OPINION
{1} This case is a sequel to Subin v. Ulmer, 2001-NMCA-105, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441. We decided in that case that a district court has no authority to order the Public Defender Department (Department) to pay expert witness fees for an indigent defendant who is represented by counsel paid for by family members. The question we must answer in this case is whether that rule applies equally to expert witness fees paid from unspecified state funds where counsel represents the indigent defendant pro bono for no fee. Based on our decision in Subin, the district court concluded that it lacked such authority and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for appeal, and we now affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} William Brown (Brown) was charged with committing three felony offenses and one misdemeanor offense. The magistrate court and district court each made an explicit finding that Brown was indigent. An attorney on contract with the Department was appointed to represent him. However, Stephen Kortemeier had previously entered his appearance as Brown’s private attorney. Mr. Kortemeier then filed a declaration under oath that he had refunded Brown’s retainer fee and agreed to represent Brown without charge. The State and Brown thereupon stipulated, and the district court ordered, that Brown was indigent and was “entitled to all services, including waivers of fees and costs, normally provided by the State of New Mexico to an indigent defendant.”
{3} Counsel determined that expert witnesses were necessary to defend Brown. The Department, however, refused to provide funds for expert assistance in defending Brown on the ground that expert fees are not paid by the Department on behalf of an indigent defendant unless the defendant is represented by the Department or an attorney on contract with the Department. Additionally, the Department told Mr. Kortemeier he was not eligible to become a contract attorney.
*293{4} Brown then filed a motion with the district court seeking an order for funds from any appropriate source to hire necessary experts. Brown primarily argued that he had a constitutional right to the funds. He argued that Subin was wrongly decided, and he also argued that Subin was distinguishable (1) because his counsel’s representation was pro bono whereas in Subin someone hired counsel on the defendant’s behalf and (2) because Brown was “not determining which arm of the State is fiscally responsible to furnish the requested funds.”
{5} A hearing was held at which Brown reiterated his position that Subin was incorrectly decided as a matter of constitutional law. The trial court indicated that it might help Brown if it had the power to make the order, but it did not want to order the Department to do anything without notice and an opportunity for the Department to be heard. Brown did not suggest that the Department was not necessary because he was seeking funds from other sources.
{6} Following the hearing, the State filed a response, arguing that Subin prohibited the district court from granting the requested relief. Brown filed a reply, pointing out that the motion did not ask that the funds be paid by the Department, but from any appropriate source. The bulk of the reply, however, was devoted to Brown’s argument that Subin was incorrectly decided.
{7} Another hearing was held, at which the State reiterated its position that Subin was dispositive. The State questioned from what source Brown thought the requested funding should come. The State pointed out that the Department was the only entity with an appropriation for expert witnesses for indigent defendants; the State alleged that the district court did not have such funding, and neither did the district attorney. Brown then reiterated his arguments that Subin was incorrectly decided and that the court could order the requested funding to insure that his constitutional rights would not be violated. He did not suggest any alternative source of funding and never argued for a statutory right to expert witness fees.
{8} The district court denied Brown’s motion, concluding that Subin was dispositive because an indigent defendant has no right to counsel of his own choosing; that if Brown continued with his present counsel, he had to pay for the expert witness himself; and that if he wanted the State to pay for expert witness services, he had to avail himself of the services of the Department.
DISCUSSION
{9} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. This right to assistance of counsel requires states to provide indigent criminal defendants with legal representation at public expense to ensure the fairness of their trials. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The New Mexico Constitution has a parallel provision embracing the ideal that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend himself in person, and by counsel.” N.M. Const, art. II, § 14; see State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575, 855 P.2d 562, 564 (1993) (noting state constitutional provision embraces and parallels ideal of federal provision). Further developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence have clarified that criminal defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel, see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (observing that the guarantee of effective assistance means indigents must be afforded adequate legal assistance), and established that the states are required to “provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense.” Britt v. N.C., 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971). In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court specifically held that states must provide expert witness services as part of their constitutional obligation to provide indigent criminal defendants with meaningful access to justice when the assistance of an expert witness constitutes a basic tool of an adequate defense. See Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶ 4, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441 (recognizing holding of Ake).
