PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of Motion for Rehearing, the original opinion heretofore filed is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.
Plaintiffs, appellants, filed suit to recover on four contracts of hail insurance. From a judgment dismissing appellants’ complaint and judgment for appellee, this appeal follows.
Appellants’ complaint alleged that at the time the applications for insurance were signed in blank there was no specific expiration date in the insurance contract, and that appellants did not know the insurance policies expired on October 1, 1957. Appellants further alleged that at the time the applications were signed, they contained a provision that the crops therein named were to be insured against loss and damage by hail for the crop year 1957, and that the expiration date of October 1, 1957, was inserted after receipt of the policies by appellee in Las Cruces, New Mexico; and that this did not express the true agreement of the parties.
Appellants’ second cause of action alleged that appellee, by inserting October 1, 1957, and stating that it covered loss or damage *177by reason of hail for the crop season of 1957 was ambiguous, and that the crop season does not expire on October 1, 1957, but at a much later date. Appellants further allege that the two provisions made it ambiguous as to the1 true expiration date and prayed that the ambiguity be resolved for1 appellants. Appellants further prayed that the trial court determine that the crop season for cotton did not expire on October 1, 1957, but at a much later date.
Appellee denied all of the allegations of appellants’ complaint, except the agency of Clyde Jones, the soliciting agent, and denied there was any ambiguity in the contract. Appellee affirmatively alleged that the applications were received and upon acceptance by appellee and before delivery to appellants, the date of October 1, 1957, was inserted in the policies as the expiration date; that the policies issued were delivered to appellants and were held in their possession for over five months without protest as to the terms and conditions of said policy.
The trial court in substance made the following findings of fact: That the applications signed by each appellant were in blank, and that they contained no date of commencement or expiration; that the applications were received and accepted by appellee and policies of insurance issued, each containing on the face thereof 'in bold capitalized type, that the policies expired October 1, 1957; that the policies were received by each appellant within one or two weeks from the date of issuance and retained by them for approximately five months without appellants having looked at or read said policies, and that appellants, made no objection or protest thereto; that each of said policies expired October lr 1957, and that the loss sustained by appellants on October 9, 1957, was after the date of expiration of each policy.
The trial court further found that appellants Porter, Hackey and Ketchem, did not discuss with the soliciting agent when the-policies would expire and that there was no. understanding, agreement or representation by the agent and appellants as to the date of expiration; that appellant, Snowder, ' knew at the time of his application that said policy expired on October 1, 1957, and that no representation was made by the agent that said policies would actually expire at any given date.
The trial court also found that appellee’ssoliciting agent made no false representation to appellants as to the date of the expiration of said policies, and made no statement of any kind to appellants, or either of them, that would lull them into a sense of security; that there were no fraudulent acts on the part of appellee, or its agent, in the soliciting or execution of said policies, and no overreaching by appellee, or its agent, of any of appellants in obtaining said insurance policies; that there was no ambiguity in the policies, and that the expiration date was typed in bold capitalized type *178so that when said policies were received, the expiration date could be readily seen.
The trial court further found that notwithstanding appellants’ allegations that the applications were for the crop year 1957, that each of said appellants admitted in open court that said policies did not contain the words “Crop Season 1957” but merely contained the language “Crop Season 19— that notwithstanding appellants’ allegations that the crop year 1957 extended beyond October 1, 1957, appellants had each wholly failed to produce any evidence showing that the crop year extended to any specific date in 1957; that each appellant accepted the contract of insurance as written by appellee, expiring October 1, 1957, and by having the same in their possession for a reasonable length of time and not having made any objections to the terms of said policies, or advising appellee that they had not accepted the same as written, that each appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to read the policies before the loss occurred; and that appellants were barred from claiming that there was any other policy containing a date of expiration different to October 1, 1957.
The trial court also found that appellants did not rely upon mutual mistake but rested their cause of action on the ground of fraud, and that no evidence was produced by appellants to show that appellee, or its agent, was guilty of fraud, constructive or actual, in accepting the applications for insurance and the subsequent issuance of the policies. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that neither appellee nor its soliciting agent was guilty of fraud, actual or constructive, in dealing with appellants and accepting their applications for insurance and the subsequent issuance of the insurance policies; that the appellants accepted the policies of insurance as written by appellee expiring October 1, 1957; and that the policies of insurance were not ambiguous and the same expired October 1, 1957.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in overruling appellants’ motion for summary judgment, which was based on the representation contained in the “work sheet” that the policies would be effective twenty-four hours after signing, and that the only matter relating to the expiration date was the statement that the policies would afford coverage for the year 19- — . Appellants argue that upon appellee’s receipt of the applications and by inserting in each policy that “This Policy Expires October 1, 1957,” that appellee committed fraud as a matter of law. Appellants’ second theory on this point is that the contracts were ambiguous as to the period of coverage.
There is no merit in appellants’ contentions. The applications and policies, signed by each appellant, show on their face that each policy would not be effective until accepted by appellee. Also, the application for insurance and policy insurance issued to each appellant contained the following:
*179“It is agreed that the by-laws of. the association and any amendments thereto, together with this application and the associations’ acceptance thereof endorsed hereon, shall constitute the entire contract between the applicant and the association; and such by-laws and amendments thereto are hereby specifically made a part of this contract.”
