*121*705In 2016, the town of Andover increased the percentage share that retired town employees had to pay for their health insurance. Three retired town employees brought this action alleging that G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (e ), prohibited the town from implementing such increases prior to July 1, 2018.3 On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled that *122the language of § 22 (e ) unambiguously supported the town's position that the increases were lawful. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment.
1. Statutory background. A municipality may, but is not required to, provide health insurance coverage to its employees and retirees. Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 564, 24 N.E.3d 552 (2015). Where a municipality has chosen to provide such coverage, it generally has a variety of options regarding the percentage it will contribute towards the insurance premiums. Although G. L. c. 32B, § 9, states that retirees are to bear the full cost of their health insurance, municipalities may elect to pay a share of those premiums by "accept[ing] the more generous provisions of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A or § 9E." Id. at 565, 24 N.E.3d 552. By opting into § 9A, the municipality can pay fifty percent of the premiums, and by opting into § 9E, they can pay a higher percentage. Id.
In Somerville, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question whether a municipality that had elected to opt into § 9E could "unilaterally reduce[ ] its percentage contribution to retired employees' health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees." Id. at 573, 24 N.E.3d 552. The court held that a town could do so, thus reaffirming that municipalities enjoyed broad statutory authority to raise the percentage share that retirees had to pay for their health insurance premiums. See id.
In 2011, the Legislature enacted a law to allow municipalities to pursue additional cost savings in the provision of their health insurance plans. See St. 2011, c. 69, § 3, inserting G. L. c. 32B, §§ 21 - 23 (2011 act). Specifically, municipalities now could elect to opt into a program through which they could redesign their health insurance plans, e.g., through changing the copayments and deductibles that those enrolled in the plans had to pay, and through adopting "tiered provider network copayments and other cost-sharing plan design features." G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (a ). The 2011 act created a sui generis, streamlined process through which such changes were to be negotiated or, barring an agreement, determined by a specially constituted "municipal health insurance review panel." G. L. c. 32B, § 21 (c ). While union representatives were given an important role in that process,4 the process otherwise by-passed ordinary collective bargaining. See *123G. L. c. 32B, § 23 (a ), (c ), (g ) (providing *706that decisions by municipality to redesign its health insurance plans are not subject to collective bargaining).
Notably, the new authority offered by the 2011 act was layered on top of the authority that municipalities already possessed to decrease the percentage share that they contributed to their retirees' health insurance premiums. See G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9A, 9E. This meant that retirees now potentially could be subjected to two types of increases implemented outside the traditional collective bargaining process: increases to the percentage share that they had to pay for their premiums, and increases to their copays, deductibles, and the like. As both sides agree, when the Legislature enacted the 2011 act, it placed temporary limits on the ability of municipalities to subject retirees to increases on both fronts. Specifically, municipalities who elected to use their new authority to implement design changes to their insurance plans outside collective bargaining temporarily were precluded from using their already existing authority to raise the percentage share that retirees had to pay. As Governor Patrick stated in proposing the language establishing this moratorium,5 the purpose was "the protection of current retirees from short-term increases in premiums." Governor's Message, 2011 House Doc. No. 3581. Although the parties before us generally agree about the role that the moratorium was intended to serve, they disagree about the details as to how the moratorium was intended to operate and, most specifically, when municipalities would be relieved from its effects.
As enacted by St. 2011, c. 69, § 3, the moratorium language set forth in § 22 (e ) reads as follows:
"The first time a public authority implements plan design changes under this section or section 23, the public authority shall not increase before July 1, 2014, the percentage contributed by retirees, surviving spouses and their dependents to their health insurance premiums from the percentage that was approved by the public authority prior to and in effect on July 1, 2011."
In 2014, the Legislature amended this language by substituting "2016" for "2014." St. 2014, c. 165, § 76. In 2016, the Legislature *124again amended the language by substituting "2018" for "2016." St. 2016, c. 133, § 45. On both occasions, the remainder of the language was left the same.
2. Background. The town previously had elected to opt into § 9E, under which towns pay more than fifty percent of their retirees' health insurance premiums. Specifically, as of 2011, the town was covering between sixty-five percent and eighty-six percent of those premiums.
