3) ; see also Hughes , 197 W.Va. at 520, 476 S.E.2d at 191-92. Additionally , when an order imposes home incarceration pursuant to the Act, the order must set forth fully and completely the mandatory requirements of West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5.[17 ]
Following our decision in McGuire , the Legislature amended the Act, making it discretionary as to whether a circuit court grants credit to an offender for time spent on home incarceration as a condition of bail. West Virginia Code § 62-11B-11(b) (2014) now provides that "[u]pon conviction of a person, the circuit court, magistrate court or municipal court may, in its discretion , grant credit for time spent on home incarceration as a condition of bail toward any sentence imposed, if the person is found to have complied with the terms of bail."18
Petitioner contends that in his case, the statutory terms and conditions that are imposed on post-conviction home incarceration by West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 were imposed upon him at the pretrial stage. Thus, although he was not yet an "offender" at the time he was placed on home incarceration, Petitioner maintains that under Hughes and McGuire , the imposition of those terms and conditions rendered his home incarceration penal, entitling him to credit for that time served. Despite the Legislature's amendment to § 62-11B-11(b) affording the circuit court discretion as to whether to grant credit for time served on post-conviction home incarceration, Petitioner urges this Court to adopt the test in McGuire as a bright-line test in determining whether a court abused its discretion in refusing to grant credit for time spent on home confinement under the Act.
Petitioner argues that if not for the condition of home incarceration, he would have been in jail awaiting trial and would have been granted credit for his time spent there.19 Petitioner alleges that the circuit court's holding creates a system ripe for abuse if credit is not given under the circumstances of this case, where the home incarceration order restricts the offender to his home. He contends that home incarceration saves counties money while the offender's liberty is severely restricted with no constitutional protections. We find Petitioner's arguments unavailing.
Critically, Petitioner's home confinement was solely a condition of his pretrial bail; thus, he was not convicted of any offense when he was placed on home confinement. Although Petitioner sought to have his home confinement continued beyond his conviction until his date of sentencing, the circuit court denied his request. Because Petitioner was not an "offender" under the Act, it is not applicable to him. Even if we were to assume, for argument's sake, that the Act applied because Petitioner's home incarceration agreement included the same restrictions as those required by West Virginia Code § 62-11B-5 -an assertion for which Petitioner has *203not provided sufficient evidence20 -we would find that the circuit court's decision was not an abuse of discretion under West Virginia Code § 62-11B-11(b).
Unquestionably, the crimes of repeated sexual assault that Petitioner committed against his young son and his two friends, the details of which have been placed under seal before this Court, are heinous in nature. Petitioner was facing a thirty-nine-count indictment, but was permitted to plead guilty to only three counts, one of which was reduced to a lesser-included offense, due to the State's concern about presenting victim testimony at trial due to the victims' emotional difficulties. During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court acknowledged that the plea agreement was "really right on the edge of what would be ordinarily accepted by the [c]ourt, ... because it [was] such a lenient plea bargain to the [Petitioner]," given the nature of the crimes at issue and the details presented by the State regarding the long-lasting traumatic effects that the abuse has had on the minor victims. Thus, in denying Petitioner credit for time spent on home incarceration at the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated:
Sentences to be served consecutively, no credit for home confinement because I believe this man's benefited from his plea bargain to the extent that-its just-in my judgment, it's just not suitable to give him credit for home confinement spent on pre-trial release condition.
While Petitioner argues that the sentence was an abuse of discretion based upon his "prior lack of any real significant criminal history," age, employment history, and background, the facts of this case demonstrate otherwise. The mere fact that Petitioner was able to comply with the terms of his home incarceration is insufficient to warrant credit for pretrial home incarceration. As the circuit court observed at the sentencing hearing, Petitioner has neither admitted guilt during the course of these proceedings nor ever shown remorse for his conduct. For these reasons, we conclude that in accordance with Hughes , the circuit court properly refused to grant the Petitioner credit for time served on home incarceration.
Finally, with respect to Petitioner's blanket assertion that his sentence is disproportionate to the nature of the offense because he was denied credit for time served on home incarceration, we likewise conclude that this issue has no merit. Petitioner's sentences for the crimes of sexual abuse by a parent, incest and attempt to commit a felony are within statutory limits and Petitioner fails to assert that they were based on any impermissible factor.21 " 'Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.' Syllabus point 4, State v. Goodnight , 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982)."22 We conclude that Petitioner's sentence should be affirmed.
*204IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the October 13, 2016 sentencing order of the Circuit Court of Jackson County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KETCHUM dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.