**188The issue before us in this case is whether an indictment returned for the purpose of charging defendant with the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon sufficed to give the trial court jurisdiction to enter judgment against defendant based upon his conviction for having committed that offense. After careful consideration of the record in light of the applicable law, we hold that the challenged indictment was fatally defective because it did not sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon and, for that reason, affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
At 11:45 a.m. on 13 September 2013, Stacy Phillips, a teller at a PNC Bank branch located in Jacksonville, was the victim of a robbery. At that time, a man entered the bank and laid a note on the counter in front of Ms. Phillips. "[T]he first thing [Ms. Phillips] saw on [the note] was 'armed,' " which led her to believe that a robbery was in progress. More specifically, the note that the man placed before Ms. Phillips read "armed" and instructed, "eyes down, 2,000-or two straps of hundreds, two straps of fifties, two straps of twenties, no devices." In spite of the fact that the only item that she saw in the robber's possession was a case that he carried under his arm, Ms. Phillips believed that the robber was armed based upon the information contained in the note that he presented to her.
Although Ms. Phillips attempted to grab the note, the robber said, "Don't touch it." At that point, Ms. Phillips gave the robber a bait strap, which included $330 in marked bills; some additional $20, $50, and $100 bills; and a dye pack, all of which the robber placed in the case. As the robber reached the door and began to leave the bank, Ms. Phillips **189activated a silent alarm and complied with PNC's robbery protocol by calling the police, locking the facility's doors, preparing an account of what she had experienced, and providing assistance to the other persons present at the time of the robbery.
Detective Gary Manning of the Jacksonville Police Department, accompanied by several other officers, arrived at the bank shortly after the robbery. After securing the crime scene and obtaining information from other witnesses, Detective Manning viewed surveillance video footage related to the robbery. As he did so, Detective Manning observed that a "red bloom ... emanat[ed] from the ... front passenger area of the vehicle" apparently used by the robber to facilitate his escape. According to Karen Salefsky, the bank manager, the "red bloom" that could be seen in the surveillance video resulted from the explosion of the dye pack contained in the bait strap.
On the following day, Detective Manning received a call from an individual who "had found money in a dumpster in Phoenix Park Apartments." While searching the dumpster, Detective Manning retrieved money "stained *506with a bright red" dye "consistent with the manner in which a dye pack is prepared." In addition, Detective Manning determined that the serial numbers of the currency retrieved from the dumpster matched those printed on the currency taken during the robbery.
On 23 September 2013, Crime Stoppers received a tip identifying the suspect depicted in the surveillance footage, which had been released to the public, as defendant, a resident of Kinston. After noticing "a striking resemblance between photographs ... of [defendant] and the person depicted in the surveillance footage," Detective Manning began to investigate defendant's possible connection to the robbery. Detective Manning learned that defendant had access to a vehicle resembling the one shown in the surveillance video footage, which was a black Suzuki XL7 that was registered to defendant's girlfriend, Heather Crider. On 4 October 2013, Ms. Crider's Suzuki XL7 was located in downtown Kinston. While searching the vehicle with Ms. Crider's consent, Detective Manning observed red smudges on the vehicle's exterior consistent with those that would have been made during the release of the dye pack contained in the bait strap.
At the time that he was arrested in Kinston on 11 October 2013, defendant possessed a duffle bag that contained, among other things, a green bed sheet stained with red material that was consistent with the color of certain stains found in the dumpster and on the exterior of Ms. Crider's Suzuki XL7. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant **190admitted that he had robbed the Jacksonville PNC Bank and gave an account of that episode consistent with the information that Detective Manning developed during his investigation. Although defendant told Detective Manning that he had been "provided" with a "pee shooter," which Detective Manning "took to mean a small caliber pistol," before entering the PNC Bank, investigating officers never recovered it or any other weapon believed to have been used during the robbery.
On 12 August 2014, the Onslow County grand jury returned a bill of indictment that was intended to charge defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon. The indictment alleged, in pertinent part, that:
defendant [ ] unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away another's personal property, U.S. Money from PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., at the location of "PNC Bank" ... when a bank employee, Stacy Phillips was present. The defendant committed this act by way of it reasonably appearing to the victim Stacy Phillips that a dangerous weapon was in the defendant's possession, being used and threatened to be used by communicating that he was armed to her in a note with demands and instructions for her to complete, whereby the life of Stacy Phillips was threatened and endangered.
