¶ 1 Gregory Ray Jones was convicted of assault after he entered an apartment occupied by four young men and a physical altercation ensued.
¶ 2 At trial, he argued that he had mistakenly entered the apartment and had used force against the homeowners only in self-defense. Finding there was some evidence to support Jones's theory of defense, the court gave a self-defense instruction, explaining that a person is entitled to use force to *763defend himself against any unlawful use of force.
¶ 3 But the court also instructed the jury that, under Colorado's "make-my-day" statute, a homeowner has the right to use any degree of physical force against a person who makes an "unlawful entry" into the home. In other words, where the make-my-day statute applies, the homeowner's use of force is necessarily lawful and therefore a trespasser has no right to use self-defense.
¶ 4 On appeal, Jones argues that the make-my-day instruction was overly broad. He says the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that only a "knowingly" unlawful entry, rather than a mistaken entry, triggers the statute. He contends that the court's error allowed the jury to determine that even a mistaken entry gave the homeowners the exclusive right to use force during the altercation which, in turn, prevented the jury from properly considering his claim of self-defense.
¶ 5 We agree and, because we conclude that the error was not harmless, we reverse Jones's conviction and remand for a new trial.
I. Background
¶ 6 Late one night, in March 2014, Jones opened the unlocked door of an apartment located in a large, gated apartment complex. He turned on the hall light and walked into one of the bedrooms.
¶ 7 The apartment was occupied by two brothers, Daniel and Ruben Peacemaker, and the brothers' two cousins (the homeowners). Jones and the homeowners had never met each other, and the homeowners all characterized Jones's entry into the apartment as a "completely random" occurrence.
¶ 8 It turned out that Jones's cousin lived in an apartment at the complex. Sometime in the previous year, the cousin had moved to a different apartment in the same complex. According to the testimony of various witnesses, the apartment complex was laid out in a confusing way: the five buildings all looked alike, and neither the buildings nor the apartments were numbered sequentially. One of the police officers who responded to the scene got lost looking for the homeowners' apartment. He testified that the complex was "really confusing" because the "numbers are labeled really odd," and that a person would "really have to spend a lot of time in that complex so that [he] would remember which building is which."
¶ 9 Jones had visited his cousin at the complex on multiple occasions, sometimes late at night. But on that night in March 2014, Jones had been drinking. His wife estimated that the couple started drinking at 6:00 that evening and that Jones drank about five glasses of brandy before she went to bed. When Jones woke her up at around 2:00 a.m. to tell her a joke, she thought he was drunk.
¶ 10 About an hour later, after parking his car at roughly the midpoint between his cousin's former and current apartments, Jones walked into the homeowners' apartment.
¶ 11 One of the occupants, a cousin, was sleeping on the couch. He heard Jones come in and turn on the light, but he assumed - because the person who had entered acted as though he "belonged there" and was not "somebody who was busting into the place" - that it was one of the Peacemaker brothers coming home late from work.
¶ 12 Jones walked past the cousin on the couch and through the open bedroom door where Daniel Peacemaker was sleeping. According to Daniel's testimony, he woke up to find Jones on top of him, punching him repeatedly in the head. Daniel yelled, then rolled out of bed, and both men fell to the floor, where Jones continued to punch Daniel.
¶ 13 The cousin on the couch heard Daniel yell and ran into the bedroom. He saw that Daniel, who was bleeding, had Jones "pinn[ed] against the wall," and that the two men were punching each other. He ran over and punched Jones "as hard as [he] could" in the face.
¶ 14 The other cousin arrived in the bedroom at almost the same time. He started punching Jones, as many times as he could, to try to knock him down. The fighting between Jones and the three men was "really *764fast, really aggressive"; there were "fists flying from everyone."
¶ 15 But within ten or fifteen seconds, the fight started to move out of the bedroom. Jones was "shuffling" with his back to the wall, moving toward the hallway, while he swung at the three men. One cousin described it as Jones "trying to fight his way out" of the apartment. But the homeowners "weren't letting him get out."