{10} Based on these principles, Brown asserts that he is entitled to the assistance of *294expert witnesses at public expense, and that conditioning such assistance upon acceptance of representation by the Department violates his constitutional rights. Brown specifically argues that (1) Subin did not overrule Quintana and cannot be read consistently with Quintana; (2) all defendants have a constitutional right to counsel of their choosing, subject only to denial for abuse of that right, such as when the change of counsel will cause delay; and (3) conditioning a defendant’s right to counsel on accepting Department services will inevitably result in a constitutionally prohibited conflict of interest. Brown does not argue on appeal the denial of any statutory right. We address each issue in turn and then discuss some miscellaneous arguments that Brown either does or does not raise.
1. Subin and Quintana
{11} Defendant contends that Quintana states the governing principles in this area, which include that courts retain the inherent authority to act “to guarantee the enforcement of constitutional civil liberty protections in criminal [cases].” 115 N.M. at 575, 855 P.2d at 564. He maintains that Subin is inconsistent with this principle to the extent that Subin held that district courts in general do not have authority to order the Department to pay expert witness fees on behalf of indigent defendants who are not its clients. See id. ¶¶ 5-12. Defendant concludes that “[t]he practical effect of Subin is to deny, to trial courts,” the authority Quintana said they had, and as a result, “Quintana has been reduced to platitude[.]” We do not agree.
{12} In fact, in Subin, this Court ordered the Department to pay the expert witness fees of the defendant because we ruled that, under the particular circumstances of that case, the defendant’s constitutional rights were in jeopardy. Id. ¶ 15. Thus, we recognized, and we continue to recognize, the important principle that courts have the inherent authority to insure that defendants are afforded their constitutional rights in criminal proceedings.
{13} In addition, the issue facing the Court in Quintana was very different from the issue facing this Court in Subin and in this case. Quintana involved the question of whether the courts or the Department had the ultimate authority to determine indigency for the purpose of requiring representation by the Department. 115 N.M. at 574, 855 P.2d at 563. In determining that the pertinent statutes permitted the courts to determine indigency, the Supreme Court reconciled the Indigent Defense Act enacted in 1968, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-16-1 to -10 (1968, as amended through 1973), with the Public Defender Act enacted in 1973, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-15-1 to -12 (1973, as amended through 2001), against a backdrop that recognized courts have inherent power to appoint counsel for indigent defendants to safeguard their constitutional rights. Quintana, 115 N.M. at 575-78, 855 P.2d at 564-67.
{14} The holding of Subin is not to the contrary. Because the Department “stood ready, willing, and able to provide expert witness assistance to [the defendant therein] as part of its duty to represent her,” we ruled that the case was not about a person whose constitutional right to counsel was proposed to be denied. Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441. In contrast, the Court in Quintana found that the Department was proposing to deny an indigent defendant his right to counsel, and accordingly permitted the district court to intervene and order the Department to represent the defendant. Quintana, 115 N.M. at 578, 855 P.2d at 567. Thus, Subin is consistent with Quintana; the cases simply involve different aspects of the facilitation of the right to counsel under different facts.
2. Right to Counsel of Choice
{15} Defendant contends that applying the rule in Subin to his case would deny him his right to counsel of his choice. Subin relied on State v. Hernandez, 104 N.M. 268, 272, 720 P.2d 303, 307 (Ct.App. 1986), and State v. Salazar, 81 N.M. 512, 514, 469 P.2d 157, 159 (Ct.App.1970), for the proposition that “indigent defendants have no right to choose their own counsel or insist that one attorney be substituted for another,” and Subin ruled that the defendant’s position would permit just that. Subin, *2952001-NMCA-105, ¶ 6, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441. Defendant maintains that Subin was incorrectly decided to this extent because the cases relied upon do not stand for the proposition asserted.
