• schools,
• daycares,
• churches,
• campgrounds,
• fairgrounds,
• restaurants,
• businesses and
• factories.
Actual determination of whether such systems hold water rights for municipal supply purposes will depend upon the particular factual situations.
AR at 143-47.
PROCEDURE
¶38 Crown West appealed the Department of Ecology's water rights determination to the Hearings Board. In turn, both parties moved for summary judgment. The Hearings Board granted Ecology's motion. Although the cross summary judgment motions raised numerous issues, the Hearings Board limited its decision to a ruling that Crown West's water right did not qualify under RCW 90.03.015(4) as municipal in nature. This ruling negated the need to decide other issues. Other questions included whether the proposed change would impair other water rights, increase *731consumptive use of water, or be detrimental to the public interest, three additional requirements for a transfer to the state trust water program.
¶39 The Hearings Board determined that Crown West failed to demonstrate that its water rights qualified as being for municipal purposes through "active compliance" with the definition of "municipal water supply purposes" under RCW 90.03.015(4). The Hearings Board pulled the "active compliance" standard from POL-2030. AR at 144. The Hearings Board concluded that, to benefit from this municipal water designation, Crown West needed to show that the industrial park's use of its well water served a municipal purpose under the statute during every five-year period from inception of use to the present. Even though the Department of Ecology conceded that the United States Navy's use of the water right entailed a municipal purpose, the Hearings Board determined that Crown West's recent use of the water right did not fall within the statutory definition. Therefore, the water right did not enjoy exemption from relinquishment, and the Water Conservancy Board erred in allowing a transfer of 5,874 AFY of unused water to the state trust water program.
¶40 Crown West appealed the Hearings Board's decision to the superior court, while also filing a motion with the Hearings Board to issue a certificate of appealability directly to this appeals court under RCW 34.05.518. The Department of Ecology did not oppose the motion, and the Hearings Board together with our court commissioner granted direct appeal to this court.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶41 On appeal to this court, Crown West contends the Hearings Board erroneously denied Crown West's water right a municipal water supply status for purposes of the relinquishment exception. When challenging the Hearings Board's ruling, Crown West forwards several arguments.
*732First, the water right holder need not establish "active compliance" with the standard of "municipal water supply purposes" for every five-year period during ownership of the right. Br. of Pet'r at 7. Second, the water right holder need only comply with a beneficial use standard at the time the holder and the Department of Ecology initially classified the water right. Third, the water right holder's claimed use or contemplated use, rather than actual use, controls the character of the water right as being for municipal water supply purposes. Fourth, Ecology's "active compliance" standard adopted in POL-2030 conflicts with the streamlined process the Department of Ecology employs when reviewing a water right. Fifth, the Department of Ecology mistakenly requires the nonresidential population, referenced in RCW 90.03.015(4), as demanding identity of people throughout the sixty days and overnight stays. Sixth, Crown West's intertie with Consolidated Irrigation District #19's water system qualifies Crown West's water right as being for municipal water supply purposes. The first three arguments conflate, and we will address the arguments together. We begin though with a review of primary principles of Washington water law, which provides a backdrop to a discussion of when should water rights be classified as serving municipal water supply purposes in order to avoid relinquishment from nonuse.
Beneficial Use and Relinquishment
¶42 Washington's water law, promulgated throughout the state's history by statute and case law, follows the western American doctrine of water rights by appropriation rather than the eastern rule of riparian water rights. RCW 90.03.010 ; Cornelius v. Department of Ecology , 182 Wash.2d 574, 586, 344 P.3d 199 (2015) ; Ellis v. Pomeroy Improvement Co. , 1 Wash. 572, 578, 21 P. 27 (1889). Under the appropriation system, the user who claims the right to appropriate water must actually do so. The water right holder must put the water claimed under the right to beneficial use or it *733relinquishes the right. RCW 90.14.160 ; Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus , 135 Wash.2d 582, 587, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). The legislature has declared:
A strong beneficial use requirement as a condition precedent to the continued ownership of a right to withdraw or divert water is essential to the orderly development of the state.
RCW 90.14.020(3).
¶43 Under Washington's 1917 Water Rights Code, all unclaimed water belongs to the State of Washington. Washington law demands that a water right return to the state, under relinquishment statutes, to the extent that, without cause, the water right holder voluntarily fails to beneficially use all or any portion of the water right for a period of five successive years. RCW 90.14.160 -.180; Department of Ecology v. Acquavella , 131 Wash.2d 746, 758, 935 P.2d 595 (1997). Accordingly, RCW 90.03.010 declares in part:
Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public, and any right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided and not otherwise....
