*325There was a bloody trail beginning in the house that continued all the way to the location where Veal was apprehended. Along the trail, police found several items discarded by Veal-a hat, a cellphone, a green jacket, a shirt, and a folding knife.
A footprint analysis confirmed that the bloody footprints in the house matched the shoes Veal had been wearing. There was no trace or trail of blood out the door where Willis had exited.
DNA analysis confirmed the presence of Christensen's blood on Veal's discarded knife and shirt. Christensen's blood was also found on the jeans and shoes Veal was still wearing when apprehended. Veal's shirt, jeans, and shoes also contained evidence of his own blood.
An analysis of the gun determined that Willis's skin tissue was on the back of the slide. This was consistent with Willis's claim that Veal had struck Willis with the gun after it jammed when Veal tried to shoot Willis. The gun also had DNA from an unknown contributor on the textured portion of the pistol grip, but the sample was too weak to determine the source of the DNA.
Willis knew both Veal and Christensen. Willis later testified that on November 16, at around 7:00 p.m., Willis received a call from Veal, who wanted to hang out. Willis picked up Veal and bought beer from a liquor store before the two of them arrived at Christensen's home at around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. Willis introduced Veal to Christensen.
Later, Willis and Veal left and went over to Kavars's home. As noted, Kavars was Willis's cousin. She had invited Willis over for an early Thanksgiving dinner. Willis introduced Veal to Kavars. While at Kavars's house, Veal cut two lines of methamphetamine with a pocket knife. Kavars and Veal inhaled methamphetamine through a straw, and Willis smoked marijuana. After about forty minutes, the three of them went over to Christensen's house. They likely arrived after midnight.
At Christensen's house, the four of them socialized in the living room. Willis and Veal drank beer, Kavars drank Vodka, and Christensen drank whiskey. Veal indicated at some point that he was not feeling well. Willis told him to go outside and get some fresh air. Veal left for about ten or fifteen minutes. When he came back in, he sat down briefly, but then he got back up and went to the bathroom.
Shortly thereafter, Veal returned from the bathroom and sat down. Willis and Kavars were talking and laughing when suddenly Willis saw Veal abruptly rise from his seat and shoot Kavars in the throat with a pistol. Willis could not see the location from which Veal had obtained the gun. Willis observed blood coming from Kavars's throat, and he watched her take her final breaths.
Veal then turned the pistol on Willis. Willis pled with him not to shoot. "I got kids, Peter," he told him. Veal attempted to fire but the gun jammed. Veal hit Willis on the right side of the head with the pistol.
As this was happening, Christensen was frozen on the couch. Willis saw Veal trying to get the jammed round out of the pistol, and Willis started running, believing Christensen would be following him. By the time Willis reached the side exterior door in the kitchen, the place was dark because the only lamp being used in the house had gone out. Willis managed to unlock the door in the dark and exit the house. The last thing he heard Christensen say as he was departing was, "What the f___ are you doing?"
Once out of the home, Willis ran across the street and called 911. Willis later saw *326Veal leave the house and run south. Willis remained across the street and called some friends who arrived and helped calm him down. When the police came, Willis remained at the scene. He gave the police permission to search his vehicle, and he agreed to go to the police station to make a statement.
On November 23, the State filed a trial information in the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County charging Veal with two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of Kavars and Christensen and one count of attempted murder with respect to Willis. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1, .2(1)(a ), .11 (2017). Because of the publicity surrounding the case, Veal sought a change of venue, and the trial was moved to Webster County.
The parties appeared for trial on Monday, July 10, 2017. Of the Webster County jury pool of 100 people who had returned juror surveys, eighty-seven of them checked in at the courthouse that morning.
Veal is African-American. However, of those in the jury pool who reported their ethnicity, only one juror had self-identified as African-American, and she did not appear on July 10. Webster County is approximately 4.6% African-American.2
Before voir dire began, Veal objected to the jury venire. He alleged a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial based on underrepresentation and systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury selection process.
The court initially gave the defense until later that day to investigate its claim of underrepresentation and systematic exclusion. Further discussions took place on the record during the course of the day, and the court ultimately agreed to conduct a hearing on July 11. Because July 10 was the ninetieth day for speedy trial purposes, the court found good cause to extend the speedy trial deadline to July 11.
In an attempt to increase the number of African-Americans in the venire, the court summoned an additional jury pool to appear on the 11th. The court also instructed the sheriff to contact the jurors who had been summoned but had not appeared on the 10th.
With the extra jury pool, there were 153 potential jurors available at the courthouse on July 11.3 Five were African-American.4 Meanwhile, defense counsel had completed a historical review of jury questionnaires in Webster County for all of 2016. They reported to the court that the overall African-American percentage of Webster County jury pools that year was approximately 1.3%. Veal moved to strike the jury panel and dismiss the case, arguing the State had systematically excluded and underrepresented African-Americans in its jury pools in violation of the Sixth Amendment *327and that it was too late to fix the problem given the speedy trial deadline.