¶ 16 Eventually, though, Jones moved into the hallway. Daniel grabbed Jones's hoodie to try to prevent him from leaving, and Jones tripped near the front door. As he tripped, Jones dropped a knife on the floor. He then "slipped out the door."
¶ 17 Daniel's brother, Ruben, who had woken to the commotion just before Jones ran out of the apartment, chased Jones out the front door, with one of the cousins in tow. Ruben and the cousin caught up with Jones, tackled him to the ground, and detained him until police arrived a few minutes later.
¶ 18 It was not until after Jones had left the apartment that Daniel realized he had been stabbed. He sustained injuries to his ears, neck, shoulders, and arm. One cousin also sustained less serious injuries.
¶ 19 Jones was charged with burglary, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of second degree assault. The jury convicted him of one count of second degree assault and one count of third degree assault, but acquitted him of the attempted murder and burglary charges.
II. Jury Instructions
¶ 20 At trial, Jones argued that he had entered the apartment by mistake. Then, when the homeowners used force against him, he justifiably defended himself, using the knife he carried for protection.1
¶ 21 The court gave two instructions relevant to the issue on appeal: a self-defense instruction, requested by Jones, and an instruction pursuant to section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S. 2017, known as the "make-my-day" statute, requested by the prosecution.
¶ 22 The self-defense instruction allowed the jury to acquit Jones of the assault charges if it found that Jones had used physical force to defend himself from the use of unlawful physical force by the homeowners. The make-my-day instruction, however, directed the jury that, if the statutory elements were met, the homeowners' use of force against Jones was lawful . Thus, because self-defense applies only where the defendant confronts unlawful force, a finding that the make-my-day statute applied would necessarily negate Jones's defense.
¶ 23 On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the make-my-day statute is triggered upon any unlawful entry into a dwelling, rather than upon a "knowingly" unlawful entry. The error, Jones says, meant that the jury could have concluded that the make-my-day statute applied even though Jones's unlawful entry into the homeowners' apartment was mistaken or accidental, not "knowing." As a result, he argues, the erroneous make-my-day instruction negated his otherwise valid claim of self-defense.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 24 A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury correctly on the applicable law. People v. Pahl , 169 P.3d 169, 183 (Colo. App. 2006). We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether the instructions as a whole accurately informed the jury of the governing law. People v. Lucas , 232 P.3d 155, 162 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 25 We review a preserved objection to a jury instruction for harmless error. People v. Garcia , 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001). A jury instruction error is not harmless when the error permits the jury "to hold [the] defendant to a higher standard in establishing self-defense than is required by law." People v. Ferguson , 43 P.3d 705, 708 (Colo. App. 2001).
*765B. Affirmative Defense of Self-Defense
¶ 26 Under section 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2017, a person has the right to use force to defend himself from the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by another person, and he may use a degree of force that he reasonably believes is necessary for that purpose.
¶ 27 That right is not absolute, however. As relevant here, an "initial aggressor" may use physical force to defend himself only if, after he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, the other person nevertheless continues the use of unlawful physical force. § 18-1-704(3)(b).
¶ 28 As a general matter, though, a person's ability to defend himself - even an initial aggressor's - does not turn on whether he is where he has a right to be. People v. Toler , 9 P.3d 341, 352 (Colo. 2000). "[T]respassers do not forfeit their rights to self-defense merely by the act of trespassing." Id. Thus, a trespasser may use physical force to defend himself where, for example, the occupant of the property confronts him with unlawful physical force. Id. And even an initial aggressor may assert self-defense, irrespective of his status as a trespasser, so long as he "withdraws and communicates as required by the statute." Id.
¶ 29 These rules animate the principle that the touchstone of self-defense is a belief that one is defending against the unlawful use of force. People v. Silva , 987 P.2d 909, 915 (Colo. App. 1999). The corollary to that principle is that a person is not justified in using force to defend against another person's lawful use of force.
C. The Make-My-Day Statute
¶ 30 Under the make-my-day statute, any degree of physical force by a homeowner against certain trespassers is lawful. Thus, when the make-my-day statute applies, it operates as a bar to a trespasser's claim of self-defense. See People v. Chirico , 2012 COA 16, ¶ 15, 272 P.3d 1170.