Relinquishment prevents water hoarding and promotes efficient use of the state's limited supply of water.
¶44 As well as being critical to establishing the existence of a water right, beneficial use establishes the quantity of that right. A user acquires the right only to the quantity of water actually put to use with reasonable diligence. Department of Ecology v. Acquavella , 131 Wash.2d at 755, 935 P.2d 595 (1997). "[B]eneficial use is 'the basis, the measure, and the limit' " of a water right. Department of Ecology v. Acquavella , 131 Wash.2d at 755, 935 P.2d 595. The requirement of a beneficial use applies even if the water right holder constructs facilities for diversion of a larger quantity of water than the holder uses. Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus , 135 Wash.2d at 593-95, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998).
*734¶45 If a water right holder fails to beneficially use any or all of its right for five successive years, the right holder loses all or a portion of the right unless it shows its nonuse falls under one of the narrow categories in RCW 90.14.140. RCW 90.14.140(2)(d) ; Department of Ecology v. Acquavella , 131 Wash.2d at 758, 935 P.2d 595 (1997). One exception, and the exception asserted by Crown West in this appeal, is water used for municipal water supply purposes. The law determines relinquishment at the time of the expiration of the five years of nonuse. Events occurring after the five-year statutory period of a water right's nonuse matter none because relinquishment already occurred. RCW 90.14.180, .130; Cornelius v. Department of Ecology , 182 Wash.2d at 617, 344 P.3d 199 (2015).
¶46 In Washington State, the law limits each water right to an amount of use in gallons and acre-feet per year to a source of diversion, and to a purpose of use. The source of diversion for groundwater is a discrete well. The source of diversion for surface water is a spot along a stream, river, or lake.
¶47 Washington law classifies water uses into ten perhaps overlapping categories of uses or purposes. RCW 90.14.031 declares:
(2) "Beneficial use" shall include, but not be limited to, use for domestic water , irrigation, fish, shellfish, game and other aquatic life, municipal , recreation, industrial water, generation of electric power, and navigation.
(Emphasis added.) One statute designates a differing list of beneficial uses:
(1) Uses of water for domestic , stock watering, industrial, commercial, agricultural, irrigation, hydroelectric power production, mining, fish and wildlife maintenance and enhancement, recreational, and thermal power production purposes, and preservation of environmental and aesthetic values, and all other uses compatible with the enjoyment of the public waters of the state, are declared to be beneficial.
RCW 90.54.020 (emphasis added). Each water right must be designated for one or more purposes depending on the *735actual employment of the water. A change to a water right's amount, source of diversion, or use requires the administrative process overseen by the Washington State Department of Ecology and already described.
Municipal Water Law
¶48 We will later discuss in detail whether Crown West's use of its water right included a use for municipal water supply purposes. This determination looms critical to whether Crown West relinquished any of its water right. We now briefly review the law about a municipal water supply.
¶49 Since 1967, the Washington statutory scheme has treated a water right claimed for municipal water supply purposes as immune from statutory relinquishment, while nonmunicipal water rights may be relinquished through nonuse. LAWS OF 1967, ch. 233, § 18 (codified as RCW 90.14.180 ); cf. LAWS OF 1967, ch. 233, § 14 (codified as RCW 90.14.140(2)(d) ). The legislature wishes municipal purveyors to be capable of meeting future municipal needs despite a lack of exercise of the entire amount of the water right.
¶50 RCW 90.14.140(2) now reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of RCW 90.14.130 through 90.14.180, there shall be no relinquishment of any water right:
....
(d) If such right is claimed for municipal water supply purposes under chapter 90.03 RCW.
Despite this favorable treatment, until recently, our laws did not define "municipal water supplier" or "municipal water supply purposes."
¶51 In 2003, our legislature amended the water law act. Lummi Indian Nation v. State , 170 Wash.2d 247, 251, 241 P.3d 1220 (2010) ; LAWS OF 2003, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 5; SECOND ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1338, 58th Leg., 1st Spec.
*736Sess. (Wash. 2003) (2E2SHB 1338). Litigants typically refer to the body of 2003 legislation concerning municipal water as the "Municipal Water Law." Cornelius v. Department of Ecology , 182 Wash.2d at 613 n.10, 344 P.3d 199 (2015) (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). The law defined "municipal water supplies and supplier" and "municipal water supply purposes" for the first time.
