Ayers v. Kalal, 925 N.W.2d 291 (2019)

March 18, 2019 · Court of Appeals of Minnesota · A18-0503

925 N.W.2d 291

Justin K. AYERS, et al., Respondents,
v.
John William KALAL, et al., Appellants.

A18-0503

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed March 18, 2019

Christopher L. Goodman, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)¹

Patrick L. Arneson, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants John William Kalal and City of Burnsville)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

RODENBERG, Judge Appellants John William Kalal and City of Burnsville (the city) appeal from judgment in favor of respondent Justin Ayers on his claims arising out of personal injuries he suffered when his van was hit by a city snowplow driven by Kalal. Appellants argue that the district court erred in (1) declining to submit to the jury factual issues concerning snow-and-ice immunity in the first trial (which determined liability), (2) granting respondent's motion for a new trial on damages, (3) failing to apply the statutory offset under Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, for basic economic loss (no-fault) benefits paid to respondent, and (4) improperly determining the amount of costs and disbursements and prejudgment interest. We affirm the district court's grant of respondent's new trial motion and see no reversible error in the district court's instructions to the jury, but we reverse and remand for the district court to properly apply section 65B.51, subdivision 1, and to properly determine costs, disbursements, and interest.

FACTS

On January 11, 2011, respondent was driving his van southbound on Highway 13 in the city of Burnsville when he was involved in a motor-vehicle collision. As respondent approached the intersection of Highway 13 with Horizon Drive to the east and 117th Street to the west, a snowplow driven by Kalal, an employee of the city, collided with respondent's van when Kalal attempted to cross the intersection by driving from Horizon Drive onto 117th Street, crossing Highway 13 in the process. The snowplow hit the driver's side of respondent's van, separated the driver's seat from the van, and pierced a hole in the side of the van large enough for respondent to crawl out of the van through that hole after the collision. It is undisputed that respondent had the right of way.

Respondent sued Kalal and the city, alleging that Kalal was negligent in operating the snowplow (which was not plowing snow at the time), and that the city was vicariously liable for Kalal's negligence. Appellants moved the district court for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Kalal's acts at the scene of the accident are protected by common-law official immunity; (2) the facts of the accident entitle appellants to statutory snow-and-ice immunity; (3) appellants are protected by statutory discretionary immunity to the extent respondent's claims are based on the city's snow-removal policy; and (4) Kalal had no duty to obey traffic laws at the time of the accident. The district court denied appellants' motion for summary judgment.

Appellants brought an interlocutory appeal, arguing that they were entitled to common-law official immunity and vicarious official immunity, or, in the alternative, snow-and-ice immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4 (2018).² Ayers v. Kalal , No. A15-0694, 2015 WL 9264116, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2015) ( Ayers I ). We affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment. Id. at *3.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Respondent introduced the medical testimony of Dr. Wengler, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who opined that respondent had suffered permanent injuries as a result of the collision.³ Appellants did not obtain a medical expert, procure any independent medical examination, or produce expert medical testimony at trial. The jury's special verdict found that Kalal's negligence was a direct, and the only, cause of respondent's injuries. The jury found that respondent had not suffered a permanent injury as a direct result of the collision, and calculated that respondent suffered damages of $ 42,178.07. The district court entered judgment accordingly. Respondent moved the district court for judgment as a matter of law (for damages above those awarded by the jury) or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Appellants moved the district court to reduce the amount of the judgment by the amount of no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf of respondent. The district court granted respondent's motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury's verdict was not justified by any reasonable interpretation of the evidence.

At the second jury trial, limited to the issue of damages, the jury's special verdict found that respondent suffered damages of $ 152,810.07 resulting from the collision. Appellants again moved the district court to reduce the award for no-fault benefits paid. Respondents moved the district court for entry of final judgment and applied for taxation of costs and disbursements. The district court declined to reduce respondent's award by the $ 23,000 respondent received from his no-fault insurance provider, and entered final judgment.

This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by rejecting the issue of snow-and-ice immunity as a matter of law?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting respondent's motion for new trial on damages?

III. Did the district court err when it declined to deduct from the verdict no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf respondent?

