This products-liability action presents a question of first impression in regard to the proper interpretation of MCL 600.2947(2).1 That provision provides that a manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the misuse of a product unless that misuse was reasonably foreseeable.
In this case, plaintiff Steven Iliades sustained serious injuries after he reached inside a 500-ton press machine to retrieve molded rubber parts from the floor and *340became trapped when the press started its automatic cycle.2 Iliades places fault with defendant Dieffenbacher North America Inc., the manufacturer of the press. If Iliades's conduct constituted misuse of the press, however, Dieffenbacher would only be liable if that particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by Dieffenbacher.
In an unpublished, split decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that, regardless of whether Iliades misused the press, Dieffenbacher can be held liable for the harm sustained by Iliades because his conduct was reasonably foreseeable under a criminal gross-negligence standard. The Court of Appeals erred by applying that standard in this context.
The Legislature set forth a clear two-part test in MCL 600.2947(2) for manufacturer liability arising from product misuse. First, a court must decide whether there was misuse of the product. Second, if there was misuse, a court must decide whether that particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Although the Legislature defined "misuse" in MCL 600.2945(e), it did not provide a definition for "reasonably foreseeable." Nevertheless, under longstanding principles of statutory construction, the phrase "reasonably foreseeable" must be construed in accordance with its common-law meaning. And under Michigan common law, foreseeability depends on whether a reasonable person could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions. When dealing with the foreseeability of a product's misuse in particular, the crucial inquiry is whether, at the time the product was manufactured, the manufacturer was aware, or should have been aware, of that misuse.
Because the majority of the Court of Appeals did not decide whether and how Iliades misused the press, and because it improperly used a criminal gross-negligence standard to determine whether Iliades's misuse was reasonably foreseeable instead of the common-law meaning of that phrase, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court to reconsider whether the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of Dieffenbacher was proper under the standards articulated in this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Flexible Products Company supplies molded rubber parts for the automotive industry. As of June 10, 2011, Iliades had more than a year of experience working on presses at Flexible Products. Although he usually worked on Press Number 1, that press was temporarily inoperable that day, so Iliades was operating Press Number 25, a 500-ton vertical rubber molding press machine manufactured by Dieffenbacher. The press creates injection-molded rubber parts by pressing together two large plates called "platens," which hold interchangeable molds, and then injecting rubber into the molds. Each cycle of the press takes less than 10 minutes to complete. Upon completion, the press stops and the finished product is manually removed by the operator.
Press Number 25 is also equipped with a presence-sensing device, often referred to as a "light curtain," whereby beams of light pass in front of the opening to the press. When this light curtain is interrupted by, for example, a hand or arm crossing the light beams, the press stops its cycle. While some of the presses would have to be manually reset once the light curtain *341was intact and no longer interrupted, other presses, like Press Number 25, would resume their cycle automatically.
Although the presses were generally set to cycle automatically, they could also operate in manual mode. Because the presses do not always eject the rubber parts properly, causing some parts to fall to the floor of a press, operators were instructed to place a press in manual mode before reaching into the press to remove any wayward part. Operators were also instructed to use a "parts grabber" to reach into the press to remove these parts.
After returning from a break on this particular day, Iliades sought to retrieve parts that had fallen to the floor inside Press Number 25 by using his parts grabber. Iliades, however, did not place the press into manual mode before doing so. In reaching into the press, Iliades's torso and back were completely inside the press, while his right knee rested on top of the guard or metal skirting on the front of the press. Despite having his left foot still touching the floor, Iliades's body was positioned in such a way that he was behind the light curtain.
With the light curtain no longer interrupted, the press resumed its automatic operation and trapped Iliades between the two plates of the press. Iliades was able to bang a tool against the side of the press and attract the attention of the foreman. After approximately 15 minutes, the press was partially disassembled, freeing Iliades. Iliades sustained serious fractures in his back and severe burns, and he continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic pain, and major depression.