The district court denied the motions, noting that the additional pool had redressed to some extent the lack of African-American jurors in the original pool. As the court explained in its subsequent written ruling,
The Court denied Defendant's motion [to strike the jury panel] based on both the second and third part of the Duren [v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct. 664 [58 L.Ed.2d 579] (1979) ] test. The Court found that with the addition of Pool 2 and the availability of additional jurors who self-identified as African-American, at least in part, that the representation of African-Americans was fair and reasonable. As to the third part of the Duren test, the Court found that there was insufficient evidence that there was systematic exclusion of African-Americans in the jury selection process.
Jury selection then took place.
The initial voir dire panel of thirty-four potential jurors included three African-Americans. One had a prior felony conviction in Iowa, was still on parole, and had been prosecuted by the State's lead prosecutor. He was excused for cause. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(a ) (allowing a challenge for cause based on "[a] previous conviction of the juror of a felony"). A second potential juror also had a felony conviction, although from another state. His civil rights had not been restored, and he was excused for cause. See id.
The final African-American potential juror was S.H. The State's lead attorney had prosecuted S.H.'s father in a prior case resulting in three class A felony convictions. During voir dire, S.H. acknowledged that she had attended part of the trial. The State exercised a peremptory challenge on her. Although the defense lodged a Batson challenge to the strike, the district court overruled the challenge finding that the State had offered "a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason for striking that juror."
Following four days of presentation of evidence, a jury found Veal guilty on all charges. On September 12, Veal was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without parole on the first-degree murder charges and twenty-five years on the attempted murder charge. See Iowa Code § 901.5 ; id. § 902.1, .3, .9. Veal appealed, and we retained the appeal.
III. Standard of Review.
We review constitutional questions de novo. State v. Plain , 898 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Iowa 2017). This includes claims of systematic exclusion of a distinctive group from the jury pool in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 810, 821-29. It also includes Batson challenges. See State v. Mootz , 808 N.W.2d 207, 214, 215-20 (Iowa 2012). Yet, we give "a great deal of deference to the district court's evaluation of credibility when determining the true motives of the attorney when making strikes." Id. at 214 ; see also State v. Griffin , 564 N.W.2d 370, 375-76 (Iowa 1997).
We likewise review de novo a district court's decision whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. See State v. Lyman , 776 N.W.2d 865, 873 (Iowa 2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int'l Inc. , 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 & n.3 (Iowa 2016).
In the speedy trial area, "[w]e review a district court's determination whether the State carried its burden to show good cause for the delay for abuse of discretion." State v. McNeal , 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017). Also, "[w]e review a district court's decision on claims of prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion, which occurs when 'a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent *328clearly unreasonable.' " State v. Coleman , 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Krogmann , 804 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 2011) ). We review rulings on demonstrative evidence for an abuse of discretion. See McNeal , 897 N.W.2d at 703. We also review evidentiary rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of prior bad acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Putman , 848 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2014).
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. State v. Sanford , 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We review a denial of new trial on the ground the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Ary , 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).
IV. Fair-Cross-Section Claim.
Veal maintains that the jury selection process used in Webster County violated the Sixth Amendment requirement that juries be drawn so as to represent a fair cross section of the community.5 We addressed a similar claim today in Lilly , 930 N.W.2d 293. In Lilly , the defendant raised both the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 10. Id. at ----. We applied the Duren / Plain framework to these issues. Id. ; see also Duren , 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S. Ct. at 668 ; Plain , 898 N.W.2d at 822. We held that under article I, section 10, a defendant establishes the underrepresentation prong of the Duren / Plain framework by showing that the representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool falls below the representation in the eligible juror population by more than one standard deviation. Lilly , 930 N.W.2d at ----. We held that the representation of the group in the eligible juror population should be assessed using the most current census data, adjusted for any reliable data that might affect eligibility, such as the numbers of persons under the age of eighteen. Id. at ----.6 Lilly also held that aggregated data on multiple jury pools could be used, so long as the data were not selective. Id. at ----. Additionally, Lilly held that a defendant whose jury pool contains at least as high a percentage of the distinctive group as the eligible population has not been aggrieved under the Duren / Plain framework. Id. at ----.
Turning to the systematic-exclusion prong of Duren / Plain , we reiterated in Lilly that the defendant must prove "causation," that is, that the underrepresentation actually resulted from a particular feature or features of the jury selection system. Id. at ----. However, we held that "run-of-the-mill jury management practices" can, under appropriate circumstances, constitute systematic exclusion. Id. at ----.
We believe that Lilly 's holdings are equally valid when a case is decided under the Sixth Amendment, with two exceptions.