IV. Did the district court err in its award of costs and disbursements, and its award of interest?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not err by declining to submit the question of snow-and-ice immunity to the jury.

The district court declined appellants' request for questions on the verdict form relating to snow-and-ice immunity. It reasoned that, as a matter of law, appellants were not entitled to such immunity. Appellants argue on appeal that factual questions concerning the conditions of the road remained to be resolved by a jury. Respondent argues that appellants forfeited the right to challenge on appeal the issue concerning snow-and-ice immunity because appellants did not move for a new trial.

Before the first trial, the district court granted respondent's motion in limine to exclude the question of snow and ice conditions from the special verdict form. "[M]atters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings and jury instructions are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error." Sauter v. Wasemiller , 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986). But appellants also argued that they were entitled to snow-and-ice immunity as a matter of law, which argument the district court rejected, once on a motion for summary judgment and again on the pretrial motion in limine. "[W]hen substantive questions of law are raised and considered in the district court, a motion for a new trial pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 is not a prerequisite for appellate review." Willis v. Ind. Harbor S.S. Co. , 790 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn. , 664 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Minn. 2003) ), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2010); see also County of Hennepin v. Bhakta , 922 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Minn. Jan. 23, 2019) (holding that pretrial orders on motions in limine are within the scope of appeal from a final judgment regardless of whether those orders have been assigned as error in a motion for a new trial). Appellants raised the legal question of immunity to the district court. See Johnson v. State , 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1996) (stating that whether government entities and public officials are protected by statutory immunity is a legal question that appellate courts review de novo). Accordingly, we review de novo the legal question of whether appellants were entitled to snow-and-ice immunity. Kariniemi v. City of Rockford , 882 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2016).

Minnesota common law has provided that a municipality has the duty to maintain public roads and sidewalks in a safe condition for travel-a duty that has existed before and after the abolition of sovereign immunity. Hoff v. Surman , 883 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. App. 2016). Municipalities are generally liable for the torts of their officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment. Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2018). Section 466.03 enumerates certain exceptions to this general rule, conferring immunity on municipalities in specific instances. Minn. Stat. § 466.03 (2018). At issue here is the exception under section 466.03, subdivision 4, concerning accumulations of snow and ice. That statute provides immunity for "[a]ny claim based on snow or ice conditions on any highway or public sidewalk ... except when the condition is affirmatively caused by the negligent acts of the municipality." Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4(a).

Statutory grants of immunity are narrowly construed. Angell v. Hennepin Cty. Reg'l Rail Auth. , 578 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Minn. 1998). We recently addressed the scope of snow-and-ice immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4, explaining that the statute providing snow-and-ice immunity has consistently involved claims against public entities concerning their duty to maintain public sidewalks or highways. Hoff , 883 N.W.2d at 635. In Hoff , we stated that "[n]o statutory language extends [that] immunity to claims based on negligent driving." Id. In rejecting the municipality's claim of snow-and-ice immunity in that case, we reasoned that "Hoff's claims against appellants are solely based on negligent driving, even though snow and ice conditions were a factor." Id.

Appellants argue that Hoff is distinguishable because the transit organization and bus driver in Hoff had no responsibility to maintain the road and were not maintaining the road at the time of the accident. Although Kalal was driving a snowplow and the city is responsible for maintaining the road, respondent's claim is not based on the city's failure to maintain the roads resulting in snow or ice accumulation (conduct which the statute would protect). Respondent's claim is that Kalal negligently failed to yield the right of way to respondent (conduct to which the statute does not speak).

Appellants' argument that the district court erred by not submitting to the jury factual questions concerning snow and ice conditions fails. When the facts are undisputed, whether a governmental unit is entitled to immunity is a question of law. Johnson , 553 N.W.2d at 45. The relevant statute unambiguously restricts immunity to claims based on snow or ice conditions . Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4(a). Accordingly, and unlike some immunity statutes,⁴ there was no factual question for resolution by the jury in this case because, regardless of whether snow or ice conditions were present on the highway, section 466.03, subdivision 4, does not extend immunity to claims of negligent driving.⁵ Because respondent's claim was not based on snow or ice conditions, the district court properly rejected appellants' claim of snow-and-ice immunity under section 466.03, subdivision 4. There were no special-verdict questions properly to be submitted to the jury concerning that immunity claim.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on damages.

Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it granted respondent's motion for a new trial on damages after the first jury found damages of $ 42,178.07. "We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion." Christie v. Estate of Christie , 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018). Appellate courts will not disturb a district court's decision to grant a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion. Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. , 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1990).

Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 establishes the causes for which a district court may grant a new trial and limits the grounds for a new trial to those enumerated causes. Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc. , 681 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 2004). A new trial may be granted when a verdict is not justified by the evidence or is contrary to law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g). "This cause 'vest[s] the broadest possible discretionary power in the trial court.' " Clifford , 681 N.W.2d at 687 (quoting Ginsberg v. Williams , 270 Minn. 474, 135 N.W.2d 213, 220 (1965) ).

Here, the district court determined that at least three of the first jury's findings were palpably contrary to the evidence produced at the first trial: (1) the finding that respondent is not permanently injured, (2) the award of past medical expenses not having included any of the expenses respondent incurred to diagnose and treat left shoulder and hand injuries, and (3) the award of zero dollars for future pain, suffering, and emotional distress, and future medical care. In the words of the district court, "the evidence on those issues was so clear as to leave no room for differences among reasonable persons."

The Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated the standard for whether a new trial should be granted on the basis that the evidence does not justify the verdict, stating that a new trial should not be granted unless the verdict is so contrary to the preponderance of the evidence as to imply that the jury failed to consider all the evidence or acted under some mistake. Clifford , 681 N.W.2d at 687. A motion for a new trial presents a factual question, and the district court may properly weigh the evidence. Lamb v. Jordan , 333 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Minn. 1983).

Dr. Wengler, the only medical expert to testify in this case, concluded that respondent suffered a permanent injury as a result of the accident. The jury was instructed that a permanent injury is one from which it is reasonably certain that a person will not fully recover. The jury was instructed that a "direct cause" is a cause that had a substantial part in bringing about the accident or injury. The first jury found that respondent did not suffer a permanent injury directly caused by the collision. The district court stated that, "[t]o the extent the jury equated 'direct cause' as something which is a 'sole cause,' that is contrary to established law and the express instructions they were provided prior to deliberating." See George v. Estate of Baker , 724 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006) ("Minnesota applies the substantial factor test for causation. The negligent act is a direct, or proximate, cause of harm if the act was a substantial factor in the harm's occurrence.").

Appellants argue that the district court erred by concluding that the jury was not allowed to disregard Dr. Wengler's testimony. The district court reasoned that a jury cannot disregard the positive testimony of an unimpeached witness unless the testimony has been rendered improbable or inconsistent. See Ruppert v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. , 392 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Oct. 22, 1986); see also Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitzimons , 261 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 1977) (stating that it is well-settled in Minnesota that a "jury cannot disregard the positive testimony of an unimpeached witness without a reasonable ground for doing so").

A defendant in a personal injury action is not required to introduce medical experts to refute the claim of injury if it can be accomplished by cross-examination of the plaintiff's experts and by reference to medical records. Rud v. Flood , 385 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. App. 1986). The opinions of medical experts are not conclusive unless so positive as to exclude all doubt as to the matter on which they are given and based on testimony which is positive, consistent, unimpeached, and uncontradicted. Krueger v. Knutson , 261 Minn. 144, 111 N.W.2d 526, 536 (1961). In other words, "if the opinion leaves other possibilities open, or is not based on consistent and unimpeached testimony, its weight is for the jury." Gale v. Howard , 413 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Minn. App. 1987). It is with these standards in mind that we review the district court's resolution of the two-part question of whether respondent suffered (a) a permanent injury that was (b) directly caused by appellants.

The district court determined that reasonable minds viewing the evidence in this case could reach only one conclusion-that respondent suffered a permanent injury to his shoulder as a result of this collision. Respondent introduced a February 2014 MRI report, where Dr. Baumgarten noted "tendinopathy [and] some tearing of his posterior glenoid as well." Dr. Baumgarten performed surgery on respondent's shoulder in December 2014. In his postoperative report, Dr. Baumgarten identified a posterior labral tear, impingement syndrome, a tear in respondent's rotator cuff, and a tear in respondent's biceps sling tendon.