¶52 Under the 2003 Municipal Water Law, when requested by a municipal water supplier or when processing a change or amendment to the water right, the Department of Ecology shall amend the municipal water supplier's water right documents and related records to ensure that a water right for municipal water supply purposes, as defined in RCW 90.03.015, is correctly identified as being for such purposes. Lummi Indian Nation v. State , 170 Wash.2d at 260 n.8, 241 P.3d 1220 (2010). No portion of a right held or acquired by a municipal water supplier should be so identified without the approval of a change or transfer of the right or portion of the right for such a purpose. RCW 90.03.560.
Time of Purpose of Use
¶53 We move further into our analysis of whether Crown West's water right qualifies for municipal water supply purposes. Crown West and its predecessors in interest pumped groundwater from wells beginning in 1942. A preliminary question then ensues: On what date do we assess whether the use of water at the Spokane Valley industrial park constituted or constitutes a municipal water supply? We later inquire whether the industrial park qualified as a municipal water supplier on that date. More importantly, we then ask under what standard we determine if the industrial park beneficially used the water right on the critical date.
¶54 We could rest our decision solely on the basis that Crown West does not qualify as a municipal water supplier, except that the Department of Ecology agrees that *737the industrial park water system qualified as a municipal water supplier from 1942 to 1958. This concession begs the question: If Crown West once qualified as a municipal water supplier does that qualification continue indefinitely or at least until it applied for a change in use and transfer of diversion in 2016? We conclude that the law requires the assessment of a municipal water supplier status as of the date that the water right holder applies for a change in use or a transfer.
¶55 Crown West contends that the water right holder need not show current or active compliance with the dictates of a municipal water supply usage at the time it applies to the Department of Ecology for a change in use of the water right or to enter the trust water program. Instead, the date that the holder first claimed the water right or the date of a certificated water right controls, and, if the holder then claimed its use constituted municipal water supply usage, that claimage controls. Crown West may further argue that, even if the purposes served by the water right did not qualify for municipal water supply purposes at the time of the claim or certificate, the water right still qualifies if its owner intended to use the water rights for municipal water supply purposes in some indefinite future.
¶56 The controlling statute is RCW 90.03.015. The statute declares, in part:
(3) "Municipal water supplier" means an entity that supplies water for municipal water supply purposes.
(4) "Municipal water supply purposes" means a beneficial use of water: (a) For residential purposes through fifteen or more residential service connections or for providing residential use of water for a nonresidential population that is, on average, at least twenty-five people for at least sixty days a year; (b) for governmental or governmental proprietary purposes by a city, town, public utility district, county, sewer district, or water district; or (c) indirectly for the purposes in (a) or (b) of this subsection through the delivery of treated or raw water to a public water system for such use. If water is beneficially used *738under a water right for the purposes listed in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection, any other beneficial use of water under the right generally associated with the use of water within a municipality is also for "municipal water supply purposes," including, but not limited to, beneficial use for commercial, industrial, irrigation of parks and open spaces, institutional, landscaping, fire flow, water system maintenance and repair, or related purposes. If a governmental entity holds a water right that is for the purposes listed in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection, its use of water or its delivery of water for any other beneficial use generally associated with the use of water within a municipality is also for "municipal water supply purposes," including, but not limited to, beneficial use for commercial, industrial, irrigation of parks and open spaces, institutional, landscaping, fire flow, water system maintenance and repair, or related purposes.
(Emphasis added.) We italicize several verbs to show that the statutory definition of municipal water supplier and municipal water supply purposes is determined in the present tense. Usage of this tense presumes a legislative intent to adjudge the character of the water right in the present.
¶57 A legislative body's use of a verb tense holds significance in construing statutes. United States v. Wilson , 503 U.S. 329, 333, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) ; State v. Stout , 362 Or. 758, 415 P.3d 567, 574 (2018). The use of the present tense in a statute strongly suggests it does not extend to past actions. Carr v. United States , 560 U.S. 438, 449, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). A statute's undeviating use of the present tense presents a striking indicator of its prospective orientation. Carr v. United States , 560 U.S. at 449, 130 S.Ct. 2229.
¶58 Our interpretation of RCW 90.03.015(4) coincides with a fundamental principle of Washington water law. The statutory subsection refers to "a beneficial use of water." "Beneficial use" is a term of art in Washington water law that means an actual use of water, rather than a potential future use.
*739Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus , 135 Wash.2d at 589, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). Presumably, this principle applies equally to exclude past use.
