**395On 8 November 2016, plaintiff Roy A. Cooper, III, was elected Governor of the State of North Carolina for a four-year term office commencing on 1 January 2017. On 16 December, 2016, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 4 and House Bill 17, which abolished the existing State Board of Elections and the existing State Ethics Commission; created a new Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement; and appointed the existing members of the State Ethics Commission to serve as the members of the Bipartisan State Board. The legislation in question was signed into law by former Governor Patrick L. McCrory on 16 December 2016. On 17 March 2017, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County, convened pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(b1), determined that the legislation in question violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the North Carolina Constitution by unconstitutionally impinging upon the Governor's ability to faithfully execute the laws. Cooper v. Berger , No. 16 CVS 15636, 2017 WL 1433245 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County, Mar. 17, 2017).
On 25 April 2017, Chapter 6 of the 2017 North Carolina Session Laws became law notwithstanding the Governor's veto. See Act of Apr. 11, 2017, ch. 6, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21 (LexisNexis).1 Session Law 2017-6 was captioned
AN ACT TO REPEAL G.S. 126-5(D)(2C), AS ENACTED BY S.L. 2016-126; TO REPEAL PART I OF S.L. 2016-125; AND TO CONSOLIDATE THE FUNCTIONS OF ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, LOBBYING, AND ETHICS UNDER
**396ONE QUASI-JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY AGENCY BY CREATING THE NORTH CAROLINA BIPARTISAN STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS ENFORCEMENT.
The newly-enacted legislation provided, in pertinent part, that:
Article 1.
Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement.
§ 163A-1. Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement established.
There is established the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement, referred to as the State Board in this Chapter.
§ 163A-2. Membership.
(a) The State Board shall consist of eight individuals registered to vote in North *101Carolina, appointed by the Governor, four of whom shall be of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates and four of whom shall be of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board. The Governor shall appoint four members each from a list of six nominees submitted by the State party chair of the two political parties with the highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board.
....
(c) Members shall be removed by the Governor from the State Board only for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. Violation of G.S. § 163A-3(d) shall be considered nonfeasance.
....
(f) At the first meeting in May, the State Board shall organize by electing one of its members chair and one of its members vice-chair, each to serve a two-year term as such. In 2017 and every four years thereafter, the chair shall be a member of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates, ... and the vice-chair a **397member of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates. In 2019 and every year four years thereafter, the chair shall be a member of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board, and the vice-chair a member of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates.
....
§ 163A-3. Meetings; quorum; majority.
....
(c) Unless otherwise specified in this Chapter, an affirmative vote of at least five members of the State Board shall be required for all actions by the State Board.
....
§ 163A-5. Independent agency, staff, and offices.
(a) The State Board shall be and remain an independent regulatory and quasi-judicial agency and shall not be placed within any principal administrative department. The State Board shall exercise its statutory powers, duties, functions, and authority and shall have all powers and duties conferred upon the heads of principal departments under G.S. 143B-10.
....
§ 163A-6. Executive Director of the State Board.
(a) There is hereby created the position of Executive Director of the State Board, who shall perform all duties imposed by statute and such duties as may be assigned by the State Board.
(b) The State Board shall appoint an Executive Director for a term of two years with compensation to be determined by the Office of State Human Resources. The Executive Director shall serve beginning May 15 after the first meeting held after new appointments to the State Board are made, unless removed for cause, until a successor is appointed. In the event of a vacancy, the vacancy shall be filled for the remainder of the term.
**398(c) The Executive Director shall be responsible for staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board's decisions and orders and shall perform such other responsibilities as may be assigned by the State Board.
(d) The Executive Director shall be the chief State elections official.
....
§ 163-30. County boards of elections; appointments; terms of office; qualifications; vacancies; oath of office; instructional meetings.
In every county of the State there shall be a county board of elections, to consist of four persons of good moral character who are registered voters in the county in which they are to act. Two of the members of the county board of elections shall be of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates, and two shall be of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published *102by the State Board. In 2017, members of county boards of elections shall be appointed by the State Board.... In 2019, members of county boards of elections shall be appointed by the State Board on the last Tuesday in June, and every two years thereafter, and their terms of office shall continue for two years from the specified date of appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified.
....
The State chair of each political party shall have the right to recommend to the State Board three registered voters in each county for appointment to the board of elections for that county. If such recommendations are received by the Board 15 or more days before the last Tuesday in June 2017 and each two years thereafter, it shall be the duty of the State Board to appoint the county boards from the names thus recommended....
....
At the first meeting in July annually, the county boards shall organize by electing one of its members chair and **399one of its members vice-chair, each to serve a one-year term as such. In the odd-numbered year, the chair shall be a member of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board, and the vice-chair a member of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates. In the even-numbered year, the chair shall be a member of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates, as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board, and the vice-chair a member of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates.
....
§ 163-31. Meetings of county boards of elections; quorum; majority; minutes.
... Three members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of board business. Except where required by law to act unanimously, a majority vote for action of the board shall require three of the four members.
....
SECTION 9. Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-2, as enacted by Section 4 of this act, the chairs of the two political parties shall submit a list of names to the Governor ..., and the Governor shall make appointments from those lists.... The State chairs of the two political parties shall not nominate, and the Governor shall not appoint, any individual who has served two or more full consecutive terms on the State Board of Elections or State Ethics Commission, as of April 30, 2017.
