{¶ 24} These provisions make no mention of an ordinance (or any other action by the city council) certifying an initiative petition to the board of elections (a "certification ordinance"). Rather, they refer to any ordinance that changes zoning or a permitted use, whether it is one enacted by the legislative body-city council-or it is one proposed by initiative petition , that is, an ordinance that would be enacted if the voters approve it in the election (the "proposed ordinance"). The phrases "passage thereof" and "Council submits such ordinance" grammatically refer to the ordinance effecting a change in the zoning classification or the uses permitted , i.e., in the initiative context, the proposed ordinance, not a separate, otherwise unmentioned certification ordinance.
{¶ 25} Although it is not clear whether the term "passage" means passage by the city council or passage by the voters in an election, neither interpretation of the term creates a requirement that the city council certify an initiative petition to the board of elections-in fact, neither interpretation makes sense in the context of initiatives. The city council does not pass an ordinance proposed by initiative petition, effecting a change in zoning or permitted use , so "passage thereof" cannot refer to passage by the city council in regard to an initiative petition. If "passage thereof" refers to passage by the voters, the submission of "such ordinance" to the electors after "passage thereof" would, as the committee argues and the city denies, subject each initiative to two votes by the electorate. Either way, the provisions simply do not address a certification ordinance.
{¶ 26} Conspicuously, the city's brief does not explain how the words of the Article XIV provisions support its position. Rather, it sets out the full text of the provisions and then shifts immediately to a discussion of its practice since the 1988 charter amendments. But the city cites no authority stating that its past practice is entitled to deference. And such deference would be particularly unwarranted here because the right to initiative belongs to the people, not to the municipality as an entity. See Article II, Section 1f, Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 27} To conclude that Article XIV of the charter provides that the city council is to certify initiative petitions to the board of elections would require us to add to or delete words from the charter in order to turn references to a proposed ordinance into references to a certification ordinance or to ignore the reference to "after the passage thereof" with respect to an ordinance proposed by initiative petition. This would be contrary to the principles of statutory construction. "A court construing a provision in a city charter, statute, contract or other *131writing may not ignore the existence of any word or phrase." Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland , 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988).
{¶ 28} We must likewise avoid reaching a conclusion premised on an inference of the provisions' possible intent rather than on the express terms of the charter. See Bardo , 37 Ohio St.3d at 109, 524 N.E.2d 447. The terms of the charter reflect the somewhat inartful insertion of a clause regarding *1246initiative petitions into what had been solely automatic-referendum provisions. The resulting provisions do not clearly and expressly conflict with R.C. 731.28's requirement that the city auditor exercise his limited, discretionary authority to certify the validity and sufficiency of the initiative petition to the board of elections, see State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders , 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 231, 685 N.E.2d 754 (1997).
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we hold that Rubino abused his discretion by failing to certify the sufficiency and validity of the petition to the board of elections by the August 8 deadline. Accord id. at 232, 685 N.E.2d 754 ; Webb , 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, at ¶ 39. Because of the proximity of the election, the committee has no adequate remedy at law. We therefore grant a writ ordering Rubino to certify the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition to the board for placement on the November 2018 ballot.
4. Constitutional Claims
{¶ 30} We do not reach the committee's arguments that Article XIV of the Solon City Charter violates Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution. "[C]ourts decide constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary." Smith v. Leis , 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 54. Because we hold inapplicable the charter provisions that the city claims govern the procedure for certifying a zoning initiative petition to the board, determining the constitutionality of those provisions is unnecessary.
{¶ 31} Moreover, we have no jurisdiction over the committee's challenges to two other aspects of the Article XIV charter provisions: (1) the "ward veto" provision, under which a zoning initiative will fail if not approved by a majority of electors in the ward in which the subject property is located, and (2) the purported "two vote" requirement, i.e., the committee's assertion that the charter requires an initiative to undergo two separate votes (an interpretation that the city rejects). This court lacks jurisdiction over a mandamus claim if the true object of the claim is a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction. State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted , 153 Ohio St.3d 225, 2018-Ohio-1854, 103 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 9. To remedy the committee's constitutional challenges to the ward veto and two-vote provisions would require not the relief the committee seeks here-a writ ordering the initiative petition certified to the board of elections-but a declaration that Article XIV is unconstitutional and an order prohibiting the city *132from enforcing the challenged provisions. We cannot grant that relief in this action.
C. Should the Committee Receive Its Costs and Reasonable Attorney Fees Under R.C. 733.61 ?
{¶ 32} R.C. 733.58 provides that if "an officer or board of a municipal corporation fails to perform any duty expressly enjoined by law or ordinance," the city law director shall seek a writ of mandamus compelling the duty's performance. If a taxpayer of the municipal corporation asks the law director, in writing, to file such an action and the law director refuses, the taxpayer "may institute suit in his own name, on behalf of the municipal corporation." R.C. 733.59. If a court hearing such a taxpayer lawsuit "is satisfied that the taxpayer had good cause to believe that his allegations were well founded, or if they are sufficient in law, it shall make such order as the equity of the case demands. In such case the taxpayer shall be allowed his costs, and, if judgment is finally ordered in his favor, he may be allowed, as part of the costs, a reasonable compensation for his attorney." R.C. 733.61. No taxpayer lawsuit "shall be entertained by any court until the taxpayer gives security *1247for the cost of the proceeding." R.C. 733.59.
{¶ 33} With its complaint, the committee filed a motion to establish the amount of security for costs, asking the court to determine whether a security beyond its $100 e-filing fee and $100 e-filing deposit is required.
{¶ 34} In Maple Hts. , this court considered a similar motion and explained that while security for costs is a "jurisdictional prerequisite to a statutory taxpayer action," the court has "rejected the argument that security must be provided at the time the suit is initially filed and held instead that a court may later transform a common-law taxpayer action into a statutory one through a waiver of security." ( Emphasis sic.) 140 Ohio St.3d 334, 2014-Ohio-4097, 18 N.E.3d 426, at ¶ 26. In that case, the court granted a writ ordering the Maple Heights City Council to immediately approve an ordinance placing a charter amendment on the ballot, granted the motion to establish the amount of security, waived the requirement that the relators provide security for costs, and found that the relators were entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. Id. at ¶ 27-28. As in Maple Hts. , we find that an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees is appropriate under R.C. 733.61.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} In light of the foregoing, we issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Solon director of finance to certify the sufficiency and validity of the initiative *133petition to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections for placement on the November 2018 general-election ballot. We deny the writ as to the remaining respondents.
{¶ 36} We grant the motion to establish security for costs and waive the provision of security for costs. We grant the committee its costs and reasonable attorney fees; attorney fees will be determined upon review of the committee's filing of an itemized application and independent evidence supporting the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged and the hours billed. The application should not include attorney fees for pages 21 through 28 of relators' reply brief, which were stricken.
Writ granted in part and denied in part, and motion granted.
O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
Fischer, J., concurs but would deny the committee's request for attorney fees.
DeWine, J., dissents, with an opinion.