¶15 Section 217 of Title 15 of the Oklahoma statutes provides that "[e]very contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind" is void.19 However, § 218 provides a statutory exception specifically allowing parties to enter into a non-compete agreement when selling the goodwill of a business . Section 218 states:
One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county and any county or counties contiguous thereto, or a specified city or town or any part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him carries on a like business therein. Provided, that any such agreement which is otherwise lawful but which exceeds the territorial limitations specified by this section may be deemed valid, but only within the county comprising the primary place of the conduct of the subject business and within any counties contiguous thereto.20
¶16 Section 218 has been in effect since statehood and has remained largely unchanged since that time.21 This Court has said that the purpose of this statute is to "allow the parties to the transfer of a going business to mutually agree, as a part of the value of the business transferred, that the transferee will be protected from his transferor who might use his previously acquired experience, contacts and expertise to promote his own interests in the same field of business in competition with his transferee." Farren v. Autoviable Servs. Inc., 1973 OK 4, ¶ 5, 508 P.2d 646, 648. This Court has held that "[i]n Oklahoma restraints of trade are permitted in connection with the sale of business, trade, or professional practice, the permissible limits being fixed by statutes which declare such agreements void only as to an excess of time or space...." Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 0, 152 Okla. 22, 3 P.2d 720, 720. We have consistently upheld non-compete agreements to protect business goodwill pursuant to § 218.22
*1070¶17 In the case before us, neither party disputes that the non-compete was included in the Agreement to protect the business's goodwill. Nor is there any doubt that the non-compete, as written, applied to the operations at Park Hill. The only concern then is that the non-compete prevents the Berrys from engaging in a competing business anywhere in the United States-as opposed to "a specified county and any county or counties contiguous thereto, or a specified city or town or any part thereof."23 However, § 218 explicitly provides that boundaries "which exceed[ ] the territorial limitations" do not render the covenant invalid. Rather, we limit enforcement of the covenant to those areas authorized by the statute. In this case, Tri-B Nursery, one of the nurseries purchased in the Agreement, is in the same county as Park Hill (Cherokee County). Therefore, limiting the enforcement of the non-compete to its permitted extent would still encompass operations at Park Hill, and the non-compete would be enforceable under Oklahoma law.
¶18 Thus, we conclude that enforcement of the non-compete under Texas law does not violate Oklahoma public policy in this case. We need not address whether enforcement of the non-solicit under Texas law violates Oklahoma public policy because the non-solicit "was intended to be ancillary to and complement the [n]on-[c]ompete[ ],"24 and the non-compete is enforceable. As we discuss in detail below, the Berrys breached the non-compete, and because the non-solicit was less restrictive than the non-compete, any breach of the non-solicit was also a breach of the non-compete. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to enforce the parties' Texas choice-of-law provision.25
Breach of the Non-Compete
¶19 After hearing five days of testimony, the trial court found the Berrys breached the covenants. "In a non-jury trial the court's findings are entitled to the same weight and consideration that would be given to a jury's verdict." Soldan v. Stone Video, 1999 OK 66, ¶ 6, 988 P.2d 1268, 1269. Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses and to gauge the credibility of the evidence, we will defer to the trial court as to the conclusions it reaches concerning those witnesses and that evidence. Mueggenborg v. Walling, 1992 OK 121, ¶ 7, 836 P.2d 112, 114. On appeal, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed if there is any competent evidence to support them.26 Upon review, we conclude the trial court correctly found the Berrys breached the non-compete.
