¶ 14 Schnitzer filed a land use petition in Pierce County, challenging the ordinance as an unlawful site-specific rezone.3 The City filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled in favor of Schnitzer, denied the motion to dismiss, and held Ordinance 3067 invalid. On appeal, a majority of *574the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the action, holding that Ordinance 3067 was not a "land use decision" reviewable by the superior court under LUPA. Chief Judge Bjorgen penned a persuasive dissent, concluding that Ordinance 3067 was reviewable under LUPA. Schnitzer W., LLC v. City of Puyallup, 196 Wash. App. 434, 444-50, 382 P.3d 744 (2016) (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bjorgen analyzed the content, context, purpose, and effect of Ordinance 3067 and determined that it "was not an adoption of legislative or area-wide policy, but rather a rezone of a specific, relatively small property in the context of a development proposal on that property," id. at 447, 382 P.3d 744, and that "[w]hether a rezone is proposed by a property owner, a neighbor, or the local government has little to do with the[ ] distinctions [between legislative and site-specific actions]," id. at 449-50, 382 P.3d 744.
¶ 15 Schnitzer appealed the dismissal of its land use petition, and we granted review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 16 Whether a city council's decision regarding the use of land is reviewable by the superior court under LUPA is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. See Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wash.2d 55, 64, 340 P.3d 191 (2014).
ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Ordinance 3067 was approved by the Puyallup City Council against the recommendation of the Planning Commission, without public comment or hearing, and with only four council members present. It applies solely to the Schnitzer property and imposes major restrictions. The City argues that Ordinance 3067 is not reviewable under LUPA because it was proposed by the city council and was not a ruling in response to an application by a third party. The City also argues that Ordinance 3067 is a legislative action expressly excluded from review under LUPA. We disagree.
*575I. Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone and can be challenged only in superior court under LUPA
¶ 18 The City argues that regardless of its content, the ordinance cannot be subject to LUPA review because it was proposed by the city council and was not an application by an *1177outside party. We disagree. Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone that must be challenged in superior court under LUPA.
A. LUPA grants superior courts exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to site-specific rezones
¶ 19 There are two primary mechanisms by which to challenge local jurisdictions' land use decisions: review by the Growth Management Hearing Board (GMHB) under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, or review by a superior court under LUPA. See Woods v. Kittitas County, 162 Wash.2d 597, 608-10, 174 P.3d 25 (2007) (explaining the statutory framework for review of local jurisdictions' land use decisions). And, "[i]f a GMHB does not have jurisdiction to consider a petition, it must be filed in superior court under LUPA." Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wash.2d 169, 178, 4 P.3d 123 (2000).
¶ 20 GMHBs have limited jurisdiction and may decide only challenges to or amendments of comprehensive plans or development regulations. Woods, 162 Wash.2d at 609, 174 P.3d 25. GMHBs do not have jurisdiction over "challenges to site-specific land use decisions because site-specific land use decisions do not qualify as comprehensive plans or development regulations." Id. at 610, 174 P.3d 25. LUPA, however, grants superior courts exclusive jurisdiction to review land use decisions unless the decision is made by a body outside a local jurisdiction or is subject to review by a quasi-judicial body such as the GMHB. RCW 36.70C.030 ; Woods, 162 Wash.2d at 610, 174 P.3d 25 ("LUPA grants the superior court exclusive jurisdiction to review a local jurisdiction's land use decisions, with the exception of decisions subject to review by bodies such as the GMHBs." (emphasis omitted) ).
*576¶ 21 Accordingly, a challenge to a site-specific land use decision can be brought only under LUPA. Woods, 162 Wash.2d at 610, 174 P.3d 25 ("GMHBs do not have jurisdiction to decide challenges to site-specific land use decisions because site-specific land use decisions do not qualify as comprehensive plans or development regulations. A challenge to a site-specific land use decision should be brought in a LUPA petition at superior court." (citation omitted) ). LUPA defines a "land use decision" as a "final determination ... on ... [a]n application for a project permit or other governmental approval." RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a). And, "[a] site-specific rezone occurs 'when there are specific parties requesting a classification change for a specific tract.' " Woods, 162 Wash.2d at 611 n.7, 174 P.3d 25 (quoting Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash.2d 201, 212, 634 P.2d 853 (1981) ).