{16} Both Hernandez and Salazar upheld the trial courts’ decisions not to substitute counsel when the defendants in those cases were voicing dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel. In both cases, the appellate court held that trial courts have discretion in the matter of whether to order a substitution of counsel, and in Hernandez, the appellate court held that a defendant’s right to have different counsel was dependent on a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hernandez, 104 N.M. at 272, 720 P.2d at 307; Salazar, 81 N.M. at 514, 469 P.2d at 159. Brown relies on the discretion of the trial court, but in our view, the appropriate focus should be on the defendant’s right, which is not invoked until there is a potential denial of a constitutional right, i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel. It is a different proposition to state that a trial court has the discretion to allow or deny substitution than to hold that a defendant has a right to substitution.
{17} Defendants, such as Brown, do have the right to select their own counsel as long as they ari'ange for counsel themselves and as long as rules governing the practice of law and other procedural and substantive rules are satisfied. Neither this opinion nor Subin holds otherwise. We hold only that defendants who wish to select their own counsel must take all the consequences that go along with that selection, and one such consequence is that public funding will not be available for expert witness services for the reasons outlined in Subin. See id. ¶ 9 (indicating that all public funding for counsel and expert witness fees for indigent defendants has been appropriated to the Department).
{18} The dissent argues that Brown was not required to rebut below the factual predicate concerning all funding being appropriated to the Department. As a matter of fairness to the trial court and to the State, we disagree. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 540, 893 P.2d 428, 436 (1995) (stating that the purpose of the preservation rule is to alert the trial court to a claim of error to allow the court a fair opportunity to rule on the claim and also to give the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the claim). The parties and the trial court below expressly operated under the same factual predicate as outlined in Subin. It was Defendant’s motion and therefore his burden to show the operative facts were different than in Subin. See State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 175, 619 P.2d 847, 851 (Ct.App.1980).
{19} To the extent that Brown argues that it is only when a defendant is abusing the right to counsel of choice, such as by using a desire for substitution of counsel as a delay tactic, that a court will be justified in denying substitution, we disagree. There are many good reasons why a court might deny a defendant the opportunity for substitution. For example, in a judicial district where there is only one public defender, a court might well require a showing of potential violation of constitutional rights, e.g., ineffective assistance, before requiring the Department to go outside of Departmental counsel or to another judicial district in satisfying its obligation to provide counsel to an indigent defendant. In our case, as we alluded to in Subin, permitting Brown to select his own counsel and then obtain services upon district court order, instead of going through Departmental processes, would put Brown in a better position and give him more rights than any other indigent defendant. See id. ¶ 6.
{20} Similarly, to the extent that the dissent contends that all defendants have a right both to counsel of choice and to defense services such that requiring an indigent defendant to select a public defender as a condition of obtaining defense services would unconstitutionally burden the right to counsel of choice, we also disagree. None of the cases relied on by the dissent for the proposition that indigent defendants have a constitutional right to counsel of choice actually decided such a proposition. For example, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988),
*296We have further recognized that the purpose of providing assistance of counsel is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial, and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such. Thus, while the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.
The Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in several important respects.
Id. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Wheat was decided in the context of a defendant who wanted to be represented by a co-defendant’s counsel, which may have led to a conflict of interest, and the Court upheld the trial court’s rejection of the non-indigent defendant’s counsel of choice. Id. at 164,108 S.Ct. 1692. In addition to the conflict situation in front of the Court in Wheat, the Court explained that other instances in which the right to counsel of choice could be circumscribed included when a defendant wanted a lawyer who was not a member of the appropriate bar or a lawyer who the defendant could not afford or who did not want to represent the defendant. See id. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692.
{21} The Court was obviously not seeking to exhaust the possibilities in that it did not list the situation Brown recognizes of the defendant who wants to delay the trial as one of the situations in which the right to counsel of choice is qualified or circumscribed. Wbat we learn from Wheat is that the right to counsel of choice is not an unqualified right and therefore it must yield to other important values in appropriate eases, such as the case here, in which a state legislature decides that its finances are such that it makes all defense services available to indigent defendants through a public defender system.