¶20 As mentioned above, after Burl's resignation from BFN, BFN senior executives met with him on February 21, 2014, to discuss his exit from the company. On that same day , after meeting with BFN executives, Burl was contacted by Wal-Mart, BFN's third largest customer, about selling trees and shrubs, through Park Hill, for a Wal-Mart promotion for which BFN was supposed to be the supplier . Burl met with Wal-Mart buyers at Park Hill less than a week later wherein Wal-Mart purchased more than 250,000 trees and shrubs from *1071Park Hill for its promotion for almost $2 million. The trees and shrubs sold to Wal-Mart that day had previously been offered by Park Hill to BFN to help fulfill its obligation to Wal-Mart for that promotion. In fact, the record indicates that on the same day Burl met with Wal-Mart buyers at Park Hill, Burl received a text message from someone at BFN asking if BFN needed to put in a purchase order with Park Hill to "hold all the shrubs, roses and other things they usually get from Parkhill," indicating that had Burl not sold the Park Hill inventory to Wal-Mart for its tree and shrub promotion, BFN would have purchased the inventory and remained the supplier for that promotion.27
¶21 After Wal-Mart purchased the trees and shrubs for that particular promotion, Burl then continued to sell to Wal-Mart. In an email on March 4, 2014, from Burl to Rob Cowgur, Wal-Mart's head buyer, Burl told Mr. Cowgur: "On other product for the rest of the spring, there are still some items out there that I can tie up for you and bring it into mix with what we have at Parkhill[.] [W]e don't plan on shipping BFN anymore product so we can ship you all of that product as well."28 Park Hill's sales to Wal-Mart approached $9 million dollars in 2014 and $12 million dollars in 2015. The record is clear that upon Burl's departure from BFN, Park Hill, while still owned by the Berrys, immediately began competing with BFN for Wal-Mart's business.29
¶22 After Burl's resignation from BFN, Park Hill also began selling directly to Home Depot, which was BFN's second largest customer. On Burl's last day at BFN, January 31, 2014, Park Hill's sales manager, Brett Jones, emailed Home Depot's buyer, Rick Pappas, attaching a Park Hill Plants quote for Home Depot to the email: "I quoted the items that we discussed and items that I thought you might be interested in. I even put a column in for what I would suggest as the retail and calculated what this would yield for a beginning margin. ..."30 Mr. Pappas responded: "Brett, I am good with all of the items listed for the program. We would need to get pricing set up and your PBS vendor number as the next steps."31 Mr. Pappas testified that the "program" referred to in the email was Home Depot's HGTV program, a program that BFN had been selling to Home Depot until Burl's departure.32 Mr. Pappas also testified that setting up a "PBS vendor number" allowed Park Hill to sell directly to Home Depot.33
¶23 In an email from Mr. Jones to Mr. Pappas on May 5, 2014, Mr. Jones specifically proposed to sell Home Depot clematises as part of Home Depot's HGTV program. Home Depot accepted the proposal. At his deposition, Mr. Pappas was asked whether this was yet another example of the Berrys, through Park Hill, seeking business from Home Depot.
*1072Mr. Pappas stated: "Yes, it was an e-mail to do business with [us]."34 Regarding a June 17, 2014, email between Mr. Jones and Mr. Pappas, Mr. Pappas testified:
Q: And your email to Jones reads, [t]hese are the heavy-hitters to ship this week. You can build larger orders around the top six-six stores listed here. Did I read that correctly?
A: Correct.
Q: Can you tell us what you're referring to?
A: My highest volume stores on this list.
Q: And did BFN sell any of the stores that are listed in your June 17 2014 e-mail?
A: Yes.
Q: Would it be fair to say that both BFN and Park Hill were selling plants to those same stores?
A: Yes.35
Park Hill's sales to Home Depot in 2014 were approximately $1.4 million dollars and $2.5 million in 2015. The record is clear that upon Burl's departure from BFN, Park Hill, while still owned by the Berrys, immediately began competing with BFN for Home Depot's business. The trial court's finding that the Berrys violated the non-compete is supported by competent evidence and is affirmed.
Injunctive Relief
¶24 The trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 19, 2015, wherein the court concluded BFN was entitled to permanent injunctive relief pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 1381.36 The trial court also concluded BFN was "entitled to an equitable extension of the Covenants through June 7, 2017 ."37 However, on September 4, 2015, before the Final Journal Entry of Judgment was filed, BFN sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order against the Berrys for their continued breach of the covenants after the entry of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The TRO Application alleged that after the trial court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on August 19, 2015, Park Hill accelerated its sales to certain retailers to sell as many plants as possible before the final judgment was entered and hosted Home Depot's plant buyers at its nursery on August 25, 2015, to garner additional Home Depot business. On October 15, 2015, the Final Journal Entry of Judgment was filed. Because of the Berrys' violation of the court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the court again extended the duration of the covenants and enjoined the Berrys until August 20, 2017 , from owning a wholesale nursery that sold to or solicited business from any national or regional retailer, including Wal-Mart and Home Depot.38
*1073¶25 "Matters involving the grant or denial of injunctive relief are of equitable concern." Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 457, 460. A court sitting in equity "exercise[s] discretionary power," and the granting of an injunction "rests in the sound discretion of the court to be exercised in accordance with equitable principles and in light of all circumstances." Id. ¶ 6, 304 P.3d at 460. However, an "[i]njunction is an extraordinary remedy that should not be lightly granted," id., and "[e]ntitlement to injunctive relief must be established in the trial court by clear and convincing evidence...."39 In reviewing the matter, we will consider all of the evidence on appeal, but the trial court's decision "issuing or refusing to issue an injunction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court has abused its discretion or its decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence." Scott v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 2013 OK 84, ¶ 16, 313 P.3d 891, 896.
