(after stating the facts). The first exception is. based upon the rejection of the testimony of the defendant’s wife, to controvert the statement of the witness Carter.
It has been well settled in this State, since the case of the State v. Patterson, 2 Ired., 346, that while the rule has been to regard the answers of witnesses on cross-examination as conclusive in reply to collateral questions, yet the rule does not apply “ as to matters, which although Collateral, tend to show the temper, disposition and conduct of the witness in relation to the cause or the parties.” His answers as to these *446matters may be contradicted. State v. Roberts, 81 N. C., 606; State v. Glisson, 93 N. C., 510; 1 Greenleaf, §449.
In this case, the temper, disposition and conduct of the witness ('arter were sufficiently apparent from his words and acts, and as was said by Peakson, C. J., in Clark v. Clark, 65 N. C., 661, “ When the cross-examination, instead of being general, descends to particulars, then the party is bound by the answer, and cannot be allowed to go into evidence aliunde, in order to contradict the witness, for it would result in an interminable series of contradictions in regard to matters collateral, and thus lead off the mind of the jury •from the matter at issue.”
We think there was no error in excluding the testimony of defendant’s wife in the particular excepted to.
The motion in arrest of judgment was properly disallowed.
The Code §1069, declares that “if any person shall steal or feloniously take and carry, awray any maise, corn, wheat, rice or other grain, or any cotton, tobacco, potatoes, peanuts, pulse, or any fruit, vegetable or other product cultivated for food or market, growing, standing, or remaining un-gathered, in any field or ground, he shall be guilty of lar-larceny and punished accordingly.”
It is manifest, not only from a fair and proper construction of the language of the statute, but from the course of legislation upon the subject, that the qualifying words, “ cultivated for food or market,” apply and are limited to “ any fruit, vegetable, or other product,” and do not apply to the several articles specifically named in the statute. At common law, growing crops were not the subject or larceny. The first statute upon the subject was in the Acts of 1811, incorporated in the Rev. Stat., chap. 34, §24, and made the stealing of specific crops therein named larceny. This wras brought forward in the Rev. Code, chap. 34, §21, and the qualifying words, “cultivated for food or market.” The taking of figs, watermelons, blackberries, or other fruits *447or vegetables, unless cultivated for food or market, would not be larceny, and as to such products the qualifying words of' the statute constitute a material and necessary part of the descriptions, but they are not necessary as to the articles specifically named in the statute. State v. Liles, 78 N. C., 496; State v. Bragg, 86 N. C., 690; State v. Thompson, 93 N. C., 538.
There is no error. Let this be certified.
No error. Affirmed.