Art. Ill, § 1 of the by-laws provides that:'
“The association shall issue policies of insurance only on * * * hail, * * * for any length of time not to exceed five years, * *
It is well established that the applir cation by the person seeking insurance is not the contract, but is a mere offer or proposal for a contract of insurance, and that before the contract of insurance is effected and any contractual relationship exists between the parties, it is necessary that the application be accepted by the insurer, since insurance companies are not compelled to accept every application presented and may stipulate upon what terms and for what period of time the risk may be accepted. 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, § 197, p. 587. See also 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 329, p. 1261.
As to appellants’ theory that the contracts were ambiguous, we say that even if we construe the policies strictly against the insurer, as required by the rule, it cannot be said that the language as to the expiration date contained in the policies is doubtful or ambiguous. This court has held that where the insured had an opportunity of seeing and examining the policy, he was bound by the statements therein contained in the absence of a showing of fraud sufficient to avoid the general rule. Gendron v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 47 N.M. 348, 143 P.2d 462, 149 A.L.R. 1310.
It has also been held that an applicant for insurance who receives a policy • which does not conform to the agent’s representations, must notify the insurer . within a reasonable time of refusal to accept the policy, and retention of the policy without objection is regarded as an acceptance thereof. State Distributing Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 224 N.C. 370, 30 S.E.2d 377.
In a case frequently quoted, it was held that an applicant for insurance who accepts a policy, the provisions of which are plain, clear and free from all ambiguity, is chargeable with knowledge of its terms and legal effect. It is the duty of the assured to read and know the contents of the policy before he accepts it, and where he fails or neglects to do so, he is estopped from denying knowledge of its terms and conditions, unless he alleges and proves that he was induced not to read the same by some trick or fraud of the other party. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. McCoy, 205 Okl. 511, 239 P.2d 428. See also Del Monte v. Travelers Ins. Co., Sup., 17 N.Y.S.2d 555.
*180With respect to appellant’s contentions as to fraud, together with the assignments of error regarding the refusal to grant certain requested findings and the granting of some of those requested by appellee, we are faced with a consideration of two rules: (1) The rule of trial procedure that upon a motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff’s case, all of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, together with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom; and (2) the rule of appellate procedure that the evidence must be considered in the aspect most favorable to the appellee, and that the facts found by the trial court are the facts to be reviewed, if supported by substantial evidence.
Any seeming inconsistency between these two rules is fully resolved in Sandoval County Board of Education v. Young, 43 N.M. 397, 94 P.2d 508, and Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 46 N.M. 10, 119 P.2d 636, with the following result :
“It is the duty of the trial court to find every essential fact necessary to sustain the plaintiff’s case, if it has substantial support in any of the evidence or any reasonable inference that can be deduced therefrom; that on appeal it will be presumed that the trial court made such findings as required, and thereafter the burden is on the appellant to successfully attack the findings of the trial court in the appellate court, or alternatively, to convince the appellate court that the trial court failed to adopt certain findings borne out by plaintiff’s evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom.
Appellants claim error due to the trial court’s refusal to grant their requested finding of fact that the application or “work sheets” contained a provision that the insurance policies would become effective twenty-four hours from the date of the application. The material issue litigated was the date of the expiration of the policies. The applications were signed in blank, forwarded by the soliciting agent to the company, and the policies were then issued. The work sheet forms used by the agent contained information as to the coverage, the name of the policy holder, and were not a part of the policies. The evidence shows that the policies were received by appellants and were in their possession approximately five months without protest. No misrepresentation or fraud was perpetrated by appellants, who relied solely upon fraud. As stated by Justice Compton ill Brown v. Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 204 P.2d 264, 266:
“Appellant requested the trial court to make separate findings of fact which were refused. These requests are themselves a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the material findings made.- Consequently, the facts thus found are the facts to be reviewed, and if supported by substan*181tial evidence the findings must be sustained. * * * ”
Applying the combined rule heretofore discussed to the instant case, and having carefully examined 'the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly found the facts as required, and we further determine that there was no error in the refusal to grant the requested findings made by appellants.
There is no merit in appellants’ point No. 19. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, appellants moved to amend their complaint on the basis that a member of the board of directors of appellee’s association asserted that the loss would be paid, or that he was going to do something about it, and that appraisers were sent out by appellee; this, on the theory of estoppel and waiver to assert October 1, 1957, as the expiration date of the contract.
There is evidence that a questionnaire was sent to each member of appellee’s association, asking them if they wanted to pay the loss, regardless of the fact that the loss occurred after the expiration date of the policy. The testimony shows that seventy-six per cent of those who replied voted against paying appellants for anything which occurred after the expiration of the policy. Appellee at all times denied liability, even though it made an investigation to determine whether to pay the claims, regardless of liability.
Appellee’s conduct and the statement of a member of the board of 'directors, all occurred after the loss had taken place. One claiming benefit of equitable estoppel must have relied upon conduct and representations of the one sought to be estopped. Treadwell v. Henderson, 58 N. M. 230, 269 P.2d 1108.
Estoppel by conduct arises: Where a party has been induced by the conduct of another to do, or forbear doing, something he would not have, or would have, done but for such conduct; when disadvantage results- from such forbearance or action. State ex rel. Fitzhugh v. City Council of City of Hot Springs, 56 N.M. 118, 241 P.2d 100.
Appellee’s actions did not compel appellants to change their position. An “estoppel” rests on one party’s word or deed, on which another party rightfully relies, and, so relying, changes his position to his injury. Triple Cities Const. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 443, 176 N.Y.S.2d 292, 151 N.E.2d 856, 858.
Finding no error, the judgment will be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
COMPTON, C. J., and CARMODY, J., concur.
MOISE, J., dissents.
*182NOBLE, J., not participating.