[7] While remaining mindful of the above, we have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S. , 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). "In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment terminating parental rights, this court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses." Id. "We consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn there from." Id. "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them." Id. Father does not contend that DCS failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's termination of his parental rights in Child. As restated, Father contends that he was denied the process due to him in a termination proceeding, namely, that he was effectively denied the statutory right to counsel.
[8] Indiana Code section 31-32-2-5 provides that "[a] parent is entitled to representation by counsel in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship." Moreover,
[i]f:
(1) a parent in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship does not have an attorney who may represent the parent without a conflict of interest; and
(2) the parent has not lawfully waived the parent's right to counsel under IC 31-32-5 (or IC 31-6-7-3 before its repeal);
the juvenile court shall appoint counsel for the parent at the initial hearing or at any earlier time.
Ind. Code § 31-32-4-3(a). However, "[a] parent who is entitled to representation by counsel may waive that right if the parent does so knowingly and voluntarily." Ind. Code § 31-32-5-5.
A. Notice
[9] As an initial matter, Father contends that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that he was ever even informed of his right to counsel. DCS, however, produced evidence that FCM Sheets told Father of this right over the telephone and detailed it in a letter sent a few days later and that the juvenile court informed him in an alias summons. Father denies only that he received the letter from FCM Sheets, failing to address the telephone call from FCM Sheets or the alias summons in his argument. We take these omissions as admissions that the telephone call occurred and that Father actually received the summons, both of *606which informed him of his right to counsel. So, even if we assume the Father did not receive the letter (which we do not), we conclude that the evidence is still more than sufficient to support a finding that Father was informed of his right to counsel. To the extent that Father asks us to find that he did not receive the letter from FCM Sheets, this is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[10] That said, on a somewhat related matter, one of the bases of DCS's desire to concede this appeal is the lack of any indication that DCS sent Father notice of the termination hearing pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5. Father himself does not make this claim, but even if we assume that DCS failed to properly notify Father pursuant to the statute, we conclude that such a failure does not require reversal under the circumstances of this case, even though it might in other cases. To get straight to the point, there is sufficient evidence to establish that Father had actual notice of the termination hearing via the personally-served summons issued by the juvenile court. Consequently, Father has failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of any failure by DCS to properly notify him of the hearing. See In re T.W. , 831 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (in termination-of-parental-rights case, concluding that, even if notice was defective, there was no due process violation where the record established that the mother had actual notice of the termination hearing).
B. Waiver
[11] Finally, Father contends that, even if one assumes that he was given proper notice of his right to counsel, it was denied without a valid waiver. In other words, Father contends that he was denied counsel without due process. When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. Lawson v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 835 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Thompson v. Clark Cty. Div. of Family & Children , 791 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ), trans. denied .
[12] The question, then, is whether the procedures used in this case were sufficient to provide a parent with the process due to him in a termination proceeding. The Indiana Supreme Court has held "that the process due in a termination of parental rights action turns on balancing three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure." In re K.D. , 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). "The balancing of these factors recognizes that although due process is not dependent on the underlying facts of a particular case, it is nevertheless 'flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' " Thompson , 791 N.E.2d at 795 (quoting Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 ).
1. Private Interests
[13] The private interests affected the most in any termination proceeding are obviously those of the parent and the child. We have already noted the value our society places on the parent-child relationship, and while we acknowledge that "a parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision [in a termination proceeding] is commanding[,]" id. , that interest is not as compelling as it would be in a criminal proceeding, where the potential *607for loss of life or liberty is very often at stake. That said, the child's interest in being raised in a safe, nurturing, and stable environment is also very compelling. As mentioned, the point of termination is to protect the child, not punish the parent, and where a parent is unwilling or unable to properly raise a child, the parent's parental interests must give way. Moreover, "the speedy resolution of termination and adoption proceedings [is] in the best interests of the child." K.S. v. Marion Cty. Dep't of Child Servs. , 917 N.E.2d 158, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although it is impossible to assign specific weights to the interests of the parent and the child in a termination proceeding, suffice it to say that the parent's interests do not outweigh the child's interests to such a degree that extraordinary measures are warranted to protect the former at the expense of the latter.
