(after stating the case). The purpose of this action is to compel specific performance of an alleged contract appearing and suggested by the condition set forth above of the bond mentioned'in that connection.
We need not stop to consider whether or not any execu-tory contract was consumated so as to become operative as contemplated u by the terms and purpose of the condition, and whether the defendants might under possible circumstances be compelled to perform it specifically, because conceding that there was such contract, we are clearly of opinion that it is not such a one as the Court ought to require to be specifically performed. The testator of the defendants died a few days after he executed the bond and while the plaintiffs were just beginning to do for him what it was intended they should do, and what it is plain the parties supposed would continue to be done through a considerable period of time — perhaps years. The expectations of the *218parties were suddenly disappointed by the unexpected sudden death of the testator. It would, in our opinion, be unjust and unconscionable for the plaintiffs to take the land by virtue of such a contract, when they had done only a very small fraction of the service and benefit to the testator that he and they must have contemplated in making the alleged contract.
The specific execution of a contract cannot be insisted upon in equity as matter of absolute right in the party demanding it; but it rests in the sound discretion of the Court, whether or not it will require it to.be done. If the contract be hard and exacting in its terms, contrary to its spirit— oppressive, unjust and inequitable under the circumstances— not strictly what the parties contemplated in entering into it, or if the specific execution of it will operate unjustly to the detriment of the party complained against, the Court will leave the parties to their remedy at law. A Court of Equity will not lend its aid to a party who seeks to take inequitable advantage of unforseen events and circumstances not contemplated by the contracting parties, especially when the complaining party can have adequate remedy at law. It is not the province of a Court of Equity to defeat a valid contract, but it will not enforce it against conscience. Leigh v. Crump, 1 Ired. Eq., 299; Cannaday v. Shepard, 2 Jones Eq., 224; Lloyd v. Wheatly, Ibid., 267; Herren v. Rich, 95 N. C., 500; Love v. Welch, 97 N. C., 200; Ad. Eq., 87 and notes.
We concur with the Court below in the opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they demand. If such contract as they allege exists, they have their remedy at law. The pleadings in this action do not contemplate such remedy, nor are they sufficient for that purpose.
Judgment affirmed.