(after stating the facts). We think there was error in admitting testimony as to the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff for the purpose of showing vindictive damages.
*249In a certain class of cases, slander among them, when the •offence is marked by malice, oppression, or gross and wilfuL wrong, the jury may give damages, not simply to compensate the party injured, but vindictive damages to punish the wrong doer, and to that end, it may be competent to show the pecuniary condition of the defendant, as was held in Adcock v. Marsh, 8 Iredell, 360. If the purpose is to punish the defendant, it will at once occur to every intelligent mind, that his pecuniary condition is a matter properly to be considered by the jury in determining the punishment. A verdict for a large sum, rendered against aman of large wealth, would be a less punishment than a verdict for a small sum against a poor man, but we are unable to see how the punishment of the defendant can be determined by the pecuniary ■condition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for all the actual damages sustained by him, without reference to the pecuniary condition of himself or of the defendant, and if the conduct of the defendant has been such as to warrant vindictive damages, the jury may add to the actual damages, by giving such additional sum by way of punishment to the defendant, as they may deem just; and for the purpose of ascertaining this, there is good reason why they should know the pecuniary condition of the defendant, but none why they should know or consider the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff, unless it can be made to appear that an equal amount of damages, if paid to one man, would be a greater or less punishment than if paid to another. There was a time when the slander of the great and rich, was held to be a more aggravated offence and meriting greater punishment than the slander of the humble and the poor, but in this day and country there is no such thing as “ Scandalum Magnatum” on the one side, nor is there on the other, any law that discriminates in favor of or against the poor man, simply because he is poor. In meting out punishment, whether in imposing fines and penal*250ties on the criminal side of the docket, or giving punitive and exemplary damages for malicious wrongs to individuals in civil actions, it is necessary to know the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant, because a small fine or slight damages might be heavier punishment to a man of small means, than a heavy fine or damages would be to a man of wealth, but whether the fine or damages go to a poor man or to a rich man, the punishment is the same to the party who has it to pay. Odgers on Libel and Slander, 292, says, “ in fact, although in theory it is the duty of the jury to give such damages as will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury he has sustained, yet in justice, juries frequently, especially when the defendant has acted with clear and express malice, give vindictive damages, which are clearly meant, not so much as a compensation to the plaintiff for his loss, as a punishment to the defendant for his misconduct.” The question is discussed at great length in the.notes to the case of Rome v. Moses, 67 American Decisions, 560, cited by counsel for plaintiff, and while the decisions are both ways, it seems pretty well settled, by the weight of authority and by reason, that in proper cases for vindictive damages, the pecuniary condition of the defendant may be given in evidence, but it is there said : “ The pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff are admitted in evidence much less often than those of the defendant,” and the cases relied on are nearly, if not all, for injuries to persons, and it is said that the evidence “ is usually admitted, if at all, on the ground that the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff are directly involved in estimating the damages caused by the tortious act, the poverty of the plaintiff making the injury the greater,” as for instance, where, by an assault or battery, or the gross negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff has been so crippled and disabled as to be unable to work, and in such cases, he may show the nature of his business, and the value of his personal services, the loss of which may be more disas*251trous to a poor man than to one of wealth, and these may properly come under the head of actual or special damages,, and nearly all the cases cited by the counsel for the plaintiff, and which are referred to in Rome v. Moses, supra, are of this class.
In Ware v. Cartledge, 60 Am. Dec., 489, the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff were held to be inadmissible in an action for slander, while in Clements v. Mahoney, 55 Mo., 352, and Sheets v. Barrets, 7 Pick., 82, referred to in note to Rome v. Moses, it was held differently.
The question, so far as our researches go, is an open one in this State, for the pecuniary condition of the defendant, not the plaintiff, was the point decided in Adcock v. Marsh, supra, and we think the better reason would exclude evidence as to his pecuniary condition, where the only purpose-of it is to increase vindictive damages, as in this case. We-say only purpose, because there may be cases in which it may be proper, in determining his actual damages. There was error in admitting testimony as to the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff, and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
This renders it unnecessary for us to consider the other-exception presented in the record.
There is error. Let this be certified.
Error. Reversed.