Concerning whether respondent has suffered a permanent injury, Dr. Wengler testified that he reviewed Dr. Baumgarten's reports, and confirmed that respondent suffered permanent injuries to his shoulder, including impingement syndrome and tears of the glenoid labrum and rotator cuff. Dr. Wengler explained that the tendons in respondent's shoulder will never fully heal and respondent will have a compromised shoulder cuff mechanism. Dr. Wengler also testified that respondent suffered permanent injuries to his hand and biceps tendon as a result of the collision. On cross-examination, appellants did not challenge Dr. Wengler's opinion that respondent has suffered a permanent injury to his shoulder, nor did appellants offer any evidence that would contradict Dr. Wengler's opinion. Accordingly, we see no abuse of the district court's discretion when it determined that the only reasonable conclusion on this record is that respondent suffered a permanent injury.

The closer question is whether respondent's permanent injuries were directly caused by this collision. Appellants assert that substantial evidence demonstrated that Dr. Wengler's opinion regarding the cause of respondent's conditions was improbable and inconsistent with other evidence. They argue that the pain in respondent's left shoulder was more likely the result of a weightlifting incident that predates this collision and that respondent's left-hand symptoms likewise preexisted this collision.

Respondent visited Dr. Jessen in April 2011, three months after the January 11, 2011 collision. The medical record from that visit indicates that respondent reported that he had injured his left shoulder about five years earlier when he was lifting weights. Dr. Jessen opined, "I think it is very likely that he tore some component of the rotator cuff with his weight lifting incident." But Dr. Jessen also wrote, "We will make a referral to Orthopedics for their opinion and let them make the decision of whether or not this young man needs a MRI of his shoulder."

Dr. Wengler was asked on cross-examination about the weightlifting incident, and he excluded the incident as a possible cause of respondent's permanent shoulder injury. Dr. Wengler testified, "[Respondent] may have had a partial tear of the cuff when he lifted-when he did the bench press, or whatever he did; but it's not an issue because he never sought medical attention, never had diagnostics, and no one has ever suggested that he have treatment for it." Further, Dr. Wengler testified that, if the tears in respondent's shoulder that were diagnosed after the 2011 collision had been caused by the weightlifting incident, respondent would not have been able to continue working full time as a flooring installer between the time of that incident and this collision. And the trial record is clear that respondent continued to work before this collision. The district court, which presided at the first trial over the course of six days, concluded that Dr. Wengler's testimony excludes all doubt concerning the collision being a substantial factor in bringing about respondent's shoulder injury.

We also observe that appellants did not argue to the first jury that the 2011 collision aggravated a preexisting injury. When preexisting injuries are aggravated by an injury-causing tort, the tortfeasor is responsible only for the damages he or she caused over and above the consequences that would have occurred from the preexisting injury in any event. Rowe v. Munye , 702 N.W.2d 729, 736 (Minn. 2005). The district court asked appellants' counsel at the first trial if appellants wanted a jury instruction on aggravation of a preexisting medical condition, and appellants' counsel stated, "I don't think we need that one." It is hard to square appellants' arguments on appeal with their trial decision to forgo any argument that this collision aggravated a preexisting condition.

The first jury must nevertheless have concluded that respondent's shoulder injury was the result of this previous weightlifting incident, not the motor-vehicle collision. The district court, however, determined that for the jury to have found that the 2011 collision was not a substantial factor in causing respondent's permanent injury, it would have had to disregard Dr. Wengler's testimony-something it could not do of an unimpeached witness when the testimony has not been rendered improbable or inconsistent.

Several cases have addressed whether and when it is proper for the jury to disregard the testimony of medical experts. In Williamson v. Furch , where medical experts testified and medical records were received in evidence, the supreme court held that, because there was no conflicting medical evidence regarding causation, a jury verdict of no damages could not be sustained. 304 Minn. 558, 229 N.W.2d 39, 40 (1975). The supreme court reasoned that cross-examination of the medical witnesses was not sufficient to cast substantial doubt in the minds of the jurors that the collision caused plaintiff's special damages. Id. Like Williamson , there is no conflicting medical evidence in this case. There is respondent's statement that he hurt his shoulder weightlifting several years before this collision, but the record supports the district court's observation that there is no evidence of earlier tears to respondent's shoulder or biceps that necessitated the 2014 surgery.