*329We are not persuaded that one standard deviation would be enough to establish the underrepresentation prong for federal constitutional purposes. In Castaneda v. Partida , the United States Supreme Court seemingly endorsed two to three standard deviations as an appropriate threshold under the Fourteenth Amendment, and we are not persuaded the Supreme Court would adopt a more lenient standard under the Sixth Amendment. 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1281 n.17, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). We believe a downward variance of two standard deviations must be shown under the Sixth Amendment.
We also are not persuaded that run-of-the-mill jury management practices can constitute systematic exclusion under the Sixth Amendment. In Berghuis v. Smith , the Supreme Court noted,
Smith catalogs a laundry list of factors in addition to the alleged "siphoning" that, he urges, rank as "systematic" causes of underrepresentation of African-Americans in Kent County's jury pool. Smith's list includes the County's practice of excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to show up for jury service, its reliance on mail notices, its failure to follow up on nonresponses, its use of residential addresses at least 15 months old, and the refusal of Kent County police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors.
559 U.S. 314, 332, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1395, 176 L.Ed.2d 249 (2010) (citations omitted). The Court then went on,
This Court ... has never "clearly established" that jury-selection-process features of the kind on Smith's list can give rise to a fair-cross-section claim. ... [I]n Duren , the Court understood that hardship exemptions resembling those Smith assails might well "survive a fair-cross-section challenge."
Id. at 333, 130 S. Ct. at 1395 (citation omitted) (quoting Duren , 439 U.S. at 370, 99 S. Ct. at 669 ).
However, Veal's pool contained only five African-Americans out of 153 potential jurors. This 3.27% figure is below the percentage of African-Americans in Webster County (4.6%) and also below the percentage of eighteen-and-over African-Americans in Webster County (3.9%).7 Turning to the aggregate data, they show only thirty-five self-identifying African-Americans out of 2637 persons who responded to the juror questionnaire in Webster County in 2016. This is statistically significant even under the higher Castaneda threshold. The odds of getting only thirty-five successes out of 2637 trials with p of .046 are 4.05 X 10-21. As the State concedes in its brief, "The odds of that occurring randomly ... are very low." This remains true even if the overall percentage of African-Americans living in Webster County is adjusted to account for the fact that a higher percentage of African-Americans living in Iowa are under eighteen and cannot serve on juries. See Lilly , 930 N.W.2d at ----. The odds of getting only thirty-five successes out of 2637 trials with p of .039 in that case are 2.29 X 10-15. Other adjustments, such as for the Fort Dodge prison population or for individuals of mixed race, likely would not alter the bottom line revealed by the aggregate data.8
*330Yet we note that Veal's counsel aggregated data from jury questionnaires for 2016 only. Veal's trial actually took place in July 2017. The record does not indicate whether similar data were available for the first half of 2017. We cautioned in Lilly that aggregate data cannot be gathered selectively. See id. at ----. Thus, if data were readily available for the first half of 2017, it would be inappropriate to exclude them.9
Veal did not attempt to meet the third prong of Duren / Plain other than by arguing that systematic exclusion can be inferred from the 2016 aggregated data. As we explained in Lilly , that is not enough. Id. at ----. The defendant must identify some practice or combination of practices that led to the underrepresentation, and it must be something other than the "laundry list" the Supreme Court declined to condemn in Berghuis . See 559 U.S. at 332, 130 S. Ct. at 1395.
As in Plain and Lilly , we believe the appropriate course of action here would be to remand the case. Neither the parties nor the district court had the benefit of today's decisions. A remand will offer Veal a further opportunity to develop his arguments that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated. If the district court concludes a violation occurred, it shall grant Veal a new trial.
V. Speedy Trial Claim.
Veal next argues his rule 2.33 right to a speedy trial was violated. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(b ). Veal's argument centers on a one-day delay that occurred from July 10, 2017, to July 11, 2017, while the parties litigated the fair-cross-section claim.
We begin by reviewing the relevant dates. The trial information was filed November 23, 2016. Trial was originally scheduled for January 24, 2017. Veal never waived speedy trial.
On December 30, 2016, Veal applied for a psychiatric evaluation of himself at state expense. On January 4, the court suspended proceedings and ordered such an evaluation. The evaluation was filed on February 28. The evaluator recommended that Veal be referred to the forensic psychiatric hospital for restoration of competency. On March 3, the court approved the referral and continued the suspension of proceedings. On May 15, the reports of two professionals were filed concluding Veal was now competent to stand trial. On May 23, the court found that Veal's competency had been restored and vacated the suspension of proceedings. The court reset trial for June 26.
Veal's counsel shortly thereafter moved to continue trial from June 26 to July 10 based on counsel's unavailability. The State did not oppose this request, and the court granted it. Everyone agreed that July 10 was the last available date within the ninety-day speedy trial window, taking into account the date the trial information was filed and excluding the time spent addressing Veal's competency.