In 2012, Iliades filed this products-liability action against Dieffenbacher, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty. Following discovery, Dieffenbacher moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that, pursuant to MCL 600.2945(e) and MCL 600.2947(2), Iliades's actions in climbing partway into the press constituted misuse that was not reasonably foreseeable. In response, Iliades argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he engaged in unforeseeable misuse of the press.
At the conclusion of the motion hearing on September 17, 2014, the trial court agreed with Dieffenbacher and granted the motion. The trial court found that Iliades misused the press, as the record evidence demonstrated that he was trained not to reach into the press while it was in automatic mode. He also knew how to place the press into manual mode, that the light curtain was not meant to be used as an emergency stop switch, and that the press would automatically begin its cycle if the light curtain was no longer interrupted. The trial court then concluded that Iliades's misuse was not reasonably foreseeable because Iliades did not present any evidence that Dieffenbacher could have foreseen that a trained press operator would crawl beyond a light curtain and partially inside a press to retrieve a part without first disengaging the press.3
On July 19, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished, split decision reversing the trial court.4 The majority chose not to expressly decide whether Iliades's conduct constituted misuse, claiming instead that "the dispositive issue is whether *342[Iliades's] conduct was foreseeable ."5 Employing the criminal-law standard for distinguishing ordinary negligence from gross negligence to define foreseeability, the majority focused on whether Dieffenbacher should have reasonably expected that press operators, like Iliades, would rely on light curtains as exclusive safety devices. The majority concluded that it was common practice for operators to routinely disregard their training and rely on light curtains as the sole safety device when removing finished parts. The majority also concluded that Iliades had no reason to know that the light curtain on Press Number 25 "would be cleared if one got between the light curtain and the press ...."6 Therefore, the majority concluded that the evidence did not show that Iliades "obviously committed gross negligence" and that it was reasonably foreseeable to Dieffenbacher that press operators would rely entirely on light curtains for safety.
In her dissent, Judge JANSEN would have affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition. According to Judge JANSEN , the evidence showed that Iliades misused the press by acting contrary to instructions provided by Joe Whiteside, who was an employee at Flexible Products with knowledge and training regarding the use of the press. Specifically, Whiteside instructed Iliades to never reach inside the press when it was in automatic mode. Whiteside also trained Iliades to never transgress the light curtain. Nevertheless, that is precisely what Iliades did here. Judge JANSEN also concluded that Dieffenbacher could not have reasonably foreseen Iliades's particular misuse because there was no evidence that anyone had ever suffered the type of injury that Iliades sustained as a result of partially climbing into a press and because there was no evidence that partially climbing into a press while it was in automatic mode was common practice among press operators.
Dieffenbacher applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We directed the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.7
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.8 When interpreting a statute, this Court's primary goal is to " 'ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in [the] statute.' "9 If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, then the statute must be enforced as written.10 A necessary corollary of this principle is that a " 'court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived *343from the words of the statute itself.' "11
This Court must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and, in particular, consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme, to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory or surplusage.12 If a statutory word or phrase is undefined, it must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.13 A legal term of art, on the other hand, must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning.14 Consequently, when the Legislature uses an undefined term with a " 'settled, definite, and well known meaning at common law,' " that settled meaning applies " 'unless a contrary intent is plainly shown.' "15
III. ANALYSIS
As part of major tort reform efforts in 1995,16 the Legislature amended the Revised Judicature Act17 to provide that a "manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action for harm caused by misuse of a product unless the misuse was reasonably foreseeable."18 The statute further provides that whether there was misuse, and whether that misuse was reasonably foreseeable, are both "legal issues to be resolved by the court."19 Thus, the plain language of MCL 600.2947(2) clearly sets forth a two-part test for manufacturer liability pertaining to reasonably foreseeable product misuse: in order for a manufacturer to be liable for the misuse of its product, a court must first decide whether there was misuse of the product, and, if so, the court must then decide whether the particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
