**301The issue here is whether plaintiffs' collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs) with defendant, Macomb County, granted plaintiffs a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits. The trial court held that while plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits, defendant can make reasonable modifications to those benefits. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs are entitled to *607lifetime and unalterable healthcare benefits and that such benefits cannot be modified absent plaintiffs' consent. Because we conclude that the CBAs did not grant plaintiffs a vested right to lifetime and unalterable benefits, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary disposition to defendant consistent with this opinion. **302I. BACKGROUND
This is a class action brought on behalf of approximately 1600 unionized Macomb County employee retirees who worked for defendant under various CBAs dating back to 1989. Plaintiffs claim that in 2009 and 2010 defendant breached these agreements by reducing and altering their healthcare benefits; plaintiffs now seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief. It is undisputed that each CBA contained an express three-year durational provision and that none of the CBAs contained a provision expressly granting a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition, concluding that while plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits under the agreements, defendant is permitted to make reasonable modifications to those benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that while plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits, those benefits cannot be modified absent plaintiffs' consent. Kendzierski v. Macomb Co. , 319 Mich. App. 278, 286-289, 901 N.W.2d 111 (2017). We ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant's application for leave to appeal. Kendzierski v. Macomb Co. , 501 Mich. 966, 905 N.W.2d 602 (2018).
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
"This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition." Bazzi v. Sentinel Ins. Co. , 502 Mich. 390, 398, 919 N.W.2d 20 (2018). "This Court also reviews de novo questions of ... the proper interpretation of a contract." Id.
**303III. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that all of the CBAs contain the following provisions or provisions that are "materially similar":1
Retirees: The Employer will provide fully paid Blue Cross/Blue Shield Hospital-Medical coverage to the employee and the employee's spouse, after eight (8) years of service with the Employer, for the employee who leaves employment because of retirement and is eligible for and receives benefits under the Macomb County Employees' Retirement Ordinance ....
* * *
Coverage shall be limited to the current spouse of the retiree, at the time of retirement, provided such employee shall retire on or after January 1, 1974. Coverage for the eligible spouse will terminate upon the death of the retiree unless the retiree elects to exercise a retirement option whereby the eligible current spouse receives applicable retirement benefits following the death of the retiree.
Coverage shall be limited to Blue Cross/Blue Shield MVF1 Master Medical with ML Rider, or its substantial equivalence.
*608* * *
Retired employees and/or their current spouse, upon reaching age 65, shall apply if eligible, and participate in the Medicare Program at their expense as required by the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, a part of the Social Security Program, at which time the Employer's obligation shall be only to provide "over 65 supplemental" hospital-medical benefit coverage. Failure to participate **304in the aforementioned Medicare Program, shall be cause for termination of Employer paid coverage of applicable hospital-medical benefits, as outlined herein for employees who retire and/or their current spouse.
Employees who retire under the provisions of the Macomb County Employees' Retirement Ordinance, and/or their current spouse, who subsequently are gainfully employed, shall not be eligible for hospital-medical benefits, during such period of gainful employment ....
* * *
The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to all subjects of collective bargaining and that all agreements and understandings, expressed, implied, written or oral, are set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement expresses the complete understanding of the Parties on the subject of wages, working conditions, hours of work, benefits and conditions of employment.
* * *
This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until December 31, 2007. [Paragraph lettering omitted.]
The issue is whether the CBAs granted plaintiffs vested rights to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits. In Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc. , 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (C.A. 6, 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the CBAs at issue in that case granted the plaintiffs vested rights to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits. However, as recognized by Arbuckle v. Gen. Motors LLC , 499 Mich. 521, 885 N.W.2d 232 (2016), the United States Supreme Court in **305M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett , 574 U.S. 427, 135 S.Ct. 926, 190 L.Ed. 2d 809 (2015), overruled Yard-Man (and its progeny) in an opinion that
characterized [ Yard-Man and its progeny] as "placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements." Those decisions, the Supreme Court explained, "distort the text of [a collective-bargaining] agreement and conflict with the principle of contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the whole agreement of the parties." Indeed, basic principles of contract interpretation instruct that "courts should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises" and, absent a contrary intent, that "contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement." For "when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life." [ Arbuckle , 499 Mich. at 540, 885 N.W.2d 232, quoting Tackett , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 935-937 (quotation marks omitted; second alteration in Arbuckle ).][2 ]
*609Tackett specifically rejected many of the same arguments raised by plaintiffs in the instant case. For example, Tackett rejected Yard-Man 's presumption that a general durational clause, which specifies when a contract will expire, states nothing about the vesting of retiree benefits.3
**306Tackett , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 937. It also rejected the presumption of vesting based on provisions that: (a) tie eligibility for retirement health benefits to eligibility for a pension, (b) enable continuation of a surviving spouse's healthcare coverage following the death of the retiree, and (c) specify that the employer will pay a retiree's insurance once he or she reaches age 65 when employees could retire at age 55.4 Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 937.
