(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.1
"Control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court." Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co. , 137 Idaho 330, 336, 48 P.3d 659, 665 (2002). A party seeking a continuance under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)"has the burden of setting out what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their opposition, making clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here, Haight stated in her request to defer summary judgment that she sought "the identity of persons authorized by [ITD] to work on Interstate 90 at the time and place of the accident." Additionally, Haight vaguely asserted that once these persons were identified she would depose them "with regard to their knowledge of facts relevant to these proceedings." However, Haight's counsel failed to specify what these depositions would reveal or how this information would preclude summary judgment. This Court has held that if a motion under Rule 56(d) fails to provide what relevant information a party needs or fails to provide a "reasonable basis to believe additional discovery will produce new or relevant information not previously disclosed" the motion may be denied. Taylor , 151 Idaho at 571, 261 P.3d at 848 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, without stating, even cursorily, what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify her request to defer summary judgment, Haight failed to meet her burden under Rule 56(d). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
3. The district court properly denied Haight's request to defer summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because Haight failed to diligently pursue discovery.
In addition to Haight's argument that ITD did not respond to her discovery requests in time to allow her to provide a proper response at the summary judgment hearing, Haight's counsel contends he exercised due diligence in performing discovery, but that he lacked staff support, resources, and experienced personal issues that prevented him from pursuing discovery sooner.
The district court properly denied Haight's request to defer summary judgment because she did not conduct discovery to substantiate the facts alleged in her complaint for approximately 14 months. The court docket indicates that this action was filed on August 20, 2015. Haight did not serve ITD with her first set of interrogatories until October 12, 2016. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(2), ITD timely answered Haight's written discovery requests on November 10, 2016. Not only did ITD timely respond, but Haight's counsel admitted at the summary judgment hearing on November 22, 2016 that he did not read them. When the district court ruled on Haight's motion under Rule 56(d), it noted that the motion was untimely and that the motion failed to specify what information would be needed from discovery. However, more important to the district court's decision was Haight's failure to engage in discovery for over a year after the case was filed. The district court stated:
And while the Court is sympathetic to how life can really get in our way-and you've had a lot of issues lately, and the Court is sympathetic to those issues-nevertheless, discovery was not engaged in when it could have been, and so to indicate that additional time is needed when this summary judgment motion is scheduled for the last possible date that the scheduling *212order would allow is simply too late, and I'm going to deny the 56(d) motion, and we are going to continue with argument on the summary judgment motion itself today.
The district court may consider the moving party's lack of diligence in pursuing discovery in ruling on a Rule 56(d) motion. Boise Mode, LLC , 154 Idaho at 105, 294 P.3d at 1117. Thus, the district court recognized to grant or deny Haight's Rule 56(d) motion was within its discretion, it articulated its reasons for denying the motion, and it exercised reason in making its decision. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Haight's motion under Rule 56(d) because discovery was not pursued timely or to the extent it should have been. Therefore we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Haight's motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
B. The district court did not err when it found there was insufficient evidence that ITD had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.
Haight alleges on appeal that ITD and its agents and employees conducted activities on a major interstate highway and that those activities included the placement of traffic control devices-orange barrels-in such a manner that caused physical damage to her personal property. This alone, Haight argues, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence that the placement of the barrel was the direct and proximate cause of the damage to Haight's camper. ITD, on the other hand, argues that it had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the roadway. Additionally, ITD contends that liability cannot attach if it did not have notice of the dangerous condition, and, furthermore, ITD only has a duty to warn motorists of a known dangerous condition on a public highway.
1. The district court properly held that there was insufficient evidence to show ITD had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
The elements of a common law negligence claim are "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC , 161 Idaho 913, 915, 393 P.3d 573, 575 (2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This Court has held that the State Highway Department is subject to liability when it creates or maintains a dangerous condition on the highway if the State Highway Department:
(1) knows of or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover such condition, and
(2) should realize that the condition, involves an unreasonable risk of harm to those using the highways, and
(3) should expect that persons using the highways will not discover or realize the danger, and
(4) fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to adequately warn of the condition and the risk involved, and,
(5) the persons using the highway do not know or have reason to know of the condition and attendant risks.
