¶ 1 Price sued the wrong defendant. The trial court dismissed, because the statute of limitations expired before the proper defendant received notice. Price argues that this was error, because her amendment to the complaint relates back to the original filing of the complaint. We affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2 Stacy Gonzalez rear-ended Anne Price. Price's declaration describes the exchange of information that occurred immediately after:
The driver who hit me was an emotional mess-she was crying, had labored breathing, and was shaking. I was very worried for her. I asked her if she was okay and she said no. She said she had just left her doctor's office[1 ] and her heart was not good. That made me even more worried for her, so I asked again if she as okay. She said no, but that she was on her way to another doctor's appointment. I said that we should call the police or an ambulance but she insisted that we not.
I suggested we exchange information, so we both went to our cars to get that. I didn't have any paper handy, so my mother gave me a receipt that she had, so I could write on the back of it. I walked back to the other driver and she handed me her insurance card; her hand was shaking. I gave her my insurance card and we each wrote down the other's contact information. The other driver did not write down her name and information on a piece of paper and give it to me-she gave me her insurance card and I wrote down her contact info on my mom's slip of paper....
At no time did the other driver tell me her name, otherwise I would have written it down. The only ID [ (identification) ] she gave me was her insurance card, she did not show me her driver's license. Based on the information the driver handed to me, I believed her name was Sara Gonzalez.
In fact, Sara Gonzalez was Stacy's2 mother.
¶ 3 On November 13, 2015, the last day before the statute of limitations expired, Price filed a summons and complaint for personal injuries against Sara Gonzalez. Sara's answer stated that Price had sued the wrong defendant.
¶ 4 The trial court granted Price leave of court to amend her complaint. On January 27, 2016, over two months after the statute of limitations had expired, Price amended her complaint to name Stacy as a defendant, in addition to Sara and Jose Gonzalez.3 On February 4, 2016, within 90 days of the filing of the original complaint, Sara's attorney accepted service on behalf of both Sara and Stacy. On September 2, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, because Stacy, the proper defendant, did not receive notice within the statute of limitations period, as required by CR 15(c). The trial court granted this motion, because "defendant Stacy Gonzalez did not *861receive notice of the institution of the action mistakenly brought against her mother within the period of time provided by law for commencing the action against her which was three years from the date of the November 13, 2012 accident."
¶ 5 Price appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶ 6 Price makes two arguments. First, she argues that her amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under CR 15(c). Second, she alternatively argues that Washington courts should change their interpretation of CR 15(c) to conform to the federal rule that allows relation back of pleadings within 90 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations.
¶ 7 The trial court granted summary judgment to Gonzalez, because it found that Stacy did not receive notice of the institution of the action within the statute of limitations, as required by CR 15.4 This court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash.2d 909, 922, 296 P.3d 860 (2013). It performs the same inquiry as the trial court, and will affirm an order of summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. It reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id.
I. Relation Back
¶ 8 Price first argues that she satisfied the requirements of CR 15(c). Our Supreme Court has described the purpose CR 15(c) as follows:
Plaintiffs occasionally sue incorrect defendants by mistake and do not realize who the correct defendants are until after the statute of limitations period expires. We have a court rule that deals with that scenario: CR 15(c). If plaintiffs amend their complaint and meet the requirements of that rule, we treat their amended complaint as "relat[ing] back to the date of the original pleading," and thus timely.
Martin v. Dematic, 182 Wash.2d 281, 288, 340 P.3d 834 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting CR15(c) ).
¶ 9 CR 15(c) has two textual and one judicially created requirements, Id. at 288, 340 P.3d 834. The first and second (textual) requirements are:
[W]ithin the period provided by law for commencing the action against the original party, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining her or his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the new party.
CR 15. Third, Washington courts have followed federal courts and added an "inexcusable neglect" prong, which disallows relation back if the error was due to inexcusable neglect. Martin, 182 Wash.2d at 289, 340 P.3d 834.
¶ 10 The party seeking for its amended complaint to relate back has the burden to prove these three conditions are satisfied. Id. at 288-89, 340 P.3d 834. But, CR 15(c) is to be liberally construed on the side of allowance of relation back of an amendment after the statute of limitations has run, particularly where the opposing party will be put to no disadvantage. Perrin v. Stensland, 158 Wash. App. 185, 194, 240 P.3d 1189 (2010).
