Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 164 Idaho 396, 399, 431 P.3d 4, 7 (2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because the facts in this case are largely undisputed, this case solely presents a question of law.
"An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 716, 378 P.3d 464, 506 (2016) (quoting Smith v. Mitton , 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004) ).
When this Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the four-part inquiry is "[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, 675, 434 P.3d 1275, 1281 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 864, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) ).
IV. ANALYSIS
The election contest at the center of this controversy concerns a disputed Senate seat following a general election. It is only the second such contest in Idaho's history. In addition, in 129 years of legislative history since statehood, the Senate has never before awarded attorney fees against a private citizen contesting the results of an election on the grounds that the contest was frivolous. Thus, in addition to the important constitutional principles at stake here, this case presents an issue of first impression for the Court.
A. The Idaho Senate did not have authority to award attorney fees to Nye at the time of this election contest.
The primary issue before us is not whether the amount of attorney fees awarded to Nye was unreasonable, but whether the Senate had authority under the Idaho Constitution to award Nye any attorney fees at all. Katsilometes argues that the Senate did not have authority under Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution to award attorney fees to Nye, regardless of the Senate's finding that the Contest of Election was "brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without factual or legal foundation."2 Accordingly, he argues that the district court erred when it determined the Senate had such authority and entered a declaratory judgment against him. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the Senate did not have the authority to award attorney fees to Nye in January 2017 and, therefore, the district court erred when it entered a declaratory judgment against Katsilometes.
As this Court examines the constitutional authority vested in a co-equal branch of the government-in this case, the legislative branch-we are respectfully mindful that this dispute involves the interplay of the bedrock principles of separation of powers and checks and balances enshrined in the Idaho Constitution. Article II, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that:
*908The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
"The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is able to operate independently." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139, 804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990). "The separation of powers doctrine prohibits 'judicial review of the discretionary acts of other branches of government.' " Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 28, 394 P.3d 54, 71 (2017) (quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995)). "The question is whether this Court, by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one properly entrusted to that other branch." Id. (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989) ).
As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the dissent does not believe that "the Senate's decision to award fees was so egregious as to convert a non-justiciable question into a justiciable one." The district court recognized that "[i]n order to reach a decision in a declaratory action, a court must determine whether a justiciable controversy exists ...." Thus, if the majority were to agree with the dissent that this case presents a non-justiciable controversy, the necessary outcome would be to vacate the district court's judgment granting declaratory relief, effectively nullifying the Senate's award of attorney fees to Nye. Yet, the dissent does not advocate for such an outcome. Instead, it describes the declaratory judgment in favor of Nye "as a perfunctory enforcement mechanism which perfected the Senate's award." The dissent cannot have it both ways-this case either presents a justiciable controversy that the courts can address, or it does not.
Neither side has argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable controversy. The Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act recognizes that "[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. I.C. § 10-1201. As the district court correctly noted, in considering "whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the criteria is whether it will clarify and settle the legal relations at issue, and whether such declaration will afford a leave from uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Sweeney v. Am. Nat'l Bk., 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 (1941). Because we believe that addressing this case will be helpful in clarifying the extent of the constitutional authority granted to the legislative branch under its plenary powers, we affirm the district court's decision to take up this matter.
Further, we note that by deciding this matter, the Court is not meddling in the affairs of the Senate-this case was brought to the district court by a member of the Senate invoking the judicial branch's power to impose an enforceable attorney fee award. As Nye aptly recognized, absent a judicial decree, the Senate's imposition of attorney fees against Katsilometes was essentially meaningless. Where, as here, a judgment of the judicial branch is required to create an enforceable obligation, we believe that a justiciable controversy exists.
The Senate cited Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution as its authority for awarding Nye his attorney fees following Katsilometes' failed Contest of Election. The relevant portion of this constitutional provision provides: "Each house when assembled shall choose its own officers; judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members, determine its own rules of proceeding, and sit upon its own adjournments ...." Idaho Const. art. III, § 9 (emphasis added). The parties disagree on the interpretation of this language. Nye contends that this provision grants the Senate broad discretion as to the rules and procedure in a Contest of Election, including the imposition of attorney fees. Katsilometes acknowledges the Senate's broad authority granted to it by *909the Idaho Constitution, but contends that the provision does not allow the Senate to award attorney fees against him. Instead, he asserts that the Senate is bound by a statute it enacted concerning monetary awards in contested general elections- Idaho Code section 34-2120 -which, prior to its amendment in 2017, only provided for an award of costs and witness fees.
The version of Idaho Code section 34-2120 in place at the time Katsilometes filed his Contest of Election stated as follows:
Security for costs-Assessment of costs.
(a) The contestant shall file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) conditioned to pay the contestee's costs in case the election be confirmed by the legislature.
