(after stating the case). We cite from the evidence given by the parties as to what occurred and omit that of others, which is mainly corroborative, so that it may be seen how, upon its different aspects, the jury were instructed, and the pertinency and correctness of the law given in the charge.
After the seizure of the hog under the warrant, the exhibits accompanying the proceeding show an affidavit made by Archbell disclaiming property in the hog, and another made by the feme plaintiff asserting her right thereto, upon the submission of which, at her instance, she was substituted and made defendant in place of said Archbell, and the action thereafter proceeded against her. This is adverted to for the purpose of showing a method of redress open to her, if wrong, without a resort to a violent resistance to the officer, carried so *322far as to put Ms life in apparent peril. We do not find it necessary to enquire whether, in a precept directing the seizure of a specific article of property, the title to which is in dispute, and which is taken into custody under judicial mandate for its preservation pending litigation, and for surrender to the party who shall thereafter be shown to have the title, can be lawfully resisted by one upon his assertion of ownership, and who may turn out to be the owner, since, if this right did exist, it has limits which have been greatly exceeded by the feme plaintiff’s conduct, and she has made herself an aggressor.
Assuming that the hog belonged to the feme plaintiff, and that she, and not Archbell, were in legal possession at the time, it was under a claim of property, asserted under the law by the said Mary Singleton, and the deputy was doing what the writ commanded him to do in making the seizure, when the feme plaintiff encountered him at the pen, and, as the deputy testifies, in great anger swore that he should not get the hog, and at the same time presented a pistol, cocked, loaded and capped, at him, thus endangering his life; and then it was that her person was seized, she resisting, and carried to jail, and a warrant of arrest obtained. The officer could not do less, under the circumstance, nor can he be held civilly liable for doing thus ?
It is not an attempt to take the property from her person, fcut in her presence and in obedience to the process in his hands, and there are reasonable limits within which force may be exercised in defence of property, even when one with no authority attempts to get possession, and they must be •narrower in case of an officer armed with legal process, and ■certainly life cannot be taken or put in great peril in resisting the seizure.
The law is very clearly stated by G-astoN, J., in these words: “ When it is said that a man may rightfully use as much force as is necessary for the protection of his person or *323property, it should be recollected that this rule is subject to this most important modification, that he shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life or do great bodily harm”
And again : “ So it is clear that if one man deliberately kills another to prevent a mere trespass on his property— whether that trespass could or could not be otherwise prevented — he is guilty of murder.” State v. Morgan, 3 Ired., 186-193.
Our statute regulates proceedings to be had upon an arrest of one engaged in committing a breach of the peace, and this seems to have been strictly preserved, and without unreasonable delay. The Code, § 1130.
It must be declared that there is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.