SECTION 10. Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-2(f) and (g), as enacted by Section 4 of this act, the Governor shall appoint a member of the State Board to serve as chair, a member to serve as vice-chair, and a member to serve as secretary of the State Board until its first meeting in May 2019, at which time the State Board shall select its chair and vice-chair in accordance with G.S. 163A-2(f) and select a secretary in accordance with G.S. 163A-2(g).
....
**400Section 17. Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-6, the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall not appoint an Executive Director until May 2019. Until such time as the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement appoints an Executive Director in accordance with G.S. 163A-6, as enacted by this act, the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections under G.S. 163-26, as of December 31, 2016, shall be the Executive Director.
Id ., secs. 4, 7(h)-(i), 9, 10, 17, at 23-34.
On 26 April 2017, the Governor filed a complaint, a motion for a temporary restraining order, and a motion for a preliminary injunction challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 3 through 222 of Session Law 2017-6 and seeking to preclude its implementation. On 27 April 2017, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina assigned a three-judge panel of the *103Superior Court, Wake County, to hear and decide this case as required by N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(b1). On 28 April 2017, defendants Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, filed a response in opposition to the Governor's motion for temporary restraining order. On the same date, the panel, by a divided vote, entered an order temporarily enjoining the enforcement of Sections 3 through 22 of Session Law 2017-6 "pending expiration of this Order or further Order of this Court."
On 23 May 2017, the Governor and the legislative leadership filed summary judgment motions.3 In addition, the legislative leadership filed a motion seeking to have the Governor's complaint dismissed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), on the grounds that the claims asserted by the Governor "constitute non-justiciable political questions" and that the Governor "lacks standing" and an answer in which they denied the material allegations of the Governor's complaint and asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including the political question doctrine, and the State of North Carolina filed an answer requesting the panel to "grant **401such relief as may be just and proper." On 1 June 2017, the panel entered an order dismissing the Governor's complaint pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1). On 6 June 2017, the Governor noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the panel's order. On 15 June 2017, the legislative leadership noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the temporary restraining order. On 19 July, 20 July, and 24 July 2017, respectively, this Court entered orders granting the Governor's petition for discretionary review prior to a decision by the Court of Appeals, allowing the legislative leadership to file an appellants' brief, prohibiting the parties "from taking further action regarding the unimplemented portions" of the challenged legislation, establishing an expedited briefing schedule, and setting this case for oral argument on 28 August 2017.
In his initial brief, the Governor argued that, while the General Assembly has the authority to enact laws, citing Article II, Sections 1 and 20 of the North Carolina Constitution (vesting "[t]he legislative power" in the General Assembly), its authority is subject to the constraints set out in Article I, Section 6 (providing that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other"). According to the Governor, the panel's decision to dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "ignor[es] separation of powers as a cornerstone of State government." In addition, the Governor asserted that he had standing to "protect the constitutional rights granted to his office," citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 6 ; id . art. II, §§ 1, 5 ; State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger , 368 N.C. 633, 645, 781 S.E.2d 248, 256 (2016) (noting that, since the adoption of the 1868 Constitution, the Governor has had the duty, pursuant to Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution, to faithfully execute the laws); Mangum v. Raleigh Board of Adjustment , 362 N.C. 640, 642, 669 S.E.2d 279, 281-82 (2008) (explaining that "the North Carolina Constitution confers standing on those who suffer harm"); Bacon v. Lee , 353 N.C. 696, 718, 549 S.E.2d 840, 855 (observing that " Article III, Section 5 of the State Constitution enumerates the express duties of the Governor"), cert. denied , 533 U.S. 975, 122 S.Ct. 22, 150 L.Ed. 2d 804 (2001). The Governor denied that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question in light of the judicial branch's duty "to identify where the line should be drawn ... between the Executive Branch and the Legislature," quoting News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Easley , 182 N.C. App. 14, 15-16, 641 S.E.2d 698, 700, disc. rev. denied , 361 N.C. 429, 648 S.E.2d 508 (2007). The Governor contended that, contrary to the arguments advanced by the legislative leadership, the presumption of constitutionality does not insulate Session Law 2017-6 from judicial scrutiny, citing **402Moore v. Knightdale Board of Elections , 331 N.C. 1, 4, 413 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1992) (stating that "[t]he presumption of constitutionality is not, however, *104and should not be, conclusive"). Finally, the Governor contended that the challenged portions of Session Law 2017-6 should be invalidated because they deprive him of the ability to exercise "enough 'control over the views and priorities of the officers' that implement 'executive policy' to allow the Governor to fulfill his constitutional duty of faithful execution," quoting McCrory , 368 N.C. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257.
The legislative leadership argued, on the other hand, that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question and that the Governor lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6. According to the legislative leadership, "the commitment of the power to alter the functions and duties of state agencies is reserved for the Legislature," with the manner in which the General Assembly has chosen to exercise that authority constituting a "political question that this Court has no authority to review." In addition, the legislative leadership contended that the Governor lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6 because the alleged constitutional injury upon which the Governor relies did not result from the enactment of the challenged legislation "given the similar or identical provisions in prior law," citing N.C.G.S. § 163-19 and section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6. In view of the fact that the panel did not reach the merits of the Governor's claim, the legislative leadership urged this Court to refrain from addressing the constitutionality of the challenged legislation even if it concluded that this case was justiciable and that the Governor had standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6. In the event that the Court elected to reach the merits of the Governor's constitutional claim, the legislative leadership asserts that the challenged legislation represents nothing more than the proper exercise of the General Assembly's constitutionally-derived legislative authority.
