OPINION
Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking damages for trespass and for cutting and removing timber from their real estate. Alternatively, plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract for failing to observe good timbering practices. The trial court sitting without a jury decided in favor of defendants; plaintiffs appeal, alleging seven points of error.
Because of our decision as to plaintiffs’ points I, III and IV and because of the disposition being made of the appeal, a rather limited statement of the facts will suffice to illustrate the basis of our opinion. Prior to September 1, 1970 the parties had entered into an oral agreement for the purchase and sale of timber located upon real property of plaintiffs near Twining, New Mexico. Shortly before that date the parties decided to put their agreement into writing. Plaintiff O. E. Pattison asked defendant George Bostian to prepare the document, which he did. The agreement was signed for the vendors by Buell Pattison, a trustee of the Pattison trust. There was no signature by O. E. Pattison or Luciester Pattison, who owned a fractional undivided interest in the subject property. The written agreement was to run from September 1, 1970, through September 1, 1973. Pursuant to this agreement defendants cut timber (weather permitting) from September 1, 1970 on. On or about June 12, 1972, plaintiffs’ attorney wrote to defendants ordering them to stop cutting timber and stating that the agreement between them was null and void.
Plaintiffs’ points I, III and IV will be considered together:
“POINT I: The purported timber sale contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants involved matters within the provisions of the statute of frauds and was invalid and unenforceable.
“POINT III: Because of the invalidity of the purported timber sale contract, the defendants committed a trespass upon the real estate of the plaintiffs.
“POINT IV: Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, were not estopped by their conduct.”
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, plaintiffs cashed several checks which defendants had tendered in full payment for timber they had cut from plaintiffs’ land. The first of these checks was dated July 20, 1973, and the last September 7, 1973. Our review of the record indicates *56that this was the last act in the consummation of the agreement. Consequently, the consummation of the agreement renders plaintiffs’ points I, III and IV moot. As our Supreme Court pointed out in Mapel v. Starriett et ux., 28 N.M. 1, 205 P. 726 (1922): “The statute of frauds applies only to executory, as distinguished from executed, contracts, and if a contract otherwise within the statute is completely performed, it is thereby taken out of its operation.” To like effect see Prude v. Lewis, 78 N.M. 256, 430 P.2d 753 (1967). We would also point that “[t]he statute of fraud is intended to protect against fraud; it is not intended as an escape route for persons seeking to avoid obligations undertaken by or imposed upon them.” Keirsey v. Hirsch, 58 N.M. 18, 265 P.2d 346 (1953).
Plaintiffs’ second point of error is that the trial court failed to make findings of fact upon certain material issues. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by not making findings as to the ownership of the land upon which the timber was located and upon the question of consent to cut timber during 1972 and 1973. The plaintiffs submitted several findings on these matters. In our opinion the trial court rejected such findings when it made the following findings: at no time did Mr. O. E. Pattison or any of the other members of the trust tell the defendants that any of the subject property was owned by O. E. Patti-son and Luciester Pattison. That prior to signing the agreement, Mr. O. E. Pattison and representatives of the trust had gone over the property and pointed out the specific areas to be cut. That defendants, with the knowledge of Mr. O. E. Pattison, paid the trust in excess of $10,368.00 for timber cut from the subject property. That at all times defendants were acting in reliance upon the representations of Buell Pattison and O. E. Pattison that they had the authority to sell the timber which was being cut. A review of the record indicates substantial evidence to support these findings; that being so, plaintiffs’ second point is without merit.
Plaintiffs’ fifth point is that an act of God is an affirmative defense, and that defendants having failed to plead it specifically could not rely upon it. The answer to this point is factual: the defendants did not assert or rely upon an act of God as a defense.
Plaintiffs’ sixth point is that the trial court failed to exercise its independent judgment and prepare its own decision. Plaintiffs in their argument refer to a letter from the trial court to the attorneys of the respective parties wherein the court stated that it found all issues in favor of the defendants and requested defendants’ attorney to prepare the necessary findings and to prepare a final judgment based upon the decision of the court. Plaintiffs cite to § 21-1-1(52)(B)(a)(1), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4, 1970) which provides in part: “In such decision the court shall find the facts and give its conclusions of law pertinent to the case . . . Plaintiffs’ point is well taken. Our Supreme Court in Mora v. Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 451 P.2d 992 (1969) had this to say:
“[W]e take note of the fact that, although our Rule 52 differs from the federal rule, nevertheless the reasons for both rules are the same, i.e., as an aid to the appellate court by placing before it the basis of the decision of the trial court; to require care on the part of the trial judge in his consideration and adjudication of the facts; and for the purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. [Citations omitted.] We agree with the federal eases which, without exception, require adequate findings and insist on the exercise of an independent judgment on the part of the trial judge in making his own findings of fact rather than adopting those of one of the parties.”
Having decided points I through V adversely to the contentions of the plaintiffs, we need not consider point VII, which alleges that there were manifest errors of law which were brought to the attention of the trial court and for which their motion for a new trial should have been granted.
*57This cause will be remanded to the trial court with instructions that proper findings of fact and conclusions of law be prepared and entered and that a judgment based thereon and consistent with this opinion be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LOPEZ, J., concurs.
SUTIN, J., dissented.