Yard-Man , 716 F.2d at 1482, held that "if [employees] forego wages now in expectation of retiree benefits, they would want assurance that once they retire they will continue to receive such benefits"; "[a]s such, it is unlikely that such benefits ... would be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." It further held that "when ... parties contract for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree." Id. Tackett , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 935, 937, rejected these inferences as "inconsistent with ordinary principles of contract law," explaining that " Yard-Man 's assessment of likely behavior in collective bargaining is too speculative and too far removed from the context of any particular contract to be useful in discerning the parties' intention" and that the Yard-Man Court "derived its assessment of likely behavior not from record evidence, but instead from its own suppositions about the intentions of employees, unions, and employers negotiating retiree **307benefits." Furthermore, Tackett held that Yard-Man failed to recognize the traditional principle that "contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement"5 and that while "a collective-bargaining agreement may provide in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration[,] ... when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life." Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 937 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).
Post- Tackett , "the Sixth Circuit [in Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. , 854 F.3d 877, 882-883 (C.A. 6, 2017),] held that the same Yard-Man inferences it once used to presume *610lifetime vesting can now be used to render a collective-bargaining agreement ambiguous as a matter of law, thus allowing courts to consult extrinsic evidence about lifetime vesting." CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese , 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 761, 763, 200 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2018). The United States Supreme Court characterized this new analysis as " Yard-Man re-born, re-built, and re-purposed for new adventures" and again reversed. Id. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 763 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It held that the Yard-Man inferences could not be used to render a CBA ambiguous. Id. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 763. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the CBA at issue was unambiguous and that it did not create lifetime healthcare benefits for retirees. Id. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 766. It observed:
**308Tellingly, no other Court of Appeals would find ambiguity in these circumstances. When a collective-bargaining agreement is merely silent on the question of vesting, other courts would conclude that it does not vest benefits for life. Similarly, when an agreement does not specify a duration for health care benefits in particular, other courts would simply apply the general durational clause. And other courts would not find ambiguity from the tying of retiree benefits to pensioner status....
Shorn of Yard-Man inferences, this case is straightforward. The 1998 agreement contained a general durational clause that applied to all benefits, unless the agreement specified otherwise. No provision specified that the health care benefits were subject to a different durational clause.... If the parties meant to vest health care benefits for life, they easily could have said so in the text. But they did not. And they specified that their agreement "dispose[d] of any and all bargaining issues" between them. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the 1998 agreement is that the health care benefits expired when the collective-bargaining agreement expired in May 2004. "When the intent of the parties is unambiguously expressed in the contract, that expression controls, and the court's inquiry should proceed no further." [ Id. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 766 (citations omitted; alteration in Reese ).][6 ]
The Court of Appeals in the instant case did exactly what the Sixth Circuit did in Reese , i.e., it relied on the Yard-Man inferences to find the CBAs ambiguous and then resorted to extrinsic evidence to find in favor of **309lifetime healthcare benefits.7 *611Although this Court is not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's **310opinion in Reese , we choose to follow it because it is fully consistent with Michigan's own principles of contract law.8 *612**311"Our goal in contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the parties, to be determined first and foremost by the plain and unambiguous language of the contract itself." Wyandotte Electric Supply Co. v. Electrical Technology Sys., Inc. , 499 Mich. 127, 143-144, 881 N.W.2d 95 (2016). "If the contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written, because an unambiguous contract reflects the parties' intent as a matter of law." In re Smith Trust , 480 Mich. 19, 24, 745 N.W.2d 754 (2008). "However, if the contractual language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence can be presented to determine the intent of the parties." Id.