¶ 22 A site-specific rezone requires three factors: (1) a specific tract of land, (2) a request for a classification change, and (3) a specific party making the request. Id.
¶ 23 For example, in Feil v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, we held that a recreational overlay district was a site-specific rezone. 172 Wash.2d 367, 380, 259 P.3d 227 (2011). In Feil, the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission applied for a recreational overlay district permit from Douglas County to develop a trail along the shore of the Columbia River. Id. at 373, 259 P.3d 227. The overlay permit dealt with a single tract of land. Id. at 380, 259 P.3d 227. This court determined that the permitting decision was a site-specific rezone. Id. There, the Parks Commission was the specific party, the recreational overlay was a classification change, and the parcel of land was a specific tract.
¶ 24 To determine whether Ordinance 3067 is reviewable under LUPA, we must determine whether Ordinance 3067 applies to a specific tract of land, whether it is a classification change, and whether it was requested by a specific party. Because Ordinance 3067 is a classification change of *577a specific tract of land requested by a specific party, we hold that it is a site-specific rezone.
B. The Schnitzer property is a specific tract of land
¶ 25 First, Ordinance 3067 applies not area-wide, but to a specific tract of land: the Schnitzer property. Puyallup Ordinance 3067 (May 28, 2014); CP at 17-23. It carves out the Schnitzer property from adjacent parcels, despite *1178the council's initial stated intent that the new zoning overlay would apply to all newly annexed properties. See CP at 124-29. Ordinance 3067 applies only to the Schnitzer property, leaving all surrounding annexed properties unaffected, despite their similar characteristics, location, and zoning. Puyallup Ordinance 3067; CP at 19-21, 23.
C. Ordinance 3067 is a classification change
¶ 26 Second, Ordinance 3067 is a classification change. Ordinance 3067 applied a new zoning overlay to the Schnitzer property. The overlay changes the Schnitzer property's zoning classification from limited manufacturing to ML-SPO; imposes a building size limitation; restricts the design, size, setback, and orientation of buildings; imposes landscaping, open space, and pedestrian infrastructure requirements; and establishes regulations pertaining to outdoor storage uses, storm water management, and signage. See Feil, 172 Wash.2d 367, 259 P.3d 227 (application of a recreational overlay district was a classification change of the tract to which it applied).
D. The city council is a specific party
¶ 27 Finally, Ordinance 3067 was requested by a specific party. The City argues that a zoning decision cannot be a site-specific rezone unless it was initiated by a third-party application, and that the government "does not apply for a permit to itself, nor does it apply for approval of its own action." Schnitzer, 196 Wash. App. at 442, 382 P.3d 744. Accordingly, the City argues that Ordinance 3067 was not a site-specific *578rezone because the ordinance was proposed by the City. We disagree: a government can approve its own actions, can apply for or initiate a request for its own approval, and can be a specific party for the purpose of a site-specific rezone classification.
¶ 28 First, the government is regularly characterized as approving its own actions. The Washington State Constitution contemplates government approval of its own actions by categorizing the governor's and the legislature's actions as "approval" prior to an act becoming law.4 Governmental approval for its own actions is also contemplated in the United States Constitution, which categorizes both the president's actions and Congress's actions as "approv[al]." U.S. CONST . art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Statutes also characterize the government as approving its own actions. For example, RCW 35A.12.130 requires every ordinance passed by the city council to be presented to and approved by the mayor.5
¶ 29 And here, even the Puyallup City Council expressly classified its actions as "approval" by articulating that Ordinance 3067 was "[p]assed and approved by City Council of the City of Puyallup at an open public meeting on the 28th day of May, 2014." Puyallup Ordinance 3067 (May 28, 2014) (emphasis added); CP at 21-22.
