(after stating the case). By the acceptance of a bill of exchange is meant the act or declaration by which the drawee therein named evinces — makes manifest — his assent and agreement to comply with and be bound by the request and order contained in the bill directed to him according to its tenor, if the acceptance be absolute. It is in substance an agreement to pay the sum of money specified in the bill as therein directed. Chit, on Bills, 281; Story on Bills of Ex., § 238; 1 Par. on Notes and Bills, 281.
No particular words or form of words or manner of expression are necessary to a valid acceptance, but it should generally be in writing, because this is orderly, promotes the convenience of business transactions, renders them more certain, and facilitates the proof of acceptance.
Writing, however, is not essential in the absence of statutory legislation requiring it; the acceptance may be verbal • or in writing; either method is valid; but it must appear by express words or reasonable inference. The intention of the acceptor to pay the bill must clearly appear in whatever manner evinced.
Usually the drawee makes his acceptance by writing his name across the face of the bill, and just over it the word “ accepted,” but it may be made by any word or phraseology implying substantially the same thing. Any words used by the drawee to the drawer or holder, or the agent of either, which bj^ reasonable intendment signify that he honors the bill — will pay it — will amount to an acceptance. And though he may not on presentment of the bill accept at once, if he afterwards does so, this will be sufficient to bind him, although the holder would have the right to insist upon prompt acceptance according to the terms of the bill.
Now if the evidence produced on the trial be accepted as substantially true, we think that what the defendant said and did was an acceptance of the order in question. He at first, in the month of April, refused to pay it on the ground that the *53contractors had “overdrawn”; he took the order and kept it until shortly before the action began on the 8th of August, 1885; he said, having in view some disposition of it, “ let me see Lordley first.”
About ten days after first seeing the order, having it in his possession, he said to plaintiff: “ I think there will be money enough to pay you, and it will be all right, and I will pay it.” Afterwards the plaintiff sent to the defendant for the money; it was not paid. After that time the plaintiff again sent his agent, who asked the defendant “ about the order’V-the one in question. The latter said “ he would not pay it that afternoon, hut tell Short (the plaintiff) it is all right, and I will pay it.” The agent so informed the plaintiff.
The defendant thus cautiously took ample'time to examine the state of the drawer’s account with himself, and to determine whether or not he would agree to pay the order.
After such consideration — understanding the whole matter — it must fairly be so taken — he said, without qualification, to the plaintiff’s agent: “ Tell Short it (the order) is all right, and I will pay it.”
The defendant was fully advised; he must have understood the purport of his language; it was plain, direct and positive, and an absolute promise to pay the order. He could scarcely have employed more unequivocal or more pertinent words. If he made the promise to pay, he accepted the order and impliedly admitted that he had money of the drawee to pay it. The promise was to pay the order on the day next after the promise; he said he would not pay it the afternoon of the day he made it.
The defendant testified that he did not make the promise last mentioned. Whether he did or not was a question of fact for the jury to determine. The Court instructed the jury that the promise was not an acceptance if made. We think it was, if the evidence, taken as a whole, were true.
There is error, and the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
Error.