Commonwealth v. Dupre, 98 N.E.3d 220, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 903 (2018)

June 4, 2018 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · No. 17–P–1324.
98 N.E.3d 220, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 903

COMMONWEALTH
v.
Ronald N. DUPRE.

No. 17-P-1324.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

June 4, 2018

Joseph Visone, Worcester, for the defendant.

Susan M. Oftring, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

RESCRIPT

*903The defendant appeals from his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, fifth offense, on the ground that statutory definitions of "motor vehicle" are inconsistent and therefore unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the defendant argues that his vehicle met the definition of a "motorized bicycle" under G. L. c. 90, § 1. As G. L. c. 90, § 1, as amended through St. 1976, c. 261, § 3, further states that "[t]he definition of 'Motor vehicles' shall not include motorized bicycles," the defendant claims it is unclear whether his vehicle could be deemed a motor vehicle for purposes of prosecution under G. L. c. 90, § 24.

This court has already addressed the question, determining that the Legislature's choice to make "motorized bicycles," as defined in § 1, subject to the Commonwealth's traffic laws, see G. L. c. 90, § 1B, "manifested its intention to make those portions of c. 90 that are concerned with operation, such as ... § 24 ..., also apply to operators of motorized bicycles." Commonwealth v. Griswold, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 462, 459 N.E.2d 142 (1984). Our construction in Griswold, which is consistent with the introductory paragraph of G. L. c. 90, § 1, eliminates any vagueness concern. See Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 581, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977) ("A sufficiently definite warning may be achieved by judicial construction").1

Judgment affirmed.