*579¶ 30 Second, the government can be a specific party for the purpose of a site-specific rezone classification. See, e.g., Feil, 172 Wash.2d at 380, 259 P.3d 227 (a rezone initiated by the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission was a site-specific rezone exclusively reviewable under LUPA); cf. Spokane County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 176 Wash. App. 555, 571-72, 309 P.3d 673 (2013) (The county initiated a rezone of an individual property and argued that the rezone was site-specific, and the Court of Appeals articulated that "a site-specific rezone is a project permit approval *1179under LUPA if it is authorized by a then-existing comprehensive plan.").
¶ 31 The legislature enacted LUPA to establish "uniform, expedited appeal procedures" for "judicial review of land use decisions made by local jurisdictions" in order to provide "consistent, predictable, and timely judicial review." RCW 36.70C.010. The standards governing relief under LUPA primarily focus on ensuring that a party impacted by a land use decision was treated fairly by the decision-maker , in process and in substance.6
¶ 32 Limiting challenges exclusively to land use decisions proposed by nongovernmental parties would result in a framework under which the decision-maker's duties of fairness to an interested party change based upon the origin of the initial request. This would contravene LUPA's objective of providing "uniform, ... consistent, predictable, and timely judicial review" and would effectively grant city councils the opportunity to make decisions with impunity, unreviewable by the superior court, if the request was self-initiated.
*580¶ 33 Furthermore, here the Puyallup Municipal Code (PMC) itself names the city council as a specific party that has the authority to initiate a site-specific rezone application. See PUYALLUP MUNICIPAL CODE 20.11.005. Chapter 20.11 of the PMC "establishes the rules and procedures for handling and management of project permit applications and records pertaining to matters under this code." PUYALLUP MUNICIPAL CODE 20.11.001. The next section lists the parties that may initiate a rezone application, explicitly including the city council:
20.11.005 General rules for processing applications.
Applications to initiate consideration of matters under this code may be. made by persons or agencies, including owners, bona fide agents, the commission and the council.
PUYALLUP MUNICIPAL CODE 20.11.005 (emphasis added). Here, the City can be and is the specific party that sought to apply an overlay zone and its major restrictions to the Schnitzer property.
¶ 34 Accordingly, Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone. The zoning overlay is a classification change, the Schnitzer property is a specific tract, and the city council is a specific party. Because Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone, it is subject to exclusive review under LUPA.
II. Ordinance 3067 is not a legislative action
¶ 35 LUPA expressly excludes from review "applications for legislative approvals such as area-wide rezones and annexations." ROW 36.70C.020(2)(a). Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone and not a legislative approval; therefore, Ordinance 3067 is not excluded from LUPA review.
¶ 36 The City argues that Ordinance 3067 is a legislative action excluded from review under LUPA. In arguing that Ordinance 3067 is legislative, the City relies on the Raynes7 factors. However, the Raynes factors are inapposite when determining whether an action qualifies as "legislative" under LUPA.
*581¶ 37 In Raynes, we created a four-factor test8 for determining whether an action is legislative for the purpose of deciding whether a statutory writ of certiorari is warranted under chapter 7.16 RCW. Raynes, 118 Wash.2d at 244, 821 P.2d 1204 ("A 4-part test has been developed to determine when a given action is quasi-judicial or legislative in relation to the writ."). However, LUPA replaced *1180the writ as the exclusive means for judicial review of land use decisions. We have explicitly declined to apply the requirements for a statutory writ to review under LUPA:
The common law writ of certiorari has been codified in chapter 7.16 RCW as the writ of review, which generally grants review of only quasi-judicial determinations. ... However, LUPA makes no reference to chapter 7.16 RCW. Reading LUPA together with chapter 7.16 RCW to ascertain legislative intent is not consistent with rules of statutory interpretation. ...
Construing the express language of RCW 36.70C.030(1) ("[t]his chapter replaces the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions and shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions") (emphasis added) according to its obvious meaning without regard to previous common law or, in this case, chapter 7.16 RCW, all land use decisions are subject to LUPA unless specifically excluded under RCW 36.70C.030.