¶26 The trial court found that BFN had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was entitled to injunctive relief. We have reviewed the entire record in this case, and we find the trial court's determination that BFN was entitled to injunctive relief is supported by the evidence. We affirm this portion of the court's order. However, we find no Oklahoma case, and the parties cite to none, wherein this Court has extended the duration of a restrictive covenant beyond the contractually specified timeframe as a remedy for violation of that covenant.
¶27 In Brown v. Stough, 1956 OK 3, 292 P.2d 176, this Court upheld a provision within a medical clinic partnership agreement that prohibited a partner who voluntarily withdrew from the partnership from practicing medicine for a period of two years within the county in which the medical clinic was located. On appeal, the plaintiffs asked the Court to "fix the time that the injunction is to commence for its duration of two years as the time the mandate is spread of record ." Id., ¶ 19, 292 P.2d at 181 (emphasis added). The Court specifically declined to extend the injunction beyond the contractually specified time reasoning that the partnership agreement "plainly provide[d] that a member withdrawing shall not practice medicine for a period of two years from the date of his withdrawal ," and that the plaintiffs sought "injunctive relief in accordance with the provisions of the contract." Id. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not "obtain additional or greater relief than that prayed for in their petition or authorized by the contract sued upon ." Id. (emphasis added).
¶28 In this case, the parties' Agreement plainly relieved the Berrys from the covenants upon the expiration of the five-year term, which all parties agree was December 7, 2015.40 Although the Agreement specifically allowed for injunctive relief as a remedy for any breach, nothing in the Agreement suggests either party contemplated or agreed to an extension of the covenants beyond December 7, 2015, as part of any injunctive relief that might issue. Thus, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment extending the duration of the covenants for an additional twenty months through August 20, 2017.
Damages
¶29 BFN also sought damages for the Berrys' breach of the covenants, specifically for lost profits on the Home Depot and Wal-Mart accounts for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 (2014-2018). BFN's expert calculated such lost profits at $8,212,404.00.41 The Berrys offered no evidence, by way of expert testimony or otherwise, to dispute BFN's calculation of such damages. Rather, the Berrys' sole argument at trial and on appeal is that the Berrys'
*1074breach was not the cause of BFN's damages with regard to sales to Wal-Mart and Home Depot. The trial court's only finding on damages was: "[B]FN failed to establish it would have continued to sell to Wal-Mart and Home Depot but for the interference of the Berrys or Park Hill. Therefore, no monetary damages are awarded."42 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's finding that BFN was not entitled to monetary damages for the Berrys' breach.
¶30 Much was made at trial about the unique purchasing cycle of the nursery industry. At trial, Burl explained the nursery planting cycle as follows:
[W]e go through the planting process. We have to plant-we have to plant in the spring of the year our bare root trees. You've got to typically plant the bare root trees in January, February, and March for the whole-for your fall business or for the next spring. So, you've got to plan it out. ...
Then, you go to the line review process. ... The line review process is where you go in to basically see a vendor, i.e., be it Wal-Mart or Lowe's. ... Typically it happens in July or August. ... You go in, and you present your prices. You present the products that you have to sell for the next year. And you basically have an idea of the area that you'd like to ship that's compatible to the products you have. And you usually go over for the day, and you make that presentation. And then typically, sometimes it was as late as December before you would hear back from them. ... And that would be the first time that you could take those areas, arrive and write some preliminary orders and know what inventory you're really going to need. ...
The next step would be the shipments. Send them back to Wal-Mart. Get PO's. Get hard PO's on them. And plan to ship them in the spring or at the next-at the determined proper time, you know, the next spring.43
¶31 Wal-Mart's head buyer, Mr. Cowgur, also testified that particularly for a company the size of Wal-Mart, horticulture inventory has to be planned out years in advance to ensure supply is available in the large quantities needed.44 When asked why Wal-Mart continued to do business with BFN after the March 2014 tree and shrub promotion, Mr. Cowgur responded:
A: We didn't have a choice. We-BFN is a big company, and they were in our top ten as far as volume goes. And when you look at what it takes to plan out the horticulture business specifically in trees and shrubs, long lead times; three, four, five, six, sometimes seven years on product . And quite frankly, you know, so many folks have closed up shop. We-we needed product to be able to sell to our customer. So not that we wanted to, but we did. ... I'm just saying there was no other product available anywhere else, so we didn't have a choice. Whether we wanted to or not, that's irrelevant .45