Turning to the first part of the test, MCL 600.2945(e) defines "misuse" as "use of a product in a materially different manner than the product's intended use."20 This provision defines "misuse" to include the following: (1) "uses inconsistent with the specifications and standards applicable to the product," (2) "uses contrary to a warning or instruction provided by the manufacturer, seller, or another person possessing knowledge or training regarding the use or maintenance of the product," and (3) "uses other than those for *344which the product would be considered suitable by a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances."21
The second part of the test requires a court to decide whether the particular misuse of the product was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Unlike "misuse," "reasonably foreseeable" is not defined under the statute. As a matter of statutory construction, however, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the common-law definition of "reasonably foreseeable" when it enacted MCL 600.2947(2).22
Under Michigan common law, foreseeability depends on whether a reasonable person "could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions."23 When dealing with the foreseeability of a product's misuse in particular, the crucial inquiry is whether, at the time the product was manufactured, the manufacturer was aware, or should have been aware, of that misuse.24 Whether a manufacturer should have known of a particular misuse may depend on whether that misuse was a common practice,25 or if foreseeability was inherent in the product.26
*345Accordingly, under MCL 600.2947(2), Dieffenbacher would not be liable for Iliades's injuries caused by the misuse of the press unless that misuse was reasonably foreseeable at the time the press was manufactured. This necessarily requires a court to first decide whether Iliades's conduct constituted misuse of the press under MCL 600.2945(e). Next, under the established common-law meaning of the phrase, Iliades's alleged misuse of the press would only be "reasonably foreseeable" if Dieffenbacher could have anticipated that the "given event"-here, Iliades reaching inside the press to remove rubber parts and transgressing the light curtain while the press was in automatic mode-might occur under certain conditions. To answer this question, a court would look to the record evidence to decide whether Dieffenbacher knew or should have known of Iliades's conduct.
Although it recognized that Iliades likely misused the press under MCL 600.2945(e), the Court of Appeals majority failed to squarely address the first prong of the test. This apparently deliberate decision was problematic for several reasons. Not only did the majority disregard the Legislature's clear directive that a court must decide whether a person misused the product, it also failed to focus specifically on Iliades's conduct, which affected its reasonable-foreseeability analysis. For instance, the majority improperly framed the issue as whether it was reasonably foreseeable that press operators at Flexible Products would rely on the light curtains as exclusive safety devices. This overly broad account of misuse in this case is inconsistent with the wording of MCL 600.2947(2), which specifically asks whether "the misuse" of the product was reasonably foreseeable.27 In other words, the question for purposes of foreseeability is whether Dieffenbacher knew or should have known of Iliades's particular misuse. Without deciding whether and how Iliades misused the press, the majority could not properly assess whether that misuse was reasonably foreseeable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals majority does not explain why it opted to disregard the wealth of reasonable-foreseeability jurisprudence when it imported the standard applicable to criminal gross negligence into its interpretation of MCL 600.2947(2). Had the Legislature intended to use this criminal standard for reasonable foreseeability in civil products-liability cases, as opposed to the common-law definition, the Legislature would have done so. Because the Legislature has not plainly shown a contrary intent, the common-law meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" must apply for purposes of MCL 600.2947(2).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court concludes that Dieffenbacher would be liable under MCL 600.2947(2) for injuries sustained by Iliades if Iliades's conduct constituted misuse of the press under MCL 600.2945(e) and that misuse was reasonably foreseeable. Whether the misuse was reasonably foreseeable depends on whether Dieffenbacher knew or should have known of the misuse, not whether Iliades was grossly negligent in operating the press. Because the majority of the Court of Appeals did not decide whether and how Iliades misused the press, and because it did not apply the common-law meaning of reasonable foreseeability, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court to reconsider the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of Dieffenbacher under the standards *346articulated in this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Stephen J. Markman, C.J., Bridget M. McCormack, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Kurtis T. Wilder, JJ., concur.
Clement, J., took no part in the decision of this case.