"A contractual term is ambiguous on its face only if it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." Barton-Spencer v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mich. , 500 Mich. 32, 40, 892 N.W.2d 794 (2017). In addition, "if two provisions of the same contract irreconcilably conflict with each other, the language of the contract is ambiguous." Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc. , 468 Mich. 459, 467, 663 N.W.2d 447 (2003).9 However, "ambiguity is a finding of last resort ...." Mayor of the City of Lansing v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 470 Mich. 154, 165 n. 6, 680 N.W.2d 840 (2004). That is, "a finding of ambiguity is to be reached only after all other conventional means of interpretation have been applied and found wanting." Id. at 165, 680 N.W.2d 840 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). "[W]e will not create ambiguity where the terms of the contract are clear." Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters , 460 Mich. 105, 111, 595 N.W.2d 832 (1999).
**312"[C]ourts cannot simply ignore portions of a contract ... in order to declare an ambiguity." Klapp , 468 Mich. at 467, 663 N.W.2d 447.
"A fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence is that unambiguous contracts are not open to judicial construction and must be enforced as written. " Rory v. Continental Ins. Co. , 473 Mich. 457, 468, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). "Courts enforce contracts according to their unambiguous terms because doing so respects the freedom of individuals freely to arrange their affairs via contract." Id. "The general rule of contracts is that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in courts." Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 71, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). "When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own independent assessment of 'reasonableness,' the court undermines the parties' freedom of contract." Rory , 473 Mich. at 468-469, 703 N.W.2d 23. "This approach, where judges divine the parties' reasonable expectations and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy."
*613Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 469 Mich. 41, 51, 664 N.W.2d 776 (2003). "[T]he rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application when interpreting an unambiguous contract because a policyholder cannot be said to have reasonably expected something different from the clear language of the contract." Id. at 62, 664 N.W.2d 776.10
**313These contract principles apply to CBAs just as they do with regard to any other contract. As this Court has explained:
The foundational principle of our contract jurisprudence is that parties must be able to rely on their agreements. This principle applies no less strongly to collective bargaining agreements: when parties to a collective bargaining agreement bargain about a subject and memorialize the results of their negotiation in a collective bargaining agreement, they create a set of enforceable rules-a new code of conduct for themselves-on that subject. A party to the collective bargaining agreement has a right to rely on the agreement as the statement of its obligations on any topic covered by the agreement. [ Macomb Co. v. AFSCME Council 25 , 494 Mich. 65, 80, 833 N.W.2d 225 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In Harper Woods Retirees Ass'n v. City of Harper Woods , 312 Mich. App. 500, 512-513, 879 N.W.2d 897 (2015), the Court of Appeals "conclude[d] that the [United States] Supreme Court's reasoning in Tackett is consistent with Michigan's contract jurisprudence regarding CBAs, which applies with equal force in both the public and private sectors." The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that "their right to the specific healthcare benefits included in their CBAs and contracts continued indefinitely after retirement, regardless of whether the explicit terms of the contracts indicated that the parties intended those benefits to continue after the agreements expired." Id. at 511, 879 N.W.2d 897. Instead, "the language governing retiree healthcare **314benefits [must] indicate[ ] that the parties intended the same benefits to continue after expiration of the agreements ...." Id. at 513, 879 N.W.2d 897. If the language does not so indicate, "the benefits terminated after expiration of the agreements, so that defendant was permitted to alter the benefits under future contracts." Id.
Post- Tackett , the Sixth Circuit addressed this same issue in Gallo v. Moen Inc. , 813 F.3d 265 (C.A. 6, 2016), cert. den. 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 375, 196 L.Ed.2d 293 (2016), and concluded that the CBAs did not provide lifetime and unalterable healthcare benefits to retirees and dependents.11 The court observed:
First and foremost , nothing in this or any of the other CBAs says that Moen committed to provide unalterable healthcare benefits to retirees and their spouses for life. That is what matters, and that is where the plaintiffs fall short. Tackett directs us to apply ordinary contract principles and not to tilt the inquiry in favor of vesting-a frame of reference that prompts two questions. What *614is the contract right that the plaintiffs seek to vindicate? And does the contract contain that right? The plaintiffs claim a right to healthcare benefits for life. But the contracts never make that commitment. Yes, Moen offered retirees healthcare benefits. And yes Moen, like many employers, may have wished that business conditions and stable healthcare costs (hope springs eternal) would permit it to provide similar healthcare benefits to retirees throughout retirement. But the question is whether the two parties signed a contract to that effect. Nothing of the sort appears in the collective bargaining agreements.