¶59 Crown West characterizes an emphasis on the legislature's use of the present tense as dubious since statutory definitions are nearly always phrased in this tense. In so contending, however, Crown West only mentions the verb "means" found in both RCW 90.03.015(3) regarding the definition of "municipal water supplier" and RCW 90.03.015(4) regarding the definition of "municipal water supply purposes." Crown West ignores all of the other present tense verbs found in RCW 90.03.015 's definitions. Crown West also ignores decisions that emphasize the tense of verbs employed in statutes.
¶60 RCW 90.14.140 exempts certain water uses from relinquishment, including municipal water supply purposes. The statute declares:
"[S]ufficient cause" shall be defined as the nonuse of all or a portion of the water by the owner of a water right....
(d) If such right is claimed for municipal water supply purposes....
RCW 90.14.140(1)(2)(d) (emphasis added). Based on this language, Crown West may argue that the relevant question for purposes of relinquishment is whether a right is "claimed" for municipal purposes and not whether the right is "issued" for municipal purposes. This argument renders irrelevant any determination of the date on which we determine the nature of Crown West's use. Nevertheless, such a reading omits any qualification for municipal water supply purposes since any party could "claim" municipal water supply purposes without any facts supporting the claim. We doubt the legislature intended a perpetual relinquishment exemption for all water rights when an entity merely contemplated or intended a municipal use, regardless of the actual beneficial uses occurring under the right. Such a reading also conflicts with other sections of the water code.
*740¶61 In City of Union Gap v. Department of Ecology , 148 Wash. App. 519, 195 P.3d 580 (2008), this court rejected a broad interpretation of the "claimed for" language of RCW 90.14.140 in the context of the municipal relinquishment exemption. In considering whether the city's nonuse of its water right was excused under the municipal relinquishment exemption, the court concluded that a water right holder must timely assert its water right for municipal water supply purposes within the five-year period.
¶62 In recognition of its broad reading of the word "claimed" in RCW 90.14.140, Crown West may limit its argument to a claimed water right for municipal purposes only if the water right holder pursues such purpose with reasonable diligence. Nevertheless, the statute does not include the term "reasonable diligence." We acknowledge use of the concept "reasonable diligence" in the setting of perfecting a water right after the Department of Ecology issues a permit for a right. RCW 90.03.320, .460. Nevertheless, we see no legislative intent in the water code to afford a water right holder, who uses none of its water for municipal water supply purposes, the favorable status of municipal water supplier based on a claim of such purposes if the holder reasonably pursues the purpose for an indefinite time in the future. In addressing the exceptions to relinquishment, we must consider that exceptions to statutory provisions are narrowly construed. R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Board , 137 Wash.2d 118, 140, 969 P.2d 458 (1999).
¶63 Assuming we reject the argument that the water right holder's "claim" can qualify the holder as a municipal water supplier, Crown West next contends that the use for which the Department of Ecology authorized controls whether the use is one for municipal water supply purposes. This argument also renders moot any decision of when to assess whether the holder qualifies as a municipal water supplier. Again, we see no legislative intent for such a construction of RCW 90.03.015(4). The statutory definition *741employs the present tense and refers none to the application or authorization process. We must construe the statutory definition narrowly.
¶64 According to amici, if the Department of Ecology determines municipal water supplier status as of the date of the application for a change or transfer of the water right, a municipality could lose a portion of its water right if it does not currently use all of the right. In turn, amici note the inconsistency between this predicament and the statute that excludes a municipal water supplier from the requirement that the water right holder employ all of its water right in order to prevent relinquishment.
¶65 We need not address this concern since the facts of this appeal do not present circumstances under which we must decide to what extent a municipality might lose a portion of its water right by nonuse. We also question the analysis presented by amici. RCW 90.03.015(4) does not require that a municipality "beneficially use" all of its water. Instead, the subsection refers to a municipal water supply purpose as a "beneficial use" of water. The word "use" functions as a noun, not a verb, in this setting, and the word "beneficial" performs as an adjective, not an adverb. Thus, RCW 90.03.015(4) emphasizes the type of use, not the amount of use. The term "beneficial use" also encompasses the types of activities for which water may be used. In re Rights of Surface & Ground Waters of Marshall Lake & Marshall Creek Drainage Basin , 121 Wash.2d 459, 468, 852 P.2d 1044 (1993). As long as the water is used for a beneficial use, the relinquishment waiver applies. Therefore, one could conclude that the municipality need only apply some of its use to a municipal water supply purpose in order to avoid a loss of a portion of the unused right in order to avoid relinquishment.