{22} Brown argues that since a paying defendant would be able to retain counsel of choice, it is a violation of the equal protection clause to deny him the same opportunity. He relies on the proposition that wealth is a suspect class. Wealth, however, is not a suspect class. See State v. Rotherham, 122 N.M. 246, 254, 923 P.2d 1131, 1139 (1996) (indicating that only race, national origin, and alienage are suspect classes).
{23} Additionally, it has never been the law that indigent defendants are entitled to all of the benefits that a wealthy person might be able to afford. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (“The duty of the [s]tate under orneases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant ..., but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the [sjtate’s ... process.”). Thus, the dissent’s reliance on San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) is inapposite. Representation by the Department, which Brown has rejected, would have satisfied Brown’s right to counsel and ancillary services. His equal protection rights were not violated.
3. Conflict of Interest
{24} Among the rationales for the Subin opinion were the practical and prudential concerns that we expressed, including the Department’s limited budget and its obligation to administer its resources so that all of its clients realize their constitutional rights to counsel and ancillary services. Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 12-13, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441. Defendant claims there is a necessary and inherent conflict of interest in having the Department manage limited resources. He compares requiring him to chose the Department’s attorneys, with their ability to obtain expert witness services only on compliance with the Department’s procedures and with the possibility of denial of expert witness services, to the sort of conflict of interest that is present when a third party pays for a defendant’s representation. See, e.g., Wood v. Ga., 450 U.S. 261, 266-67, 101 *297S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (indicating that there would be a conflict of interest when the defendants’ employer (who was also a defendant) paid for the attorney representing all defendants and the attorney may have been representing the employer’s interests more than the individual defendant’s interests).
{25} We cannot agree with this sweeping contention that could impact public defender systems, state and federal, throughout the country. All government agencies must live within budgetary constraints, subject of course to constitutional considerations. For example, if an inadequate budget led to ineffective assistance of counsel, it would be the duty of courts to insure that convictions obtained thereby were vacated, just as it is the duty of courts to insure their own adequate operation. See Quintana> 115 N.M. at 575-78, 855 P.2d at 564-67 (indicating that courts will sometimes need to act in accordance with their inherent power to insure that constitutional rights are safeguarded); Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶ 15, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441 (affirming the district court’s order in that ease to insure that the defendant’s rights to both counsel and a speedy trial were not violated); Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1339-40 (Miss.1990) (recognizing inherent authority of courts to provide adequate funding for their operations in cases where the legislature fails to so provide, but refusing to apply that rule to indigent defense attorney fees set by legislature under the facts of that case); State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm’rs, 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 734 N.E.2d 811, 818 (2000) (acknowledging rule that courts have inherent authority to insure necessary funding for their operations).
{26} Brown claims that it is insufficient to adjudicate ineffective assistance of counsel claims on a case by case basis if the problem is the inherent conflict presented by budgetary considerations. No specific authority is cited, however, and Brown appears to rely on genuine conflict of interest cases, such as State v. Martinez, 2001-NMCA-059, ¶25, 130 N.M. 744, 31 P.3d 1018 (where the defendant’s attorney or his associates may have been involved in the crimes), which are inapplicable for the reasons stated above. See also In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (holding that an appellate court will not decide an issue in a party’s favor if no authority is cited for the proposition). In sum, we do not perceive an automatic and inherent conflict of interest that would deprive Brown of his rights if he were required to become a client of the Department in order to access expert witness services.