Second , not only do the CBAs fail to say that Moen committed to provide unalterable healthcare benefits for life to retirees, everything they say about the topic was contained in a three-year agreement. If we do not expect to find "elephants in mouseholes" in construing statutes, we should not expect to find lifetime commitments in time-limited **315agreements. Each of the CBAs made commitments for approximately three-year terms-well short of commitments for life. Present in each CBA, the general durational clause supplied a concrete date of expiration after which either party could terminate the agreement. When a specific provision of the CBA does not include an end date, we refer to the general durational clause to determine that provision's termination. Absent a longer time limit in the context of a specific provision, the general durational clause supplies a final phrase to every term in the CBA: "until this agreement ends." Reading the healthcare provisions in conjunction with the general durational clause gives meaning to the phrases "[c]ontinued," "will be provided," "will be covered," and the like. These terms guarantee benefits until the agreement expires, nothing more. [ Id. at 269 (citations omitted).]
The Gallo analysis applies equally to the instant case. It is undisputed that none of the CBAs at issue specifies that defendant committed itself to provide lifetime and unalterable healthcare benefits. It is also undisputed that the CBAs contain three-year durational provisions. Therefore, the CBAs guarantee benefits only until the agreements expire and no longer. In other words, because the CBAs do not specify an alternative ending date for healthcare benefits, their general durational clauses control.
The trial court here found that the CBAs are not ambiguous and that "[d]efendant did not promise or otherwise obligate itself under the clear language to provide a certain duration or level of retiree healthcare coverage beyond the term of each CBA." Indeed, it held that "plaintiffs have not pointed to any specific CBA language explicitly conferring lifetime or unalterable healthcare benefits on retirees." Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits because "plaintiffs have proffered unrefuted evidence that defendant has acknowledged that retiree **316healthcare coverage is a lifetime benefit." Finally, the trial court held that these lifetime benefits are not unalterable because "plaintiffs have not established [that] defendant has unequivocally acknowledged that it is obligated to provide[ ] unalterable retiree healthcare coverage." The court concluded that while "retirees have lifetime healthcare benefits," defendant "may reasonably modify the scope and level of benefits from those that existed when the retirees retired."
While the trial court correctly held that the CBAs are not ambiguous and that they do not provide for unalterable lifetime healthcare benefits, it nonetheless relied on extrinsic evidence to conclude *615that plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime benefits that can be reasonably modified. However, since the CBAs are not ambiguous, the trial court should not have considered extrinsic evidence because the "parol evidence rule ... prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret unambiguous language within a document." Shay v. Aldrich , 487 Mich. 648, 667, 790 N.W.2d 629 (2010) ; see also In re Smith Trust , 480 Mich. at 24, 745 N.W.2d 754.
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that the "CBAs do not expressly state whether the benefits were promised indefinitely or only for the duration of the CBA," it concluded that "other contract language creates a latent ambiguity regarding whether the healthcare benefits are vested." Kendzierski , 319 Mich. App. at 286, 901 N.W.2d 111. Given this "latent ambiguity," the Court held that the "trial court properly examined extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the CBAs" and properly concluded on this basis that the retirees are entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits. Id. at 286-287, 901 N.W.2d 111. However, the appellate court held that the trial court erred by holding that these benefits **317could be modified absent plaintiffs' consent because a party may not unilaterally alter vested rights. Id. at 288-289, 901 N.W.2d 111.