On 1 September 2017, "without determining that we lack the authority to reach the merits of plaintiff's claims," the Court entered an order concluding that "the proper administration of justice would be best served in the event that we allowed the panel, in the first instance, to address the merits of [the Governor's] claims before undertaking to address them ourselves." As a result, the Court certified this case "to the panel with instructions ... to enter a new order ... that (a) explains the basis for its earlier determination that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the claims advanced in [the Governor's] complaint and (b) addresses the issues that [the Governor] has raised on the merits."
**403On 31 October 2017, the panel entered an order determining that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the Governor's claims on the grounds that "[t]he functions, powers, and duties of an agency encompass how a particular agency might work, its structure, and what role it may play in enforcement of the laws"; "the power to alter the functions and duties of state agencies is reserved to the Legislature through its law-making ability and the Governor through executive order subject to review by the Legislature"; and that "[t]he merger of the Board of Elections and Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan Board ... is a political question and therefore a nonjusticiable issue." In compliance with our order requesting it to address the merits of the Governor's claims, the panel found that:
1. The General Assembly has the authority and power to create and modify the duties of state agencies. See, e.g., Adams v. N. Carolina Dep't of Nat. & Econ. Res. , 295 N.C. 683, 696-97, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978).
....
5. Plaintiff has produced no authority that a commission or board with an even number of members is unconstitutional as a matter of law. Plaintiff has also produced no authority that "deadlock" on a particular issue constitutes a separation of powers violation.
6. The requirement that the Governor must make his appointments from lists provided by the state party chairs does not constrain his execution of the laws or otherwise violate separation of powers, as the Governor (and not the General Assembly) has a choice among the names on the lists and is making the decision about who will ultimately serve.... Session Law 2017-[6]-*105N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-19 -also requires that the Governor appoint members to the Board of Elections from lists provided by the party chairs. This requirement was first added by Session Law 1985-62 after the election of Governor James Martin. Other statutory changes to the Board of Elections (including the extension of the term of the Executive Director, see S.L. 1973-1409, § 2; S.L. 1985-62), may have coincided with a change in the political party of the Governor but have not resulted in constitutional challenges.
....
**4048. The Executive Director of the Bipartisan Board is to be, beginning in May 2019, chosen by the Bipartisan Board. Until that time, the current Executive Director of the Board of Elections, whose term is extended by Session Law 2017-6, will serve as the Executive Director of the Bipartisan Board. Such a statutory extension of a term of office has been found to be constitutional....
9. The chair of the Bipartisan Board will initially be chosen by the Governor and will, thereafter, be chosen by the Bipartisan Board....
10. The Governor also has the ability to remove any or all members from the Bipartisan Board for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. The General Assembly has no ability to remove members.
11. The Governor has adequate supervision over the Bipartisan Board, given the Bipartisan Board's role in and impact on state government as the oversight authority for ethics, elections, and lobbying. Additionally, Session Law 2017-6 expressly states that the Bipartisan Board must comply with the duties under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-10, which includes reporting duties to the Governor. The General Assembly does not retain the ability to supervise the Bipartisan Board.
12. Session Law 2017-6 reserves no ongoing control to the General Assembly, and therefore, the General Assembly neither exercises power that the constitution vests exclusively in the executive branch nor prevents the Governor from performing his constitutional duties. Were the Governor given the degree of control he seeks over with the Board of Elections or Bipartisan Board in this case, neither Board could continue to function as "an independent regulatory and quasi-judicial agency" as the Board of Elections under prior law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-28, and the Bipartisan Board would under Session Law 2017-6 (enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163A-5(a) ).
13. On a facial challenge, this Court cannot consider hypothetical situations that could sink the statute; to the contrary, Plaintiff must "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid."
**405State v. Bryant , 359 N.C 554, 564, 614 S.E.2d 479 (2005) (quotations omitted)....
14. There is evidence that supports the Bipartisan Board being able to function in politically divided situations....
15. There are also numerous other boards and commissions tasked with some administrative functions that are made up of an even number of members such that tie votes and, therefore, deadlock, are hypothetical possibilities....
After conceding that "circumstances could arise where a deadlock or stalemate so stifles the work of the Bipartisan Board that [the Governor] would have standing to raise a challenge that this statute is unconstitutional, not on its face but as applied to that particular situation," the panel held that Session Law 2017-6 is not unconstitutional on its face.
