B.
¶17 Ward also offered sufficient evidence to show that the harms of global climate change were greater than the harm of breaking into Kinder Morgan's property. Ward asserted that the extent of the harm resulting from his actions were the loss of a few locks and the temporary inconvenience to Kinder Morgan's employees. Compared to this, Ward introduced "voluminous scientific evidence of the harms of climate change." This evidence included information establishing climate change is real and detrimentally effecting Washington, and that tar sands oil poses a specifically acute threat to our environment. Further, Ward offered to present testimony from climate scientists, Drs. James Hansen, Richard Gammon, and Celia Bitz, supporting his defense.
C.
¶18 Whether the harms of global climate change was brought about by Ward was not an issue in this case. Nevertheless, Ward proffered evidence and expert testimony establishing the harms associated with global climate change and the root causes of global climate change.
*595D.
¶19 Ward also offered sufficient evidence to create a question of fact on whether there were reasonable legal alternatives. Ward argued that the window for action on climate change has narrowed to the point that immediate, emergency action is necessary. Ward offered evidence of his more than 40 years being involved in various environmental movements, the numerous attempts he has made to address climate change, and how most of those efforts have failed. Ward additionally offered proposed testimony by pipeline industry expert Eric de Place, professor and climate campaigner Bill McKibben, and professor of political science Martin Gilens, to the effect that the fossil fuel industry's influence over political institutions renders traditional legal avenues unreasonable as a means of addressing the climate emergency.
¶20 State v. Parker, 127 Wash. App. 352, 353, 110 P.3d 1152 (2005), discussed the "no reasonable alternative" element. Parker was charged with felon in possession of a gun. Parker claimed that he carried the gun because he had been shot the previous July and his assailants were still at large. Division Two of this court held that in order to show he had no reasonable alternative, Parker has to demonstrate "that he had actually tried the alternative or had no time to try it, or that a history of futile attempts revealed the illusionary benefits of the alternative." Parker, 127 Wash. App. at 355, 110 P.3d 1152.
¶21 Here, in contrast with Parker, Ward offered evidence that he had tried the alternatives and they were unsuccessful. Whether Ward's evidence was sufficient to establish that his history of failed attempts to address climate change revealed the futility of supposed reasonable alternatives was a question for the jury. Viewed in the light most favorable to Ward, and admitting the truth of his evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, Ward's offer of proof created a question for the jury. Cole, 74 Wash. App. at 578-79, 874 P.2d 878.
¶22 Because Ward met his initial burden of showing that he would likely be able to submit a sufficient quantum of evidence on each element of necessity to make it a jury question whether he established that element beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court violated his constitutional right by granting the State's motion in limine.
IV.
¶23 The State argues that the necessity defense is unavailable when the real purpose is to advertise a political debate. We agree with the State that if Ward's true intent was to induce jury nullification, then the trial court would not have erred in prohibiting Ward's evidence. Therefore, in order to determine if the trial court erred we must also determine what Ward's purpose was in offering his evidence.
¶24 "Jury nullification occurs in a trial when a jury acquits a defendant, even though the members of the jury believe the defendant to be guilty of the charges." State v. Nicholas, 185 Wash. App. 298, 301, 341 P.3d 1013 (2014). But the jury's power of nullification does not stem from any legal right. State v. Brown, 130 Wash. App. 767, 771, 124 P.3d 663 (2005). Rather, the power of nullification is rooted in courts' unwillingness to inquire into deliberations because jurors can agree to acquit on virtually any basis without court knowledge. See State v. Elmore, 155 Wash.2d 758, 771, 773-74, 123 P.3d 72 (2005). Nevertheless, Washington courts have concluded that a trial court does not err by instructing the jury that it has a duty to convict, rather than that it may convict, if it finds all of the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. 693, 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Recuenco, 154 Wash.2d 156, 110 P.3d 188 (2005).
¶25 A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it prohibits a party from introducing evidence solely intended to induce jury nullification. If here, for example, Ward's actions were purely symbolic-if they had no ability to actually avoid or minimize the harms he perceived-then his proffered evidence would have been aimed not at proving necessity but instead at inducing jury nullification. In such a situation, the trial court would not have erred in prohibiting *596such evidence. If, however, Ward's actions were not purely symbolic-if they had some ability to actually avoid or minimize his perceived harms-then the evidence he offered would not have been aimed at inducing jury nullification and the trial court would have erred in prohibiting it. When civil disobedience and the necessity defense intersect, it is the intent of the protester, not the effectiveness of the protest, that is of the utmost relevance.