The charges against defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 11 May 2015 criminal session of the Superior Court, Onslow County. On 15 May 2015, the jury returned a verdict convicting defendant as charged. Based upon the jury's verdict, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing defendant to a term of fifty-three to seventy-six months imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal from the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals.
In seeking relief from the trial court's judgment before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred by failing to dismiss the indictment returned against him in this case on the grounds that it failed to properly charge him with the commission of robbery with a dangerous weapon. According to defendant, "[t]he requirements for an indictment charging a crime in which one of the elements is the use of a deadly weapon are (1) to 'name the weapon and (2) either to state expressly that the weapon used was a "deadly weapon" or to allege such facts as would necessarily demonstrate the deadly character of the weapon,' " quoting State v. Brinson , 337 N.C. 764, 768, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting **191State v. Palmer , 293 N.C. 633, 639-40, 239 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1977) ). More specifically, defendant asserted that
[a]lthough the language "robbery with a dangerous weapon" appears in the caption, the indictment fails to name any weapon.
*507Since no weapon was named, the State could not expressly state that the weapon was a deadly weapon or allege facts that demonstrate the deadly character of the weapon. The indictment also fails to allege any facts of how the victim's life was threatened or endangered. The indictment simply states that it appeared to the victim that Mr. Murrell possessed a "dangerous weapon."
In defendant's view, "[b]ecause the dangerous weapon [that] Mr. Murrell allegedly possessed inside the bank was not named[,] the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction." In support of this contention, defendant pointed out that "the 'implement' alleged in the indictment is a note which contained the word 'armed,' " which "is not an article, instrument or substance likely to produce death or great bodily harm," citing State v. Wiggins , 78 N.C.App. 405, 406, 337 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1985), and which "cannot[, for that reason,] constitute a dangerous weapon for purposes of robbery with a dangerous weapon pursuant to N.C.[G.S.] § 14-87."
The State, on the other hand, argued that the indictment intended to charge defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon sufficed to establish the trial court's jurisdiction because it alleged "that Defendant handed a note saying 'armed' to the victim, and that it reasonably appeared to the victim that Defendant possessed a 'dangerous weapon.' " According to the State, the indictment at issue in this case alleged the essential elements of the crime of robbery with a deadly weapon, citing State v. Beaty , 306 N.C. 491, 496, 293 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1982), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. White , 322 N.C. 506, 518, 369 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1988), given that the indictment included references to "deadly weapon" and "armed."
On 19 April 2016, the Court of Appeals filed an opinion holding that the indictment intended to charge defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon was fatally defective because it failed to name any dangerous weapon that defendant allegedly employed. State v. Murrell , --- N.C.App. ----, --- S.E.2d ----, 2016 WL 1565576, at *5, (Apr. 19, 2016) (No. COA15-1097) (unpublished). As a result, the Court of Appeals arrested judgment with respect to the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id . However, given that the challenged indictment sufficiently alleged the commission of a common law robbery, the Court of **192Appeals remanded this case to the Superior Court, Onslow County, "for entry of judgment and resentencing on common law robbery." Id . (quoting State v. Marshall , 188 N.C.App. 744, 752, 656 S.E.2d 709, 715, disc. rev. denied , 362 N.C. 368, 661 S.E.2d 890 (2008) ). On 22 September 2016, this Court granted the State's discretionary review petition.
In seeking to persuade this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, the State argues that the indictment at issue in this case sufficed to charge the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon because it alleged all of the elements of that criminal offense. As an initial matter, the State notes that this Court has held that "[i]t is sufficient for indictments or warrants seeking to charge a crime in which one of the elements is the use of a deadly weapon (1) to name the weapon and (2) either to state expressly that the weapon used was a 'deadly weapon' or to allege such facts as would necessarily demonstrate the deadly character of the weapon," quoting Palmer , 293 N.C. at 639-40, 239 S.E.2d at 411 (emphasis omitted). The indictment at issue in this case satisfies the first of these two approaches, according to the State, because "the indictment did name a weapon" given the allegation that defendant presented a "note saying that [he] was armed," and because this statement "amounts to [an allegation concerning the] actual threatened use of a dangerous weapon." In addition, the State asserts that the indictment at issue in this case satisfies the second of the approaches delineated in Palmer because "the indictment here expressly states that it appeared that Defendant possessed a 'dangerous weapon.' " As a result, contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, the State contends that "the indictment meets the aforementioned requirements for robbery with a dangerous weapon."