4. Other Contentions and Considerations
a. Law of the Case
{27} Again without citing authority, Brown contends that the original order, entered by the district court on stipulation of the parties, establishing Brown’s indigence and his entitlement to “all services” normally provided indigent defendants, was law of the case and prohibited the district court from denying him funds for expert witness fees. The doctrine of law of the case traditionally applies when there has been a specific ruling in a prior and final appellate proceeding. State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 418, 25 P.3d 257. In contrast, while a matter is pending before the district court, a district court may change its mind at any time prior to entry of the final ruling. State v. Diaz, 100 N.M. 524, 525, 673 P.2d 501, 502 (1983); State v. Doe, 99 N.M. 460, 463, 659 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct.App.1983). Thus, the fact that the trial court initially entered a stipulated order allowing Brown access to “all services” did not preclude it from reversing that ruling upon full briefing and argument when the matter was later contested.
b. Statutory Authority
{28} Brown does not argue that the Indigent Defense Act gives him a right to expert witness fees to be paid for by funds appropriated to either the district court or the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). While he claims not to care where the fees come from, he acknowledges that the factual basis for the Subin opinion was that all funding for such fees was appropriated by the Legislature to the Department. See Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441. He did not make a showing below or a *298claim on appeal that that factual basis was erroneous. In light of Brown’s failure to make a showing that either the district court’s or AOC’s budget has such funds, we do not believe that the Legislature intended current implementation of the Indigent Defense Act to come from any other source of funds than the Department. See Herrera v. Sedillo, 106 N.M. 206, 207, 740 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Ct.App.1987) (“The Indigent Defense Act gives indigent defendants the right to free counsel, thereby recognizing their sixth amendment rights. The Public Defender Act, enacted later, provides an administrative agency for accomplishing this objective.”). Therefore, we continue to believe that Subin is the controlling authority.
c. Out-of-State Authority
{29} We are aware that there exists out-of-state authority that is contrary to what we hold here. See Thompson v. State, 525 So.2d 1011, 1011 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293-94 (Iowa 1981); State v. Manning, 234 N.J.Super. 147, 560 A.2d 693, 697-99 (Ct.App.Div.1989); State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 800-02 (Utah 2000). We are not, however, impressed with the reasoning of those cases. Some, such as Thompson, appear to contain no reasoning whatsoever. Others, such as English, 311 N.W.2d at 294, and Manning, 560 A.2d at 699, appear to be grounded in the view that it would be strange to require the public defender to provide both counsel and expert witness assistance when the alternative is to require the public defender to pay only the latter, thereby saving public money and placing less of a burden on the public defender system.
{30} We believe it is noteworthy in our jurisdiction that the Department has appeared in both the Subin ease and in this case to advocate the rule we adopted in Subin and affirm herein. Thus, it is apparent to us that the Department believes that it can better administer the limited funds appropriated by the Legislature for indigent defense services without interference, or competition, from the courts. In this connection, we also take note of the lengths that one court had to go to implement its rule. See In re Cannady, 126 N.J. 486, 600 A.2d 459, 462-64 (1991). As we stated in Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 4, 12, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441, and reiterate here, we will not interfere with the administrative affairs of another agency absent compelling reason, such as potential constitutional violations of the sort present in Subin or a situation that forces a choice between constitutional rights of equal footing.
{31} In addition, we are not alone in the view expressed in Subin. There exists out-of-state authority that is consistent with our holding. In particular, our neighbor state of Colorado has ruled that, “If Defendant wants the state to pay the costs of his attorney and supporting services, his only choice is to be represented by the public defender, or in the case of a conflict, a state-appointed alternative counsel.” People v. Cardenas, 62 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo.2002). As was the case in Subin, 2001-NMCA-105, ¶ 6, 131 N.M. 350, 36 P.3d 441, an underlying rationale for the court’s decision in Cardenas was that an indigent “does not have the right to pick the attorney of his choice.” 62 P.3d at 623.
{32} Thus, as in Subin, we again perceive no threat to Brown’s constitutional right to counsel or other constitutional rights by denying him funds for expert witness services as long as he rejects the opportunity with which the Legislature has provided him for satisfaction of his right to counsel. In New Mexico, the Legislature has made the policy decision that indigent defense services paid for by public funds shall be administered by the Department. The Department has filed an amicus brief indicating its willingness to provide the necessary services to Brown and urging affirmance of the district court order. We will not second guess that policy decision in the absence of facts suggesting our need to step in to safeguard constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
{33} The district court’s order is affirmed.
{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WECHSLER, C.J. concurs.
VIGIL, Judge (dissenting).