Respectfully, the Court of Appeals erred by finding a latent ambiguity. "A latent ambiguity ... is one that does not readily appear in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or executed." Shay , 487 Mich. at 668, 790 N.W.2d 629 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, "[a] latent ambiguity exists when the language in a contract appears to be clear and intelligible and suggests a single meaning, but other facts create the necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the Court of Appeals relied on language within the contract itself to find an ambiguity. Therefore, the Court of Appeals actually found a patent ambiguity, not a latent ambiguity, because the former arises "from the face of the document." Id. at 667, 790 N.W.2d 629.12 Nevertheless, the **318Court of Appeals erred by finding even a patent ambiguity. As the trial court correctly held, the CBAs here are unambiguous.
The Court of Appeals rested its ambiguity conclusion on three provisions of the CBAs: (a) "the CBAs contain a 'survivor' option permitting continuation of a surviving spouse's healthcare coverage following the death of the retiree," (b) "the CBAs provide that the agreement may be terminated if the retiree fails to enroll in Medicare at age 65," and (c) "the CBAs provide that healthcare coverage is suspended *616while the retiree has coverage through another employer but then states that coverage through the CBA recommences once the coverage through the other employer ends." Kendzierski , 319 Mich. App. at 286, 901 N.W.2d 111. On the basis of these provisions, the Court of Appeals concluded that the CBAs were ambiguous as to "whether the parties intended for the retiree benefits to vest ...." Id.
We do not agree that these provisions render the CBAs ambiguous. The first provision relied on by the Court of the Appeals-the surviving-spouse provision-reads:
Coverage shall be limited to the current spouse of the retiree, at the time of retirement, provided such employee shall retire on or after January 1, 1974. Coverage for the eligible spouse will terminate upon the death of the retiree unless the retiree elects to exercise a retirement option whereby the eligible current spouse receives applicable retirement benefits following the death of the retiree.
The Court of Appeals concluded that because the provision "contemplates that coverage will continue until, and even after, the death of the retiree," it "indicates that the parties intended that the healthcare coverage would last beyond the three-year term of the individual CBAs." Kendzierski , 319 Mich. App. at 286, 901 N.W.2d 111. In our judgment, **319however, the text of the provision does not warrant this conclusion because it only speaks to the disposition of retiree benefits upon the death of the retiree, which could occur within the three-year duration of the CBAs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in considering a similar surviving-spouse provision, stated as follows:
The retirees argue that the [collective-bargaining insurance agreement] is implicitly extended beyond its three-year term by a clause that provides benefits for surviving spouses until their death or remarriage. This provision, however, refers to the eligibility of individuals to receive benefits under the agreement, not to the duration of the agreement. Surviving spouses were eligible to receive benefits only so long as the [collective-bargaining insurance agreement] was in place. [ Cherry v. Auburn Gear, Inc. , 441 F.3d 476, 483 (C.A. 7, 2006).][13 ]
Similarly, the surviving-spouse provision of the CBAs in this case governs the eligibility of the spouse upon **320the death of the retiree; it does not set the duration of either the retiree's or the spouse's benefits. Therefore, the provision does not evidence an intention that the benefits continue beyond the term provided in the *617durational clause of the CBAs.14
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the provision requiring enrollment in Medicare at age 65 is also unavailing. That provision states:
Retired employees and/or their current spouse, upon reaching age 65, shall apply if eligible, and participate in the Medicare Program ... at which time the Employer's obligation shall be only to provide "over 65 supplemental" hospital-medical benefit coverage. Failure to participate in the aforementioned Medicare Program, shall be cause for termination of Employer paid coverage of applicable hospital-medical benefits, as outlined herein for employees who retire and/or their current spouse.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]his provision again contemplates that the coverage outlasts the three-year period of the CBA given that a retiree may retire years before turning 65." Kendzierski , 319 Mich. App. at 286, 901 N.W.2d 111. But the Sixth Circuit in Serafino v. City of Hamtramck , 707 F. Appx. 345 (C.A. 6, 2017), considered **321and rejected a similar argument.15 The provision at issue in that case stated that the employer would pay retirees' medical expenses " 'until that retired employee attains the age of sixty-five (65) or is eligible for Medicare or Medicaid.' " Id. at 348. The Sixth Circuit concluded that rather than indicating any intention that the retiree benefits vest, the provision served only to " 'guarantee[ ] benefits until the agreement expires, nothing more.' " Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted), quoting Gallo , 813 F.3d at 269. The provision at issue here, by contrast, does not contain even a guarantee of benefits for the duration of the agreement but, rather, conditions continued benefits upon enrollment in Medicare if a retiree reaches age 65 within the duration of the CBA.16 We are not persuaded that this provision demonstrates that benefits will necessarily outlast the expiration of the CBA itself.