¶26 Here, in order to determine the intent behind Ward's actions, we must first determine what specific harm his protest was intended to avoid. If Ward was protesting global warming as a whole, then the impact of his action would be so infinitesimal that we would be unable to conclude anything other than that his actions were symbolic in nature. If, however, Ward was protesting more than climate change as a whole-if the harm he was attempting to alleviate was, for example, the danger of Canadian tar sands oil specifically or the danger that global warming poses to Washington-then we could conclude that his actions were actually intended to have an impact on the harm that he sought to avoid.
¶27 Below, Ward phrased the harm that he sought to avoid as more than just global climate change. Ward asserted that the harm he was attempting to avoid was threefold: (1) global climate change, generally, has the potential to destroy our way of life, (2) Canadian tar sands oil is a uniquely potent contributor to climate change, and (3) the localized impacts of climate change on Washington has the potential to be debilitating.
¶28 Ward argued that "tar sands oil represent[s] an elevated level of risk to global climate[,]" and that he felt he needed to act "in order to stop the advance of global warming, encompassing both current and projected warming in Washington state, ocean acidification, and impacts on local ecosystems and residents." Further, Ward argued that his "temporary shut-down of tar sands oil flowing through the Trans-Mountain Pipeline certainly minimized the harm flowing from that quantum's contribution to climate change ... and from the use of tar sands in particular." Ward also introduced exhibits about the danger that sea level rise poses to Washington.
¶29 Based on the specific harms that Ward asserted he was trying to avoid, his actions were not merely symbolic. The protesters' intent was to physically stop the flow of Canadian tar sands oil into the United States. Because one of the specific harm Ward asserted was that Canadian tar sands oil is a particularly potent contributor to climate change, the protest was not a purely symbolic act. It was a direct way of preventing a uniquely potent contributor to climate change from entering the United States.3
¶30 Because the harms that Ward asserted he was trying to alleviate were more than just climate change, generally, but also included both the specific dangers of Canadian tar sands oil and the impacts of sea level rise on Washington, Ward's actions were not intended to be merely symbolic in nature. As such, the evidence he planned to introduce was not solely aimed at inducing jury nullification and the trial court erred in preventing Ward from introducing evidence in support of his necessity defense.
V.
¶31 The violation of a defendant's constitutional right is presumed to be prejudicial, but may be harmless "if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result without the error." Jones, 168 Wash.2d at 724, 230 P.3d 576. "Such a determination is made from an examination of the record from which it must affirmatively appear the error is harmless." State v. Stephens, 93 Wash.2d 186, 191, 607 P.2d 304 (1980).
¶32 The closest question in this matter is whether Ward admitted that he had available reasonable legal alternatives. If he did, it would indicate that the trial court's error was harmless. The State points to Ward's testimony *597at trial concerning his legal alternatives.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: What was your intent in shutting off that safety value on the 11th?
[Ward]: To stop the flow of tar sands oil running through that pipeline.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: Why were you attempting to do that?
[Ward]: I was attempting to take the most effective measure that I could think of to address this problem to avoid cataclysmic climate change.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: Did you believe that there was anything left to do that may have been legal that could have addressed the issue?
....
[Ward]: I think that there are legal steps that can be taken, and I continue to take those. But I think that alone they are insufficient.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: What are the other steps that you continue to participate in?
[Ward]: Well, I'm engaged in efforts in my own state, which has been quite successful. The City of Portland has just announced a plan to shift to 100 percent renewable energy, and I supported that. I am engaged in general public education. And I am increasingly looking at ways to support candidates for office who endorse a significant plan of action on climate change.
¶33 When viewed in its entirety, Ward's testimony indicates that Ward was addressing the ineffectiveness of his alternatives and was not admitting that he had reasonable legal alternatives available to him. Moreover, if the jury was allowed to hear Ward's testimony in conjunction with the excluded expert testimony, it could well have concluded that Ward's available legal alternatives were futile. The error was not harmless.
¶34 We reverse and remand.
WE CONCUR:
Smith, J.
Dwyer, J.