In the supplemental briefs that the Court requested following the filing of the panel's order, the Governor argued that "the judicial branch has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve separation of powers disputes," citing McCrory , 368 N.C. at 638, 781 S.E.2d at 25, In re Alamance County Court Facilities , 329 N.C. 84, 99, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1991), and State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone , 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982), and that he has standing to advance the claim asserted in this complaint because the "North Carolina Constitution confers standing on the Governor to challenge statutes that cause him constitutional harm," citing Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution and Mangum , 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 281-82. In addressing the merits of his challenge to *106Session Law 2017-6, the Governor contends that the General Assembly's action in appointing the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board represented an unconstitutional exercise of control over an executive branch agency, with decisions authorizing legislative extensions of existing terms of office being inapplicable to a proper constitutional analysis given that those cases involved pre-existing municipal offices in which an incumbent's term was extended in lieu of holding a new election, citing Penny v. Salmon , 217 N.C. 276, 277, 7 S.E.2d 559, 560 (1940), and Crump v. Snead , 134 N.C. App. 353, 354, 517 S.E.2d 384, 385, disc. rev. denied , 351 N.C. 101, 541 S.E.2d 143 (1999), while the office of Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board did not exist prior to the enactment of the challenged legislation, citing section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6 (creating "the position of Executive Director of the State Board"), and given that the challenged legislation abolished the office **406of Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, citing subsections 7(e) and (f) of Session Law 2017-6 (repealing N.C.G.S. §§ 163-26 ). Finally, the Governor contends that Session Law 2017-6 contravenes the separation-of-powers principles set out in McCrory , which require a reviewing court to focus upon the extent to which the Governor has a sufficient degree of control over executive branch agencies. According to the Governor, McCrory requires that "the Governor must have 'enough control' over executive branch entities and officials that possess 'final executive authority' in order to perform his constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed," quoting McCrory , 368 N.C. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256, with the requisite degree of control being exercised by means of appointment, supervision, and removal, citing McCrory , 368 N.C. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. Although the General Assembly may require the appointment of statutory officers from lists and may require that appointees satisfy additional qualifications, the provisions of the challenged legislation "deprive[ ] the Governor of the ability to appoint a majority of members of the [Bipartisan] State Board who share his views and priorities."
On the other hand, the legislative leadership argues that the panel correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue in this case because the North Carolina Constitution provides the Governor with the authority to "make such changes in the allocation of offices and agencies and in the allocation of those functions, powers, and duties as he considers necessary for efficient administration," subject to later legislative review, quoting Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution, thereby eliminating any need for the judicial branch to "interject itself into a balance struck in the text of the Constitution specifically dealing with the organization and structure of a state agency." For that reason, "[t]he question raised in this case by the Governor goes to the structure and function of the agency, which is textually committed to a balance struck in the text of the Constitution."
As far as the merits are concerned, the legislative leadership contends that McCrory does not necessitate the invalidation of Session Law 2017-6 because the Bipartisan State Board is structured as an independent agency. According to the legislative leadership, "the quasi-judicial nature of a commission can support its independence from being under the thumb of the executive," citing Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2617, 101 L.Ed. 2d 569, 603 (1988). In addition, unlike the situation at issue here, the General Assembly appointed more members to the executive bodies at issue in McCrory than the Governor, citing McCrory , 368 N.C. at 637-38, 781 S.E.2d at 250-51.
**407Finally, the legislative leadership asserts that the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board is, on an ongoing basis, to be appointed by the members of the Bipartisan State Board and that the sole authority to remove the Executive Director is vested in the members of the Bipartisan State Board, citing section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6. The legislative leadership further argues that the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 designating the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board represent nothing more than the extension of a pre-existing term of office and that the Governor has mischaracterized the role of the Executive Director, whose authority *107is limited to "staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board's decisions and orders," quoting section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6.
"[O]ne of the fundamental principles on which state government is constructed," John V. Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 50 (2d ed. 2013), is that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other," N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. The legislative power is "vested in the General Assembly," N.C Const. art. II, § 1, which "enact[s] laws, within constitutional limits, to protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society," State v. Ballance , 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949) (citations omitted); see also N.C. Const. art. II, § 20. "The executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor," N.C. Const. art. III, § 1, who "faithfully executes, or gives effect to, these laws," McCrory , 368 N.C. at 635, 781 S.E.2d at 250 ; see also N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (4).4 Finally, "[t]he judicial power of the State, shall ... be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice," N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1, which "interprets the laws and, through its power of judicial review, determines whether they comply with the constitution," McCrory , 368 N.C. at 635, 781 S.E.2d at 250 ; see also N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1. Bayard v. Singleton , 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 6-7 (1787).
"The political question doctrine controls, essentially, when a question becomes 'not justiciable ... because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.' " Bacon , 353 N.C. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486, 517, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961, 23 L.Ed. 2d 491, 514 (1969) ). "The ... doctrine **408excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the" legislative or executive branches of government. Id . at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y , 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed. 2d 166, 178 (1986) ). "In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations." Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed. 2d 663, 682 (1962) (brackets in original) (quoting Coleman v. Miller , 307 U.S. 433, 454-55, 59 S.Ct. 972, 982, 83 L.Ed. 1385, 1397 (1939) ).
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Id . at 211, 82 S. Ct. at 706, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 682. In other words, the Court necessarily has to undertake a separation of powers analysis in order to determine whether the political question doctrine precludes judicial resolution of a particular dispute.
