(after stating the case). The objection suggested in this Court, that the action cannot be maintained in the name of L. R. Waddell, was not taken in the Court below, but if it had been, it could be of no avail. L. R. Waddell is the successor in office to P. T. Massey, and the action may properly be brought in his name to the use of K. W. Creech, the apprentice. The Code, § 10. It was unquestionably an official bond or indenture upon which an action might be instituted in the name of the successor to P. T. Massey, and is therefore easily distinguishable from the case of Threadgill v. Jennings, 3 Dev., 384, cited by counsel.
In the latter case, the bond was payable to “ Thomas Threadgill, Chairman, his executors, administrators,” &c., instead of to “ his successors in office.” But even in that case, the bond was held to be sufficient, if the jury should find that it was intended that the bond should be delivered to the Chairman of the County Court, and “ after its delivery, operate in law as an office bond,' and not as an individual bond.”
The first instruction asked for by the defendant was substantially given by the Court, and as given, could present no *159ground for complaint by him. There was evidence tending to show that the apprentice was required to do work beyond his capacity to perform ; that he had sometimes to work in the night to complete his task, and that he was whipped if he failed to perform it.
The charge of his Honor in regard to exemplary or punitive damages was as favorable to the defendant as could be justly asked. The case states, that “ there was no evidence of actual damage,” and the defendant insists that there was error in the refusal of his Honor to instruct the jury that nominal damages alone ’could be recovered,” and that the charge as given upon the question of damages is inconsistent.
This presents a question not free from difficulty. The case is unlike that of Bell v. Walker, 5 Jones, 43, in which there was evidence that the apprentices (in that case slaves) would have had an enhanced value to their owner, if the master had complied with his covenants to teach them “the ship carpenter and caulker’s trades.”
Undoubtedly the general rule is, that where no actual damages are proved, the jury can only give nominal damages. As was said by Judge GastoN, in State v. Skinner, 3 Ired., 568, “ there must be a rule whereby -to assess them, although the application of the rule is with great propriety confided to the jury.”
From a review of the evidence, and the charge of his Honor, it is apparent that when it was said that “ there was no evidence of actual damages,” reference was had to such direct and immediate damages as could be fixed by evidence, and measured and weighed by the jury, and it was not meant that there was no evidence tending to show such damages or injury resulting to' the plaintiff from the breaches complained of, as would entitle him to more than nominal damages, for the jury are told, “ That if they should find that the plaintiff had suffered actual damages by per*160manent injury to his health, * * * * they should say from the evidence what that damage was,” &c.
And there are exceptions to the general rule, that when no actual damages are proved, the jury can only give nominal damages, which would embrace the case before us. Southerland on Damages, Vol. 1, pps. 156-57, and 172.
In Scott v. Williams, 1 Dev., 376, which was an action brought by the plaintiff for- an assault and battery and false imprisonment, the object of the suit being to ascertain whether the plaintiff in that action, who was held in slavery by the defendant, was not in truth free, the Court held, that under the circumstances of the case, the jury might give more than nominal damages, though there appears to have been no proof of the actual damages.
The evidence warranted the charge as given by the Court, and there is no error.
No error. Affirmed.