*331On the morning of July 10, the court convened proceedings intending to begin the trial. Veal's counsel observed there were no minorities and sought until the afternoon to explore racial disparity and systematic exclusion in the jury venire. Further discussions occurred later that morning and Veal's counsel asked for additional time past the 10th to investigate systematic exclusion. The State resisted the request. It noted that Veal had been in possession of the list of potential jurors earlier and could have raised the fair-cross-section claim before the day of trial. The State also asked the court to find good cause for extending the ninety-day deadline if it granted more time.
The court decided to give Veal's counsel until the following day, i.e., the 11th, to conduct research and discovery on the fair-cross-section claim. On the question of speedy trial, the court ruled,
THE COURT: To grant the motion to -- to allow time to do discovery and make a further record regarding whether an under-representation is due to the systematic exclusion of a group in the jury selection process necessarily requires trial to begin after the 90 days. I think there has to be a conscious choice of that or at least be aware of that.
So given those situations, that they're really in conflict, counsel for the defendant, I just want to, you know, understand for the record, knowing that you're at the 90th day, you are asking for additional time to do further discovery or present further arguments on this matter to extend -- and that would extend this case past 90 days. Is that your position? MR. KLOBERDANZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And you've discussed that with your client also? MR. KLOBERDANZ: Yes, Your Honor, we have.
THE COURT: All right. Based upon that record, I will agree to give defense counsel additional time. I find, however, that there is good cause shown for extending the time to present this case for trial:
As Mr. Brown has said about four times, the State is ready to proceed here today. The jury panel was here. We were ready to begin the case. The jury panel is coming back at 1:00, so we could continue the case yet today;
That the circumstances where Defendant's motion was first raised on Friday of last week [July 7], frankly, without any time for any of us to do anything about it, and then raised today, makes the situation where it would have been impossible to deal with this matter before the conclusion of the 90 days;
That this is the defendant's motion with full knowledge that this would require trial to begin after 90 days.
And in light of that, the defendant has chosen to seek the additional time to exercise his rights under the Plain case to do some further discovery; and, therefore, I think that the -- any delay in the case would -- would be attributable to the defendant and there'd be good cause for -- for not getting this case tried within 90 days.
The next day, July 11, a second pool of potential jurors had been summoned to add to the first pool. Veal, meanwhile, provided additional data based on jury pools in Webster County for all of 2016 and formally moved that his jury venire be stricken as not reflecting a fair cross section of the community. In addition, Veal moved for dismissal of the case based on violation of his speedy trial rights, reasoning that it was the State's duty to provide a jury panel representing a cross section of community within the ninety-day deadline. The court denied both motions, reiterating *332on the speedy trial issue that "there was good cause to go past the 90 days." At this point, the parties proceeded with jury selection.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b ) provides,
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
The good cause determination focuses on "the reason for the delay." McNeal , 897 N.W.2d at 704 (quoting State v. Winters , 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005) ). Yet we also consider "surrounding circumstances such as the length of the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether prejudice resulted from the delay." Id. Here the delay was only one day, it was precipitated by the defendant's request for more time to investigate and present evidence on the fair-cross-section issue, and the defendant cites no prejudice that resulted from this single-day postponement. In our view, the district court carefully balanced a number of concerns. "[P]utting ourselves in the shoes of the district judge," we find no abuse of discretion. See id. at 708.
Veal denies there was good cause for any delay. Treating the judicial branch and the county attorney's office collectively as "the State," Veal maintains it was the State's obligation not just to be ready to try the case on July 10, but also to have a jury pool meeting constitutional standards available that day. Thus, Veal's argument would effectively transform any fair-cross-section violation not remedied before the ninety-day deadline into a speedy trial violation.
Veal cites no authority for his effort to conflate substantive legal claims with speedy trial violations. We are not persuaded. By Veal's logic, any time we find on appeal that a defendant is entitled to a new trial, we should also find that "the State" violated the defendant's speedy trial rights by committing a legal error that resulted in a new trial beyond the ninety-day deadline. This would go too far.
VI. Batson Challenge.
Veal contends the district court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State's exercise of a peremptory strike on an African-American prospective juror. Batson holds that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that the prosecutor has exercised one or more peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of a racial minority and that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Such a showing shifts the burden to the prosecution to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for exercising the challenges. Id.
During voir dire of this juror, the lead prosecutor recognized her as the daughter of a person he had prosecuted successfully for three class "A" felonies. The juror had attended two days of her father's trial. The juror stated during voir dire that she believed her father was treated fairly. She conceded he was "involved" in the crimes but said she did not "know for sure if he was the only person."