Chelan County v. Nykreim, 146 Wash.2d 904, 930-31, 52 P.3d 1 (2002) (third alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). As a result, because Raynes examined only the procedures for a statutory writ, we cannot rely on its test when determining whether Ordinance 3067 is a legislative action under LUPA.
¶ 38 Instead, to determine whether Ordinance 3067 is a legislative action excluded by LUPA, we turn to statutory interpretation. In doing so, we hold that Ordinance 3067 is not excluded from LUPA review.
*582¶ 39 LUPA does not exclude all legislative action; rather, it excludes "applications for legislative approvals such as area-wide rezones and annexations." RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a). However, the inclusion of "such as" in this section indicates the list of excluded "legislative approvals" is illustrative, not exhaustive. Cf. In re Postsentence Review of Leach, 161 Wash.2d 180, 186, 163 P.3d 782 (2007) (because the statute lacked a provision for "similar" or "like" offenses, "the legislature plainly meant for these enumerated crimes to be the exclusive and complete list").
¶ 40 Nonetheless, the plain language of RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a) indicates that the illustrative examples were intended to limit the scope of exclusions. Cf. State v. Larson, 184 Wash.2d 843, 849, 365 P.3d 740 (2015) (the illustrative examples in RCW 9A.56.360, which state in part, "The person was, at the time of the theft, in possession of an item, article, implement, or device designed to overcome security systems including, but not limited to, lined bags or tag removers," were intended to limit the scope of the statute).
¶ 41 Principles of statutory interpretation suggest that "general terms, when used in conjunction with specific terms in a statute, should be deemed only to incorporate those things similar in nature or 'comparable to' the specific terms." Simpson Inv. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 141 Wash.2d 139, 151, 3 P.3d 741 (2000) (quoting John H. Sellen Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 87 Wash.2d 878, 883-84, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976) ). Therefore, the scope of exclusions under LUPA is limited to actions similar in nature to area-wide rezones and annexations.
¶ 42 Further, the modification of "rezone" by "area-wide" is exclusive, indicating that rezones are only part of the illustrative list when they are area-wide, not when they are site-specific. See In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) ("Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction, to express one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of the other. Omissions are deemed to be exclusions." (citation omitted) ).
*583¶ 43 Here, Ordinance 3067 is not an area-wide rezone or annexation, nor is it similar in nature to either. Rather, Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone, confined to a specific tract and impacting a sole owner. See supra Section I. Thus, Ordinance 3067 does not fall within the category of "legislative approvals such as area-wide rezones and annexations." As a result, Ordinance 3067 is not excluded from LUPA review.
CONCLUSION
¶ 44 We hold that site-specific rezones-regardless of the initiating party-are reviewable under LUPA. Because Ordinance 3067 is a site-specific rezone, the Ordinance is subject to review in the superior court under LUPA. We reverse the Court of Appeals *1181and hold that the superior court correctly denied the City's motion to dismiss. We remand to the Court of Appeals to proceed on the merits of the City's appeal of the superior court's decision and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Owens, J.
Stephens, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
González, J. (concurring)
¶ 45 I agree with the lead opinion, but write separately to emphasize that Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) (ch. 36.70C RCW) review in this context is limited. In order to preserve the chance to develop its property, Schnitzer West LLC submitted a short plat application to the city of Puyallup on January 7, 2014. That short plat application vested the project to the city's land use regulations at the time. RCW 58.17.033 ; RCW 19.27.095. The legislature intended property owners to have recourse when "municipalities ... abus[e] their discretion with respect to land use and zoning rules." Snohomish County v . Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd., 187 Wash.2d 346, 362, 386 P.3d 1064 (2016). Consequently, Schnitzer may seek redress under LUPA because the city passed a site-specific *584ordinance targeting Schnitzer's existing proposal. See, e.g., Clerk's Papers at 463 (a council member described the ordinance as "personal retribution against Schnitzer"); Resp't's Opening Br., Schnitzer West, LLC v . City of Puyallup, No. 47900-1-II, at 8 & n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2015) ("the Project ... will immediately become a 'nonconforming' structure on the site, because it will not comply with the Ordinance"). On narrower grounds, I concur.