(after stating the case). The statute (The Code, §291, par. 2) provides, that a defendant may be arrested “ for seduction,” and it has been held, that this provision is *328valid, and not in conflict with Art. II., §16, of the Constitution, which provides, that “ There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud.” Damages recovered in an action for seduction do not constitute a debt, in the sense implied by this provision. Moore v. Mullen, 77 N. C., 327; Hoover v. Palmer, 80 N. C., 313; Moore v. Green, 73 N. C., 394; Long v. McLeod, 88 N. C., 3.
■ The statute (The Code, §442) provides, that there may be execution against the person of the judgment debtor, and §447 prescribes that, “ If the action be one in which the defendant might have been arrested, an execution against the ■person of the judgment debtor may be issued to any county within the State, after the return of an execution against his property, unsatisfied in whole or in part. But no execution shall issue against the person of a judgment debtor, unless an order of arrest has been secured, as provided in Title IX., sub-chapter 1, of this chapter, or unless the complaint contains a statement of facts showing one or more of the causes of arrest required by §291,” cited above.
In this case, it appears that the verified complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action against the defendant for the seduction of the plaintiff’s step-daughter, and in addition, there was an affidavit upon which and the complaint, a warrant of arrest issued. Upon the judgment obtained, an execution against the property of the defendant issued, and this was returned unsatisfied. A proper execution against the person of the defendant might therefore have been issued. There had been an order of arrest served upon him, and moreover, the complaint contah id a statement of facts showing a cause of arrest. An e* to be such a one, did issue, but it was ini to have commanded the sheriff, or othi directed by the statute (The Code, §448, | defendant, “ and commit him to the jail til he shall pay the judgment, or be dis ition, purporting icient. It ought oroper officer, as 3), to arrest the the county, un-irged, according *329bo law,” and to make due return of the execution to the •Court, and how he had executed the same. It would have been well, also, in connection with the other recitals in the execution, to have made brief reference to the cause of arrest, although, perhaps, this is not essential in such execution. The party thus arrested must be committed to the jail of the county from which the execution issued. The Code, §444; Houston v. Walsh, 79 N. C., 35; Peebles v. Foote, 83 N. C., 102.
It must be observed, in Houston v. Walsh, supra, that the Chief Justice, in pointing out the defects in the execution referred to in that case, had reference to the statute (Battle’s Rev., ch. 18), suspending the Code of Civil Procedure in certain respects, and not to C. C. P., §261, par. 3, which provided just as the statute {The Code, §448, par. 3,) now provides.
As the defendant asked the Court to commit him to jail in exoneration of his surety, if the plaintiff had joined in such request, it might have made a proper order so committing him, “ until he shall (should) pay the judgment or be discharged, according to law,” but the plaintiff did not ask for such an order. The Court, therefore, properly declined to make it.
Nor was it necessary that the Court should order that an execution issue forthwith against the person of the defendant. The facts being as they appear to us, it was the duty of the clerk, upon application of the plaintiff, or his counsel, to issue a proper execution against the person of the defendant, as indicated above, without an order of the Court. Nothing appearing to the contrary, the plaintiff may yet apply for and obtain such execution.
There is no error, and the order appealed from must be affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.