On the other hand, defendant asserts that the indictment that was intended to charge defendant with robbery with a dangerous *508weapon in this case failed to satisfy either of the approaches delineated in Palmer and did not, for that reason, suffice to support defendant's conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon given its failure to "specify a dangerous weapon," to "set forth any facts describing a dangerous weapon," or to "allege that Mr. Murrell possessed any weapon at all." According to defendant, Palmer requires "some minimal degree of specificity in describing the dangerous weapon at issue in an indictment for robbery with a dangerous weapon." In defendant's view, "[t]he State ... must prove that the instrument in question is a dangerous weapon"; in the event that "the State cannot name a dangerous weapon nor describe one, the State cannot allege nor prove [armed robbery]." A note containing the word "armed," cannot, in defendant's view, constitute a **193"dangerous weapon." According to defendant, the indictment fails to allege that defendant possessed a dangerous weapon while committing the robbery, citing State v. Keller , 214 N.C. 447, 449, 199 S.E. 620, 621 (1938) (holding that robbery with a dangerous weapon "requires as a constituent element the presence of firearms [or some other dangerous weapon]"). A mere allegation that defendant informed the bank teller that he was armed simply "fails to allege that Mr. Murrell in fact possessed a dangerous weapon." (Emphasis omitted.) Put another way, defendant argues that the indictment alleged that defendant "conveyed the impression that he possessed some type of weapon" while failing to allege the actual possession of a dangerous weapon. As a result, defendant asserts that "[t]he indictment was fatally defective and conferred jurisdiction only for common law robbery."
According to well-established North Carolina law, a valid indictment is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Morgan , 226 N.C. 414, 415, 38 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1946) ; see also State v. Snyder , 343 N.C. 61, 65, 468 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1996). Generally speaking, an indictment is sufficient if it: (1) "apprises the defendant of the charge against him with enough certainty to enable him to prepare his defense"; (2) "protect[s] him from subsequent prosecution for the same offense"; and (3) "enable[s] the court to know what judgment to pronounce in the event of conviction." State v. Coker , 312 N.C. 432, 434-35, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984) (citations omitted); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2015) (requiring that a criminal pleading contain "[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant ... of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation"). In order to satisfy the relevant statutory requirements, including the provision of adequate notice, an "indictment must allege lucidly and accurately all the essential elements of the offense endeavored to be charged." State v. Ellis , 368 N.C. 342, 344, 776 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2015) (quoting State v. Hunt , 357 N.C. 257, 267, 582 S.E.2d 593, 600, cert . denied , 539 U.S. 985, 124 S.Ct. 44, 156 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003) ). Consistent with this general rule, "[a]n indictment charging a statutory offense must allege all of the essential elements of the offense." Snyder , 343 N.C. at 65, 468 S.E.2d at 224 (citation omitted). "A criminal pleading ... is fatally defective if it 'fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty,' " Ellis , 368 N.C. at 344, 776 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting State v. Gregory , 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943) ), with the presence or absence of such a fatal defect to be "judged based solely upon **194the language of the criminal pleading in question without giving any consideration to the evidence that is ultimately offered in support of the accusation contained in that pleading," id . at 347, 776 S.E.2d at 679.
Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place of business, residence or banking institution or any other place where there is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, either day or night ... shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
*509N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2015) (defining "Robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons"). As a result, the essential elements of the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon are (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from another; (2) the possession, use, or threatened use of firearms or other dangerous weapon,1 implement, or means; and (3) a danger or threat to the life of the victim. See State v. Moore , 279 N.C. 455, 458, 183 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1971) ; see also N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a). Although the indictment at issue in this case clearly alleges that defendant unlawfully took the personal property of another while threatening the life of the victim, we do not believe that the indictment adequately alleges the possession, use, or threatened use of firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement, or means.