The distinction between cases that do and do not involve nonjusticiable political questions can be seen by comparing our decision in Bacon with the Court of Appeals' decision in News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Easley . In Bacon, which involved a challenge to "the constitutionality of the Governor's exercise of his clemency power under Article III, Section 5(6) of the Constitution of North Carolina," 353 N.C. at 698, 549 S.E.2d at 843, this Court stated that "a question may be held nonjusticiable under this doctrine if it involves 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,' " id . at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting Baker , 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686 ). As a result of the fact that " Article III, Section 5(6) of the State Constitution expressly commits *108the substance of the clemency power to the sole discretion of the Governor," we concluded that, "beyond the minimal safeguards applied to state clemency procedures," "judicial review of the exercise of clemency power would unreasonably disrupt a core power of the executive." Id . at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854. On the other hand, in News & Observer Publishing Co. , which **409also dealt with clemency-related issues, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the question before the Court is whether the [ News & Observer ] is entitled, under the Public Records Law, to certain clemency records within the possession of the Governor," 182 N.C. App. at 19, 641 S.E.2d at 702 ; determined that "[t]he answer to that question turns not on a political question, but on the meaning of our constitution's proviso that the Governor's power is subject to legislation 'relative to the manner of applying for pardons,' " id . at 19, 641 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (6)); and noted that "[t]he principle that questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the judiciary is just as well established and fundamental to the operation of our government as the doctrine of separation of powers," id. at 19, 641 S.E.2d at 702 (citations omitted). As a result, in order to resolve the justiciability issue, we must decide whether the Governor is seeking to have the judicial branch interfere with an issue committed to the sole discretion of the General Assembly or whether the Governor is seeking to have the Court undertake the usual role performed by a judicial body, which is to ascertain the meaning of an applicable legal principle, such as that embodied in N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (4).
As the briefs that he has submitted for our consideration clearly reflect, the Governor has not challenged the General Assembly's decision to merge the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan State Board, which is, as he appears to concede, a decision committed to the sole discretion of the General Assembly. See N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (10) (providing that "[t]he General Assembly shall prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State and may alter them from time to time"). Instead, the Governor has alleged in his complaint that the enactment of Session Law 2017-6 "curtail[ed], in significant ways[, his] executive powers." More specifically, the Governor has alleged that "Session Law 2017-6 violate[s] the separation of powers by preventing the Governor from performing his core function under the North Carolina Constitution to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' " quoting Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution. As a result, the Governor is not challenging the General Assembly's decision to "prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State" by merging the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan State Board and prescribing what the Bipartisan State Board is required or permitted to do; instead, he is challenging the extent, if any, to which the statutory provisions governing the manner in which the Bipartisan State Board is constituted and required to operate pursuant to Session Law 2017-6 **410impermissibly encroach upon his constitutionally established executive authority to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
As this Court explained in McCrory , "the separation of powers clause requires that, as the three branches of government carry out their duties, one branch will not prevent another branch from performing its core functions." 368 N.C. at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250 (citing Hart v. State , 368 N.C. 122, 126-27, 774 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2015) ). In that case, this Court considered former Governor McCrory's "challenge [to the constitutionality of] legislation that authorize[d] the General Assembly to appoint a majority of the voting members of three administrative commissions" on the grounds "that, by giving itself the power to appoint commission members, the General Assembly ha[d] usurped Governor McCrory's constitutional appointment power and interfered with his ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed," id . at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250, and noted that, in order to decide the issues before it in that case, the Court was required to "construe[ ] and appl[y] ... provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina," id . at 638-39, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (citations omitted). Instead of holding that Governor McCrory's challenge to the *109validity of the legislation in question involved a nonjusticiable political question, we addressed Governor McCrory's claim on the merits.5
Our implicit decision that Governor McCrory's claim was justiciable is fully consistent with the literal language contained in Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution, which refers to "the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State," or, in other words, to what the agencies in question are supposed to do, rather than the extent to which the Governor has sufficient control over those departments and agencies to ensure "that the laws be faithfully executed," N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (4). Alternatively, even if one does not accept this understanding of the scope of the General Assembly's authority under Article III, Section 5(10), we continue to have the authority to decide this case because the General Assembly's authority pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10) is necessarily constrained by the limits placed upon that authority by other constitutional provisions. See Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 132, 96 S.Ct. 612, 688, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659, 752 (1976) (noting that "Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction") (citation omitted). For this reason, **411the Governor's authority to appoint constitutional officers pursuant to Article III, Section 5(8) is subject to the constitutional provisions limiting dual office holding, N.C. Const. art. VI, § 9, and separation of powers, State ex rel. Wallace , 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 888 (holding that the appointment of sitting legislators to membership on administrative commissions constitutes a separation-of-powers violation); the General Assembly's exclusive authority to classify property for taxation-related purposes does not allow more favorable tax classification treatment for one religious organization as compared to another in light of the constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and equal protection, see N.C. Const. art. 1, §§ 13 and 19 ; Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., v. State , 299 N.C. 399, 406 n. 1, 263 S.E.2d 726, 730 n. 1 (1980) ; and the General Assembly's exclusive authority to enact criminal statutes, N.C. Const. art. II, § 1 (providing that the legislative power of the State is to be exercised by the General Assembly), does not authorize the enactment of ex post facto laws in violation of Article I, Section 16. As a result, under either interpretation of the relevant constitutional language, the authority granted to the General Assembly pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10)6 is subject to other constitutional limitations, including the explicit textual limitation contained in Article III, Section 5(4).7
In this case, like McCrory , the Governor has alleged that the General Assembly *110"usurped [his] constitutional ... power and interfered with **412his ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed," id . at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250, requiring us, consistent with McCrory , to "construe[ ] and appl[y] ... provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina," id . at 638, 781 S.E.2d at 252. In other words, unlike Bacon , this case involves a conflict between two competing constitutional provisions. For that reason, this case, like McCrory , involves an issue of constitutional interpretation, which this Court has a duty to decide utilizing the manageable judicial standard enunciated in that decision, rather than a nonjusticiable political question arising from nothing more than a policy dispute. See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1. A decision to reach a contrary result would necessarily compel the conclusion that both McCrory and Wallace were wrongly decided and sharply limit, if not eviscerate, the ability of executive branch officials to advance separation-of-powers claims. As a result, the panel erred by dismissing the Governor's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8
In order to have standing to maintain this case, the Governor was required to allege that he had suffered an injury as a result of the enactment of Session Law 2017-6 or, in other words, that he had "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." Mangum , 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev. , 284 N.C. 15, 28, 199 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973) ) (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 18 ). This Court held in McCrory that the Governor had standing to challenge the legislation at issue in that case on the grounds that it "interfered with his ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed." 368 N.C. at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250. Similarly, as is evidenced by the allegations set out in his complaint, the Governor has clearly asserted the existence of a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" in this case. Mangum , 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282. Simply put, if a sitting Governor lacks standing to maintain a separation-of-powers claim predicated on the theory that legislation impermissibly interferes with the authority constitutionally committed to the person holding that office, we have difficulty ascertaining who would ever have standing to assert such a claim. Apart from their contention that the claim advanced in the Governor's complaint is a nonjusticiable political question, which we have already rejected, the legislative leadership does not appear to explicitly contend **413that the Governor lacks the necessary personal stake in the outcome of this controversy to deprive him of standing.9 As a result, we hold that the panel erred by dismissing Governor Cooper's complaint for lack of standing to the extent that it did so.