In 2012, the town board of selectmen voted to make use of the statutory authority provided by the 2011 act so that the town could restructure the health insurance benefits it provided to its existing employees and retirees. Following the procedures required by the 2011 act, the town implemented its first set of design changes to its health insurance plan effective July 1, 2012. Those design changes, inter alia, included increased copays and deductibles that current employees and retirees alike would have to pay. The percentage contribution that retirees would have to pay for their premiums was not changed at that time.6
*707In 2016, the town implemented a second set of design changes effective July 1, 2016. At that time, the town also decreased the percentage contribution it would make to cover the premiums of its retirees (thereby increasing the share retirees had to pay). Because the Legislature by this time had extended the end date included in § 22 (e ) to July 1, 2018, the plaintiffs challenged the 2016 increase to their percentage contribution as violating the moratorium.7 On cross motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in the town's favor, explaining his reasoning in a thoughtful memorandum of decision. In short, the judge accepted the town's argument that under the plain language of § 22 (e ), it could increase the percentage contribution that retirees would have to pay even prior to July 1, 2018, because the moratorium applied only to "the first time" a municipality implemented design changes to its health insurance plans, not to second or subsequent changes. Although the judge recognized that the town's interpretation *125"imposes a very real financial hardship upon [retirees]," he concluded that it was compelled by unambiguous statutory text. Relatedly, the judge concluded that the plaintiffs' interpretation would render superfluous the introductory language about "the first time" a municipality restructures its health insurance plans. See Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 796, 955 N.E.2d 905 (2011) (statute is to be construed "to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous" [quotation and citation omitted] ).
3. Discussion. When discerning the intent of the Legislature, we, of course, must "begin with the language of the statute, and [w]hen a statute is plain and unambiguous, we interpret it according to its ordinary meaning" (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810, 985 N.E.2d 1179 (2013). See DiGregorio v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 775, 780, 942 N.E.2d 998 (2011) ("Statutory text is, of course, the principal source from which courts ... are to discern legislative purpose"). However, "we look to the language of the entire statute, not just a single sentence, and attempt to interpret all of its terms 'harmoniously to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.' " Hanson H., supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 745, 905 N.E.2d 545 (2009).
The key language of § 22 (e ) states as follows: "The first time a public authority implements plan design changes under this section or section 23, the public authority shall not increase before July 1, 2018, the percentage contributed by retirees ...." The town's contention that this language is unambiguous has some force, especially if that language is read in isolation. However, the town passes over the fact that the statutory text does not directly address what constraints may apply the second time a municipality implements plan design changes; the town's interpretation relies on an inference that "the first time" means "but not the second or subsequent time." That inference is permissible, but not mandatory. Moreover, "meaning and ambiguity are creatures of context." Downer & Co., LLC v. STI Holding, Inc., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 792, 927 N.E.2d 471 (2010). For the reasons set forth below, *708ambiguity emerges here when we examine the key language in the context of the statute as a whole.
It is uncontested that the moratorium set forth in § 22 (e ) served to place temporary limits on the authority that municipalities already had to increase the percentage share that retirees would have to pay to cover their premiums. In addition, the § 22 (e )
*126moratorium does not apply across the board to all municipalities, but instead applies only to those that have elected to make use of the new authority to redesign their health insurance plans outside the collective bargaining process. See G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (e ). In light of this complicated structure, two questions naturally arise with respect to the timing of the moratorium: first, on what date does the moratorium first limit a municipality's ability to make use of its existing authority to increase the percentage contribution that retirees will have to pay, and, second, when does that limitation expire. In this context, the introductory language regarding "the first time" a municipality restructures its health insurance plans readily can be interpreted as answering the first question. That is, the language of § 22 (e ) can be interpreted so that the moratorium applies to a given municipality once that municipality has implemented design changes to its health insurance plans "the first time," and the moratorium expires on the date certain set forth in the statute (originally July 1, 2014, later extended to July 1, 2018).
This interpretation not only is consistent with § 22 (e )'s text, but also has the benefit of reading the various provisions in G. L. c. 32B as a harmonious whole. Under it, municipalities were informed that, if they chose to make use of their new authority to redesign their health care plans outside the scope of collective bargaining, their existing authority to raise the percentage contributions made by retirees would be limited temporarily until a date certain. See Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178, 114 N.E.3d 52 (2019) ("Our principal objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature in a way that is consonant with sound reason and common sense"). In contrast, under the town's interpretation, a municipality's authority would be tied to the happenstance of how many times the municipality chooses to implement design changes to its insurance plans. A municipality would be free to avoid the moratorium designed to protect retirees so long as it already had implemented design changes that presumably had hurt them.8 Even if that interpretation were not considered absurd *127or illogical, the legislative policy rationale supporting it is, at a minimum, far from obvious.9
The town argues that its interpretation is compelled by the Legislature's use of *709the term "the first time" elsewhere in a related subsection. See G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (b ). That subsection draws an express distinction between certain procedural requirements that apply only to "the first time" a municipality implements the authority provided by the 2011 act to redesign their health insurance plans, and those procedures that apply "each time" it does so. See id. The town argues that the use of the "the first time" language in § 22 (b ) means that we must attribute the same meaning to the Legislature's use of the same language in § 22 (e). See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 457 Mass. 663, 695-696, 932 N.E.2d 787 (2010) ("Words used in one part of a statute to connote a particular meaning should be given the same meaning in another part of the same statute" [quotation and citation omitted] ).
