(after stating the facts). The rulings complained of by the appellant, are in refusing to allow the jury to hear *ral testimony to show that:
I.. The plaintiff'-refused to pay the last maturing note without a survey, and agreed to pay for any surplus over 62 acres, should it be found, and demanded such survey, under the original conditions of sale.
II. When defendant tendered the deed, the plaintiff offered to pay for any excess over the supposed quantity, at the rate of three dollars for each acre.
*563III. The actual survey showed such excess, and when the surveyor announced upon a rough estimate, that there were more than 62 acres in the tract, plaintiff paid his last note.
Both parties impressed upon the surveyor, the necessity of ■care and accuracy in his calculations, which he used, and drew the deed accordingly. ' The plaintiff then agreed to pay for the increased number of acres. The jury were directed to find the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and such was their verdict.
The exceptions rest upon a single proposition, the right to ■depart from the terms and conditions of the respective written nontracts, executed by each to the other, and professing to embody their agreement, and introduce other provisions, upon parol proof of what transpired at the time ; or to substitute and en-graft a further and subsequent stipulation upon the bonds.-
There is a class of cases, where the original agreement was •comprehensive, and part of it only executed, not intended to •include the whole, and the omitted part has been allowed to be proved by oral testimony. Such are the cases of Twidy v. Saundeson, 9 Ired., 5; Manning v. Jones, Busb., 368; Kerchner v. McRae, 80 N. C., 219; Braswell v. Pope, 82 N. C., 57.
Perhaps the recent case of Sherrill v. Hagan, 92 N. C., 345, •affords as much support to the contention of the appellant, as any other of the adjudications of this Court; but a brief analysis will show that it does not furnish a precedent.
There, the vendor made a deed for the land contracted to be sold, and which he represented to contain as much as 350 acres, at the satire time agreeing with the vendee, that in case the land Rid not contain as many acres, he would refund, to the extent of the deficiency, at the rate of $5.7If per acre. It was held, that this was a separate contract, not embraced, nor intended to be embraced, in the deed, nor required to be in writing, and as such, could be enforced. It is not essentially different from the ■ease of Manning v. Jones, supra, and rests upon the same general principle. It is an inexorable rule in the law of evidence, that the terms of a written contract, cannot be changed or modi*564fied by any contemporary parol agreement or understanding, so as to make it different from what it professes on its face to be.
It is effective upon a just and reasonable interpretation of its own terms, and this for the reason, that the writing is presumed to embody all the stipulations by which the parties intend to be bound.
The subject has been considered in Ray v. Blackwell, at the present term, to which we add a few references to cases of recent date. Etheridge v. Palin, 72 N. C., 213; Wilson v. Sandifier. 76 N. C., 347.
In the present case, the plaintiff covenants in his bonds, tc pay a definite sum for the land, while the defendant, with equal explicitness, binds himself to make the deed, on payment of the plaintiffs notes for that specified purchase money. The bonds profess to contain the contracts of the parties with each other, as expressed in sealed instruments, and the appellant, proposed tc engraft upon them other terms, and thus modify and changi their effect. Testimony of this kind was ruled out, as inadmissible for any such purpose.
It is not a case where the writing, as a deed or note, is in partial performance of an antecedent agreement, accepted as a par tial execution only, and leaving in full force the unexecuted part
There is no error in the ruling, and the judgment must b< affirmed. It is so ordered.
No error. Affirmed.