A. Notice Within the Limitations Period
¶ 11 The first requirement of CR 15(c) is that the added defendant had notice of the action within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the *862original party. Martin, 182 Wash.2d at 288, 340 P.3d 834. Our Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean within the applicable statute of limitations. Id.
¶ 12 Price presents three alternative arguments to satisfy this prong. First, she argues that there is a question of material fact as to whether Stacy had actual notice of the action within the statute of limitations. Second, she argues that knowledge of the action should be imputed from Sara to Stacy due to a "community of interest." Third, she argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled under these facts, and, if so, Stacy would be deemed to have received notice within the appropriate limitation period.
1. Actual Notice
¶ 13 Price first argues that there is a question of material fact regarding whether Stacy had actual notice of the complaint within the statute of limitations. Price did not serve Stacy within the statute of limitations period. However, she argues that Stacy's affidavit leaves open the question of whether Stacy received actual notice, on November 13, 2015, the date the statute of limitations expired. Price relies on the specific language of Stacy's affidavit: "Prior to November 13, 2015, I was not aware a lawsuit had been filed against my mother." (Emphasis added.) And, Stacy's declaration states that she did not know about the lawsuit before November 13, 2015. Price asserts that this alleged ambiguity leaves open the possibility that Stacy received notice of the lawsuit on November 13, 2015.
¶ 14 But, other portions of the declaration foreclose this interpretation, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Price. Stacy's declaration states that "it was not until an attorney called my mother about the lawsuit that my mother told me she had been mistakenly sued regarding this accident. I do not recall specifically when this call occurred but it was sometime after November 24, 2015." (Emphasis added.) Sara's declaration states that the first time she heard about the lawsuit was on a call from an attorney, and that that call occurred "[s]ubsequent to" November 13, 2015. (Emphasis added.) Thus, while Stacy did not know of the action before November 13, she also did not know of the action until after November 24. Actual notice has not been established.
2. Community of Interest
¶ 15 Price alternatively argues that knowledge should be imputed to Stacy under a "community of interest" between Stacy and Sara. Price cites four cases where courts have imputed knowledge to misnamed parties when a community of interest exists between the named party and the new party. In Perrin, this court found a community of interest between a deceased defendant and the defendant's estate. 158 Wash. App. at 188, 196, 240 P.3d 1189. In LaRue v. Harris, 128 Wash. App. 460, 465, 115 P.3d 1077 (2005), the court imputed notice, based on a community of interest, to the insured decedent's estate from a properly served insurer. In both Schwartz v. Douglas, 98 Wash. App. 836, 840, 991 P.2d 665 (2000) and Craig v. Ludy, 95 Wash. App. 715, 717, 720, 976 P.2d 1248 (1999), this court found a community of interest between a deceased defendant and his insurer, when the original complaint named the deceased defendant, rather than his estate. These four cases all involve a legal alignment of interests such as that between an insurer and insured, or decedent and estate. But, Price cites no Washington authority where a court has found a community of interest based on a factual circumstance such as cohabitation or a familial relationship.5 This is insufficient to create a community of interest for the purposes of CR 15(c).
3. Equitable Tolling
¶ 16 Price alternatively argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Equitable tolling permits a court to allow an action to proceed when justice requires it, even though a statutory time period has nominally elapsed.
*863Benyaminov v. City of Bellevue, 144 Wash. App. 755, 760, 183 P.3d 1127 (2008). "[T]his court allows equitable tolling when justice requires." Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash.2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791 (1998). "The predicates for equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff." Id.; see also Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash.2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991) ("In the absence of bad faith on the part of the defendant and reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff, equity cannot be invoked.") The party asserting that equitable tolling should apply bears the burden of proof. Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 153 Wash. App. 366, 379, 223 P.3d 1172 (2009).
¶ 17 Courts typically permit equitable tolling to occur only sparingly, and should not extend it to a garden variety claim of excusable neglect. Benyaminov, 144 Wash. App. at 761, 183 P.3d 1127. Appellate courts review a decision on whether to grant equitable relief de novo. Trotzer v. Vig, 149 Wash. App. 594, 607, 203 P.3d 1056 (2009).