As this Court has previously stated, "robbery with firearms of necessity requires as a constituent element the presence of firearms," Keller , 214 N.C. at 449, 199 S.E. at 621, or, by logical extension, the presence of a dangerous weapon. See also State v. Joyner , 295 N.C. 55, 63, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978) (stating that "[t]he question in an armed robbery case is whether a person's life was in fact endangered or threatened by defendant's possession, use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, **195not whether the victim was scared or in fear of his life"). In evaluating the meaning of the statutory reference to "the use or threatened use of any firearms," N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a), we have previously determined that
the word "use" as a noun has the meaning of an "act of employing anything, or state of being employed; application; employment.... The words "threatened use" coupled, as they are, with the preceding words clearly indicate the threatened act of employing. Hence, construed contextually the clause "with the use or threatened use" of a weapon, requires, in the one instance, or presupposes, in the other, the presence of the weapon with which the act may be executed or threatened.
Keller , 214 N.C. at 449, 199 S.E. at 621-22 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Hinton , 361 N.C. 207, 211-12, 639 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2007) (stating that "the General Assembly intended to require the State to prove that a defendant used an external dangerous weapon before conviction under the statute is proper"); State v. Williams , 335 N.C. 518, 520, 438 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1994) (stating that, "[t]o establish robbery or attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon at the time of the robbery or attempted robbery and that the victim's life was in danger or threatened") (citing N.C.G.S. § 14-87 (1986) ); State v. Gibbons , 303 N.C. 484, 491, 279 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1981) (stating that "[o]ur interpretation, which requires both an act of possession and an act with the weapon which endangers or threatens the life of the victim gives substance to all of the terms of the statute"). As a result, an indictment sufficient to charge the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon must allege the presence of a firearm or dangerous weapon used to threaten or endanger the life of a person.
In State v. Palmer , this Court, in addressing the manner in which the use of a "dangerous weapon" must be alleged,2 held
that it is sufficient for indictments ... seeking to charge a crime in which one of the elements is the use of a deadly weapon *510(1) to name the weapon and (2) either to state expressly that the weapon used was a "deadly weapon" or to allege such facts as would necessarily demonstrate **196the deadly character of the weapon. Whether the state can prove the allegation is, of course, a question of evidence which cannot be determined until trial.
293 N.C. at 639-40, 239 S.E.2d at 411.3 For instance, in State v. Brinson , an indictment purporting to charge an assault with a deadly weapon alleged, in pertinent part, that the defendant "unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did assault John Delton Eason, Jr. ... by ... slamming his head against the cell bars, a deadly weapon, and floor. The assault was intended to kill and resulted in serious injury, a broken neck ... and ... left the victim paralyzed." Brinson , 337 N.C. at 767, 448 S.E.2d at 824. This Court determined that the indictment satisfied the first of the two approaches delineated in Palmer because it "specifically referred to the cell bars and cell floor" and satisfied the second of the two approaches delineated in Palmer by stating that "the victim's broken neck and paralysis resulted from the 'assault,' " " 'necessarily demonstrat[ing] the deadly character' of' the cell bars and floor." Id . at 768, 448 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Palmer , 293 N.C. at 640, 239 S.E.2d at 411 (emphasis omitted)).
The indictment at issue in this case alleged that defendant took money "by way of it reasonably appearing to the victim ... that a dangerous weapon was in the defendant's possession, being used and threatened to be used by communicating that he was armed to her in a note." An allegation that it "reasonably appear[ed] ... that a dangerous weapon was in the defendant's possession" is simply not equivalent to an allegation that defendant actually possessed a weapon.4 In the event that the allegation that defendant was "armed" was intended to suggest **197that defendant possessed an unidentified weapon, the nature, identity, or deadly character of that unidentified weapon is not described at any point in the indictment. See State v. Hines , 166 N.C.App. 202, 207, 600 S.E.2d 891, 895 (2004) (addressing a fatal variance claim, rather than a challenge to the indictment's sufficiency, arising under an indictment describing the weapon used in a robbery as "an unknown blunt force object causing trauma to the head of the victim."). Simply put, the indictment at issue in this case provides no basis for a determination that defendant was "armed" with any implement that was inherently dangerous or used in such a manner as to threaten the infliction of death or serious injury.5 As a result, since the indictment *511returned against defendant in this case failed to sufficiently allege that defendant possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon,6 the Court of Appeals correctly held that the indictment returned against defendant in this case for the purpose of charging him with the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon was fatally defective.
AFFIRMED.