(b) The contestants are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by them respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs against the contestant. If the election is annulled by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs against the contestee.
....
Ch. 209, § 28, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 580 (emphasis added). In July 2017, approximately six months after Katsilometes contested Nye's election, the entirety of Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code was repealed and replaced with new statutes containing much of the same language. See Ch. 293, § 2, 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws 774. However, the section relating to costs was rewritten to expressly allow for an award of attorney fees. Id. It now reads as follows:
Security for costs-Assessment of costs and fees-Assessment of attorney's fees
(1) The contestor must file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000) conditioned to pay the contestee's costs if the election be confirmed by the legislature.
(2) The parties are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by them respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs and fees, other than attorney's fees , against the contestor. If the election is annulled by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs and fees, other than attorney's fees , against the contestee.
(3) Attorney's fees.
(a) Attorney's fees may be awarded against the contestor if the legislature determines the contest of election is frivolous and has no foundation in law or fact.
(b) Attorney's fees may be awarded against the contestee if the election is annulled by the legislature due to misconduct, fraud or corruption on the part of the contestee.
....
I.C. § 34-2118 (emphasis added). Thus, the revision that occurred in 2017 changed the statute to provide for attorney fees in cases where, as here, the Senate determines that the "contest of election is frivolous and has no foundation in law or fact." Thus, Katsilometes argues that this change evinces that the Senate implicitly recognized it was without authority to award attorney fees at the time of his election contest.
Katsilometes further contends that this Court's decision in Noble v. Ada County Elections Board , 135 Idaho 495, 20 P.3d 679 (2000), is dispositive of the attorney fee issue. In Noble , the losing candidate in a primary election filed a Motion to Contest an Election in district court. Id. at 497, 20 P.3d at 681. After the district court upheld the election results, Noble appealed to this Court. Id. at 498, 20 P.3d at 682. As to attorney fees on appeal, the statute at issue provided that "[t]he appellant shall file a bond sufficient to cover the cost of appeal of a primary contest." Id. at 504, 20 P.3d at 688 (quoting I.C. § 34-2130 (repealed)). Interpreting that same provision, this Court stated: "This statute is not a basis for awarding attorney fees ...." Id. As we explained:
The general rule is that costs do not include attorney fees unless attorney fees are expressly included in the definition of the term costs. The legislature's awareness of this rule is demonstrated by its authorization of awards of costs and attorney fees. When the legislature has intended that the *910term costs cover attorney fees, it has so provided. Therefore, we hold that attorney fees are not appropriately awarded under I.C. § 34-2130.
Id. (citations omitted). Although Noble concerned whether the Supreme Court could award attorney fees on appeal after a primary election contest was filed in the district court, our explanation of whether attorney fees could be awarded under the statute at issue there applies equally to the statute in this case, which is also located in Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code.
As noted, the Senate has the constitutional authority to be the "judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members" and to "determine its own rules of proceeding ...." Idaho Const. art. III, § 9. Thus, the Senate had constitutional authority to preside over the Contest of Election and determine the rules of proceeding applicable thereto. Pursuant to this authority, the legislature enacted Idaho Code section 34-2120. As discussed, that statute explicitly provided for an award of costs but not attorney fees. That the legislature later clarified Chapter 21 of Title 34, only months after Katsilometes' challenge, to provide for an award of attorney fees strongly suggests that it recognized it had not provided itself with authority to do so under the version of Idaho Code section 34-2120 in place at the time of this election contest. See Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015) ("It is the long standing rule in this state that when the legislature amends a statute it is deemed, absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent" ) (quoting Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, 23 (1987) )); see also Lincoln Cnty. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 491, 632 P.2d 678, 680 (1981) ("When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.").
Nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on the Senate's constitutional authority to enact its own rules of proceeding in the event of an election contest. We are not intervening in the Senate's constitutionally-delegated powers or even in its power to define its own rules by statute. Rather, we merely recognize that where the Senate enacts a law or a rule which does not permit it to impose attorney fees in an election contest, it cannot do so on an ad hoc basis.
Although our conclusion regarding the effect of the previous version of Idaho Code section 34-2120 is dispositive of this case, we briefly address Katsilometes' additional argument that "[t]he statutory scheme in place at the time this election contest was initiated and decided defined the substantive rights of the parties which could be impacted by an adverse decision by one house of the legislature." This assertion implicates important due process concerns. As to such matters of constitutional importance, we have previously held:
A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the procedure employed is fair. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fundamental fairness through governmental conduct that offends the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play. Procedural due process is the aspect of due process relating to the minimal requirements of notice and a hearing if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur. A deprivation of property encompasses claims where there is a legitimate claim or entitlement to the asserted benefit under either state or federal law. The minimal requirements are that there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due process requirement.