¶ 31 Section 18-1-704.5(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704 [the self-defense statute], any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant.
¶ 32 The make-my-day statute therefore has three elements: (1) an unlawful entry; (2) the occupant's reasonable belief that the person entering unlawfully has committed, is committing, or intends to commit a crime other than the entry; and (3) the occupant's reasonable belief that the person entering unlawfully might use physical force against an occupant. See People v. Zukowski , 260 P.3d 339, 343 (Colo. App. 2010). Only the first element is at issue here.
¶ 33 The "vexing question" of the proper definition of "unlawful entry" was resolved in People v. McNeese , 892 P.2d 304, 310 (Colo. 1995) : "[A]n unlawful entry means a knowing, criminal entry into a dwelling." Though the statute does not contain the word "knowingly," the supreme court construed the statute to require a "culpable mental state" because, without such a requirement, the occupant of a dwelling could lawfully use physical force, even deadly physical force, against "any unanticipated or unexpected 'intruder.' " Id. at 311. And surely, the court reasoned, the legislature did not intend the statute to justify the use of physical force against "persons who enter a dwelling accidentally or in good faith." Id. Thus, the statutory language justifies an occupant's use of physical force against another person only when the other person has made "an entry in knowing violation of the criminal law" - that is, when the other person is "knowingly engaging in criminal conduct." Id. at 310-11.
*766¶ 34 Jury Instruction Number 29 instructed the jury that any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person "has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling," and the other elements of the make-my-day statute are established. Over defense counsel's objection, the court declined to add the word "knowingly" to modify the "unlawful entry" element.
D. McNeese 's Definition of "Unlawful Entry" is Not Limited to Immunity Cases
¶ 35 The People contend that the supreme court's interpretation of the term "unlawful entry" in the make-my-day statute is limited to cases in which the homeowner, not the trespasser, asserts the affirmative defense of self-defense.2 We are not persuaded.
¶ 36 To be sure, the make-my-day statute can apply outside the immunity context. See People v. Hayward , 55 P.3d 803, 805 (Colo. App. 2002). The question is whether the supreme court intended "unlawful entry" to have a different meaning depending on whether the homeowner or the trespasser is on trial.
¶ 37 We begin with the uncontroversial proposition that we are "bound to follow supreme court precedent." In re Estate of Ramstetter , 2016 COA 81, ¶ 40, 411 P.3d 1043 (quoting People v. Gladney , 250 P.3d 762, 768 n.3 (Colo. App. 2010) ). Our obligation takes on even greater import when it comes to statutory interpretation, because our departure from supreme court precedent amounts to an amendment of the statute that the legislature has not approved. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2410, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015).
¶ 38 Nonetheless, the People urge us to abandon the definition of "unlawful entry" articulated in McNeese . They contend the McNeese court adopted the "knowing" element of the "unlawful entry" requirement to temper the statute's grant of immunity to homeowners who use what would otherwise amount to excessive force against trespassers. See 892 P.2d at 310-11. We agree that this concern informed the supreme court's statutory interpretation, at least in part, but the People do not explain why this concern would not be present in cases where an unwitting trespasser is prosecuted and seeks to invoke self-defense.
¶ 39 As the McNeese court observed, the make-my-day statute "is similar to self-defense," but is much broader because it justifies deadly physical force, not just physical force, against an intruder, even when the intruder threatens the slightest use of force against the homeowner. Id. at 309. Thus, the court construed the statute to shield the homeowner only when the intruder made a "knowing, criminal entry" into the home. Id. at 310. Otherwise, a homeowner could take advantage of the statute's grant of immunity to use otherwise excessive force against a person who had a good faith belief that he was making a lawful entry. At bottom, the purpose of the "knowing" element is to protect the accidental trespasser. See id. at 310-11. (The supreme court apparently did not consider the second and third statutory requirements sufficient to achieve that goal.)