¶32 With regard to the Home Depot account, Burl testified at trial that he and Mr. Pappas had previously discussed an order of more than twenty thousand hydrangeas that were originally supposed to have been shipped to Home Depot in the spring of 2014 through BFN . When asked if prior to his departure from BFN, whether he "anticipated that that product would be shipped to Home Depot under BFN[,]" Burl responded, "[p]rior to my leaving, yes, that was our plan."46 In addition, when asked whether Park Hill anticipated selling inventory already in the ground to BFN for the spring 2014 season so that BFN could then sell it to Wal-Mart, Burl replied, "[n]ot only Wal-Mart. Lowe's ... Home Depot, any accounts."47
*1075¶33 A claim for lost profits need not be proven with "absolute certainty," and " '[i]n essence, what a [party] must show for the recovery of lost profits is sufficient certainty that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that such damages were actually suffered .' "48 Upon Burl's departure from BFN on January 31, 2014, Park Hill immediately began selling inventory directly to Wal-Mart and Home Depot-inventory that Burl specifically testified was to be sold to BFN for the spring 2014 season so BFN could sell to Wal-Mart and Home Depot. The question then is not whether the Berrys' breach caused BFN damages-it most certainly did-the question, rather, is what are BFN's damages? On remand the trial court shall determine BFN's damages for lost profits on the Home Depot and Wal-Mart accounts. Although a "non-breaching party may not receive more in damages than he might or could have gained from full performance" of the contract, we make no determination whether BFN is entitled to damages beyond December 7, 2015, and leave that question to the trial court to determine on remand.49
Tortious Interference
¶34 BFN also alleged that Park Hill tortiously interfered with BFN's Agreement with the Berrys.50 BFN argues that "[b]ecause the sales to Wal-Mart and Home Depot in violation of the Covenants were all made by Park Hill, the damages from the Berrys' breach of the Covenants and Park Hill's interference with them are the same."51 The trial court found "Park Hill tortiously interfered with the Covenants"52 because Park Hill "intentionally and knowingly" participated in the violation.53 However, the trial court found BFN "failed to prove monetary damages."54 The Berrys made no claim of error on appeal with regard to the court's finding that Park Hill tortiously interfered with the Agreement.55 Thus, the trial court's finding remains undisturbed in that regard, and the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded BFN failed to prove monetary damages.
*1076¶35 Because we are remanding the case to the trial court to determine BFN's damages for the Berrys' breach, we also remand the case for the trial court to reconsider damages with regard to BFN's tortious interference claim against Park Hill. Although BFN agrees that damages from the Berrys' breach and Park Hill's interference are the same, BFN is entitled to reassert its claim for punitive damages against Park Hill on remand upon the trial court's determination of BFN's damages for lost profits on the Home Depot and Wal-Mart accounts.56 In addition, on remand, Park Hill is entitled to a reduction of $439,000.00 on any judgment against it as the trial court correctly concluded BFN owed Park Hill $439,000.00 on an open account.57
Attorney's Fees
¶36 The Final Journal Entry of Judgment also concluded that BFN, as the prevailing party, was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees with the "amount [to] be determined by separate application."58 Although the trial court did not specify whether it was awarding attorney's fees to BFN under Texas or Oklahoma law, BFN sought attorney's fees pursuant to Section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.59 The Berrys appealed the trial court's finding, asserting that the trial court erred "in ruling BFN is entitled to attorneys fees and costs ... under § 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code" because, among other reasons, the court "erred procedurally in not allowing the issue to be fully briefed by both parties."60 Because the trial court did not set an amount for attorney's fees in the Final Journal Entry of Judgment, that portion of the judgment is an interlocutory ruling. An order granting attorney's fees, but not determining the amount is not a final judgment, and appeal of this issue is *1077premature.61 Because the trial court's ruling is not a final order in this regard, either party may ask the trial court to reconsider the ruling. Liberty Bank & Trust Co. of Okla. City, N.A. v. Rogalin, 1996 OK 10, ¶ 14, 912 P.2d 836, 839 (stating that an interlocutory order is "subject to trial court modification"). In that same vein, because the trial court's ruling on the issue remains open to modification, any ruling regarding attorney's fees, is "subject to subsequent examination on timely appeal" by either party. Id.
Conclusion
¶37 The trial court correctly enforced the parties' bargained-for Texas choice-of-law provision, and under Texas law, the non-compete is valid and enforceable. The trial court also correctly concluded that the Berrys breached the non-compete upon Burl's departure from BFN on January 31, 2014. Although the trial court correctly found BFN was entitled to injunctive relief, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment extending the duration of the restrictive covenants for an additional twenty months through August 20, 2017. We also reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment finding BFN suffered no damages from the Berrys' breach or from Park Hill's tortious interference. We affirm the trial court's finding that BFN owed Park Hill $439,000.00 on an open account. That portion of the trial court's order awarding attorney's fees to BFN is not a final judgment, and appeal of that issue is premature. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT
¶38 Combs, C.J., Gurich, V.C.J., Kauger, Winchester, Reif and Wyrick, JJ., concur;
¶39 Colbert, J., concurs in result;
¶40 Edmondson, J., not participating.