The State exercised one of its peremptory strikes on this juror. Veal's counsel objected on the basis of Batson and the prosecutor provided the following explanation:
*333So I'll tell you why we struck Ms. [H.]. Ms. [H.] is the daughter of [S. H.]. I prosecuted [S. H.] for three class A felonies in this county; kidnapping, sexual abuse, and murder, all in the first degree. It was a very high-profile case, a very brutal killing ....
At the time of the -- the crime -- I can't tell you the year or the date. I do lose dates -- but Ms. [H.], I believe, was right around the age of 17 years old. I vaguely remember her being present at least at part of the -- if it wasn't the trial, it would have been part of the pretrial proceedings. She was with her mother ....
....
I mean, I can't keep a juror on whose father I prosecuted for a class A felony. I mean, there -- there -- she may have latent hostility towards me personally because of what I did. Her expressions that she made on the -- on the record, she said that his sentence was fair. She doesn't appear to have a whole lot of contact with him; but that's not a risk I can take, particularly under the circumstances of this case.
We have -- The allegation is that Mr. Veal killed two people. At least based in part on what our expert has said, he may be blaming a -- a second person, may be blaming Ron Willis, claiming that he didn't -- that Mr. Veal's claiming that he didn't do the crime that he's accused of.
And Ms. [H.] raised that issue with me concerning the fairness and what she thought about the trial of her father, [S. H.], whenever she said somebody else might have been involved.
I can tell you right now, in the [S. H.] case, no one else was involved. We had strong physical evidence against him that he was the sole perpetrator of those three crimes. That's what concerns me about Ms. [H.]. I think those are race-neutral reasons to strike her.
If she were white, I would make the exact same objection to having her -- or make the same exact strike that I would. And it -- this has nothing to do with her race; it has everything to do with her background and who her father is and the fact that I was directly involved in that case and that prosecution. So for those reasons, that's why we exercised our preemptory challenge.
One other thing I would tell you is we did wait to the end to strike her with No. 10 because I thought the defense might actually challenge her for the same reason; that she had, you know, had this -- this connection to a previous high-profile violent crime here in the county. I could see actually how that they could maybe justify a preemptory strike on that basis, as well. I thought that would alleviate this problem of having to articulate why we're doing it; but apparently that didn't happen, so that's why we took her with No. 10.
Just don't want you to read anything else into that. That's why we waited till the end. So those are our reasons, and we would ask that our strike be upheld.
Defense counsel did not question the State's motive for striking this juror, but argued that her voir dire responses gave no indication of bias. Because this juror was the last available African-American juror, defense counsel "ask[ed] the Court to hold the State to a very high standard given the circumstances here."
The district court overruled Veal's Batson challenge, stating,
Prosecution of a potential juror's father in a -- in an apparently class A case by the same attorney as is in this case, I think, is a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason for striking that juror; and that's *334why I'm going to overrule your objection.
Here and below, Veal insists that a nondiscriminatory reason for striking the last African-American juror is insufficient and that we should adopt something like a cause requirement in those circumstances. This is contrary to our precedent. In Griffin , we upheld a prosecutor's use of strikes on the only two African-American members of the panel. 564 N.W.2d at 375-76. We noted that the prosecutor's explanation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause" but must be race-neutral and "related to the particular case to be tried." Id. at 375 (quoting Batson , 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24 ). We affirmed the district court's acceptance of the prosecutor's explanation that both jurors had previously sat on a jury that convicted the defendant of lesser included offenses in a willful injury case. Id. at 376. We stated that "[t]hese qualify as racially-neutral reasons" and "[t]here is nothing to suggest they were a mere pretext." Id. The same observations can be made here; indeed, to an outsider, the prosecutor's reason for striking juror H. here seems more substantial than the reasons given in Griffin .
More recently, in Mootz , we said that a Batson challenge should not prevail "merely because the judge does not find the reason given to be persuasive." 808 N.W.2d at 218. Rather, "[t]he reason given must, in and of itself, violate equal protection." Id.
Veal argues that allowing prosecutors to use peremptory strikes on prospective jurors who are relatives of individuals they previously prosecuted "disproportionately implicates African-American potential jurors." We are aware of the disproportionate impact when jurors can be removed based on prior interactions with law enforcement. But see id. at 219 ("Our cases have repeatedly noted that a juror's interactions with law enforcement and the legal system are a valid, race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge."). But this case involved a special set of circumstances-a prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike on a juror because the same prosecutor had sent her father to prison for the rest of his life. We affirm the district court's ruling that this was a valid, race-neutral reason for rejecting the Batson challenge.
