(after stating the case). The action of the plaintiff is founded literally upon the principle of quia timet, without any of the elements of the equitable remedy recognized by the Court in such cases. With counsel present advising him and drawing the papers, he executed an instrument, by rvhich he covenanted not to sue the executor of G. W. Ward, deceased, but he subsequently has his fears aroused, by consultation with his counsel, that he may possibly have, by mistake of law, executed an instrument by which the estates of both the obligors to the Humphrey bond, may be discharged from liability on the same, and he brings this action, invoking the equity jurisdiction of the Court, to correct the mistake. He does not allege that White was surety to the Humphrey -notes, but simply expresses an undefined apprehension that he may be, and if so, that he will set up the covenant in discharge of his liabilities. An action so vague and uncertain in its statements, cannot be sustained.
*495But even if the facts had been stated with more certainty and precision, the plaintiff would have been met by a principle of equity that would have defeated his application for relief. He alleges there was a mistake in drawing up the covenant, and it was not intended to release White from his liability on the note, and he asks the Court to correct the mistake. But the mistake is one of law, and not of fact, and a Court of Equity never corrects mere mistakes of law, save in exceptional cases, when the mistake is mixed up with other equitable elements, as in cases of imposition, misrepresentation, undue influence, misplaced confidence and surprise. Story’s Eq. Jurisprudence, §§137 and 138.
The plaintiff says he was induced to execute the covenant through ignorance, surprise, mistake, and the confidence he had in Mr. Humphrey. His ignorance is no excuse, for every man is presumed to know the law, and we do not see how he can be relieved on the ground of surprise, for he had two counsel present, advising him at the time, one of whom drew up the covenant. Nor does his misplaced confidence in Mr. L. W. Humphrey afford him any excuse. When Mr. Humphrey offered to sell him the note for half price, and by looking at it he could see that it was more than ten years old, it should have put him on his guard, and greatly weakened the confidence he had in the advice of Mr. Humphrey, to favor whom he executed the covenant. The contract was made with Humphrey. Ward was not present, nor does it appear that he had any knowledge of the transaction, or that the covenant has even to this day been delivered to him by Humphrey. Then there was no misrepresentation by any one, and if any imposition, it was practiced upon him by Humphrey, who was a stranger to the subject intended to be affected by the covenant, and no imposition, or even fraud, practiced by him, could affect the relation between the plaintiff and the estates of White and Ward. The execution of the covenant then, was a pure mistake of the law, and when that is so, there is no ground for relief in a Court of Equity. In the case of Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Peters, 32, 55, 56, *496when the main question was, whether a mistake of law was relievable in Equity, it being stripped of all other circumstances, the Court held it was not. Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Peters 15; Story Eq. Ju., §§116 and 138; Storrs v. Barker, 6 John., Ch. 169-70.
But notwithstanding the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded, it does not follow that he must lose his debt against the estate of White, unless he has lost his remedy by lapse of time, as a statutory bar. For, conceding that the covenant is valid as between the plaintiff and the executor of Ward, White was either a co-obligor or surety. If a co-obligor, the covenant cannot have the effect to discharge his estate. It was not a release, but only a covenant not to sue, which has been held by the Court not to discharge a co-obligor. Winston v. Dalby, 64 N. C., 299; Russell v. Adderton, Ibid., 417.
But if White was surety, a different rule applies.
Under the last authority cited, it was held that such a covenant would discharge the sureties. And it is a general rule in equity, that where the creditor acts in such a way as directly to impair or destroy the relation of the principal to the surety, as. by a release to the principal, or a covenant not to sue him, or issue execution, or giving further time, the surety is discharged. Adams’ Eq., 106. But this rule is subject to exceptions, as when the creditor, in agreeing to give time, expressly reserves his remedies against the sureties, or when the agreement not to sue, or to give time, is of such a character, that the principal could have no remedy for its breach or non-performance against the creditor. In such cases, it is held the surety is not discharged, as when there is a parol promise not to sue, or to give time, without a consideration moving from the principal. The question in every such case, is whether the agreement to give time, or to vary the contract in any other particular, could have been enforced by the principal against the creditor, either as a defence or as a cause of action, for if it could not, there will be no discharge. Rees v. Berington, Hare & Wallace’s Notes to Leading Cases in Equity— *497Note referring to American decisions, and numerous American cases there cited in support of the doctrine. If that be the correct doctrine, and it is too well established by the overwhelming weight of authority to be questioned, then the estate of-White is not discharged by the covenant not to sue the executor of Ward; for the covenant, lias no validity. The executor of Ward cannot maintain an action upon it. It is a covenant with no one, the covenantee is not named. It- is of the essence of a bond to have an obligee as well as an obligor; it must show upon its face to whom it is payable, and the defect cannot be supplied by showing a delivery to a particular person. Phelps v. Cole, 7 Ired., 262; Graham v. Holt, 3 Ired., 300. To constitute a deed, there must be persons able to contract, and be contracted with, for the purpose intended by the deed; and also a subject matter to be contracted for; all which must be expressed by sufficient names. 2 Black. Com., 296.
In this view of the case, independent of the defects in the complaint, there was no necessity for seeking a reformation of the covenant. There is no error, and the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.