OPINION
Plaintiff recovered judgment in a wrongful death action involving her son who committed suicide while in police custody. Defendants appeal asserting several grounds for reversal: (1) refusal to give certain instructions; (2) the giving of certain instructions; (3) admitting certain items in *614evidence; and (4) permitting an expert to express an opinion. We affirm.
Facts
Plaintiff’s deceased son, Paul, was apprehended by the Belen police for armed robbery and taken to jail. Paul was seventeen years old. Plaintiff was notified of her son’s arrest, and shortly thereafter, arrived at the jail. She was taken to an office where Paul was present with Officer Gabaldon. She was given permission to speak privately with him in a glass enclosed room.
Plaintiff testified that Paul said that “he wasn’t going to the penitentiary, that they wouldn’t take him there alive . . . .” She informed Assistant Chief Montano of Paul’s statement “. . that he’d die before he would go [to the penitentiary], he would kill himself . . . .” As plaintiff was leaving the area she saw Paul attempting to slash his wrist with a flip top (as is found on cans of cola). She told Montano of this and both returned to the restraining area where plaintiff took “the flip top and gave it to Montano and I [plaintiff] got Paul’s wrist and turned it and Montano walked out.”
As a result of this incident, Officer Ortega came in to sit with plaintiff and Paul. He claimed he was there to “baby-sit.” Later, as plaintiff was leaving, she told Paul she would be back in the morning. He answered, “don’t come back because you won’t see me alive anyway.” Plaintiff then told Montano, “you take care of him, he’s going to try to kill himself.”
Plaintiff testified that Montano assured her of Paul’s safety stating that “we’ll take good care of him” and “there’s nothing there for him to hurt himself.” Based upon the policeman’s assurances and the belief that there was nothing else for her to do, plaintiff went home.
After plaintiff left, Montano gave instructions to Lovato, the dispatcher, to watch and check Paul every few minutes. The juvenile cell was located near the dispatcher’s desk and had a window from which the cell could be observed. Lovato testified that he turned off the lights in the cell and checked on Paul every 10 to 15 minutes.
When Paul was first booked he was stripped of all clothes except his undershorts and placed in the juvenile cell. When his mother arrived, he was given his shirt and pants and removed to the glassed in area where they spoke. When his mother left, -he was placed in the juvenile cell but was not again stripped.
Approximately three hours after his apprehension by the police, Paul was found dead hanging from a vent in the cell by his long-sleeved shirt.
Refusal to Instruct
Defendants claim that the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury whether Paul’s suicide was an independent intervening cause and whether Paul’s action in killing himself and plaintiff’s action in not remaining with her son after he had been incarcerated amounted to contributory negligence. Both of these contentions are unfounded.
A party is entitled to a jury instruction upon his theory of the case if it is supported by substantial evidence. Martinez v. Schmick, 90 N.M. 529, 565 P.2d 1046 (Ct.App.1977); Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct.App.1972). The allegation that Paul’s act of suicide was an independent intervening cause cutting off defendants’ liability is simply an incorrect statement of the law.
When one party is in the custodial care of another, as in the case of a jailed prisoner, the custodian has the duty to exer-. cise reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances for the life and health of the charge. Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga.App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962); see Porter v. County of Cook, 42 Ill.App.3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 561 (1976); compare Warner v. Kiowa County Hospital Authority, 551 P.2d 1179 (Okl.App.1976). Knowledge on the part of the custodian that the charge may injure himself unless precautionary measures are taken is an important factor in determining whether the custodian exer*615cised reasonable care. Thomas, supra, and Porter, supra.
The Belen police, then, had the duty to exercise reasonable care for the life and health of Paul, as they were the persons responsible for placing him in the custodial setting. Their duty was heightened by their knowledge that Paul had made repeated threats of and had once even attempted to commit suicide.
This duty, moreover, contemplates the reasonably foreseeable occurrence of a self-inflicted injury regardless of whether it is the product of the charge’s volitional or negligent act. Hunt v. King County, 4 Wash.App. 14, 481 P.2d 593 (Ct.App.1971). It is public policy which necessitates the negation of the charge’s duty for self-care for:
[a]ny other rule would render the actor’s duty meaningless. The rule would in the same breath both affirm and negate the duty undertaken or imposed by law. The wrongdoer could become indifferent to the performance of his duty knowing that the very eventuality that he was under a duty to prevent would, upon its occurrence, relieve him from responsibility. 481 P.2d at 598.