Appellants cite Brannan v. Shertzer , 242 Minn. 277, 64 N.W.2d 755 (1954), for the assertion that it was within the province of the first jury to disregard the medical expert's conclusion of a permanent injury when the defense introduces evidence that at least some of the plaintiff's symptoms were preexisting. Brannan is distinguishable in that "subjective symptoms played an important role" and the "medical experts, of necessity, were required to rely, in a substantial measure, upon [the plaintiff's] complaints." Id. at 761. That distinction is important considering the facts of that case. First, the defendants in Brannan were able to impeach plaintiff's credibility concerning the existence of the injury and the extent of it, which was critical to the experts' conclusions. Id. Here, respondent's shoulder injury is objectively verified by MRI results. Second, and critically, the supreme court in Brannan was unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial because the district court was "in a much better position than we are to pass upon the question and its action must stand." Id. Brannan , like the other reported cases, reflects the high degree of deference afforded a district court in ruling on new-trial motions. See, e.g. , Krueger , 111 N.W.2d at 536 ; Brannan , 64 N.W.2d at 761 ; Barrera v. Muir , 553 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996); Rud , 385 N.W.2d at 361.

1 The complaint identified both Justin Ayers and his wife, Jamie Ayers, as plaintiffs. The record does not appear to include any notice of withdrawal as counsel for Jamie Ayers. Damages were awarded to Justin Ayers, although the court administrator identified both Justin and Jamie as judgment creditors, when docketing the judgment. Throughout this opinion, "respondent" refers to Justin Ayers.

2 This action was commenced in 2014. Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4, remains unchanged, so we cite to the current version.

3 Before trial, respondent moved the district court to exclude evidence and argument challenging Dr. Wengler's opinions as to medical causation and reasonableness and necessity of treatment because appellants did not retain an expert or seek an independent medical examination. The district court granted respondent's motion, reasoning that, without an expert to challenge Dr. Wengler's medical opinion, appellants would be limited to challenging Dr. Wengler's credibility.

4 See J.E.B. v. Danks , 785 N.W.2d 741, 751 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment based on statutory immunity because there were genuine issues of material fact as to two prerequisites for immunity under Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subds. 3, 4 (2008) ).

5 The district court had earlier denied appellants' motion for summary judgment based on snow-and-ice immunity, noting that there was a genuine fact dispute as to the conditions of Highway 13 at the time of the accident. Ayers I , 2015 WL 9264116, at *2. We observed on appeal from that denial of summary judgment that the facts concerning the condition of Highway 13 had yet to be developed, and we therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment. Id. Our decision in the earlier appeal was released before Hoff , which addressed the scope of snow-and-ice immunity and held that snow-and-ice immunity does not apply to claims based on negligent driving, even where snow and ice conditions are a factor. 883 N.W.2d at 637. In Ayers I , we also observed that respondent's claim was one for negligent driving, and our decision concluded that appellants were "not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of common-law official immunity and vicarious official immunity." Ayers I , 2015 WL 9264116, at *3.

Here, the district court was in "a much better position than we are to pass upon [this new-trial] question." Brannan , 64 N.W.2d at 761. And we are unable to say on this record that the district court abused its discretion. Dr. Wengler's testimony was not impeached or contradicted, he was fully aware of the previous shoulder complaints, and his unequivocal testimony was that respondent suffered a permanent injury as a result of the collision. Second, this testimony, coupled with an understanding that "direct cause" does not necessarily mean sole cause, supports the conclusion that respondent suffered a permanent injury as a direct result of the accident. Finally, and aside from respondent's shoulder injury, it appears from this record that the district court would be free to conclude that the first jury's verdict could not stand because appellants offered no evidence to render either improbable or inconsistent Dr. Wengler's testimony concerning permanent injuries to respondent's left hand and biceps.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on damages.

III. The district court erroneously interpreted and applied Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, requiring reversal and remand.