Finally, we also do not find that the subsequent-employment provision creates an ambiguity as to whether the parties *618intended that retiree benefits would vest. It states:
**322Employees who retire under the provisions of the Macomb County Employees' Retirement Ordinance, and/or their current spouse, who subsequently are gainfully employed, shall not be eligible for hospital-medical benefits, during such period of gainful employment ....
The Court of Appeals identified in this provision an implication "that the retirees will receive healthcare benefits far beyond the three-year term of the CBAs." Kendzierski , 319 Mich. App. at 286, 901 N.W.2d 111. This is not a necessary implication, however, because a retiree might alternatively obtain coverage through another employer before the three-year term of the CBA expires. Moreover, as explained in Reese , we are not engaged here in a search for any implication that benefits continue past the expiration of the CBA itself but, rather, are seeking provisions that, taken as a whole, reasonably and clearly indicate that the retiree benefits are to continue beyond the duration of the CBAs. Reese , 583 U.S. at ----, 138 S.Ct. at 766 ("Shorn of Yard-Man inferences, this case is straightforward. The 1998 agreement contained a general durational clause that applied to all benefits, unless the agreement specified otherwise. No provision specified that the health care benefits were subject to a different durational clause.").
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' analysis, none of these provisions gives rise to an ambiguity.17 Each of **323the events addressed *619in these provisions could occur during the three-year duration of the CBAs. That each **324of these events could occur beyond that period does not indicate that the parties intended coverage to last beyond the term of the CBAs. Moreover, reading these provisions as encompassing events beyond the duration of the CBAs would obviously give rise to what we view as an altogether unnecessary conflict between these provisions and the general durational provision of the CBAs, when both a more reasonable and a more harmonious understanding can be achieved using the interpretive analysis previously set forth in this opinion. See, e.g., Singer v. Goff , 334 Mich. 163, 168, 54 N.W.2d 290 (1952) (recognizing "the cardinal principle which requires us to construe this contract as a whole and give harmonious effect, if possible, to each word and phrase"). See also Barton v. Constellium Rolled Prod.-Ravenswood, LLC , 851 F.3d 349, 357 (C.A. 4, 2017) ("One can reconcile the dependent coverage provision with the durational language by reading the former to terminate benefits for a retiree's dependents at the time of the retiree's death, while the benefits for dependents of surviving retirees terminate at the end of the CBA. This reading seems the likelier manifestation of the parties' intent, both because it harmonizes the purportedly conflicting provisions and because the dependent coverage sections of the [summary plan description] contain nothing explicit about vesting."). Therefore, simply because these events could occur beyond the duration of the CBAs does not lead us to conclude that the parties intended such coverage to last in perpetuity. Accordingly, these provisions do not render the CBAs ambiguous.18 **325The CBAs contain a general three-year durational clause, and no provision specifies that the benefits in dispute are subject to any different duration. If the parties meant to vest healthcare benefits for life, they easily could have said so in the CBAs, but they did not.19 The CBAs specify that "all agreements and understandings, *620expressed, implied, written or oral, are set forth in this Agreement" and that "[t]his Agreement expresses the complete understanding of the Parties on the subject of ... benefits ...." Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the CBAs is that the contractual right to healthcare benefits expired when the CBAs expired.20 This holding is consistent with our holding in Arbuckle that given the durational clauses at issue, the provisions that prohibited the coordination of benefits terminated when the agreements expired.21 Arbuckle , 499 Mich. at 541-543, 885 N.W.2d 232. It is also **326consistent with Tackett , which held that "contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement" and that while "a collective-bargaining agreement may provide in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration[,] ... when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life." Tackett , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 937 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Because the CBAs at issue here do not indicate that the provided benefits are to continue after the agreement's expiration, this Court will not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life. Instead, we hold that the contractual obligations provided therein expired when the CBAs expired.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the CBAs did not grant plaintiffs a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court **327of Appeals and remand to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary disposition to defendant consistent with this opinion.
Zahra, Viviano, and Clement, JJ., concurred with Markman, J.