¶66 Amici's concern also conflicts with another statute, at least as to certificates issued to municipalities before September 9, 2003. Water right certificates issued prior to September 9, 2003, for municipal water supply purposes *742based on system capacity remain in good standing. LAWS OF 2003, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 5; 2E2SHB 1338; H.B. REP. ON 2E2SHB 1338, at 1-2, 58th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
¶67 The Department of Ecology asserts that "active compliance" with municipal water supply purposes is required for the municipal water supplier to retain its preferred status. The Department of Ecology further demands that compliance with the standard be demonstrated for each five-year period from the right's inception to the present. In short, Ecology impliedly asks that we adopt its POL-2030.
¶68 Crown West and amici note that the Washington water code never employs the term "active compliance." According to amici, the Department of Ecology's interpretation conflicts with the objective of the 2003 Municipal Water Law to provide certainty to municipal water suppliers and to require increased water conservation and efficiency. One might also wonder why the Department of Ecology needs to change the statutory term "beneficial use" to "active compliance" and whether the concept conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v. Department of Ecology , 182 Wash.2d 574, 344 P.3d 199 (2015).
¶69 We particularly note that our ruling may conflict with POL-2030 section 9d:
If a water right does not meet the definition of a water right for municipal water supply purposes for 5 or more years, or does not otherwise qualify for the relinquishment exception under RCW 90.14.140(2)(d), then the water right would be valid only to the extent it had been beneficially used during that period, with any non-use resulting in relinquishment of the right unless the non-use is excused by one of the other exemptions to relinquishment provided under RCW 90.14.140.
We reserve approval or disapproval of POL-2030 for another day and perhaps another court because of its irrelevance to our ruling.
*743¶70 The Department of Ecology emphasizes that this appeal arises from a change and transfer of a water right sought by Crown West. The Department of Ecology argues that Crown West may only change or transfer its right to the extent of its use. RCW 90.03.380 permits a change in rights only to the extent the holder has applied the water to beneficial use. RCW 90.42.080 limits the quantity of water that can be placed into trust to the quantity actually used by the applicant. The Department of Ecology may be correct, but the Hearings Board never reached this question. We also do not rely on RCW 90.03.380 or RCW 90.42.080 because of our interpretation of RCW 90.03.015(4).
Municipal Water Supplier
¶71 We now analyze whether Crown West qualified as a municipal water supplier when it filed its 2016 applications for a change of use and transfer. Each of Crown West's Department of Ecology certificates of water right declares the water use to be for "community domestic supply, manufacturing, and industrial use." AR at 402, 404, 406. Each certificate also proclaims the right to be subject to relinquishment. As part of its 2016 applications for a change in use, Crown West seeks recharacterization of its water usage to municipal water supply purposes. This relabeling would presumably avoid any relinquishment of the water right.
¶72 The labeling of a water certificate as one for domestic use does not prevent reclassification to municipal water supply purposes. Cornelius v. Department of Ecology , 182 Wash.2d 574, 344 P.3d 199 (2015). We assume that a certificate for industrial or manufacturing use may also be reissued for municipal uses. RCW 90.03.560 reads, in part:
When requested by a municipal water supplier or when processing a change or amendment to the right, the department shall amend the water right documents and related records to ensure that water rights that are for municipal *744water supply purposes, as defined in RCW 90.03.015, are correctly identified as being for municipal water supply purposes.
¶73 One likely will be a municipal water supplier if one is a government entity, but one need not necessarily be a governmental unit to qualify. Again, RCW 90.03.015 declares, in part:
(4) "Municipal water supply purposes" means a beneficial use of water: (a) For residential purposes through fifteen or more residential service connections or for providing residential use of water for a nonresidential population that is, on average, at least twenty-five people for at least sixty days a year ; (b) for governmental or governmental proprietary purposes by a city, town, public utility district, county, sewer district, or water district; or (c) indirectly for the purposes in (a) or (b) of this subsection through the delivery of treated or raw water to a public water system for such use.
(Emphasis added.) WAC 173-505-030, a rule promulgated by the Department of Ecology, repeats, but does not clarify, the definition.
¶74 Crown West claims that, as a nongovernment entity, it fulfills the language of definitions (a) and (c). Crown West underlines that its water system delivers water to 5,000 to 6,000 employees who daily work at the industrial park and use the water for drinking, cleansing, toileting, and even cooking. Crown West highlights that the industrial park includes a hotel with overnight guests that use water for the same purposes.