Finally, we must address the merits of the Governor's claim that Session Law 2017-6 "unconstitutionally infringe[s] on the Governor's executive powers in violation of separation of powers."10 "We review constitutional *111questions de novo." McCrory , 368 N.C. at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (citing Piedmont Triad Reg'l Water Auth. v. Sumner Hills, Inc., 353 N.C. 343, 348, 543 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2001) ). "In exercising de novo review, we presume that laws enacted by the General Assembly are constitutional, and we will not declare a law invalid unless we determine that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (first citing Hart , 368 N.C. at 131, 774 S.E.2d at 287-88 ; then citing Baker v. Martin , 330 N.C. 331, 334-35, 410 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1991) ). In order to "determine whether the violation is plain and clear, we look to the text of the constitution, the historical context in which the people of North Carolina adopted the applicable constitutional provision, and our precedents." Id . at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (citations omitted). A facial **414challenge to the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the General Assembly, which is the type of challenge asserted in the Governor's complaint, "is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." Hart , 368 N.C. at 131, 774 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 363 N.C. 500, 502, 681 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2009) ).
As we have already noted, the North Carolina Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, contains an explicit separation-of-powers provision. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 6 (stating that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other"). For that and other reasons, "the separation of powers doctrine is well established under North Carolina law." Bacon , 353 N.C. at 716, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (citing, inter alia, State ex rel. Wallace , 304 N.C. at 595-601, 286 S.E.2d at 81-84 (stating at 304 N.C. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81, that "each of our constitutions has explicitly embraced the doctrine of separation of powers")). As we explained in McCrory , separation-of-powers violations can occur "when one branch exercises power that the constitution vests exclusively in another branch" or "when the actions of one branch prevent another branch from performing its constitutional duties." McCrory , 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256.
This Court has held that Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution requires "the Governor [to] have enough control over" commissions or boards that "are primarily administrative or executive in character" "to perform his [or her] constitutional duty," id . at 645-46, 781 S.E.2d at 256, with the sufficiency of the Governor's "degree of control" "depend[ing] on his [or her] ability to appoint the commissioners, to supervise their day-to-day activities and to remove them from office," id . at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. In view of the fact that "each statutory scheme" is different, "[w]e cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge" and "must resolve each challenge by carefully examining its specific factual and legal context." Id . at 646-47, 781 S.E.2d at 257. In holding that the legislation at issue in McCrory violated Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution, we noted that the General Assembly had "appoint[ed] executive officers that the Governor ha[d] little power to remove" and left "the Governor with little control over the views and priorities of the officers that the General Assembly appoint[ed]." Id . at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257.
The test adopted in McCrory is functional, rather than formulaic, in nature. Although we did not explicitly define "control" for separation-of-powers purposes in McCrory , we have no doubt that the relevant **415constitutional provision, instead of simply contemplating that the Governor will have the ability to preclude others from forcing him or her to execute the laws in a manner to which he or *112she objects, also contemplates that the Governor will have the ability to affirmatively implement the policy decisions that executive branch agencies subject to his or her control are allowed, through delegation from the General Assembly, to make as well. In the absence of such an understanding, the power of an executive branch agency to adopt rules and regulations could be rendered completely nugatory without any separation-of-powers violation having occurred.