2. Risk of Error
[14] In our view, the procedure used in this case was unlikely to have produced the error of denying representation to a parent who wished to exercise that right. The FCM went to some lengths to find Father and communicate with him regarding his right to counsel and how to obtain it, speaking with him on the telephone and mailing him the materials he needed to obtain counsel. Moreover, the alias summons issued by the juvenile court reminded Father that he had the right to counsel, which was to be appointed at State expense, if necessary. Even though apparently all Father had to do to obtain counsel was make a telephone call, there is no indication that he ever even tried. DCS and the juvenile court's general approach, involving notification and instructions, etc., is unlikely to result in the erroneous denial of representation to a parent who genuinely wishes to have it.
[15] Moreover, even if a wrongful denial of counsel were to occur, the inherent nature of termination proceedings is such that the risk of erroneous disposition due to lack of representation is much lower than in most other legal proceedings. The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized this, adopting the following passage from an opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court:
[B]ecause of the doctrine of Parens Patriae and the need to focus on the best interest of the child, the trial judge, who is the fact finder, is required to be an attentive and involved participant in the process. While he must depend upon the litigants to present the evidence to establish the particular elements or defenses in the termination case, he is not limited to their presentations, and as in any custody case, he may require more than they present and direct further investigation, evaluations or expert testimony to assure him that the interests of the child and the respective parties are properly represented. Under the aegis of the court, the role of the lawyer, while important, does not carry the deleterious impact of ineffectiveness that may occur in criminal proceedings.
Baker v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Ind. 2004) (quoting In re Adoption of T.M.F. , 392 Pa.Super. 598, 573 A.2d 1035, 1042-43 (1990), appeal denied ). In other words, the juvenile court is looking out for the parent's interests in a termination proceeding even if an attorney is not. The low risk of error also weighs against requiring a more involved procedure for determining waiver, such as would generally be required in a more adversarial proceeding.
3. Governmental Interest
[16] Finally, we note the State's significant interest in the speedy, efficient, and *608cost-effective resolution of termination proceedings:
The State has a significant parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of the children involved. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599. Although the State does not gain when it separates children from the custody of fit parents, id. , the State has a "compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child by intervening in the parent-child relationship when parental neglect, abuse, or abandonment are at issue." E.P. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children , 653 N.E.2d at 1032. Delays in the adjudication of a case impose significant costs upon the functions of government as well an intangible cost to the lives of the children involved. See In re M.R. , 316 Ill. App. 3d 399, 249 Ill.Dec. 325, 736 N.E.2d 167 (2000), appeal denied .
J.T. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied , abrogated on other grounds by Baker , 810 N.E.2d at 1041. It seems to us that the procedure used in this case adequately informed Father of his right to counsel without incurring significant costs or causing undue delay.2 The interests of the State are served by the procedure used in this case.
4. Balancing
[17] We conclude that a balancing of the Mathews factors does not require more process in termination proceedings than Father was given in this case. Father was informed on multiple occasions of the right to counsel, and if he wanted counsel, all he would have had to do was make a telephone call. We do not believe that this is too much to ask of a parent in a termination proceeding. Moreover, there is a greatly reduced risk of error in termination proceedings, even without counsel, which also weighs against a more burdensome procedure. Finally, the interests of Child and the State in a speedy resolution are well-served by the procedure used in this case. A more involved process would, in our view, not do much to advance Father's interests while very possibly negatively affecting the interests of Child and the State through delay and unnecessary commitment of resources. In summary, we conclude that the procedure used in this case provided Father with "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Thompson , 791 N.E.2d at 795. Father has failed to establish that his due process rights were violated.3
*609[18] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Mathias, J, dissents with opinion.