¶75 The Hearings Board found that Crown West does not connect its water system to fifteen or more residences. Crown West does not challenge this finding on appeal. Thus, we must decide whether the second half of the definition in section (a) in the statute applies. We must discern whether Crown West provides "residential use of water for a nonresidential population that is on average, at least twenty-five people for at least sixty days a year."
*745RCW 90.03.015(4)(a). We refer hereafter to this language as the "second statutory definition" or simply the "definition."
¶76 No case discusses the second statutory definition. Going further, no Washington court has interpreted the legislature's intent behind any portion of RCW 90.03.015(4) 's definition of municipal water supply purposes. Other western states' water laws lack relevance because the law does not contain the same definition. Legislative history of the statute does not assist because the history lacks any indication as to the types of places falling under this definition.
¶77 We mention some rules of statutory construction. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Evans , 177 Wash.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature. State v. Ervin , 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010). But we must also consider the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When the legislature has not defined a term, we may look to dictionary definitions. In re Detention of J.N. , 200 Wash. App. 279, 286, 402 P.3d 380 (2017), review granted , 189 Wash.2d 1031, 407 P.3d 1147 (2018). When the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature intends the terms to have different meanings. State v. Barnes , 189 Wash.2d 492, 502, 403 P.3d 72 (2017). A municipal water supplier enjoys an exception from relinquishment of the water right. We construe exceptions narrowly. R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Board , 137 Wash.2d at 140, 969 P.2d 458 (1999).
¶78 The relevant language of RCW 90.03.015(4) and the parties' respective contentions raise the following questions concerning when an entity qualifies under the second statutory definition. What constitutes a residential use of *746water? When does a nonresidential population employ water for a residential use? Does residential use include water used for drinking and cleaning by employees of businesses or industries? What is a nonresidential population? Does a nonresidential population include employees of businesses and industries? Does a nonresidential population include hotel guests? Must the nonresidential population stay overnight? Must the nonresidential population stay in temporary housing but have a permanent residence elsewhere? Must the twenty-five people be the same people over a period of sixty days?
¶79 RCW 90.03.015(4) does not list examples of residential water use. The parties catalogue residential uses of water as drinking, cooking, cleaning, flushing waste, and watering grass. Compiling such a list, however, does not necessarily end our task of discerning what constitutes a "residential use" under the second statutory definition. After reading RCW 90.03.015(4) as a whole and perusing definitions for "residential use," we conclude that the term "residential use" within the second statutory definition includes use of water within a residential setting. Thus, we disagree with Crown West that use of water for drinking, cleaning, toileting, or cooking within any setting constitutes a "residential use" within the meaning of the statute. Use of water for cleaning and drinking in an office, commercial, or industrial setting does not constitute a residential use. Water for cleaning and drinking is attended to nearly every setting including commercial, industry, and agricultural settings, such that Crown West's broad view of the term would have few, if any, limits.
¶80 RCW 90.03.015(4) sometimes attaches the indefinite article "a" to a noun or an adjective and a noun. For example, the statute refers to "a beneficial use" and "a nonresidential population." (Emphasis added.) But the statute omits the indefinite article before the phrase "residential use." The term "residential use" connotes a concept narrower than "a residential use" in that the latter could *747refer to any of many residential uses. The idea of "residential use" must then mean something different than uses for which water can be employed inside a residence.
¶81 To repeat, RCW 90.03.015 holds two distinct definitions for "municipal water supply purposes":
(4) "Municipal water supply purposes" means a beneficial use of water: (a) For residential purposes through fifteen or more residential service connections or for providing residential use of water for a nonresidential population that is, on average, at least twenty-five people for at least sixty days a year....
(Emphasis added.) The first definition includes the phrase "residential purposes" and the second statutory definition employs the term "residential use." Based on a standard rule of construction, "residential use" must mean something different from "residential purposes." We conclude that something different is the use of water within a residential setting.
¶82 We rely on an Indiana decision's analysis of "residential use," in the context of a restrictive property covenant dispute.
Residential is defined as "of or relating to residence or residences." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 996 (10th ed. 1994). Residence is defined as "the place where one actually lives as distinguished from one's domicile or a place of temporary sojourn." Id. Our court has previously determined that the "plain and ordinary meaning of 'residential purpose' " is "one in which people reside or dwell, or in which they make their homes." The people who rent Colucci's cabins use the structures for eating, sleeping, and other typical activities associated with a residence or dwelling place. Although we recognize that the renters' occupation of the cabins is only on a temporary basis and the definition of residential seems to contemplate a more permanent presence, we find that this definition is at odds with the covenant language explicitly allowing the rental or lease of property. If the term "residential use" as used in the covenant language was meant to only apply *748to permanent and not temporary rental of property, then it would have been easy to explicitly state this and make the covenant unambiguous. In Indiana, restrictive covenants are disfavored and are strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions. We therefore conclude that, because the language in the covenants is ambiguous, Colucci's short-term rental of its cabins does not run afoul of the covenants.