¶ 18 Trotzer is an example of the hesitancy with which courts apply equitable tolling. In 2000, Vig cleared a walking trail on Trotzer's land, mistakenly believing that it was on his property. Id. at 599, 203 P.3d 1056. Vig wrote a letter to Trotzer that stated, "In the future, we will never do any work near the property line without first consulting you." Id. at 600, 203 P.3d 1056. Two years later, Vig and Trotzer met by chance at a store, and briefly conversed. Id. Vig told Trotzer that they intended to extend the trail, but on their own property, Id. Trotzer commissioned a survey, and discovered that some of the trail was on his property. Id. at 600-01, 203 P.3d 1056.
¶ 19 Trotzer filed a complaint for trespass against the Vigs, but this occurred outside the statute of limitations with respect to the 2000 trespass. Id. at 601, 606, 203 P.3d 1056. Trotzer argued equitable tolling should apply, because the Vigs' letter gave false assurances that they would consult Trotzer prior to further action. Id. at 606, 203 P.3d 1056. This court disagreed, and held that equitable tolling did not apply. Id. at 607, 203 P.3d 1056. Although the meeting was by chance, the court viewed the brief conversation at the store as satisfying that promise to "consult" Trotzer. Id. Thus, it found no false assurances, and no grounds for equitable tolling. Id. Vig illustrates the narrowness with which Washington courts have applied the "false assurances" prong.
¶ 20 Here, no facts suggest that Stacy made a deliberate attempt to mislead. Immediately after the accident, Price observed Stacy to be shaken up. Viewing the facts most favorably to Price, Stacy gave Price her insurance card, but not her driver's license, identification, or name. Nothing suggests that Stacy told Price that she was the person named on the insurance card. She merely gave her the card. Price then made an inference. These facts do not meet RCW 46.52.020(3)'s requirements6 for information exchange following a collision. But, they do not establish bad faith, or any affirmative false assurances that Stacy was Sara. Nor do they suggest reasonable diligence from Price. In the three years following the collision, nothing in the record suggests that Price used the contact information, the insurance card, the vehicle information, or made any other efforts to verify the driver's true identity. Stacy was the registered owner of the vehicle she was driving, and a cursory records search therefore would have shown that Stacy was likely the driver. But, the only act Price took in identifying the driver was inferring the driver's identity from the insurance card.
¶ 21 Courts should apply equitable tolling only sparingly. As the party seeking relation back under CR 15(c), Price has the burden of showing that Stacy had notice within the statute of limitations period. Martin, 182 Wash.2d at 288-89, 340 P.3d 834. She has not met that burden.
¶ 22 Because Price cannot meet the first prong of the CR 15(c) requirements, we need not address the remaining prongs.
*864II. Foreign Authority
¶ 23 Price alternatively argues that Washington courts should align its interpretation of CR 15(c) with federal courts' interpretation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.)15(c).
¶ 24 Washington CR 15(c) states that an amended pleading bringing in a new party will relate back to the original pleading if, "within the period provided by law for commencing the action," the new party had notice and knew or should have known of the action against him or her. CR 15(c). The Martin court viewed this as the applicable limitations period. 182 Wash.2d at 288, 340 P.3d 834. By contrast, The federal rule states that an amended pleading bringing in a new party will relate back to the original pleading if, within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the new party had notice and knew or should have known of the action against him or her. FED .R. CIV. P. 15(C) ; 4(m).
¶ 25 Price asserts that Washington courts should follow the federal approach. But, this ignores the obvious textual differences between the Washington and federal rules. "Federal authority is persuasive in interpreting language of a state court rule that parallels a federal rule." Craig, 95 Wash. App. at 719 n.2, 976 P.2d 1248. The Washington rule does not parallel the federal rule in this regard. Federal courts allow the 90 day window for adding misnamed parties, because the federal rule explicitly allows this. The Washington rule does not.7
¶ 26 The trial court correctly determined that Washington law requires that a misnamed party receive notice of the action within the statute of limitations period.
¶ 27 We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
Verellen, J.