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council , 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Procedural Order for Contest of Election issued by the Senate and sent to Katsilometes indicated that the Senate would be *911performing its constitutional duty pursuant to Article III, section 9 to "judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members" and that "[n]othing in this Procedural Order limits or restricts the Senate in the performance of its duties as the judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members." However, as noted, although the Idaho Constitution allows the Senate to determine the rules of its own proceedings, the Senate already did so when it enacted Idaho Code section 34-2120, a statute that did not provide the Senate with the power to impose attorney fees in a general election contest. The ordering of attorney fees against a private citizen on an ad hoc basis, without prior notice, raises significant due process concerns.3 Conversely, the Senate had notice of our decision in Noble -which concerned a similar provision in Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code-for more than ten years before it imposed attorney fees against Katsilometes under a statute that did not expressly provide for them. We also recognize that, as counsel for Katsilometes averred during oral argument, there is no case law over the last 250 years in the United States affirming that a legislative body, through its plenary powers, can impose attorney fees against an individual who is not a member of the legislative body without a statutory basis.
Again, as we have approached this dispute, we have strived to honor the doctrine of separation of powers and respect the constitutional role of the legislature-a co-equal branch of our government. Therefore, we have not attempted to define or limit the Senate's constitutional authority and discretion in determining its internal "rules of proceeding" and regulating the conduct of "members" of the Senate. Idaho Const. art. III, § 9. It is unnecessary for us to do so here because in adopting the earlier version of Idaho Code section 34-2120, the Senate defined and limited its own power to impose such fees. In essence, we are merely holding that the Senate, as part of a bicameral legislative body, cannot ignore laws duly passed by both chambers of the legislature and impose attorney fees against a private citizen on an ad hoc basis.
In conclusion, it is important to recognize that at its core, this case does not concern a rule of the Senate; rather, it concerns the Rule of Law. Contrary to the hyperbolic assertion of the dissent, this is hardly an attempt by the judiciary to "muscle" itself into the affairs of the Senate. Indeed, this action was initiated by a member of the Senate seeking judicial assistance in enforcing a decision of the Senate. This Court is merely responding to a case that has been brought before it-and fulfilling its constitutional role-by applying well-settled legal principles to an unsettled question of law. This is a judicial function almost as old as our republic. Indeed, as Justice John Marshall observed, in perhaps the most notable appellate ruling in the last 230 years: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). In short, this Court is merely holding that the Senate, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution, is subject to the very laws it enacts. This is entirely consistent with another renowned statement by Justice Marshall contained in Marbury v. Madison: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men." Id. at 163. Accordingly, we respectfully hold that the Senate's award of attorney fees to Nye was improper.
B. Nye was not entitled to recover his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest in the district court action.
Following the district court's entry of the declaratory judgment, Nye sought an award of his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest for bringing his action in the district court. The district court awarded Nye, as the prevailing party, attorney *912fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(1) and costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) ; however, no discretionary fees were awarded. Additionally, the district court awarded Nye prejudgment interest on the Senate's attorney fee award.
In light of this opinion, Nye should not have been the prevailing party in the district court action. Therefore, the district court's award of costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest must be vacated.
C. Neither side is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Katsilometes requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Katsilometes further seeks an opportunity on remand to recover his attorney fees incurred during the district court proceedings since he should have prevailed below. Nye requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120(1) or 12-121.
Section 12-120(1) applies to claims for monetary relief in which the amount pleaded is under $35,000, and entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney fees. Here, Nye's claim was for a declaratory judgment effectuating the Senate's award of fees. Although this is a claim for money, the gravamen of the action is a dispute concerning the legal authority of the Senate to impose attorney fees in January of 2017 under the then-existing statutory scheme. As such, this case does not arise under the circumstances contemplated by section 12-120(1). Rather, it is, at its core, a constitutional issue. As a result, Katsilometes is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under 12-120(1), and may not seek his fees on remand. Nye did not prevail on appeal, so he is not entitled to fees on appeal, and his award of fees by the district court must be vacated.
Attorney fees under section 12-121 are only permissible "if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." "Fees will generally not be awarded for arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument." Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016). Here, the parties were confronted with a difficult case of first impression, one that concerned important constitutional issues. Both sides defended their respective positions professionally, reasonably, and in good faith. Accordingly, we decline to award either side attorney fees under section 12-121.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court's order enforcing the award of attorney fees to Nye pursuant to the order of the Idaho Senate, and vacate all costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest awarded to Nye by the district court. Neither side is entitled to attorney fees on appeal; however, as the prevailing party, Katsilometes is entitled to his costs on appeal.4
Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL concur.