Applegate v. Colucci , 908 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (most citations omitted). We note that the Indiana decision mentions temporary and permanent rentals and both constitute a "residential use."
¶83 From other jurisdictions come similar definitions of "residential use." The definition of "residential use" means "the use of property for living purposes." Winn v. Ridgewood Development Co. , 691 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. App. 1985). Thus, "residential use" or property should not be for work purposes. College dormitories are residential buildings occupied or intended to be occupied as a dwelling, and thus a dormitory is included in an ordinance's definition of "residential use." Myers Park Homeowners Association v. City of Charlotte , 229 N.C. App. 204, 213, 747 S.E.2d 338 (2013). A unit providing an independent kitchen, bathroom, and sleeping facilities qualifies as a "residential use." Adams v. Town of Brunswick , 2010 ME 7, 987 A.2d 502, 507-08. Accordingly, a "residential use" should include facilities for an overnight stay, but for more than an overnight stay. A "residential use" should allow for independent living for weeks, if not months. Some, but few, hotels include kitchen facilities. No evidence supports a finding that the hotel inside the Crown West industrial park facilitates independent living and functions as a temporary dwelling. We might, however, consider an extended-day hotel to qualify.
¶84 Crown West contends that the Department of Ecology's construction of "residential use" essentially means that a "residential population" must reside in the structures *749served by a municipal water supplier despite the statute referencing a "nonresidential population." Crown West may criticize our analysis as suffering from this same anomaly or oxymoronic paradox since we hold that the term "residential use" means something akin to residing in a home when the second statutory definition applies only to nonresidents. Nevertheless, in addition to giving import to the phrase "nonresidential population," we must provide meaning to the word "residential." We discern no inconsistency in our analysis, when viewed in the light that nonresidents may temporarily use home-like environments as temporary residences.
¶85 We agree with the Department of Ecology that we should construe the term "residential use" in light of the numbers and time constraints imposed on the nonresidential population inside the second statutory definition. The statutory language mentions "a nonresidential population that is, on average, at least twenty-five people for at least sixty days a year." RCW 90.03.015(4)(a). We need not discern the full implications of this language or answer all of the questions posed by the parties because of the limited circumstances of this appeal. Nevertheless, the language suggests more than one or two overnight stays by a hotel guest and implies some temporary living quarters.
¶86 Crown West argues that the legislature modeled RCW 90.03.015(4) after the Department of Health regulations relating to noncommunity transient and nontransient water systems under WAC 246-290-020(5)(b). For purposes of regulation, the Washington Department of Health classifies public water systems into Group A systems and Group B systems. WAC 246-290-020. A "Group A" system is a public water system that provides service such that the system fulfills the definition of a public water system provided in the 1996 amendments to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (Public L. No. 104-182, § 101(b)). WAC 246-290-020(4). The regulation further categorizes Group A water systems into community and noncommunity *750water systems. In turn, the regulation categorizes noncommunity water systems as "nontransient systems" and "transient systems." The regulation reads:
(b) Noncommunity water system means a Group A water system that is not a community water system. Noncommunity water systems are further defined as:
(i) Nontransient (NTNC) water system that provides service opportunity to twenty-five or more of the same nonresidential people for one hundred eighty or more days within a calendar year.
Examples of a NTNC water system might include a school, day care center, or a business, factory , motel , or restaurant with twenty-five or more employees on-site.
(ii) Transient (TNC) water system that serves:
(A) Twenty-five or more different people each day for sixty or more days within a calendar year;
(B) Twenty-five or more of the same people each day for sixty or more days , but less than one hundred eighty days within a calendar year; or
(C) One thousand or more people for two or more consecutive days within a calendar year.
Examples of a TNC water system might include a restaurant, tavern, motel, campground, state or county park, an RV park, vacation cottages, highway rest area, fairground, public concert facility, special event facility, or church.
WAC 246-290-020(5).