The flaw in the town's argument is that interpreting the moratorium language in the plaintiffs' favor does not depend on ascribing different meanings to "the first time" language used in the two sections. Rather, in § 22 (b ) and § 22 (e ), the meaning of the term "the first time" is identical; it appears plain that, in both instances, the Legislature used these words in the ordinary manner to refer to the date that the municipality initially made design changes to its health insurance plans (in reliance on its new authority to implement such changes outside the collective bargaining process). The key question is not what the phrase "the first time" means, but what legal consequences were intended to attach to it based on how the phrase specifically is used in each section. Under the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 22 (e ), the date a municipality first uses the authority provided by the 2011 act marks when the moratorium first applies; under the town's, that date marks both the first time and the last time that the moratorium *128applies. The plaintiffs' interpretation is significantly more plausible. Cf. Leighton v. Hallstrom, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 447, 114 N.E.3d 95 (2018) (rejecting interpretation under which certain legal consequences "were so evanescent as to vanish as soon as they were created").
None of this is to suggest that the plaintiffs' interpretation flows easily from well-crafted statutory text. But the sentence structure that the Legislature chose to employ renders both competing interpretations awkward at best.10 Our mandate is "to give ambiguous, imprecise, or faultily drafted statutes 'a reasonable construction,' with the primary goal of 'constru[ing] the statute to carry out the legislative intent,' " and to "avoid[ ] a construction which would negate legislative intent or defeat its intended utility" (quotation and citations omitted). Bartlett v. Greyhound Real Estate Fin. Co., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 286, 669 N.E.2d 792 (1996).
When the language of § 22 (e ) is considered in the context of the statute as a whole, the plaintiffs' parsing of the language is no less natural than that of the town. Had the Legislature plainly intended its temporary curtailment of municipal authority to terminate on "the earlier of" July 1, 2018, and the date on which the municipality implements its second set of design changes to its health insurance plans, it would have been easy to say so. See *710Peters v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 775, 783-784, 762 N.E.2d 881 (2002) (rejecting party's interpretation of statute because, "had the Legislature desired to create such a system, we believe it would have said so with considerably greater clarity").
We finally consider the parties' competing claims about whether available legislative history supports or undercuts their respective interpretations. See Commonwealth v. Deberry, 441 Mass. 211, 215, 804 N.E.2d 911 (2004), quoting Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 435, 772 N.E.2d 578 (2002) ("Where the statutory language is not conclusive, we may 'turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation' "). The parties agree that if resort to legislative history is appropriate, then the statement made by Governor Patrick when he *129sponsored the moratorium language would be a valid source to consider. See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 168, 65 N.E.3d 1166 (2017) (where resort to legislative history is appropriate, courts may consider and give weight to Governor's sponsoring statement). However, the Governor's 2011 statement that the moratorium was intended to protect "current retirees from short-term increases in premiums" is consistent with both interpretations, and therefore provides little assistance in choosing between them.11
For their part, the plaintiffs highlight legislative history related to the 2016 amendment to § 22 (e ), which extended the moratorium end date from July 1, 2016, to July 1, 2018. See St. 2016, c. 133, § 45. They argue, with at least some force, that during the floor debate on that bill, at least one key proponent of the bill and one key opponent both appear to have understood that the 2016 amendment would extend the moratorium for another two years, without any hint that municipalities might avoid the moratorium simply by making design changes to their health insurance plans a second time.12 In addition, the plaintiffs point out that Governor Baker vetoed the two-year extension of the moratorium end date and, in a statement accompanying that veto, explained that "I am vetoing this section because the section would take away, for an additional two years, one of the few tools a city or town has to control both its health insurance costs and its liability for other post-employment benefits." Attachment B to Governor's Message, *1302016 House Doc. No. 4505. In the face of Governor Baker's unqualified statement about the broad effects *711of the two-year extension, the Legislature overrode his veto.
The parties engage in a vigorous debate about whether it is appropriate to take into account the various comments made with respect to the 2016 amendment to § 22 (e ) and, if so, how much force to attach to them.13 For present purposes, it suffices to say that nothing in the legislative history contradicts the plaintiffs' interpretation, and that what is available, if anything, provides some support for that interpretation. We do not place conclusive, or even significant, weight on the legislative comments that the plaintiffs have brought to our attention.
4. Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the judge erred in concluding that § 22 (e ), as amended by St. 2016, c. 133, § 45, allowed the town to increase its retirees' proportionate share of their health insurance premiums prior to July 1, 2018. We therefore *131vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.