(after stating the facts). The locus in quo is a wharf on the shore of the Chowan river, and the question presented by the record is whether the description in a deed, executed by Thomas B. Sharp to Sophia Smith, under which the plaintiffs claim, covers the wharf.-
This involves a construction of the said deed. The subject-matter of the conveyance is described in the deed as follows: “The Mount Pleasant Fishery, with the land attached to the same, supposed to be one thousand yards in length, bounded by the brink or brow of the hill on one side, and the river on the other, from one end of the beach to the other.”
There were two creeks emptying into the river above and below the place used for a fishery and known by the name of the “ Mount Pleasant Fishery,” about twelve hundred yards apart, at a point some thirty-three yards above the lower creek called Nowells. At the upper edge of a marsh making into the river, there was a bluff or ridge which widened out as it extended up the river to the width of one hundred yards, leaving a space used *173as the fishery about three hundred yards in length, and known as the “ Mount Pleasant Fishery.” A short distance above the upper end of this space, the ridge or hill approached within three or four feet of the river and continued along to the water’s edge up to within five feet of Simon’s creek, except at a point about two hundred and fifty yards above the place used for a fishery, where there was a ravine breaking into the river, at which there was a wharf. The distance from the upper edge of the marsh above Nowell’s creek was 966J yards.
The Avharf is the loom in quo. The plaintiffs contend that the deed under which they claim by its description covers the wharf, and that the distance called for in the deed is the controlling specification.
The defendants insist that, the proper construction of the deed is, that only so much of the beach as was actually used as a fishery with the land lying between that and the ridge, is all that Avas conveyed by the deed, and it did not cover the loous in quo.
In questions of boundary, Avhat are the boundaries of a tract of land is a question for the Court; AAdiere are the boundaries is a question for the jury; and in the construction of deeds, the first rule is, that the intention of the parties is, if possible, to be supported; and the second rule is, that this intention is to be ascertained by the deed itself, that is, from all the parts of it taken together. Dismukes v. Wright, 4 Dev. and Bat. 206 ; Proctor v. Pool, 4 Dev. 370.
In reading the description of the deed- from Sharp to Smith, AAre think it is manifest that the intention of parties AAras to convey that part of the beach of the ChoAvan river Avhich AAras known as the “ Mount Pleasant Fishery,” and actually used as a fishery, with the land attached, Avhich AAras necessary and convenient for operating the fishery — that is, not only a place for landing the seine but, as an appurtenance thereto, a place for drying the seine after drawing. Hence the description of the “ Mount Pleasant Fishery,” with the land attached, bounded by a bluff or hill and - the river. The name of the fishery, the natural boundaries of *174the bluff and the river fully ascertain the corpus. Nothing more was required to identify and ascertain the subject matter of the grant. The additional specification of the length of the beach, could not affect an identification so completely established.
When the subject matter of a conveyance is completely identified, by.its name, by its localities, and by certain other marks of description, the addition of another particular which does not apply to it will be rejected as having been inserted through misapprehension or inadvertance. Belk v. Love, 1 D. and B. 65.
Here the name of the subject-matter of the conveyance is given, to-wit, the “Mount Pleasant Fishery,” with the further marks of description, the bluff or hill on one side, and the river on the other. “The name of a place,” says Chief Justice Buffin in Smith v. Low, 2 Ired., 457, “like that of a man, may and does serve to identify it to the apprehension of more persons than a description by ooterminous lands and water-courses, and with equal certainty. For example, ‘ Mount Vernon/ the late residence of General Washington, is better known by that name than by a description of it as situated on the Potomac river and adjoining the lands of A, B and C.” And in Reddick v. Leggat, 3 Mur., 539, it was said by Chief Justice Henderson, “when the thing referred to has no particular name, and there are superadded to the general description specifications, or localities, all those specifications or localities must concur to point out the object, otherwise it does not point out the thing intended; as if I grant all my lands in Dale, which I purchased of J. S. and which arc in the tenure of -J. N., all these specifications must concur; otherwise nothing is described. But if I grant White Acre, which I purchased of J. S., and which descends to me from my father, White Acre will pass, although I purchased it of J. N. and not from J. S., and although it descends to me from my mother and not my father.” And in the samé case, by way of illustration, the learned judge says, “if one grants one thousand acres and no more, bounded as follows, &c., and two thousand acres are included in the boundaries, the two thousand acres will pass, as *175tbe butts and bounds are more certain than quantity.” These authorities are cited to show the controlling effect of the name of the place in the description of a deed. In the deed under consideration the name of the place is given, to-wit, the “ Mount Pleasant Fishery.” What is a fishery? “It is a place prepared for catching fish with nets or hooks.”
This term is commonly applied to the place of drawing a seine or net. 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 528. This fishery then, as described by its name, was that part of the beach of the river prepared and used for drawing the seine. We do not see how the description could apply to a part of the beach never used for such a purpose, and which could oxrly be used for fishing “at great •cost and by cutting away the bank and building wharves.” We concur with His Honor in holding that the description of length of plaintiffs’ line, supposed to be one thousand yards, is not sufficiently definite to guide the jury in ascertaining the lines of the plaintiffs, because there is no certain point ascertained for the beginning and end of the line, and the distance is not fixed with •exactness. A description so indefinite must always yield to others that are less uncertain. The description is by no means relieved from its uncertainty, as contended by plaintiffs’ counsel, by the superadded words “ from one end1 of the beach to the other,” for the case states that “the river shore is not generally called beach, except when it is used as á fishery, when it is so called.”
Our opinion is His Honor has put a proper construction upon the deed, and that there was no error in giving or refusing instructions.
No error. Affirmed.