¶ 40 Given that purpose, we do not see why the knowing element would suddenly become irrelevant simply because the trespasser, not the homeowner, is ultimately prosecuted. An accidental trespasser who is confronted by a homeowner's excessive force would be unable to lawfully use force to defend himself, giving the homeowner a "license" to use unnecessary force against any intruder - the same *767scenario the supreme court intended to discourage in McNeese . Id. at 309 ; see also id. at 311 ("The immunity was not intended to justify use of physical force against persons who enter a dwelling accidentally or in good faith.").
¶ 41 The dissent raises a different reason to disregard McNeese 's definition of "unlawful entry." According to the dissent, the "knowing" element is tied not to the consequences of granting immunity, but instead to the burden of proof. In an immunity case, when the defendant homeowner raises the make-my-day defense at trial, it operates as an affirmative defense, meaning the prosecution bears the burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the victim's entry was knowingly unlawful. People v. Janes , 982 P.2d 300, 303 (Colo. 1999). But in a case where the trespasser is prosecuted, the dissent says, the prosecution's task is to prove the elements of the charged offenses; it should not bear the additional burden of proving that the homeowner used lawful force against the trespasser under the make-my-day statute.
¶ 42 The issue on appeal, though, is simply whether the instruction should have included the "knowingly" element of the statute's unlawful entry requirement. The dissent's argument goes to a different issue: Who should bear the burden of proof when the make-my-day statute is not raised by the homeowner as an affirmative defense?
¶ 43 Assuming the burden of proof were our concern, though, we note that the prosecution requested the make-my-day instruction in this case. It asked the jury to find that, at the moment Jones "unlawfully" entered the apartment, the homeowners were "justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force," against him. The instruction's effect - and, presumably, its purpose - was to give the homeowners the exclusive right to self-defense and thereby negate any such claim by Jones.
¶ 44 But regardless of whose burden it was to prove the application (or nonapplication) of the make-my-day statute, the jury had to be correctly instructed as to its elements. The dissent does not explain why the prosecution should be entitled to the benefit of a broader definition of "unlawful entry" simply because Jones was on trial, not the homeowners. Indeed, even if Jones should have borne the burden of proof (and we do not decide that issue, as it was not raised in the trial court or on appeal), he could not have disproved the homeowner's exclusive right to use physical force unless the instruction included the disputed "knowingly" element.
¶ 45 Accordingly, we see no reason to depart from McNeese 's definition of "unlawful entry."
E. The Make-My-Day Instruction Improperly Abridged Jones's Self-Defense Defense
¶ 46 Jones presented two theories of self-defense, both of which started from the premise that Jones had unlawfully, but mistakenly, entered the homeowners' apartment. Under the first theory, after the mistaken entry, Daniel was the initial aggressor, and Jones's use of physical force was justified as a reasonable response to the homeowners' unlawful use of force. Under the alternative theory, even if, after the mistaken entry, Jones was the initial aggressor, he tried to retreat by leaving the apartment, but the homeowners nevertheless used unlawful physical force to try to detain him, and therefore Jones's use of physical force after his attempt to retreat was justified as self-defense.
¶ 47 But if the make-my-day statute applied - that is, if Jones made an "unlawful entry" into the apartment (and the other statutory criteria were met) - then he would not be justified in using physical force against the homeowners. That is true because, under those circumstances, the homeowners' use of physical force against Jones was necessarily lawful, and, as we have noted, self-defense is only a defense to another's use of unlawful physical force.
¶ 48 The trial court, however, declined to instruct the jury that Jones's entry was not an "unlawful entry" for purposes of the make-my-day statute unless it was made "knowingly" - meaning, with a "mental state [that] reflect[s] an entry in knowing *768violation of the criminal code." McNeese , 892 P.2d at 312. A mistaken or accidental entry is not a knowingly unlawful entry. Id. at 312.
