(after stating the facts). The only question presented by this record for our determination, is whether the debt sued for is barred by the statute of limitations.
The promise made by the first administrator, A. J. Herren, was conditional, depending upon his selling some stock and making collections, and it does not appear that he ever sold the stock. This promise had no effect in obstructing the running of the statute.-
Then the promise of the administrator, S. C. hierren, that he would pay the note, if Mr. Cocke and his client would put him to no trouble, was made more than three years after the cause of action accrued on the note, and more than five years prior to the commencement of thé action. So that, taken either way, the action was barred. But the plaintiff says he' was prevented from bringing suit in time, in consequence of the first administrator not denying the note, and the promise of the last administrator to pay it. But the witness Cocke testified, that A. J. Herren did not ask “ any indulgence or forbearance, and there was no agreement for forbearance,” nor was there any promise on the part of A. J. Herren or S. C. Herren that they would not rely upon thé statute of limitation, and that distinguishes this case from that of Barcroft v. Roberts, 91 N. C., 363. And now, by section 51 of The Code, it is required that a promise to take a case out of the operation of the statute, should be reduced to writing. This is conclusive. If the contention of the plaintiff that he was prevented from suing at an earlier date, was sustained, then every new promise to pay a debt, barred by the statute, would be sufficient to repel the statute, and would defeat the *391purpose of the Legislature in requiring such promises to be in writing. There is no error in the judgment of the Superior Court, and it is affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.