VII. Prosecutorial Error or Misconduct.
Veal contends that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in several instances, requiring reversal of his convictions and a new trial. We have drawn a distinction between prosecutorial misconduct and prosecutorial error. State v. Schlitter , 881 N.W.2d 380, 392-94 (Iowa 2016). The former requires an intentional violation of a clear legal or professional standard; the latter involves a mistake or an exercise of "poor judgment." Id. at 394 (quoting Shawn E. Minihan, Measuring Prosecutorial Actions: An Analysis of Misconduct Versus Error , Prosecutor, Dec. 2014, at 25). We will treat Veal's claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct or error .
Veal first takes issue with the following exchange during voir dire:
MR. BROWN: ... Ms. [M.], I'll come back to you. I've mentioned multiple times here that this is a murder case and an attempted murder; right? Okay. And I think with Ms. [P.], she talked about a case that she was on that dealt with a -- serving a minor; correct? Okay. So obviously when you compare the two, that's, you know, certainly minor compared *335to -- to a murder. Would you agree? MS. [M.]: Yes.
MR. BROWN: Okay. So looking at comparing those two, would you say that we would have to have more evidence in a murder case than we would in someone who sells alcohol to a minor? MS. [M.]: Yes.
MR. BROWN: Okay. I get that answer a lot too. Do you realize that the burden in those two cases is exactly the same, the definition would be the same? Do you follow me? MS. [M.]: Uh-huh.
MR. BROWN: So it'd be beyond a reasonable doubt as it's defined by the judge here. The same instruction would be given in the case like what Ms. [P.] had talked about. So the burden is the same in the sense that it's defined the same. Do you follow me? MS. [M.]: Yes.
MR. BROWN: Okay. So would you hold us to the burden as the Judge gives it to you -- MS. [M.]: Yes.
MR. BROWN: -- and not think that we have to have something more than that? MS. [M.]: Correct.
Veal's counsel shortly thereafter moved for a mistrial based on this exchange. He said, "I don't know if that went over the line but want to bring it to the court's attention. ... It was a comparison of selling alcohol to minors and -- and murder ...." He then added that when a prosecutor compares two crimes it is "at least arguably a comment on potential punishment; and certainly that's not appropriate or proper."
The court denied the motion for mistrial. It recalled the reference as an effort to equate the burden of proof for both crimes. It did say that the comment could be viewed as one on possible punishment, and counsel should "avoid that sort of discussion in the future."
We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial. Jurors didn't fall off the turnip truck and into the courtroom. Inevitably, a prospective juror is going to regard murder as a more serious crime than selling alcohol to minors and assume it has a more severe punishment. The point of the prosecutor's voir dire questioning was not to comment on punishment but to make sure jurors would be willing to accept the proposition that all criminal cases are subject to the same "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. That was a legitimate purpose.
On appeal, Veal argues that the prosecutor's contrast between murder and selling alcohol to minors "[p]lanted in the jurors' mind the anchor of a minor punishment ...." This seems unlikely to us. No one referred to the actual punishment for either crime.
Veal also complains that during trial, one of the prosecutors incorrectly told the jury that the defense had seen a particular diagram before. The defense immediately disputed that statement in front of the jury. The diagram was not admitted at that time. During the next break, outside the presence of the jury, it was established that both sides were partly right: the diagram had been provided to defense counsel, but some additions had been made. Over objection, the court received the diagram into evidence and rejected any argument that the changes to the diagram had prejudiced the defense.
Notably, defense counsel did not then assert prosecutorial misconduct or error. Defense counsel did not seek any relief from the prosecutor's previous statement about the diagram, such as a curative instruction. And on appeal, defense counsel is not even appealing the decision to admit the diagram. We find no reversible error.
*336Veal also complains about comments made by the lead prosecutor during his rebuttal closing argument. Over objection, the prosecutor engaged in some sharp criticism of defense counsel's closing argument. These included analogizing the defense argument to the times when the prosecutor's daughter would say, "Really, Dad? Really?" to her father without having any "substance." The prosecutor also argued as follows:
Mr. Kloberdanz characterized this as a horrible tragedy. Well, I would disagree with this. You know what a horrible tragedy is? When an infant dies in its crib for no reason. When a father of three, driving home from work, his car slides off the highway and is killed in a crash for no reason.
This is not a horrible tragedy, this is a cold-blooded killing. It is a brutal, senseless murder and a near-miss on Ron Willis. That's the proper way to characterize what occurred.
At the end of Mr. Kloberdanz's statement -- at his closing argument to you, he told quite a story. Wow. What was all of that based on? Nothing. What -- You would have thought Mr. Kloberdanz was there, the way he told that story.
That Ron Willis got hit in the head with the lamp, that he switched clothes with Peter Veal, that he did all those things. Holy cow. Wow.
The district court overruled defense counsel's objections to this line of argument but told the prosecutor he "may be pushing" the line of what is proper. At that point, the prosecutor shifted into a detailed discussion of the evidence.