The Bipartisan State Board established by Session Law 2017-6, which has responsibility for the enforcement of laws governing elections, campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics, clearly performs primarily executive, rather than legislative or judicial, functions.11 See id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256 (referring to "the final executive authority" that the three commissions at issue in that case "possess[ed]"). The Bipartisan State Board consists of eight members appointed by the Governor, four of whom must be members of the political party with the highest number of registered affiliates selected from a list of nominees provided by the chair of the party in question and four of whom must be members of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates selected from a list of nominees provided by the chair of the party in question. Ch. 6, sec. 4(c), 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (enacting N.C.G.S. § 163A-2 (2017) ). In addition, Session Law 2017-6, like the **416legislation governing the agencies at issue in McCrory , precludes the Governor from removing members of the Bipartisan State Board in the absence of "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance," id. , at 24 (enacting N.C.G.S. § 163A-2(c) (2017) ); see McCrory , 368 N.C. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 257 (stating that "the challenged legislation sharply constrains the Governor's power to remove members of any of the three commissions, allowing him to do so only for cause") and limits the ability of persons who share the Governor's policy preferences to supervise the day-to-day activities of the Bipartisan State Board, at least in the short term, by ensuring that no one could be appointed to the position of Executive Director other than the General Assembly's appointee until May 2019. As was the case in McCrory , in which we determined that the General Assembly had exerted excessive control over certain executive agencies by depriving the Governor of "control over the views and priorities" of a majority of the members of the commissions at issue in that litigation, 368 N.C. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257, we conclude that the relevant provisions of Session Law 2017-6, when considered as a unified whole, "leave[ ] the Governor with little control over the views and priorities" of the Bipartisan State Board, id . at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257, by requiring that a sufficient number of its members to block the implementation of the Governor's policy preferences be selected from a list of nominees chosen by the leader of the political party other than the one to which the Governor belongs,12 limiting the extent to which individuals *113supportive of the Governor's policy preferences have the ability to supervise the activities of the Bipartisan State Board, and significantly constraining the Governor's ability to remove members of the Bipartisan State Board.
In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, the legislative leadership has advanced a number of arguments, each of which we **417have carefully considered. Among other things, the legislative leadership asserts that the General Assembly has not retained ongoing supervision or control over the Bipartisan State Board given that none of its members are either legislators, as was the case in Wallace , or legislative appointees, as was the case in McCrory . This argument rests upon an overly narrow reading of McCrory , which focuses upon the practical ability of the Governor to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed rather than upon (1) the exact manner in which his or her ability to do so is impermissibly limited or (2) whether the impermissible interference stems from (a) direct legislative supervision or control or from (b) the operation of some other statutory provision. Put another way, the separation-of-powers violations noted in Wallace and McCrory do not constitute the only ways in which the Governor's obligation to "faithfully execute the laws" can be the subject of impermissible interference. Instead, as McCrory clearly indicates, the relevant issue in a separation-of-powers dispute is whether, based upon a case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the Governor is entitled to appoint, supervise, and remove the relevant executive officials, the challenged legislation impermissibly interferes with the Governor's ability to execute the laws in any manner.
The General Assembly does, of course, have the authority pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution to specify the number of members of an executive branch commission. Moreover, the General Assembly clearly has the authority to establish qualifications for commission membership, to make certain persons ex officio members of the commission, and to mandate that differing policy preferences be reflected in the commission's membership.13 Similarly, the General Assembly has the undoubted authority to prescribe the commission's functions, powers and duties and to determine the substance of the laws and policies that the commission is called upon to execute. Finally, the General Assembly has the authority to provide the commission with a reasonable degree of independence from short-term political interference14 and to foster the making of independent, non-partisan decisions.
**418All of these *114determinations are policy-related decisions committed to the General Assembly rather than to this Court. The General Assembly cannot, however, consistent with the textual command contained in Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution, structure an executive branch commission in such a manner that the Governor is unable, within a reasonable period of time, to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" because he or she is required to appoint half of the commission members from a list of nominees consisting of individuals who are, in all likelihood, not supportive of, if not openly opposed to, his or her policy preferences while having limited supervisory control over the agency and circumscribed removal authority over commission members. An agency structured in that manner "leaves the Governor with little control over the views and priorities of the [majority of] officers" and prevents the Governor from having "the final say on how to execute the laws." McCrory , 368 N.C. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257. As a result, the manner in which the membership of the Bipartisan State Board is structured and operates under Session Law 2017-6 impermissibly, facially, and beyond a reasonable doubt interferes with the Governor's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed as required by Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina. Id .
In addition to challenging the validity of the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 governing the composition of the Bipartisan State Board, the Governor has also challenged the statutory provisions "creat[ing] the position of Executive Director of the [Bipartisan] State Board" and making the Executive Director, who is designated as the "chief State elections official," "responsible for staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board's decisions and orders" and for performing "such other responsibilities as may be assigned by the State Board." Ch. 6, sec. 4(c), 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 26 (enacting N.C.G.S § 163A-6 (a), (c), (d) (2017) ). Although the General Assembly appointed the individual then serving as the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections to be the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board for a term of office lasting until at least May 2019, see id. , sec. 17, at 34, the Bipartisan State Board is entitled to appoint an Executive Director by a majority vote after that point, N.C.G.S. § 163A-6 (2017). As a result, the relevant provisions of Session Law 2017-6 ensure that the Governor will not have **419any control over the identity of the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board until May 2019 and, perhaps, even after that time, given the manner in which the General Assembly has structured the membership of the Bipartisan State Board in Session Law 2017-6, id . § 163A-2.
Although the legislative leadership argues that, rather than appointing the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board, the General Assembly simply extended the term of the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, we do not find that argument persuasive. As an initial matter, given that Session Law 2017-6 abolished the State Board of Elections, the position of Executive Director of that body no longer exists. Instead, Session Law 2017-6 expressly "create[s] the position of Executive Director of the [Bipartisan] State Board," id . § 163-6(a), clearly indicating that the position of Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board is a new office rather than the continuation of an existing one. In addition, given the General Assembly's decision to combine the functions previously performed by the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the functions to be performed by a single agency, the duties assigned to the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board are necessarily more extensive than the duties assigned to the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections. See Ch. 6, sec. 4(c), at 26 (enacting N.C.G.S. § 163A-1 (2017) ). As a result, we cannot agree that the General Assembly's decision to designate the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections as the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board constitutes nothing more than the exercise of the General Assembly's authority to extend the term of an existing officeholder in order to achieve some valid public policy goal.