¶ 49 Although it is generally true that "an instruction couched in terms of the language of the statute is proper," a trial court must tailor those instructions to the particular circumstances of the case. Idrogo v. People , 818 P.2d 752, 754 (Colo. 1991). Therefore, an instruction clarifying the meaning of "unlawful entry" is necessary where the evidence supports a theory that the defendant accidentally entered the dwelling or otherwise entered without the requisite mental state. Cf. Hayward , 55 P.3d at 805 (perceiving no error in the trial court's decision to give the make-my-day instruction in the exact terms of the statute, where the evidence was undisputed that the defendant's attempted entry into his estranged wife's home was knowingly unlawful).
¶ 50 Here, in the absence of any further instructions to the jury about the meaning of "unlawful entry," the jury could have erroneously concluded that even an accidental entry into the apartment triggered application of the make-my-day statute. A mistaken entry, after all, could still be unlawful under the criminal code, see § 18-4-504, C.R.S. 2017 (criminal trespass in the third degree); see also McNeese , 892 P.2d at 316 (Scott, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the majority's definition [of unlawful entry], third degree criminal trespass would not fulfill the 'unlawful entry' requirement because it lacks the culpable mental state of knowingly."), even if it does not count as "knowingly" unlawful for purposes of the make-my-day statute.
¶ 51 We therefore conclude that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the make-my-day statute's "unlawful entry" element requires that the unlawful entry be made "knowingly."
¶ 52 We further conclude that the instructional error was not harmless. The evidence supported Jones's theory that he entered the apartment accidentally, under the mistaken belief that he was entering his cousin's apartment: Jones's cousin lived in the complex, the cousin had recently moved, the complex was difficult to navigate, and Jones was apparently drunk. Indeed, after receiving an instruction on "mistaken belief of fact,"3 the jury acquitted Jones of first degree burglary.
¶ 53 Accordingly, the record supported a determination by the jury that Jones's entry was accidental and that the make-my-day statute did not apply.
¶ 54 Under those circumstances, the jury would then have evaluated Jones's claim of self-defense under ordinary self-defense principles. If the jury determined that Daniel was the initial aggressor, Jones was entitled to use physical force to defend himself from the moment Daniel used unlawful physical force against him. But even if the jury determined that Jones was the initial aggressor, it could nonetheless have credited Jones's theory of self-defense if it also determined that Jones had attempted to withdraw from the encounter and had effectively communicated his intent to the homeowners, but that the homeowners nevertheless continued the use of unlawful physical force against him.
¶ 55 The erroneous make-my-day instruction, though, meant that the jury might not have evaluated the claim of self-defense even though it found that Jones's entry was not "knowingly" unlawful. See Ferguson , 43 P.3d at 708 (An error in the self-defense instruction is not harmless where "we simply cannot determine the manner in which the jury applied the self-defense instruction, if at all.").
¶ 56 The People contend that any error was harmless because Jones's acquittal on the burglary charge rendered the make-my-day instruction "moot." According to the People, in acquitting Jones of burglary, the jury necessarily determined that Jones had not made a knowingly unlawful entry. Therefore, the jury would have known that the make-my-day *769instruction did not apply and would have considered Jones's self-defense defense.
¶ 57 Not true, because only the burglary instruction required a "knowingly" unlawful entry; the make-my-day instruction required only an "unlawful" entry. Thus, the jury could have determined that Jones did not "knowingly" enter the homeowners' apartment unlawfully, for purposes of the burglary statute, because his entry was accidental or mistaken. But it could still have concluded, for purposes of the make-my-day statute, which did not include a "knowingly" element, that Jones committed an unlawful (though accidental or mistaken) entry - i.e., a third degree trespass. See § 18-4-504.
¶ 58 The likelihood that this precise problem occurred was only increased by the mistaken-belief-of-fact instruction. The jury was told that, for purposes of the burglary charge only, if Jones engaged in prohibited conduct - presumably, entering the apartment - under a mistaken belief, and the mistaken belief precluded him from forming the requisite mens rea (knowingly), his conduct was "legally authorized." The jury, following this instruction, could have concluded that Jones's entry into the apartment was made under a mistaken belief that he was entering his cousin's apartment and it could have acquitted Jones of burglary on that basis. But because the instruction applied only to the burglary charge, the jury could reasonably have understood that it could not consider the "mistaken" or "accidental" nature of the entry for any other purpose, including applicability of the make-my-day statute.