¶87 When dissecting the Department of Health definitions of "transient" and "nontransient" noncommunity water systems, we note that both definitions repeat in part the requirement of "twenty-five people" found in RCW 90.03.015(4) 's second statutory definition. Nevertheless, neither of the Department of Health definitions includes the qualifier "residential use." As with the nonresidential population in RCW 90.03.015(4) 's definition, the twenty-five people within the nontransient system must be nonresidential. Nevertheless, WAC 246-290-020(5)(b)(i) demands that the *751twenty-five people be the same people, whereas RCW 90.03.015(4) omits the word "same." Under the regulation, the nonresidential population must be present at least one hundred and eighty days. The second statutory definition in RCW 90.03.015(4) requires a presence for at least sixty days. Crown West highlights the examples given of nontransient systems, such as a hotel and other businesses, and the identification of employees as nonresidential people.
¶88 The definition of "transient water system" in WAC 246-290-020(5)(b)(A), unlike the definition of a municipal water supplier in RCW 90.03.015(4), expressly allows the twenty-five or more people to be "different people" during the sixty or more days. Examples of the transient system include a motel and restaurant, but no other businesses. Crown West emphasizes WAC 246-290-020(5) 's definition of the transient water system because the nonresidential population may differ from day to day and the examples include a motel.
¶89 The purposes behind the definitions found in the Department of Health regulations and those found in RCW 90.03.015(4) differ. The Washington State Department of Health safeguards, under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, the purity of drinking water for purposes of public health. The Department of Ecology, who administers implementation of RCW 90.03.015(4), also holds responsibilities for clean water, but under the federal Clean Water Act and in a broader sense concerning the environmental condition of the state's natural waterways. WAC 246-290-020(5) applies only to public water systems, and Crown West owns a private water system. Since the Department of Health regulations further dissimilar ends, we afford WAC 246-290-020(5) little import.
¶90 The Department of Ecology contends that " 'residential use of water for a nonresidential population' " implies use by people who reside elsewhere. RCW 90.03.015(4)(a). In turn, Ecology inserts into its POL-2030 the term "temporary *752domicile" to characterize the concept of a "nonresidential population." AR at 146. According to Ecology, residential uses must serve temporary domiciles occupied by the same nonresidents overnight for sixty or more days each. According to Ecology, Crown West does not fulfill the standard with a hotel by aggregating populations of different transients who may stay overnight for only a few days each. Ecology limits its examples of facilities to vacation homes and farm worker housing. Our construction of the second statutory definition partially coincides with Ecology, but we need not formally adopt the policy statement or limit examples to vacation homes and farm worker housing.
¶91 Crown West astutely argues that an industrial park is more worthy of the relinquishment exemption than vacation homes and thus more worthy of being deemed a municipal water supplier. Presumably, Crown West emphasizes the jobs available at the industrial park that stimulate the Spokane Valley economy. We are not convinced that a business and industrial park deserves more protection for its water system than a system serving temporary housing. Anyway, the legislature should make this determination.
Streamlined Process
¶92 The Washington State Department of Ecology maintains a streamlined process to determine the extent and validity of a water right, including whether the right holder qualifies as a municipal water supplier. Crown West underscores Ecology's position that a water right can lose its municipal status if five years pass without the water having been used for that purpose. Crown West argues that Ecology's position conflicts with this process. We need not address this argument since we have not adopted Ecology's position.
Intertie with Consolidated Irrigation District
¶93 Finally, Crown West contends that its usage of water also meets the definition in subsection (c) of *753RCW 90.03.015(4) relating to water supplied indirectly to a public water system. Crown West agreed with Consolidated Irrigation District #19, a government entity, to supply, on an emergency basis, water for municipal purposes. The irrigation district and Crown West fashioned an intertie between the two water systems. The record shows, however, that Crown West has never supplied water to the irrigation district. The two parties exchange minimal amounts of water periodically only to ensure the proper functioning of the intertie's valves.
¶94 The relevant portion of RCW 90.03.015 declares:
(4) "Municipal water supply purposes" means a beneficial use of water: ... (b) for governmental or governmental proprietary purposes by a city, town, public utility district, county, sewer district, or water district; or (c) indirectly for the purposes in (a) or (b) of this subsection through the delivery of treated or raw water to a public water system for such use.
(Emphasis added.) We reject Crown West's contention. The statutory language assumes that the water supplier actually delivers water to the public water system and the public water system puts the water to a beneficial use. If we read the statute otherwise, a private water supplier could enter an agreement to provide water to the public system and construct the intertie solely for the purpose of immunizing its water right from relinquishment.
CONCLUSION
¶95 We affirm the Pollution Control Hearings Board's decision with regard to Crown West's applications for a change and transfer of use.
WE CONCUR:
Korsmo, J.
Siddoway, J.