Appellants argue that the district court erred when it failed to offset from the verdict $ 23,000 in no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf of respondent. The question on appeal is one of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Ouradnik v. Ouradnik , 912 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. 2018).

In a negligence action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident, the district court is required to deduct basic economic loss benefits from any verdict. "With respect to a cause of action in negligence accruing as a result of injury arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle ... the court shall deduct from any recovery the value of basic or optional economic loss benefits paid or payable ...." Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (emphasis added).

Here, respondent received $ 23,000 in no-fault benefits from Farmers Insurance Group, his no-fault carrier. The district court was required by statute to deduct this amount from respondent's award. The district court declined to do so because it determined that Farmers could assert a subrogation claim to recover this amount. Had Farmers been able to assert a subrogation interest, the district court would not have been required to deduct the benefits from respondent's award, but that is not the case here.⁶

Subrogation for no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf of an injured person is governed exclusively by statute. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Transit Comm'n , 538 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1995) ("[T]he [No-Fault] Act has replaced the no-fault insurer's common law rights to subrogation and indemnity with very limited statutory rights."). Subrogation is only permitted under the no-fault statute if the insured's action is based upon negligence in another state, or arises from claims other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53 (2018).

The district court seems to have reasoned that allowing Farmers to assert a subrogation interest would be good policy because it is consistent with the policy of the no-fault act to allow Farmers to recover directly from its insured and would also avoid the time and expense of a separate arbitration between Farmers and the League of Minnesota Cities, which insured the city. It is not for the courts to apply policy considerations when the law is clear. See Hickok v. Margolis , 221 Minn. 480, 22 N.W.2d 850, 852 (1946) ("Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of statutes. The remedy for unwise or inexpedient legislation is political and not judicial."); see also LaChapelle v. Mitten , 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000) (explaining that when a statute is clear, the court need not, and cannot, look beyond its plain language and rejecting appellant's policy arguments), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).

Respondent's action here is plainly based upon negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle in the state of Minnesota, an action in which a subrogation interest has not been available for over 40 years. See e.g. , Note, Subrogation and Indemnity Rights Under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act , 4 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 119, 134-35 (1978) (explaining that the legislature repealed the right of subrogation upon institution of a civil action in 1976 amendments to the no-fault act, other than for accidents occurring in another state or when an insured's claim is based upon an intentional tort or statutory liability); Paul F. McEllistrem, No-Fault Benefits: An Overview at 23-39, in Minnesota Motor Vehicle Accident Deskbook (5th ed. Minn. CLE 2014 and 2018 update) (explaining that, since 1977, no-fault carriers do not have any right of subrogation except for (1) when the accident occurs out of state, or (2) when the claim is based on intentional tort, strict or statutory liability, or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle); Theodore J. Smetak et al., The Minnesota Motor Vehicle Insurance Manual 183 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that subrogation is only permitted if the insured's action is based upon negligence in another state, or claims other than negligence in the use of a motor vehicle). The district court was required to apply the offset provision in Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, and deduct $ 23,000 from respondent's award. Farmers has no right of subrogation.

Section 65B.53, subdivision 1, of the no-fault act allows a reparation obligor (Farmers, in this case) paying economic loss benefits to seek indemnity from the insurer of a negligently operated commercial vehicle. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1. Respondent argued to the district court that this section allows Farmers the option of either seeking indemnity from appellants' insurer or asserting a subrogation interest in respondent's award. Appellants are correct that indemnity is Farmers' exclusive means to recover what it paid.

The district court rejected appellants' argument based on Langenberger v. Dahl , and quoted the following portion: "The trial court's determination, that subrogation is only available to a reparation obligor where indemnification is not, is incorrect." 329 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. 1983). The district court reasoned that Langenberger rejected appellants' argument that the right of indemnity set forth in Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1, precludes an insurer from asserting a subrogation interest in an insured's recovery. Noting that Langenberger has not been overruled, the district court followed it and concluded that Farmers is entitled to a subrogation interest.