¶ 59 Nor are we persuaded by the People's alternative argument, that the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly disproved Jones's claim of self-defense.
¶ 60 True, Daniel testified that he awoke to Jones jumping on top of him and "throwing blows to [his] head ... more [times than he] could count." That testimony was sufficient to establish that Jones was the initial aggressor and not entitled to claim self-defense unless he met other criteria. But other evidence contradicted Daniel's testimony. Despite the nearly twenty punches to his head and face, on cross-examination he admitted that he did not sustain any injuries to his face, and he agreed that photographs taken just after the fight and a week later showed no facial injuries. There was also the lack of any motive. The homeowners testified that they had never met Jones and that his entry into their apartment was "completely random." A rational juror was not compelled to accept Daniel's testimony that Jones was the initial aggressor. And if Jones was not the initial aggressor, and the make-my-day statute did not apply, he was entitled to use physical force against Daniel from the inception of the incident.
¶ 61 But even if Jones was the initial aggressor, he was entitled to claim self-defense if he attempted to withdraw from the encounter and effectively communicated his intent to do so but the homeowners nonetheless continued any unlawful use of physical force. See § 18-1-704(3)(b). Each of the four occupants testified that very quickly after the altercation started - within ten or fifteen seconds, according to one of the cousins - Jones attempted to extricate himself from the melee and leave the apartment. But each of the four occupants also testified that they continued to use physical force against Jones in an effort to detain him. Some evidence, or at least reasonable inferences drawn from it, also supported Jones's argument that he did not use the knife until after he had attempted to withdraw from the altercation and get out of the apartment.
¶ 62 The dissent says Jones's efforts to extricate himself from the altercation were merely an "attempt to flee a crime scene." The jury could have adopted that view, but we cannot say that it is the only reasonable view of the evidence. See State v. Jones , 165 So.3d 74, 87 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (the jury is the "ultimate fact-finder" in determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense, including whether the defendant was the initial aggressor who had withdrawn from the conflict); see also People v. Hernandez , 111 Cal.App.4th 582, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 588 (2003) (an initial aggressor may communicate withdrawal either by words or conduct; verbal notification is not required).
*770¶ 63 In sum, we cannot say that the evidence was so overwhelming that the instructional error was harmless. See Garcia , 28 P.3d at 344 (error in jury instruction is not harmless where the language of the instruction creates a reasonable probability that the jury could have been misled in reaching a verdict).
¶ 64 Finally, to the extent the People argue that defense counsel's closing argument cured the effect of an erroneous jury instruction, we reject that argument. True, in his closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that Jones's mistaken or accidental entry into the apartment did not constitute a "knowing unlawful entry," and therefore Jones could use physical force to defend himself from the homeowners' use of physical force against him. But defense counsel's closing argument, even if a correct statement of the law, did not remove the taint of the court's error. "[A]rguments by counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court." Taylor v. Kentucky , 436 U.S. 478, 488-89, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). It is the duty of the trial court - not counsel - to "correctly instruct the jury on all matters of law for which there is sufficient evidence to support giving instructions." People v. Jacobson , 2017 COA 92, ¶ 10, --- P.3d ---- (quoting People v. Rhea , 2014 COA 60, ¶ 10, 349 P.3d 280 ). Consistent with its obligation, the trial court repeatedly admonished the jury to "go with the instructions," reminding the jury that "if the lawyers say the law is something and it's something different in the instructions, then you go with the instructions."
¶ 65 The language of the make-my-day instruction improperly abridged Jones's claim of self-defense and created a reasonable probability that the jury could have been misled in reaching a verdict. Accordingly, we reverse Jones's convictions and remand for a new trial.
III. Remaining Contentions
¶ 66 Jones also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after he sought to add a dismissed juror to his witness list and in denying his request for the juror's contact information. In light of our disposition, we do not address these additional claims.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 67 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Terry, J., concurs
Casebolt* , J., dissents