Smith v. State , 93 Idaho 795, 804, 473 P.2d 937, 946 (1970). "[T]he State is not immunized from liability when with respect to a public highway, the State maintains a known dangerous condition on the highway and fails to properly warn motorists of such a condition." Leliefeld v. Johnson , 104 Idaho 357, 362, 659 P.2d 111, 116 (1983). In this case, there were no facts in the record showing ITD breached a duty owed to Haight.
Here, Haight failed to present evidence that establishes ITD had actual or constructive notice that the construction barrel was out of place. Both Haight and her husband testified that they had no knowledge of how the barrel got out of place on the roadway, how long it had been out of place, or that anyone from ITD put the barrel in that position. Haight offered no evidence showing actual or constructive notice in her memorandum *213in opposition to summary judgment. Furthermore, during oral arguments, the district court asked Haight's counsel if he wanted to respond to the summary judgment motion on the negligence action. Haight's counsel responded by simply stating "No."
As the moving party, ITD met its burden by establishing no genuine issue of material fact existed to show that it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Then, the burden shifted to Haight. Wattenbarger , 150 Idaho at 317, 246 P.3d at 970 (if moving party has satisfied its burden, non-moving party must identify specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact). Haight's counsel declined to meet this evidentiary burden, and Haight's negligence claim was properly dismissed by the district court. Accordingly, we find the district court did not err when it held there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding ITD's actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
C. The district court properly dismissed Haight's complaint for declaratory judgment seeking injunctive relief for lack of standing.
Haight argues that Idaho Code section 67-5278 and Rawson v. Idaho State Board of Cosmetology , 107 Idaho 1037, 695 P.2d 422 (Ct. App. 1985) grant her standing to request relief in the form of enjoining and restraining ITD from publishing any information that is misleading or contrary to law. Furthermore, Haight requests a writ mandating ITD correct all Idaho licensing manuals so the State provides fair and competent testing to obtain a vehicle operator's license. ITD argues that Idaho Code section 67-5278 only provides a mechanism for a person injured or threatened to be injured by a rule to bring a claim. The statute alone, ITD claims, does not automatically provide standing or a justiciable interest. Moreover, ITD asserts that Haight has failed to show an injury caused by ITD's manuals. Because Haight has failed to show a distinct palpable injury, ITD contends that she is unable to establish a causal connection between any injury and the challenged content of ITD's manuals.
1. The district court properly dismissed Haight's claim because she lacks standing to bring this action.
"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Gallagher v. State , 141 Idaho 665, 668, 115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case." Young v. City of Ketchum , 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (citation omitted). "Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issue the party wishes to have adjudicated." Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County , 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The authority to render a declaratory judgment is governed by statute. I.C. § 10-1202. Idaho Code section 10-1201 confers jurisdiction upon the courts with the option to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." An aggrieved party may also seek declaratory relief as to the validity of Idaho rules. See I.C. § 67-5278 ("The validity ... of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the district court, if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.").
An important limitation upon this jurisdiction is that, "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). This concept precludes courts from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory in nature. State v. Rhoades , 121 Idaho 63, 69, 822 P.2d 960, 966 (1991). "To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Backpackers v. Boundary County , 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
*214"This requires a showing of distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Haight argues that ITD's manuals have interfered with or impaired her legal rights under Idaho Code section 67-5278. Additionally, Haight argues that this Court's decision in Rawson gives her standing because her claims are based on interference or impairment by a rule. Rawson , 107 Idaho at 1041, 695 P.2d at 426.
Under the facts of this case, Haight's reliance on Rawson is misplaced. In Rawson , the plaintiff was denied a cosmetology license under contentious circumstances. Id. The plaintiff in Rawson , therefore, had standing because she had suffered a distinct and palpable injury that a favorable court decision could remedy. Haight, on the other hand, has failed to show that she has personally suffered any injury that can be redressed.
