Thornton v. State , 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
I. Disclosure
[5] F.B.C. contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her Disclosure claim. Because the tort of Disclosure has not yet been recognized in Indiana, we disagree. In Doe v. Methodist Hospital , *837the Indiana Supreme Court declined to adopt Disclosure, which is a sub-tort of invasion of privacy, as an actionable claim. 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997). The Court recognized that while neighboring states have adopted a more liberal Disclosure standard, it was not persuaded to adopt Disclosure as a cognizable claim in Indiana. Id. at 692-93. See also Felsher v. University of Evansville , 755 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Ind. 2001) ("Our discussion of [the history of the invasion of privacy tort] and the Second Restatement served as a prelude to our decision not to recognize a branch of the tort involving the public disclosure of private facts."). F.B.C. has failed to establish that the trial court erroneously dismissed her Disclosure claim.
II. Intrusion
[6] F.B.C. contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her Intrusion claim. Intrusion occurs when there has been an "intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion as by invading his home or conducting an illegal search." Cullison v. Medley , 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991). F.B.C. does not claim any physical intrusion by Insurer but, rather, claims that Insurer intruded upon her emotional solace. However, we have specifically chosen not to recognize claims of Intrusion where the intrusion only invades plaintiff's emotional solace. See Westminster Presbyterian Church of Muncie v. Yonghong Cheng , 992 N.E.2d 859, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that the tort of Intrusion has only been found where there was an intrusion by physical contact or an invasion of plaintiff's physical space, and refusing to extend it to cases where the only intrusion is upon plaintiff's emotional solace), trans. denied . Because F.B.C. only claims that Insurer intruded upon her emotional solace, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed her claim of Intrusion.
III. Outrage
[7] Insurer cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erroneously denied its motion to dismiss F.B.C.'s Outrage claim. Outrage (also referred to as intentional infliction of emotional distress) is caused by "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." Branham v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. , 744 N.E.2d 514, 522-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied . To prove Outrage, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant (1) engages in extreme and outrageous conduct that (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes (4) severe emotional distress to another. Id. at 523. In appropriate cases, the question of what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct can be decided as a matter of law. Id. Conduct is extreme and outrageous
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!
Conwell v. Beatty , 667 N.E.2d 768, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
[8] We conclude that Insurer's alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. F.B.C. alleges that Insurer caused her severe emotional distress by posting the Statement listing the various diseases that she was tested for on its web portal, which was subsequently viewed by Husband. This is not conduct which is utterly intolerable in a civilized community but, rather, routine in *838today's technologically-driven society. Health insurance companies maintain web portals to allow policyholders instant access to their personal medical information, insurance claims, etc., and the current matter is no exception. Husband was the primary policyholder with instant access to the couple's medical insurance information through Insurer's web portal. Even if we assume, which we do not, that Insurer intended to cause F.B.C. severe emotional distress by posting the Statement for Husband to view, the conduct still does not amount to extreme and outrageous. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to dismiss F.B.C.'s Outrage claim.
[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss F.B.C.'s Outrage claim.
Brown, J., concurs.
Bailey, J., dissents with opinion.