We have indicated that a prosecutor may attack the defense's "theory of the case" so long as he or she does not make "denigrating or inflammatory comments of a personal nature aimed at defense counsel." Coleman , 907 N.W.2d at 140. In Coleman , we found no violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial when the prosecutor commented that "the defense, they want to-to blow a lot of smoke around the law, make it as fuzzy as possible" and "the defense will hide behind [a] cloud of assumption." Id. at 139-41 (alteration in original).
Here the prosecutor's comments may have veered improperly into personal attacks on defense counsel, e.g., "You would have thought Mr. Kloberdanz was there, the way he told that story." Having said that, we do not find that the comments resulted in prejudice that denied Veal a fair trial. See id. at 140. As the district court noted in denying the motion for new trial, "[T]he evidence against [Veal] was strong." Veal's theory of defense was implausible.10
VIII. Firearm Demonstration.
During trial, the State's firearms expert Victor Murillo used a .380 semiautomatic pistol from the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation's (DCI) reference collection for demonstrative purposes. This was done because the actual murder weapon had carcinogenic dye on it. The demonstration *337weapon was the same make and model as the murder weapon, although with some design changes.
Murillo testified that the murder weapon had jammed after it was used to kill Kavars because a faulty cartridge became stuck inside of the chamber. To help illustrate his testimony, the State asked Murillo to display the operation of a semiautomatic .380 using the sample weapon from DCI's lab.
At trial and on appeal, Veal claims the demonstration should not have been permitted because the demonstration weapon differed from the murder weapon in certain respects. However, we find no abuse of discretion. See State v. Liggins , 524 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Iowa 1994) (noting the court's "broad discretion in permitting demonstrative evidence to explain or illustrate the testimony of witnesses"). The demonstration weapon was not admitted into evidence and it was made clear that it was not the original. See McNeal , 897 N.W.2d at 709 ("It was made clear to the jury that the replica [sledgehammer] was not the original. The replica was not admitted into evidence."). Veal's counsel was able to make any differences clear when he cross-examined Murillo.
Veal urges that the demonstration had little relevance, because "there was no dispute over how the gun operated" and "[t]he dispute was over who fired the gun ...." To the extent that is true, though, it would also mean that the demonstration had little potential for resulting in unfair prejudice.
IX. The Defendant's Competency Hearing.
On May 15, 2017, two examining professionals reported that Veal was properly oriented as to time, place, and current events and could perform mental tracking tasks and a memory test without difficulty. According to the reports, Veal also was able to list the charges against him and identify the range of potential sentences; he could confirm that he had met with his defense attorney five or six times and that he was able to work with him; he understood the roles of his defense attorney, the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury; he understood what a plea bargain would entail; and he realized that he should advise his defense attorney if a witness wasn't telling the truth. Veal's scores on tests of basic legal concepts and skills to assist defense were described as "somewhat higher than average compared to the general population."
These evaluations concluded that Veal had a factual and a rational understanding of the legal proceedings and could assist his defense counsel. Thus, they opined he was competent to stand trial. See Iowa Code § 812.3(2) ; id. § 812.5 (defining the issue as whether "the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense").
Following the receipt of both evaluations, a competency hearing took place on May 23. The evaluations were admitted into evidence. For the defense, Veal's mother testified that she had visited her son twice recently for brief periods of time. The first time, Veal was rocking and looking behind him. His mother got "the feeling he was paranoid." The second time, Veal did not behave like that. However, during this second visit, Veal asked Veal's mother about how his sister was doing just a few minutes after Veal's mother had already spoken to Veal about his sister.
Defense counsel also represented that in their encounters with their client, Veal had not asked questions of his own and often had not responded to their inquiries. Defense *338counsel urged that there was a serious question whether Veal was listening to his attorneys-rather than listening to voices-and that Veal was having a hard time paying attention.
After considering the evidence, the district court concluded that Veal was competent to stand trial. On our de novo review, we agree. The two expert evaluations on which the district court relied were detailed and thorough. As the district court observed, the testimony of Veal's mother was based on only two fifteen-minute visits with her son. Even accepting the professional statement of Veal's counsel that they were having trouble interacting with their client, the examining psychiatrist and the examining psychologist covered this same subject in considerable detail in their evaluations. Based on their objective testing and personal observations, they found Veal would be able to work with his counsel.
In sum, the State carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that Veal's competency had been restored. See id. § 812.8(5). Notably, Veal cites nothing from the trial itself that might have suggested he was not competent to stand trial. Cf. State v. Einfeldt , 914 N.W.2d 773, 776-77 (Iowa 2018) (discussing behavior and statements of the defendant during trial).11
X. Excluded Evidence.
Veal challenges the district court's exclusion of evidence pertaining to Willis. The limited evidence essentially fell into two categories: (1) Willis's criminal history and (2) information that a defense witness, M.B., had concerning Willis.