Haight lacks standing because she has not established ITD's manuals caused her an injury in fact or that the information contained within the manuals is responsible for the alleged property damage to her camper. As the party bringing the claim, Haight has the burden of establishing standing. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006).
Not only has Haight failed to establish how her rights have been impaired or affected under Rawson and Idaho Code sections 67-5278 and 10-1202, Haight has also failed to provide any testimony or other evidence that she suffered an injury in fact. Instead, Haight offers generalized statements that information within ITD's Motorcycle Manual and Motor Vehicle Operator's Manual may lead her to be unfairly or unlawfully tested for her qualifications if she were to apply for a motorcycle endorsement. Haight vaguely alludes to the alleged misleading statement that "[i]n most cases, the law requires that we stay as far to the right side of the road as possible ..." However, Haight has never explicitly stated what is incorrect about this statement or how she has been injured by it. In fact, Haight is already lawfully licensed to operate motor vehicles in the State of Idaho, does not have a motorcycle license or endorsement in Idaho, and has never been injured while operating a motorcycle. Furthermore, Haight has not been required to take a written examination at any point following the first time she was issued an Idaho driver's license. Nevertheless, Haight contends additional discovery will reveal the extent to which the foregoing misrepresentation would disqualify her from securing the motorcycle endorsement, which she has yet to obtain.
Haight has not established that she has suffered an injury that is distinct to her and not suffered by all citizens within the jurisdiction. Cf. Koch v. Canyon County , 145 Idaho 158, 160-61, 177 P.3d 372, 374-75 (2008). Likewise, Haight has not established that the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury, namely that she suffered an injury in fact and that the property damage alleged was caused by misinformation contained within ITD's manuals. Young , 137 Idaho at 106, 44 P.3d at 1161. Because Haight has not met her burden to show she has standing to bring a claim, her complaint for declaratory judgment seeking an injunction was properly dismissed by the district court.
D. Attorney fees on appeal.
Given the particular circumstances of this appeal, we conclude that ITD is entitled to costs and attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2.
We construe Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 the same way as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) because the rules have virtually identical wording. Sims v. Jacobson , 157 Idaho 980, 986, 342 P.3d 907, 913 (2015) (citing Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Fremont Cnty. , 156 Idaho 449, 454, 328 P.3d 429, 434 (2014) ). We have construed both Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) and Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 as follows:
The attorney's or party's signature on a document constitutes two substantive certifications: (a) that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, *215modification, or reversal of existing law, and (b) that it [the document] is not interposed for any improper purpose. Both certifications must be accurate in order to comply with the rule. If either of them is not accurate, then the document would be signed in violation of the rule.
Flying A Ranch, Inc. , 156 Idaho at 453, 328 P.3d at 433 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In other words, attorney fees can be awarded as sanctions when a party or attorney violates either (a) the frivolous filings clause, or (b) the improper purpose clause. Sims , 157 Idaho at 987, 342 P.3d at 914. "[A] party becomes subject to the rule the moment they sign a notice of appeal." Id. ; I.A.R. 11.2. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, this Court may, sua sponte , award attorney fees if we deem it appropriate. State v. Keithly , 155 Idaho 464, 468, 314 P.3d 146, 150 (2013) ; Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist. , 154 Idaho 317, 330, 297 P.3d 1134, 1147 (2013).
In this case, we have determined that Haight's appeal is frivolous. This is because Haight's claims are not well grounded in fact, nor are they warranted by existing law. First, Haight's appeal contains little in the way of legal argument or authority. Haight's counsel, by failing to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below, simply asks this Court to second-guess the district court's discretionary decision on Rule 56(d) and the court's ruling on summary judgment, which Haight's counsel chose not to oppose during oral argument below. Second, Haight's counsel was less than diligent in the trial court, and then did not bother to appear at oral argument before this Court. Haight's attorney unnecessarily and needlessly increased the costs of the litigation and wasted judicial resources. For all of these reasons, an award of costs and attorney fees is appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of ITD. Additionally, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, we award sanctions against Haight's counsel, G. W. Haight, for costs and attorney fees incurred by ITD on appeal.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.