Since Paul committed the very act that defendants were under a duty to prevent, Paul’s conduct, although reasonably foreseeable, is irrelevant on the issue of proximate cause. Hunt, supra. Since public policy absolves Paul from any duty of due care under these circumstances, he could not by definition be contributorially negligent. Hunt, supra. The trial court, then, did not err in refusing to submit whether Paul’s suicide was an independent intervening force and whether his act of killing himself was contributorially negligent.
The foregoing, however, does not answer the issue, of whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on the contributory negligence of plaintiff. See Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M. 468, 379 P.2d 765 (1963). That answer is factual. There is simply no evidence of her contributory negligence. She repeatedly told the authorities of Paul’s suicide threats and attempted suicide, and was assured that defendants would watch out for him. She had no duty to stay with Paul in jail and, in fact, did everything that she could reasonably be expected to do to protect her jailed son. Under the facts of this case, to impose a further duty on plaintiff would have the effect of lessening the duty of the defendants. This we will not do. The trial court properly refused the requested instruction on plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
The foregoing discussion answers defendants’ point regarding refusal to instruct on duty to exercise ordinary care since there is no issue of contributory negligence.
Instruction Nos. 11, 12 and 13
Defendants objected to instruction nos. 11,12 and 13 on grounds different than those briefed on appeal. To preserve an objection for appeal, the objection must point out the specific defect. Morris v. Dodge Country, Inc., 85 N.M. 491, 513 P.2d 1273 (Ct.App.1973). Since defendants failed to allege the specific defect at trial, they lost their right to do so on appeal. Objections to instruction nos. 11, 12 and 13 were not preserved for appeal.
Juvenile Standards
Defendants objected to the admission of the “Minimum Standards” for juvenile detention on the grounds that “the so-called ‘standards’ had no place in this lawsuit whatsoever” since, they relate to “detention facilities of a permanent nature” rather than to “temporary police custody of a juvenile.” This allegation is without merit.
Section 2.01 of the standards defines a detention facility as “a place where a child may be detained pending court hearing and does not include facilities for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children.” A general reading of the standards indicates that they set a minimum standard *616for juvenile detention which “assures more uniform and sound practices for the detention of the delinquent child.” The Belen jail, then, was a detention facility as contemplated by the standards. As such, the standards were relevant and admissible on the issue of the minimum level of detention to which the City of Belen had to comply.
Photograph
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8 is a color photograph of Paul’s torso taken shortly after death. Defendants objected to its admission on grounds of irrelevancy.
Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevancy as that evidence which has the “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The photograph here depicted the scene of the incident, and was taken as part of the official investigation. It shows the cut marks on Paul’s wrist and the bruises on his neck from the hanging. The fact that a photograph may be cumulative of other evidence does not necessarily render it inadmissible so long as it serves to corroborate other evidence. State v. Sedillo, 76 N.M. 273, 414 P.2d 500 (1966). The photograph here tended to corroborate other evidence and was, therefore, admissible as relevant evidence.
Expert Witness
Plaintiff’s expert, a clinical psychologist with an expertise in suicide, was asked a hypothetical question regarding what would have been reasonable action for the police to have taken in order to prevent Paul’s suicide. Defendants contend this question invaded the province of the jury to decide what is “reasonable.” We disagree.
The Court gave N.M.U.J.I.Civ. 15.1, N.M. S.A.1978, which states that the jury is free either to give an expert opinion whatever weight they think it deserves or to reject it entirely. As such, the opinion of the expert does not “preclude the jury on the ultimate question for their deliberation.” N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 15.1, “Directions for Use.”
Defendants also contend on appeal that the use of depositions of the police officers, as required by Rule of Evidence 703, were not of the kind reasonably relied upon by psychologists in the field. However, defendants did not make this specific objection at trial as required by Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227 (Ct.App.1976). Since defendants failed to properly object at trial, they lost their Rule 703 objection on appeal.
Affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
WOOD, C. J., concurs.
SUTIN, J., dissenting.