As the Bipartisan State Board is structured in Session Law 2017-6, the General Assembly's decision to appoint the Executive *115Director of the Bipartisan State Board and to preclude the Bipartisan State Board from either selecting a new Executive Director prior to May 2019 or removing the Executive Director in the absence of "cause," N.C.G.S. § 163A-6(b), could impermissibly constrain the Governor's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. See McCrory , 368 N.C. at 645-46, 781 S.E.2d at 256-57. On the other hand, in the event that the membership of the Bipartisan State Board is structured in such a manner as to pass constitutional muster under Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution and the Board is given adequate control over the manner in which the duties assigned to the Executive Director are performed, the Bipartisan State Board's ability to supervise and control the actions of the Executive Director might suffice to give the Governor adequate control over the Executive Director's activities, which appear to be **420primarily administrative in nature,15 for separation-of-powers purposes. For that reason, an interim appointment to the position of Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board made by the General Assembly for a limited term might not constitute a separation-of-powers violation in the event that the Governor otherwise has sufficient control over the Bipartisan State Board. For that reason, given our determination that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the manner in which the members of the Bipartisan State Board must be selected pursuant to Session Law 2017-6 is constitutionally invalid, we need not reach the issue of whether the provisions governing the selection of the Executive Director constitute a separate violation of Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution at this time and decline to do so.
Finally, the Governor has questioned the validity of the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 requiring that the office of the chair of the Bipartisan State Board be rotated between the state's two largest political parties and the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 restructuring the county boards of elections. Among other things, the Governor contends that the restructuring of the county boards of elections worked by Session Law 2017-6 "interferes with the executive function by creating deadlocked structures" and argues that the manner in which the *116county boards of elections are structured, coupled with the similar provisions governing the structure of the Bipartisan State Board, are likely to have the effect **421of thwarting the implementation of any particular Governor's election law-related policy preferences given that both boards will have a sufficient number of members who are unlikely to share the Governor's policy views to preclude the implementation of his or her preferred method of executing the elections laws. Although we agree that the provisions of Session Law 2016-7 governing the selection of the chair of the Bipartisan State Board and the manner in which the county boards of elections are structured have the effect of compounding the separation-of-powers violation which we have identified earlier in this opinion, we further note that the Governor has not argued before this Court that either of these sets of provisions, taken in isolation, work an independent separation-of-powers violation. In light of the manner in which the Governor has argued these issues before this Court and our decision to invalidate the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 relating to the composition of the Bipartisan State Board, we express no opinion concerning the extent, if any, to which an independent separation-of-powers challenge relating to provisions of Session Law 2017-6 governing the rotation of the office of chair of the Bipartisan State Board among the two largest political parties or the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 governing the composition of the county boards of elections would have merit.
As we have already noted, the General Assembly noted an appeal from the temporary restraining order that the panel entered following the filing of the Governor's complaint. However, given that this temporary restraining order was dissolved relatively shortly after its entry, any decision that we might make with respect to its validity "cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy." Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass'n , 344 N.C. 394, 398-399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). Moreover, since we conclude that the issues that had to be addressed during the proceedings leading to the entry of the challenged temporary restraining order are unlikely to recur, we do not believe that the legislative leadership's challenge to the entry of the temporary restraining order is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson , 134 N.C. App. 286, 292, 517 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1999) (stating that "[a]n otherwise moot claim falls within this exception where '(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again' " (quoting Ballard v. Weast , 121 N.C. App. 391, 394, 465 S.E.2d 565, 568 (alterations in the original), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied , 343 N.C. 304, 471 S.E.2d 66 (1996) )). Similarly, given that the temporary restraining order has been dissolved and that we have decided the Governor's constitutional claim on the **422merits, we are not persuaded that a decision to address the legislative leadership's challenge to the temporary restraining order would, at this point, serve the "public interest." Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n , 368 N.C. 92, 100, 772 S.E.2d 445, 450 (2015) (declining to reach the merits of an obviously significant issue relating to the regulatory treatment of coal ash lagoons because any decision to do so would not "have any practical impact"). For all of these reasons, the legislative leadership's appeal from the temporary restraining order is dismissed as moot.
Thus, we hold that the panel erred by dismissing the Governor's complaint. Simply put, the claim asserted in the Governor's complaint does not raise a nonjusticiable political question, and the Governor clearly has standing to assert the claim that he has presented for consideration by the judicial branch. In addition, for the reasons set forth in more detail above, the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 concerning the membership of and appointments to the Bipartisan State Board, taken in context with the other provisions of that legislation, impermissibly interfere with the Governor's ability to faithfully execute the laws in violation of Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution. Finally, the legislative leadership's appeal from the 28 April 2017 temporary restraining order is moot and does not come within the proper scope of either of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine upon which the legislative leadership relies. As a result, (1) the panel's 1 June 2017 order is reversed, with this case being remanded to the panel for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including the entry of a final judgment on the merits, and (2) the legislative leadership's appeal from the 28 April 2017 temporary restraining order is dismissed as moot.
ORDER ENTERED ON 1 JUNE 2017 REVERSED AND REMANDED; APPEAL
*117FROM ORDER ENTERED ON 28 APRIL 2017 DISMISSED AS MOOT.