(after stating the facts). In this case the learned counsel for the plaintiffs went into an elaborate and ingenious argument before us, upon the question of the descent of the title to the plaintiffs, relying on the principle enunciated in the cases of Laurence v. Pitt, 1 Jones, 344; King v. Scoggin, 92 N. C., 99, and that class of cases, to show that the plaintiff did not derive her title to the land from her mother, Susan Wyatt, and was therefore not barred by the deed made by her mother to her brother, Alexander Wyatt.
But it is immaterial from whom the plaintiff claimed to derive title to the land by descent, whether from her mother, Andrew Shearer, or the child of Andrew Shearer, or qua-qunque via data. The plaintiff could only recover upon the strength of her title, by showing a grant from the State, a long possession from which a grant could be presumed, or an estoppel upon the defendants. Neither of these have been shown by the plaintiff. No grant from the State was offered in evidence, nor any possession by any one from whom she claimed title, except that held by Andrew Shearer from the time of his purchase in 1812 to his death in 1817. But she contended that it was not necessary to show any title out of the State, for the defendants both claim title to the land from Andrew Shearer, and are therefore estopped to deny his title, and as she has derived the better title from him, she is entitled to recover.
To establish the estoppel of the defendants, the plaintiff offered evidence of the declaration of one Peyton Colvard that he claimed the land in controversy under the said Andrew Shown, the second husband of Elizabeth, the widow of Andrew Shearer, and also the declarations of AVilliam Wyatt that he had purchased a part of said land (that part now occupied by defendant Neal) from the said Colvard; and *513the plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to show that George Bower, Jr., under whom the defendant Davis claimed, purchased the other part of said land from the said Colvard. Conceding that an estoppel like that here attempted to be set up by the plaintiff upon the defendants, can be established by mere declarations, those offered in this case are too uncertain and indefinite to be relied upon 'for such a purpose. There is nothing to show when, or under what circumstances they were made, nor when Colvard derived his alleged title from Shown, whether before or after liis marriage with the widow of Shearer, and it is not stated when they were married ; nor that Shown claimed in right of his wife. For aught that appears, he may have derived his claim from Shown before his marriage, for there is no presumption that Shown claimed under his wife. But the declarations of a person not in possession, no matter how clear and specific, are insufficient to establish an estoppel of this character. Estoppel of this kind, presupposes the existence of a deed in proper form from some one under whom the defendant claims; and admissions, written or oral, which, in this respect are of equivalent import, cannot be substituted as evidence so as to dispense with the production of the deed itself after registration, or a copy or an explanation of its absence. To allow this, would be to render titles insecure, and judicial proceedings dependent upon the uncertain memory of witnesses. In Ryan v. McGehee, 83 N. C., 500; and again in Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C., 464, it was held, that although “ it is not necessary to show that the defendant has a complete title to the land, if there is no title paramount to it, it is sufficient to show that under a valid contract he claims to hold and has possession of the property derived from the common source. If the defendant has a bond for title, or other contract of purchase, or an unregistered deed for the land, and is in possession thereof, this will be sufficient evidence of a claim under the common source.”
*514From those authorit.es it will bo seen, that to work an estoppel upon a. defendant in an action to recover land, there must be something more than the mere declarations of a party, and it must be shown that he claims a title or interest in the land, however defective, evidenced by a deed, bond or written contract.
In this case, to connect the defendant with the common source of title, the plaintiff lias shown nothing more than the bare declarations of Oolvard, that he claimed the land under Andrew Shown, nor was it shown that Oolvard was ever in possession of the land.
The plaintiff thus having failed to show title to the land, she cannot recover from the defendants who arc in possession, and are prima fame the owners of the land, and arc therefore not called upon to show any title to the same. It is therefore needless to go into the inquiry whether the plaintiff is concluded by her election to take the land devised to her by the will of her father, William Wyatt.
The plaintiff has, in our opinion, failed to establish her title to the land occupied by Neal, and also to that occupied by Mr. Davis, notwithstanding she offered evidence to show that her husband, George Bower, Jr., under whom she claimed the land, was the son and heir of John Bower, and that the deed from John Bower to George Bower only carried a life estate. But she was evidently not advised of the decision in Pulliam v. Ricks, supra. But that could not operate as an estoppel upon them, because her husband never claimed the land as heir of John Bower, and as evidence that he did not do so, he purchased the land from Peyton Colvard.
There is no error, and the judgment of the ¡Superior Court is affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.