Although it is true that Langenberger has not been expressly overruled, the supreme court in that case was interpreting the no-fault act as it was originally enacted in 1974. See 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 408, § 13, at 776. In Langenberger , the subject automobile accident occurred in 1976, before the no-fault act was amended and while the act still provided a right of subrogation for accidents involving commercial vehicles. 329 N.W.2d at 69, 70 n.1. As the Langenberger court recognized, "[t]he legislature apparently decided that the offset provision was sufficient to accomplish the readjustment of losses among reparation obligors responsible for the payment of basic economic loss benefits when it repealed the right of subrogation in cases covered by § 65B.51, subd. 1, in 1977 ." Id. at 72 (emphasis added) (citing 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 266, § 4, at 438-39). The supreme court continued, "The original act which controls the disposition of this case, however, stated in the last sentence of § 65B.51, subd. 1, that '[t]his subdivision shall not bar subrogation and indemnity recoveries under section 65B.53, subdivisions 1 and 2.' " Id. at 72-73 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (1974) ). Langenberger is still good law for pre-1977 motor-vehicle accidents. It has no application in a case such as this, as the supreme court expressly recognized.

The district court erroneously concluded that Farmers could assert a subrogation interest here. The right to subrogation in motor-vehicle litigation concerning personal-injury claims exists only where provided by statute, and it matters not whether allowing Farmers to assert a subrogation interest would be good policy. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 538 N.W.2d at 695. It is also irrelevant whether the time and expense of arbitration would be avoided by allowing Farmers to subrogate. "The right of indemnity provided in subdivision 1 shall be enforceable only through mandatory good faith and binding arbitration procedures established by the rule of the commissioner of commerce." Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 4 (emphasis added). The right of indemnity is owned by the no-fault insurer and must be asserted against the defendant's insurer.⁷ The fact that respondent's insurer may seek indemnity does not create a right to subrogation that has been modified by the no-fault statute.

The district court erred by declining to offset respondent's award in the second jury trial by the $ 23,000 respondent received in no-fault benefits from Farmers. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to apply that statutory offset.

IV. We remand to the district court to redetermine the award of costs, disbursements, and interest.

Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded respondent $ 2,500 for a medical evaluation and erred in determining that prejudgment interest runs from when the action was commenced and not from when respondent's counsel gave written notice of the claim. Respondent agrees on appeal that the $ 2,500 cost for the medical evaluation was not properly taxable, and also agrees that prejudgment interest should have accrued from the date that appellants suggest, May 29, 2014.

On remand, the district court is instructed to recompute the award after properly deducting the no-fault benefits paid by Farmers to or on behalf of respondent, deducting the $ 2,500 medical evaluation from the taxable costs and disbursements, and computing interest from May 29, 2014.

DECISION

The district court properly determined that appellants were not entitled to immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4(a), and acted within its discretion when it granted respondent's motion for a new trial on damages. But the district court erred by failing to deduct from the verdict the amount of no-fault benefits paid by respondent's no-fault insurer to or on behalf of respondent. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand to the district court to properly apply the no-fault offset, to effectuate the parties' agreement concerning costs and disbursements properly taxable, and to recompute the total award with interest from May 29, 2014.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

6 The more general collateral-source statute, Minn. Stat. § 548.251 (2018), establishes procedures for a defendant to request offsets from a jury verdict when certain damages have been paid to or for a plaintiff, in order to prevent a double recovery. The statute provides that, when such otherwise-recoverable damages have been paid by a collateral source, those amounts should be offset except those for which a subrogation right has been asserted . Minn. Stat. § 548.251, subd. 2. We have explained that the two statutes-Minn. Stat. § 548.251 and Minn. Stat. § 65B.51 (2018)-can and should be reconciled, with the collateral-source statute providing procedures for implementing the offsets mandated by Minn. Stat. § 65B.51. Lee v. Hunt , 642 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn. App. 2002).

7 If it were not for the indemnity right against the insurer of a heavy commercial vehicle, the cost associated with operating heavy over-the-road trucks would be shifted to the consuming public which purchases private passenger automobile insurance. Smetak et al., supra , at ----. The indemnity right involves only the shifting of expense from one insurer to another, leaving any claim of the insured intact and unaffected by the indemnity right. Id. In furtherance of that goal, the indemnity claim may not be consolidated with the insured's claim for tort relief. Id.