A. Willis's Criminal History. We begin with the admitted evidence. The defense was allowed to impeach Willis with the fact that he had been convicted in 2009 on a felony drug charge. The defense was also allowed to argue that Willis had been found by the police to have a small amount of marijuana in his car on November 17, 2016, and was not prosecuted. Similarly, the defense was able to argue that Willis had not been prosecuted as a felon in possession of a firearm.12
However, the defense was not allowed to bring out Willis's drug charges in Minnesota that were pending at the time of trial. Likewise, evidence of Willis's early June 2017 misdemeanor drug possession conviction was excluded. Also excluded was the fact that Willis did not serve the mandatory minimum two days in jail on the June 2017 conviction and the possibility that the charge could have been (but was not) enhanced to a felony. The court reasoned that misdemeanors and unproved charges are not normally admissible, and there was no basis for concluding that Willis was the beneficiary of some kind of deal to receive favorable treatment.
We see no abuse of discretion here. Allowing the defense to present this additional evidence of Willis's criminal history could have led to an unneeded and time-consuming sideshow. Willis made a 911 call to police voluntarily on November 17, 2016, to report that Veal had shot Kavars. Willis's *339version of events never changed. While defense counsel should have broad leeway to question prosecution witnesses facing criminal exposure, this record contains no suggestion that any sort of deal was made with Willis. There would have been no need for a deal: Willis had reported the criminal episode of his own volition. Moreover, Veal's defense theory was that Willis had shot Kavars and stabbed Christensen to death. If that were true, Willis had plenty of motive to pin the crimes on Veal and did not need a "deal" as motivation.
B. M.B.'s Testimony. Again, we begin with the admitted evidence. M.B. was Christensen's live-in girlfriend during the last few months before his death. She testified that she witnessed Willis delivering drugs to Christensen. She testified that Christensen was spending a lot of money on drugs and his financial situation was deteriorating. She also testified that about two weeks before November 17, 2016, Willis had date-raped her and she reported this to Christensen. M.B. further testified that Christensen was upset and mad at Willis upon hearing this. And M.B. testified that Willis kept drugs and a handgun in his car.
M.B. was not allowed to testify that Christensen had "a significant drug problem," how much Christensen was spending on drugs, or that she was "scared of" Willis.
Veal claims that these limits on M.B.'s testimony significantly interfered with his ability to present his case. In particular, Veal contends that the jury got to hear of a "rift" between Willis and Christensen but did not get to hear "what the rift was about." We disagree. Veal was able to demonstrate that Willis had a motive to kill Kavars and Christensen. We find no abuse of discretion.
XI. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Veal argues the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for the first-degree murder of Christensen and Kavars and for the attempted murder of Willis. Alternatively, Veal urges that his motion for new trial should have been granted on the ground that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. We disagree with both contentions.
Willis testified that Veal shot Kavars in the throat before turning the gun on Willis and attempting to shoot Willis. When the pistol jammed, according to Willis, Veal struck Willis in the head and then attempted to free the lodged round. The pistol recovered at the scene by police had a jammed round in the firing chamber. Willis's skin tissue was also found on the pistol's slide consistent with his being struck on the head with it.
After Willis fled the scene, Veal was the only person remaining in the house with Christensen. Christensen's dead body was later found in a pool of blood with twenty-five stab wounds. Christensen's blood was all over Veal's jeans and shoes. The bloody footprints in the house matched Veal's shoes. A trail of Christensen's blood followed Veal's path out of the house. Along the path were Veal's discarded bloody shirt and bloody knife. Again, Christensen's blood was on these items.
Veal's improbable defense theory was that Willis had both shot Kavars and stabbed Christensen, then forced Veal to put on Willis's bloody clothes, then cleaned himself up so he would have no trace of Christensen's blood, and then left the house and called 911. The jury was entitled to reject this theory which was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
*340XII. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally affirm Veal's conviction and sentence, but remand this case for further consideration of Veal's claim that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Cady, C.J., concurs.
Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concur as to divisions IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI, and dissent as to division VI.
Waterman, Christensen, and McDonald, JJ., concur as to divisions V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI, and dissent as to division IV.
CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I join in each division of the majority opinion by Justice Mansfield. In particular, I agree that the district court in this case properly applied the Batson test to reject the challenge to the removal of the last African-American juror from the panel. See Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In other words, the district court properly applied our current law.
Nevertheless, I acknowledge problems inherent in the exercise of peremptory challenges and agree with the separate opinion by Justice Wiggins that the solution in the future is to do away with the use of peremptory challenges. Thus, I am not in favor of trying to modify our governing rules to better detect bias in discretionary decision-making so much as I am in eliminating discretionary practices altogether that allow implicit bias to exist undetected. For that reason, I also concur in the overall theme of the thoughtful analysis and criticism of peremptory challenges discussed in the separate opinion by Justice Appel.